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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to explain and evaluate the law
concerning compensation for tanker-source oil pollution damage
under three different liability regimes:
(a) the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969 and the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1971 including the Protocols of 1976, 1984 and
1992 to these Conventions.
(b) the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability
for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) and the Contract Regarding a
Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) as at
the 20th February, 1994.
(c) the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and U.S. State
Legislation.
In this context the thesis explains inter alia the evolution of
law from fault to no-fault liability and from limited to
increasingly limitless liability. The thesis examines the notion
of damage eligible for compensation, for example, ecological and
pure economic damage. Conclusions are reached as to the role
increasingly stringent liability provisions may have on the
quality of the tanker-process. The impact that the U. S. Oil
Pollution Act 1990, and associated U.S. state legislation may
have on the international pollution regimes covered by the
various international Conventions and associated voluntary
agreements is also discussed.
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This work undertakes an analysis of the three dominant liability
determining-mechanisms governing tanker-source oil pollution
liability. The aim is to explain the operation of each system,
the relevant legal evolution of these instruments and to compare
and evaluate their relative strengths and weaknesses. The
influence that each system exerts on the others will also be
discussed .
This work is divided into five Parts which are discussed in turn
immediately below.
Part One, consisting of a single chapter, encompasses a
conceptual introduction to tanker-source oil pollution
regulation. It defines certain distinct but inter-connected
concepts relevant to this work . This Chapter also provides an
historical analysis of the law governing oil pollution liability
prior to the application of t he international Conventions and
voluntary agreements which are covered in Part Two and Part Three
respectively. The historical analysis largely entails an
examination of the legal implications of two early tanker-source
oil pollution incidents. The relevant incidents are, firstly, the
Inverpool spill, which happened in England in 1950, and,
secondly, the Torrey Canyon oil pollution disaster which occurred
in the English Channel in 196 7 . The Torrey Canyon spill exposed
the inadequacy of the laws f a cili t a t i ng the recovery of oil
pollution damage and directly precipitated the development of the
legal instruments which are analysed in Parts Two and Part Three.
Part Two deals with the two-tier compensation arrangement brought
about by the 1969 International Conv e n t i on on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (t h e Civi l Liability Convention), and, the
1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensat ion for Oil Pollution Damage (the
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Fund Convention). Part Two also includes a discussion of the
revision of these Conventions by the Protocols of 1984, the
substance of which has subsequently been further revised and
incorporated into the 1992 Protocols. This two-tier arrangement
is referred to as the 'international approach' because the
ultimate purpose of these Conventions is to be incorporated in
all states across the globe. Th is status has not, however, yet
been achieved .
Part Three constitutes an analysis of the two-tier voluntary
compensation agreements brought about by the tanker and oil
industries. These instruments are the Tanker Owners Voluntary
Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), and,
the Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil
Pollution (CRISTAL), as at 20th February, 1994. These two
agreements will hereinafter be referred to as the 'voluntary
agreements' .
Part Four concerns liability and compensation arrangements for
tanker-source oil pollution in the United States, as regulated
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and applicable state
legislation within the United States . The existence of certain
U.S. state legislation exposing the actual cargo owner to direct
liability for tanker-source oil pollution damage and the possible
impact of such provisions will also be discussed.
Part Five, the final chapter , covers recommendations and
conclusions. Important concepts which are of mutual concern to
the oil pollution liability regimes mentioned in Parts Two, Three
and Four will be discussed. The wide approach adopted facilitates
an over-arching statement -of policy which is explained and
substantiated within the context of the three main areas
ment ioned immediately above .
In most instances, primary compensation
tankers is provided by shipowners,
compensation may be provided by cargo
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for oil spills from
while supplementary
owners. First-phase
liability for tanker-source oil pollution damage has been borne
traditionally by the owners of tankers. This is so under the
Civil Liability Convention, and the TOVALOP voluntary agreement.
Only once the ceilings of limited liability set for tankers
owners (through either the Civil Liability Convention or TOVALOP)
have been reached, and exceeded, may oil importers become liable.
This may occur through limits set by the Fund Convention or under
the CRISTAL voluntary agreement.
The manner in which this liability is apportioned between tanker
owners and cargo owners will be explained through an analysis of
the provisions of the instruments covered which govern the
liability of tanker owners and operators, oil-importers and their
respective insurers, for the damage caused by oil spills from
tankers. An assessment will be made of the effectiveness (or
ineffectiveness) of the various 'compensatory regimes' in
providing compensation for oil pollution victims. Close attention
will be given to an analysis of the effectiveness of these legal
regimes as a form of pressure brought to bear on those interest-
groups who are in a position to reduce the risks of the
transportation process.
A degree of co-operation already exists between tanker owners and
oil importers in the matter of compensating claims for oil
pollution. But, a considerable area of conflict remains between
oil importer and oil carrier interests as to how liability ought
to be apportioned. This zone of contention between oil importer
and oil carrier interests has been made more complex by the U.S.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This Act exposes tanker owners to
primary, and potentially unlimited liability, for oil pollution
damage occurring in the United States. It has also been
criticised widely for letting oil importers escape direct
liability. However, the Act does propose the establishment of a
billion dollar trust fund (the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund)
which is made up from a tax on all oil imports into the United
States by sea.
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Oil pollution liability can be managed in a way such as to
preserve the status quo or it can be used as a dynamic mechanism
to bring about change. Elements of both conflict and co-operation
exist between the proponents of the International Liability
Conventions, essentially states contracting to the Conventions,
and the oil importation and transportation industries to which
the Conventions apply. The multi -partite industry, in response,
has attempted to preempt and mitigate this 'external' assumption
of control by the implementation of the voluntary compensation
schemes - TOVALOP and CRISTAL. The voluntary schemes may be seen
either as supplementary to the Conventions, or as alternatives
or rivals to the Conventions. The oil industry supports the
Conventions because the presence of the Conventions, together
with the voluntary compensation regimes, serve as disincentives
for coastal states to enact unilateral, possibly draconian,
domestic oil pollution legislation .
On the other hand, the existence of the voluntary schemes works
against the uniform implementation of the Conventions.
Governments, and claimants, in states which have not contracted
to the Conventions, may be satisfied by the level of compensation
available under TOVALOP and CRISTAL . Thus, they may have no
inclination to participate in either the Civil Liability or Fund
Conventions.
An important part of this work contains an analysis of the impact
of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and associated U. S. State
legislation, on the pollution regimes covered by the
International Conventions and the parallel voluntary agreements.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 diminishes the possibility of the
shipowner or other responsible parties being able to limit
liability, expands upon the kinds of damage recoverable and
encapsulates the principle that states may enact or retain
additional laws relating to oil pollution damage, even where
these laws may conflict with, or exceed the provisions of the
U.S . Oil Pollution Act. Within the United States, some conflict
exists between Federal and State authorities over which entity
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exerts control over oil pollution clean-up operations and the
issues of associated damage and compensation. It is necessary to
briefly review the most innovative of the state law provisions
because in the same way that the U.S. Oil Pollution Act may exert
influence on the future application and success of the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions and the continued application of
the voluntary agreements, so to can emerging legal trends in
certain U.S. state legislation exert influence over U.S. Federal
oil pollution laws and the law adopted in the field of oil
pollution by other states.
The adoption of the U.S. Oil Pollution Act was also significant
because it scuppered any chance of the 1984 Protocols to the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions entering into force in their
original forms. This resulted in the development of the 1992
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. Certainly,
a large degree of de facto conflict exists between the proponents
of the "international approach" and the United States. The United
States favours the development of domestic oil pollution
legislation in preference to the international Conventions.
Whether or not the goal of an internationally acceptable system
of liability and compensation can be achieved through the
international Conventions is presently a moot question.
Nonetheless, tanker-source oil pollution is a world-wide problem
which needs to be thoroughly understood so that solutions can be
devised, and speedily implemented, to avert further environmental
damage. A recent rash of oil pollution incidents has drawn
attention to a decline in tanker standards over the past decade.
Clearly, unless an effective plan is formulated, and implemented,
to improve the quality of the tanker-transportation system, a
further degeneration in the international tanker-fleet may be
predicted. Inaction, or ineffective action, may result in further
damage being done to the environment and a detrimental impact on
human activities.
This work attempts, also, to articulate certain legal solutions
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to the problem of oil pollution from tankers. It is argued that
the oil companies must be induced to hire only good quality
tanker tonnage. More accurately, they must be provided with a
disincentive to charter sub- standard tonnage. This will be
achieved by levelling direct liability for tanker-source oil
pollution damage at the cargo owner as well as the shipowner. It
is argued that civil liability, and the threat thereof, can be
utilized as a powerful tool to bring about higher standards of
tanker operation, and thereby mitigate the incidence of
pollution. The possibility exists that a significant improvement
in the quality of tankers will be brought about if strict,
unlimited liability for oil pollution damage is placed upon the
actual cargo owner involved in the spill, together with the
tanker owner. This is presently the legal position in t he
following u. S . states; Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland,
North Carolina, Oregon and Washington. Thus, through an analysis
of certain U.S. State legislation a new policy or legal norm is
proposed for the assessment of liability for oil spills from
tankers carrying oil in bulk at sea. A common course of action
is proposed which if adopted and pursued by governments will be
advantageous to shipowners, shippers of oil, the environment, the
public, and, will furthermore, expedite the transportation of oil
at sea.
Oil pollution from tankers is by no means a recent problem;
however, this problem has become critical in recent years due to
the increased public and governmental awareness of the
degradation of the environment. The integrity of the environment
is finally becoming a factor to be reckoned with.
It will be shown that the tanker and oil industry has
incrementally become subj ected to increasingly stringent
liability laws as a direct result of the advent of environmental
concerns. The present work depicts the growing importance of
environmental considerations for the shipping and petroleum
industries. This impact should not be overlooked because the
lessons learned from experience of tanker-source oil pollution
6
can be applied to other aspects of the shipping and petroleum






Consciously or unconsciously almost all human endeavour is
governed to a greater or lesser extent by "methodology". This
term describes the body of methods employed in any particular
branch of activity to achieve specific objectives. The present
work is organized according to the "comparative methodology",
which is frequently utilised by researchers and commentators in
many disciplines, including law.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the comparative method
in relation to the particular subject of this work. With this
obj ective in mind, three inter-connected questions will be
considered. What is the comparative method, how is it used in
this particular context and, to what end is it employed?
2.2 Comparative methodology
In essence the comparative methodology applied to legal research
contrasts one legal system with other such systems. Contrasted
with the study of a single legal system, the comparative approach
leads to a more holistic understanding of the subject. Clearly,
the comparative approach is a superior methodology and its
relevance becomes almost indispensable where the different legal
systems studied exert significant influence upon one another.
Where this is so an analysis of just one system to the exclusion
of the others runs the risk of leaving the reader, and the
writer, with an incomplete understanding of the subject. The
writer's recommendations and conclusions drawn from an
inappropriately narrow study of a complex subj ect may be premised
upon a limited, or even incomplete, frame of reference. In this
work an attempt has been made to avoid such short-comings by
adopting a broad comparative analysis of three dominant legal
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systems governing tanker-source oil pollution liability. Further,
an attempt is made to understand and respond to a whole set of
global trends concerning the question of oil pollution, rather
than simply focusing on problems in particular countries or
regions.
To recapitulate, the three legal systems are: the international
Conventions, the voluntary agreements and U.S. Federal and State
law controlling oil pollution liability in the United States.
An obvious point is that these systems cannot effectively be
compared and contrasted without also being described.
Accordingly, the provisions and operation of the various systems
are discussed in detail. In this way the evaluative and
descriptive features of this study are both of importance.
Greater emphasis is placed on the analysis of the international
Conventions than is accorded to the other two systems dealt with.
In the view of the present writer this approach is justified
because in principle the international Conventions represent in
principle a legal ideal, of great importance, which it is hoped
will serve as an precedent to the international community of
nations.
The use of the comparative methodology in the present work is not
confined only to an analysis of the provisions of the studied
legal systems in force at present. This would be unsatisfactory
as it would limit the scope of the work by precluding an analysis
of previous developments in the legal systems studied and exclude
an analysis of important developments which have modified those
legal systems but which have not, as yet, achieved the status of
law. In this way the comparative methodology is utilized to draw
attention to, and analyse, significant epochs in the historical
development and evolution of the different legal systems studied.
Thus, this work includes an examination of legal developments in
respect of the 1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions which have not as yet come into force. To do
otherwise would detract from the investigative integrity of the
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study. Laws do not evolve in isolation, the law in existence at
present is in most instances shaped by the law which predated it.
In the same way the law of the future will tend to evolve out of
the laws of the past and t h e present. Accordingly, for a
comparative study to be effective it must include an analysis of
the past and the present in order to identify emerging legal
trends and thereby anticipate the possible character of future
laws governing tanker-source oil pollution liability.
2.3 Comparative methodology and evaluation of policy
The most important decision to be made before the comparative
legal study is embarked upon is the choice of legal systems to
be compared. The subjects of comparison should ideally be linked
by sufficient common factors to permit constructive comparison.
The comparison of different but related legal systems which have
evolved in response to the same problem enables the researcher
to formulate an understanding of the policy considerations
influencing the development of each system over the passage of
time and in the face of changing circumstances. Through
comparison and evaluation of the different policies inherent
within the legal systems compared , the researcher is then placed
in a favourable position from which new policy considerations can
be identified and articulated .
The identification and evaluation of policy is one of the
concerns of this work. This is so because policy considerations
determine law. However, policy considerations need not always
relate specifically to law. Often non-secular bodies adopt and
implement policy which is not backed by the authority of state
and law. 1 For example, the pol i cy articulated by the tanker and
oil industries through the voluntary agreements essentially falls
within a non-secular category of policy making. By contrast,
policy articulated and enforced through the international
Conventions, as incorporated i nto the municipal legislation of
lEnright Studying Law 4th ed (1991) at 248.
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nation states, and, U. S. Federal and State legislation, is
sanctioned by the authority of law.
This is not to say that the policies articulated by the industry
agreements are less relevant than those which enjoy the backing
of law and it must be recognized that the policies expounded by
the international Conventions and U. S . legislation are also
strongly influenced by the business interests involved. In fact
these interests are an important part of the bundle of interests
which must be considered before a policy debate can properly
ensue.
Because the evaluation of policy is one of the prime objectives
of the comparative methodology it is proper that methodology and
policy are considered together. The evaluation of policy entails
an inquiry into the purpose of the law and the manner in which
the law attempts to attain that purpose. 2 Specific problems
arise in the evaluation of policy within the context of the legal
systems chosen for investigation in this work. It is necessary
to identify those difficulties and describe the methods used to
overcome them. 3
Enright suggests that policy may be articulated, through the
medium of law, by either common law or statute, but that most
policy is in fact implemented by statute. 4
Within the context of the legal systems studied here, this
general statement requires qualification. The only statute law
examined in detail in this work is the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and U.S. state legislation. Although the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions become statute law upon being ratified by states
and incorporated into the municipal legislation of such states,
2Enright , op cit , at 247 .
3The reader may note that the analysis of the problems
discussed below is not exhaustive.
4Enright, op cit, 247.
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they are not examined as adopted into the legislation of any
single sovereign state. The approach adopted in respect of these
instruments is to analyse the provisions of the actual
Conventions rather than municipal statute law. This is in keeping
with the international approach adopted in this work as opposed
to a parochial perspective. Furthermore, the voluntary agreements
are not legislative instruments, and, as such, are not statute
law. Notwithstanding this important conceptual distinction;
certain important aspects of these agreements are regulated by
law, and, as such, in this work they are considered to be a
"legal system".
The control of tanker-source oil pollution liability under the
international Conventions and the voluntary agreements is marked
by a policy in terms of which disputes are settled, wherever
possible, without litigation. Accordingly, an investigation of
the provisions of these agreements, as opposed to an examination
of case law, affords greater opportunities for the evaluation of
policy. Due to the fairly brief period of time that the U.S. Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 has been in effect there is, regrettably,
a paucity of case law interpreting the policy of that potentially
important legislative instrument.
The objective of all critical analysis of legal systems is to
suggest a new policy where and if the analysis reveals that a
change in policy is necessary. The first stage in policy making
is the identification or perception of a particular problem or
some undesirable feature prevalent within the field of research
undertaken. The next step is a desire to solve the problem or
change the situation leading to that problem; calling in turn,
for detailed research into the field in which the problem arises.
The broad comparative approach adopted here best facilitates the
evaluative process leading to the formulation of new policy. The
strength and utility of the comparative legal method is that it
allows the researcher to make informed judgment that one
situation is better or more des irable than another and to suggest
the most effective methods through which to bring about the
12
preferable option. s
In conclusion, it must be recognised that the determination of
policy is essentially a subjective process. Every commentator's
evaluation of policy is influenced by his particular viewpoint.
Therefore, it is important that the commentator understands the
subject at hand toughly, considers the works of previous
commentators in the same or related fields and the concerns
articulated by various interest groups involved. In this way,
where the commentator evaluates policy, he does so in a balanced
way from an informed and considered perspective.
SEnright, op cit, pp149-152.
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CHAPTER 3
Introductory conceptual and historical analysis
3.1 Introduction
The objectives of this Chapter are two-fold. Firstly, certain
important concepts are defined with the intention of facilitating
a clear understanding of the subjects analysed in the remainder
of this work. Secondly, an attempt is made to illustrate how,
before the development of the special tanker-source compensation
mechanisms, claimants had experienced great difficulty in
recovering the full extent of their damage. Such difficulties,
which became apparent in the Torrey Canyon case, precipitated
increased public, governmental and industry emphasis upon the
provision of adequate compensation for tanker-source oil
pollution damage. In this way, the wreck of the Torrey Canyon is
significant in that it provided the motivation for the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions as well as the voluntary
agreements.
3.2 Preliminary distinctions
It is appropriate at the outset of this work to explain certain
distinctions between various important concepts fundamental to
a broad understanding of the subject at hand.
3.2.1 Preventive / Compensation legislation
Since the formation in 1958 of the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), which from 1976 became known
as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) , several
international conventions relating to pollution prevention have
been developed. Individual states are encouraged to become party
to these instruments and in this way the provisions contained in
the conventions may become i n co r p or a t e d into the domestic
legislation of the party states. The most commonly referred-to
example within the category of preventive conventions is MARPOL
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73/78. 1 This Convention provides detailed regulations for the
design and construction of oil tankers and the circumstances in
which the discharge of oil or ballast water is prohibited. It
does not, however, impose liabilities on polluting ships other
than by way of fines for non-compliance with its provisions. 2
By contrast, compensation legislation can be described as the
body of statutory, enacted rules governing the settlement of
claims for loss and damage caused by oil pollution.
3.2.2 Conventions / Agreements
3.2.2.1 International Conventions
Two international conventions; namely, the 1969 International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil
Liability Convention) and the 1971 International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Convention) govern liability and
compensation for damage caused by oil pollution from tankers. It
is important to note that these instruments operate only in
states which have elected to become party to the conventions.
The 1969 Civil Liability Convention governs the liability of
shipowners for oil pollution damage and imposes the principle of
strict liability for shipowners. It also stipulates that
shipowners must maintain compulsory liability insurance which
guarantees the existence of a limited fund from which claims can
be made against shipowners causing pollution in member states.
The 1971 Fund Convention established the International Oil
1 The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships 1973, and its Protocol 1978 which came
into force on 2nd October 1983 .
2For an analysis of MARPOL 73/78 see Brubaker Marine
Pollution and International Law Principles and Practice 1st
ed. (1993) pp 122-129.
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Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) which is made up of
monetary contributions from oil importers in member states. The
function of the IOPC Fund is to provide supplementary
compensation to claimants who have suffered oil pollution damage
in Fund Member States but have not obtained full compensation in
terms of the limited compensation available under the Civil
Liability Convention. Although the tanker and oil importing
industries which are directly affected by these conventions were
consulted when the conventions were developed, the regimes
essentially were forced upon both arms of the industry by the
governments of contracting states. It must be emphasised that
these conventions are not applicable world-wide but apply only
in the territory of party states. Furthermore, not all states
party to the Civil Liability Convention are party to the Fund
Convention.
3.2.2.2 Voluntary agreements
Broadly there are two voluntary agreements; the Tanker Owners
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution,
(TOVALOP), and, the Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution, (CRISTAL). TOVALOP came into effect
on 6th October, 1969, and has since then periodically undergone
amendment including the very important TOVALOP Supplement (TS)
which came into effect on the 20th February, 1987. CRISTAL has
been in force since the 1st April, 1971. Like the TOVALOP
Agreement, the CRISTAL Contract has been amended from time to
time. By contrast the Civil Liability Convention entered into
force on the 19th June, 1975, and the Fund Convention on the 16th
October, 1978.
The two voluntary schemes were originally developed at the
independent initiative of the tanker, and oil importing
industries, to provide an "acceptable" interim compensation
system until the time that the Conventions could provide
satisfactory compensation . Significantly, the voluntary regimes
continue to provide compensation to victims of oil pollution
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damage in states which have not contracted to the Civil Liability
or Fund Conventions and in certain circumstances even provide
additional relief where the c~ventions apply.
In effect the voluntary regimes complement the framework of
compensation implemented through the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions. Accordingly, the voluntary regimes closely resemble
the two tiered system of compensation adopted by the Conventions.
In general TOVALOP corresponds to the Civil Liability Convention,
and CRISTAL corresponds to the Fund Convention.
3.2.3 Civil/Criminal penalties
Most states impose criminal liability for negligent discharges
of oil but no standard approach exists, either to fines or the
circumstances in which such fines should be imposed. By contrast,
civil liability is the quantum of compensation that is assessed
against parties responsible for oil pollution damage. The Civil
Liability Convention and the Fund Convention are conventions in
the field of private civil law adopted by various states for the
purpose of providing compensation to various victims of pollution
damage in those territories. By contrast the U.S. Federal Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 simultaneously regulates the civil
liability and the imposition of criminal sanctions for oil
pollution damage.
3.2.4 Tankers / other ships
As yet there is no internationally agreed system of liability for
oil spills from dry cargo ships but most coastal states impose
liabilities on such vessels under municipal legislation. As
described above, various compensation regimes have been developed
pertaining to oil tankers. In many ways these regimes are unique
and in order to understand the concepts behind such instruments
it is necessary to trace their history over the last twenty seven




Operational discharges of oil into the sea include the discharge
of oil and water mixtures from ballast tanks or oil discharged
during tank cleaning operations . Operational discharges, which
are usually intentional, account for a high percentage of the
total oil pollution from ships . In most instances operational
discharges cause low intensity pollution and as such do not
usually give rise to claims fo r oil pollution damage. Traumatic
or accidental oil spills often lead to large amounts of oil
escaping into the sea and wide -spread pollution. As a result,
claims for oil pollution damage can be considerable . In light of
the above observation it is natural that this work will, in the
main, focus on compensation arrangements for traumatic oil
spills.
3.3 The beginnings of oil pollution regulation
This analysis deals, firstly, with attempts by governments prior
to 1969 to control the problem of tanker-source oil pollution
and, secondly, the difficult ies which confronted claimants
attempting to recover damages f r om shipowners in the Inverpool
and Torrey Canyon cases .
3.3.1 Initial intergovernmental responses to oil pollution
After the Second World War there were calls for control over
marine oil pollution in the face of a world wide explosion in the
demand for oil. 3 The increased demand for oil had also resulted
in problems in supply and tanker shortages . For example, in early
1948 the tanker shortage was exacerbated after several tankers
broke in half while at sea and t he U.S. Coast Guard ordered 288
3Yergin The Prize (1991 ) at 410 makes the following
observation :
' I n 1945 , 26 million cars were in service in the United
States, by 1950 this f igure had risen to 40 million.
G~solin~ consumption in the United States was 42 percent
hlgher ln 1950 than they h a d been in 1945 .'
1 8
tankers laid up for emergency reinforcing. 4
As greater quantities of oil were being transported by sea in
increasingly large tankerss this increased the risk of serious
oil pollution. Those responsible for the transport of oil in
tankers realized that international co-operation was required if
such incidents as described above were to be prevented. In 1948,
the United Nations established the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO). This arm of the United Nations
was established by the Convention on the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, dated the 6th March, 1948.'
The task of IMCO was to facilitate co-operation among countries
in the field of shipping safety, including the prevention and
control of maritime pollution from ships and other craft.' The
first international convention to limit marine pollution was the
1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil. 8 The 1954 Convention's primary concern is with
the deliberate discharge of oil in the course of tank-cleaning
operations at sea and does not address the problem of oil
pollution caused by maritime casualties. 9
3.3.2 The Inverpool spill
In 1956 there occurred the English case of Esso Petroleum Co.
4Yergin, op cit 410.
sFor a brief analysis of the evolution of tankers which
culminated in the development of the supertanker see Annexure
One.
'This Convention came into force in 1958 and IMCO
officially came into existence .
'See Article 1 of the IMCO Convention.
8This Convention came into force in 1958 after
ratification by 11 states.
9Articles 111.2 and VIII .
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Ltd. v , Southport Corporation. 10 On the 3rd December, 1950, a
680 gross ton esturial oil tanker called the Inverpool was
proceeding into the River Ribble in North West England when the
vessel struck a revetment wall and stranded. The master of the
Inverpool deliberately jettisoned about 400 tons of heavy cargo
oil into the Ribble estuary. This action was ostensibly in order
to lighten, refloat and thereby prevent the vessel from breaking
up. The discharged oil was carried to shore by the action of the
wind and tide onto the premises of Southport Corporation, which
was put to considerable expense in cleaning their premises of oil
and sought to recover their expenses from the owners and master
of the Inverpool.ll The pollution damage which occurred and the
unsuccessful attempts by claimants to recover clean up costs
revealed a serious gap in the English common law's ability to
provide a remedy for this unprecedented type of damage.
Common law consists of a country's laws built up from customs and
usages which have been accepted by its courts and as such given
the force of law. Under the common law of England as it then was,
it proved extremely difficult to establish the tortious liability
of shipowners for this type of damage . One writer suggests that
' ... the law which worked so well with contracts and insurance
had little flexibility to meet new concerns about pollution . ,12
This view is difficult to refute when the law associated with the
shipowners right to limit liability is considered in relation to
the 1967 Torrey Canyon accident. It was clear that many legal
doctrines had evolved in an age that lacked any conception of the
supertanker and its consequences. They were, to that extent,
inadequate for contemporary needs.
10Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corporation, [1956]
A. C. 218, [19 5 6 ] 2 W. L . R. 81, [1955] 3 All E. R. 864 H. L. ,
[1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 655 H.L .
llEsso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1956]
AC 218, 220.
l2W?ite-Harvey 'Black Tide at the Convergence of Admiralty
and Envlronmental Law' (1991) 1 Journal of Environmental Law





In the case at hand, it was necessary for the Southport
Corporation to proceed under the English common law of tort
because at that time the only English legislation on the subject
of oil pollution was the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1922, which
applied to criminal matters only and therefore had no direct
bearing on the question of liability. 13 Accordingly the
Southport Corporation proceeded against the shipowners and the
master in an action based on trespass, nuisance and negligence.
Generally speaking, as a cause of action under English common
law, trespass was available only to occupiers of land where there
has been some direct, physical interference with property. The
weight of authority would seem to support the view that the
interference must be direct. Where the interference is
consequential then nuisance, which is a wider remedy than
trespass, is the appropriate cause of action. 14 In the court of
first instance Devlin J, as he then was, favoured a wide
interpretation of the notion of directness and held that the
Southport Corporation had a good cause of action in trespass or
nuisance, subject, however, to certain special defences. 1s The
difficulty in successfully invoking trespass and nuisance is that
these remedies are subject to special defences, the first of
which is the so-called 'traffic rule'. Devlin J. began by
pointing out that under the 'traffic rule':
it is well established that persons whose property
the highway cannot complain of damage done by
using the highway unless it is done negligently:
(Goodwin) v , Ctievel.ey,"' Tillet v , War&7 and
13Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corporation [1956]
AC 218, 227.
14Abecassis & Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships:
International, United Kingdom and United States Law and
Practice 2nd ed. (1985) 358 .
lSEsso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v . Southport Corporation, [1956]
A.C. 218 at 225.
16(1859) 28 L.J.Ex. 298 .
21







drew an analogy between traffic
citing two obiter dicta of Lord




'Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be
conducted without exposing those whose persons or property
are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so,
those who go on the highway, or have their property
adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject to their
taking upon themselves t he risk of injury from that
inevitable danger.'
Blackburn J. then went on to say that such persons could not
recover ' .. . without proof of want of care or skill occasioning
the accident .'
In a subsequent decision i n River Wear Commissioners v.
Adamson2 0 Lord Blackburn said :
'My Lords, the common law is, I think, as follows:-
property adjoining to a spot on which the public have a
right to carry on traffic is liable to be injured by that
traffic . In this respect there is no difference between a
shop, the railings or windows of which may be broken by the
carriage on the road, and the pier adjoining to a harbour
or a navigable river or t he sea, which is liable to be
injured by a ship . In either case the owner of the injured
property must bear his own loss, unless he can establish
~(1882) 10 Q.B.D. 17.
18[1924 ] 2 K.B . 75; 40 T . L .R . 591.
19 (18 66 ) L . R . 1 Ex. 265 a t 286 .
20(1877) 2 App. Cas. 74 3 at 767 .
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that some other person is in fault, and liable to make it
good. '
The analogy between traffic on land and traffic at sea was
accepted by Morris L. J. 21 and Lord Tucker. 22 Furthermore the
owners of the Inverpool were able to invoke the defence of
necessity in that the discharge of oil was justified to save
life. The answer to either the 'traffic rule' or the defence of
necessity was if the Southport Corporation could establish that
the predicament in which the ship found herself was due to her
own negligence. 23 Accordingly, the success of the action brought
by the Southport Corporation depended on their ability to
establish negligence. A claimant was required to prove that the
shipowner or the master had caused the oil spill negligently,
that the shipowner or the master owed a duty of care to the
claimant, which he had failed to discharge, and that such failure
was linked causally to the resulting damage . The burden of proof
was on the plaintiff (the Southport Corporation) to establish
negligence . The plaintiffs' efforts had all been directed at
showing that the Master of the Inverpool had been negligent but
the trial judge, Devlin J. held the plaintiff had not proved
their case. Therefore Devlin J. concluded that the shipowners
were not negligent as alleged in the statement of claim and that
Southport Corporation was not entitled to succeed either in
trespass, nuisance or negligence. Although the Court of Appeal
set aside the decision of Devlin J. and found in favour of the
Southport Corporation, the House of Lords reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeal in favour of the reasoning of Devlin J.
In this way the law in England was established that coastal
landowners had to accept inevitable hazards from marine traffic,
including oil pollution, and could not sustain an action without
proof of fault.
21[1954] 2 Q.B. 182 at pp. 203-204.
22[1956] A.C. 218 at pp . 244-245.
23Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v . Southport Corporation, [1956]
A.C. 218 at 228.
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This construction in English common law was endorsed in The Wagon
Mound. 24 This judgement arose from an appeal from the Supreme
Court of New South Wales to the Privy Council. The Privy Council
had to determine liability for damage caused by fire to the
respondent's wharf. The fact were as follows:
'While an oil-burning vessel, of which the appellants were
the charterers, was taking in bunkering oil in Sydney
Harbour a large quantity of the oil was, through the
carelessness of the appellants' servants, allowed to spill
into the harbour. During that and the following day the
escaped furnace oil was carried by wind and tide beneath a
wharf owned by the respondents, shipbuilders and ship
repairers, at which was lying a vessel which they were
refitting, and for which purpose their employees were using
electric and oxyacetylene welding equipment. Some cotton
waste or rag on a piece of debris floating on the oil
underneath the wharf was set on fire by molten metal
falling from the wharf, and the flames from the cotton
waste or rag set the floating oil afire either directly or
by first setting fire to a wooden pile coated with oil and
thereafter a conflagration developed which seriously
damaged the wharf and equipment on it .' 25
Viscount Simons stated that:
'It is no doubt, proper when considering tortious liability
for negligence to analyse its elements and to say that the
plaintiff must prove a duty owed to him by the defendant,
a breach of that duty by the defendant, and consequential
damage. ,26
240verseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock &
Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.),
hereinafter The Wagon Mound.
25The Wagon Mound [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) at 389.
26The Wagon Mound [1961] A.C. 388 (P .C.) at 425.
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As to whether or not the damage was the direct result of the
escape of oil the Privy Council applied the foreseeability test.
Viscount Simonds declared that ... the essential factor in
determining liability is whether the damage is of such a kind as
the reasonable man should have foreseen.' 27 This question was
determined on what the engineer of The Wagon Mound could foresee
as likely to result from the bunker spillage. Accordingly the
appellants were not held liable for the damage as it was
determined that they could not reasonably have been expected to
have known that the oil would catch fire. 28 By contrast in The
Wagon Mound (No.2)29 a ship damaged by the same fire was
successful in its claim for damages because the plaintiff was
able to show that the fire was foreseeable as officers on board
The Wagon Mound had testified that they believed that the oil
could be ignited, although with some difficulty.
Nonetheless certain developments in English common law before the
Torrey Canyon accident had occurred illustrate the beginning of
an evolution away from the traditional fault oriented rule. In
Rylands v. FletcherO the House of Lords held a person 'strictly
liable' for damage caused by the escape of harmful materials from
an 'extra-hazardous activity .' M'Gonigle and Zacher argue that:
'Considering the damage caused by massive releases of crude
oil, it was reasonable that the transportation of such oil
should be considered such an extrahazardous activity. ,31
The correctness of this view can only be established by actual
litigation. Nevertheless this untested hypothesis is of
27 The Wagon Mound [1961] A.C . 388 (P. C. ) at 426.
28The Wagon Mound [1961] A.C . 388 (P. C. ) at 389.
290verseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship
Co. Pty . (The Wagon Mound (No.2)) [1967] 1 A.C. 617.
3°(1968) L.R. 3 (H.L. ) 330.
31M'Gonigle & Zacher Pollution, Politics and International
Law: Tankers at Sea (1979) 151 .
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considerable importance in respect of vessels transporting
hazardous or noxious cargoes in jurisdictions applying English
law where the provisions of the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions and the voluntary compensation are not applicable.
This may be the case in a variety of circumstances, the most
obvious being where the spill emanates from a vessel which is not
a tanker. Where the Conventions or other statutory provisions do
not apply, claimants in such countries may be required to invoke
the English common law which may include the above argument. 32
The common law remains of considerable importance because spills
from vessels other than tankers can give rise to large claims.
For example, the discharges of bunker oil from the Kowloon Bridge
incident in Ireland and the incident involving the bulk carrier
Mercantil Maricah gave rise to clean-up costs estimated at US$2,9
million. 33 In 1989 the Brazilian bulk carrier Mercantil Maricah
spilled hundreds of tonnes of fuel oil into the inshore waters
of Sognefjord north of the Norwegian port of Bergen. 34 In
January 1992 the ore carrier Arisan, which was in a very poor
condition, went aground on the island of Runde which is a noted
breeding ground for seabirds off mid-Norway. The Norwegian
Government spent almost NOK50 million responding to this
incident. In this instance it was clear who was responsible for
the incident and because the shipowner had adequate liability
insurance the Norwegian Government was able to recover most of
their clean-up costS. 35
In relation to oil pollution claims arising from the
32Where the common law applies in the United Kingdom, the
cost of reasonable preventive measures taken against
persistent oil pollution from ships is recoverable in terms of
s. 15 of the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971.
33Lloyd's List 4.11.89 .
34'The thick black line ' New Scientist vol.137 No.1858 30
January 1993 at 24.
35L.H. Halvorsen 'Norway tightens green controls' June
1993 Statoil at 14-15 .
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transportation of oil, the Torrey Canyon accident and the
subsequent development of the two liability Conventions and the
voluntary compensation regimes diminished the relative importance
of the common law. However, the ordinary rules of remoteness and
causation of damage must always be invoked to determine the scope
of compensation available under the conventions and the voluntary
regimes because a wide variety of harm may conceivably be
attributed to oil pol l.ut.Lon v "
3.3.3 Watershed 'Torrey Canyon' spill
It was only in the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster that an
international effort was made to develop certain mechanisms which
would facilitate more equitable compensation following oil
pollution accidents. The Torrey Canyon, which ran aground some
distance out to sea off the southwest coast of England on 18th
March, 1967, was the first tanker accident to 'sensationalize'
through the media the harmful effects of oil pollution in the
eyes of the world. The inability of the legal process to bring
about equitable compensation to those who suffered damage in the
ensuing oil spill also became apparent.
'In every respect whether scientific, ecological or legal,
the Torrey Canyon disaster caught the maritime world
completely unprepared.. . . Damage claims in Great Britain
amounted to 6,000,000 pounds and 40,000,000 francs in
France. Most of these claims found no settlement. ,37
The position of the wreck was not within British Territorial
36Gibson 'Oil Pollution and Common Law' [1979] Lloyd's
Maritime and Commercial LQ 498 at 499.
37Gold Handbook on Marine Pollution (Norway: Assurance -
Foreningen GARD , 1985) 24 ; For a full account of the demise of
the Torrey Canyon, see Keeton ' The lessons of the Torrey
Canyon: English law aspects ' (1968) 21 Current Legal Problems
~p .94-112 and Brown 'The lessons of the Torrey Canyon:
lnternational law aspects' (1968) 21 Current Legal Problems
pp.113-116.
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Waters but on the High Seas, also referred to as International
Waters. Under international treaty law, a coastal state could
only intervene with certainty where an accident had occurred
within its territorial waters as this portion of surrounding sea
was deemed to be an area of full coastal state sovereignty,
subject to the right of innocent passage and standard rules of
reasonable conduct. 38 A further precept of international law
maintained that while on international waters ships possess the
same sovereign status and protection as the state in which the
vessel is registered. 39 Articl~of the 1958 Geneva Convention of
the High Seas articulated the principle that:
'The High seas being open to all nations, no State may
validly purport to subject any part of them to its
sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised ... by
all States.' _
Therefore the ability of coastal states to legally interfere with
the sovereignty of vessels upon international waters was far from
clear under international treaty law. 40
Customary international law presented another way through which
the legality of the right to intervene on the high seas in cases
of threatened oil pollution could be established. Considerable
authority exists which gives credence to the view that the right
to intervention where it is absolutely necessary to do so, was
well established in international customary law. The locus
classicus on the subject is the United States Supreme Court
decision in Church v. Hubbard where Chief Justice Marshall held
that the seizure of an illegal trading ship on the high seas was
a legitimate exercise of a sovereign state's right to use the
38Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone , Article 1.1 and 17.
39M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, pp 144-147.
4°M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 148; Abecassis & Jarashow,
op cit, pp.119-120 para.6-13.
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means necessary for its protect ion . 41 The most authoritative
commentators agree that intervention, as in the case of the
Torrey Canyon, was justified under international common law as
the danger posed was imminent , the rights or interests threatened
were substantial and the measures taken were proportionate to the
t hr ea t. 42 It would also seem tha t thi s right would extend to
cases where the threatened danger i s b r ought about by the force
of nature. 43 Therefore the bombing of t he Liberian registered
Torrey Canyon by the Royal Air Force in an attempt to burn the
oil remaining in her tanks almost certainly did not constitute
an act of international "piracy" as was suggested at the time.
Clearly, coastal states required certainty in respect of their
right to legally intervene where a marine casualty, beyond their
territorial limits, nonetheless threatens the well-being of that
state. This right of intervent ion was subsequently provided for
by the International Convention Relating to the Intervention on
the High Seas in Cases of Oi l Pollution Casualties, 1969. 44 The
41Church v. Hubbard (1804 ) 6 U.S. (2 Crank) 187, pp 234-
235.
42M'Gonigle & Zacher , op ci t, 148-149 citing Goldie
' Pr i nc i p l e s of Responsibility i n International Law' Hearings,
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the United States
Senate Committee on Public Works, 91st Congress, 2nd Session,
July 21 and 22, 1970, p.99 and also O'Connell 'Reflections on
Brussels, IMCO, and the 1969 Pollution Convent ions' (1970) 3
Cornell International Law Journal 1; Abecassis & Jarashow, op
cit, pp.116-118 especially at pa r a. 6- 09 citing Oppenheim
International Law (1955) 8th ed. 298.
43Ibid. L. Oppenheim Interna t ional Law (1955 ) 8th ed. 298 ,
fn. 3.
44International Convention Relat ing to the Intervention on
the High Seas in Cases of Oi l Pol l u t i on Casualties , done at
Brussels 29 November, 1969. The Convention entered into force
on 6th May, 1975 . Significantly t he United States which seldom
elects to ratify international ma r i t i me conventions did ratify
the Intervention Convention . The Convent i on entered into force
for the United States on 6 May , 1975, 26 U.S.T. 765, T .I.A.S.
No.8068 see Paulsen ' Why t he Uni t ed States should ratify the
1984 Protocols to the Internat ional Conventions on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollut ion Damage (1969 ) and the
Establishment of an Internat ional Fund for Compensation for
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essence of this Convention is encapsulated in Article 1.1 which
provides that:
'Parties to the present Convention may take such measures
on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate
or eliminate grave and i mmi ne n t danger to their coastline
or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution
of the sea by oil, fo llowing upon a maritime casualty,
which may be expected to result in major harmful
consequences.'
The above provision closely reflects the criteria for
intervention which had previously been determined by
international customary law. Clearly, the Intervention Convention
requires a relatively severe threat of damage to the
environment. 45 Intervention is jus t i f i e d only where a 'grave and
imminent danger' is posed 'which may be expected to result in
major harmful consequences' . Significantly, the Convention
permits states to undertake pur e threat removal measures where
a danger is posed but no oil has in fact yet been discharged. A
'maritime casualty' for the purpose of the Intervention
Convention is defined as 'a col l i s i on of ships, stranding or
other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a ship
or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat
to a ship or cargo.' 46 The Conv e n t i on is of considerable
importance because it added certainty to the right of
intervention and clarified the circumstances under which such
intervention was justifiable . A feature of the Intervention
Convention which must not be overlooked and which is significant
in the context of liability f o r oil pollution is that where
measures are taken in contravent ion of the provisions of the
Oil Pollution Damage (1971) ' (1 984 / 85 ) 20 The Forum 164 at
164-165.
45S ' Th It ' 1prlnger e n ernat~ona Law of Pollution: Protecting
the Global Environment in a World of Sovereign States (1983)
71.
46Intervention Convention, Article 11.1.
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Convention the coastal state is obliged to pay the injured party
compensation for damage caused by such actions. 47 This would be
the case where unreasonable or excessive action is taken which
is not justifiable in the circumstances.
The 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions which will
later be discussed in detail were devised shortly after the
Intervention Convention. The International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 , and the International
Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 were also implemented
largely as a result of the Torrey Canyon incident.
With hindsight, the final destruction of the Torrey Canyon by the
British Government in an attempt to mitigate pollution damage,
was probably counter productive, in that it allowed significant
amounts of oil which may have remained in the tanks of the
stricken tanker to escape into the sea . Furthermore, despite the
accuracy of the bombing, it is believed only a small proportion
of the oil was in fact burned away. The possibility therefore
existed that the tanker owner might have been able to contend
that the damage caused by the spill had been exacerbated by what
some had considered to be the illegal intervention of the U.K.
Government in ordering the bombing of the Torrey Canyon. 4 8
3.3.3.1 Problems exacting liability
Not only were claimants in the Torrey Canyon case faced with the
task of establishing locus standi; which is the legal capacity,
or standing, to bring an action , but they also had to establish
47Intervention Convention , Article VI.
48It must be borne in mind that the aerial bombing of the
Torrey Canyon was not the only attempt undertaken to mitigate
the harmful effects caused by the wreck. Salvage operations
we:e undertaken almost immediately after the grounding but
enJoyed no success. In the course of one such salvage
operation a salvor lost his life when a cloud of gas on the
Torrey Canyon exploded.
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jurisdiction,'9 and ascertain the correct party against which to
bring the action. At the time of the stranding, the registered
owner of the Torrey Canyon was Barracuda Tanker Corporation, but
the ship was under a twenty year time charter to the Union Oil
Company of California (UNOCAL). Barracuda Tanker Corporation was
a wholly owned subsidiary of UNOCAL. The crude oil she was
carrying had been shipped by British Petroleum Trading, Ltd.
under a voyage charter from UNOCAL, with freight payable at
destination. 50 A voyage charter describes a contractual
arrangement whereby a ship is leased to the charterer for the
duration of a single voyage . The shipowner provides the crew and
supervises the operation of that ship while it transports the
cargo for the charterer to a specified destination. This
arrangement is roughly analogous to the hire of a taxi to go from
one place to another. Although many different meanings are
sometimes attributed to the term \ freight' it is generally
understood to refer to the price charged for the successful
transportation of goods by a ship from one place to another. 51
3.3.3.2 Action in rem
Under general maritime law the negligent discharge of oil from
a ship is a maritime tort for which the ship is liable in rem and
her owner in personam for damage caused . The Government of the
United Kingdom firstly proceeded against the Barracuda Tanker
Corporation by way of the action in rem. This is a procedure,
unique to maritime law, whereby claimants, upon showing good
cause, are sometimes able to have the offending vessel, or a
'9As the wreck giving rise to the pollution was on
international waters, this presented uncertainty as to whether
jurisdiction could be established in the countries where the
damage was done; France and England.
50A summary of t~e charter and corporate (real and dummy)
a:rangement und7r Wh1C~ the To:rey ~anyon was operating at the
t1me of the acc1dent, 1S conta1ned 1n Gilmore & Black The Law
of Admiralty 2nd ed. (1975) 841-42. '
51Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 5th ed. Vol.2 D-H (1972) at
1111.
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'sister-ship' of the offending vessel arrested to obtain
prejudgment security. 'Sister-ships', which are sometimes
referred to as 'associated ships', are vessels effectively owned
by the same company or corporation as the offending vessel. The
owners of the arrested vessel are required to lodge sufficient
security to guarantee or cover the claims brought against them
to effect the arrested vessel 's release. If the owners are unable
to provide satisfactory security, or decline to do so, the ship
usually remains under arrest until the conclusion of the action,
and may be sold to satisfy any claims which succeed against it.
Such recalcitrance is unusual and in most instances the owner,
or the vessel's Protection & Indemnity Club (P&l Club), provide
prejudgment security and effect the vessel's release .
The action in rem offers another advantage to claimants. Where
the claim is against a foreign defendant, which is often the
case, the action in rem enables claimants to circumvent
difficulties associated with establishing jurisdiction in a
foreign forum or attempting to obtain a foreign defendant's
submission to the jurisdiction where the damage was done. All
that is required is that the guilty ship or a 'sister ship' of
that ship be arrested. 52
The Torrey Canyon was a total loss and as such could not be
arrested; however, two sister ships, the Lake Palourde and the
Sansinena could be arrested. Four months after the accident, the
Lake Palourde was arrested in Singapore by the U.K. Government.
The arrest continued until the shipowner had deposited £3 million
security to meet the United Kingdom claims against the Torrey
Canyon. 53 Nine months later, in April 1968, the Lake Palourde
was again arrested, this time in Rotterdam by the French
52Staniland ' Towa r d s a New Right and Remedy for Marine
Pollution' (1989) 1 Marine Pol icy Reports 151 at 152.
53Barker 'Hazardous goods at sea' (1992) 16 Marine Policy
306 pp.317-318.
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Government to attain security for French claims. 54 Unfortunately
the Sansinena was destined to perpetuate the ill fated legacy of
her sister the Torrey Canyon when in December 1976 she was
totally destroyed by an explosion and fire in Los Angeles
harbour. Nine people lost their lives in this particular
accident. ss
3.3.3.3 Limited liability
The admiralty action in rem provides powerful (and, it may also
be said, unique) advantages for claimants against shipowners. On
the other hand, certain principles of admiralty law had evolved
to protect shipowners. The most powerful of these protective
measures were the laws which insulated shipowners from the
consequences of unlimited liability. In the United States at the
time of the Torrey Canyon incident a shipowner was entitled to
invoke his right to limit his liability to an amount not
exceeding his interest in the vessel at the conclusion of the
casualty voyage and any freight then pending. Because very high
claims stemmed from the stranding of the Torrey Canyon the owners
naturally attempted to invoke the protection afforded to them by
the right to limit. At the time of the Torrey Canyon incident the
shipowner was able to limit l i a b i l i t y under maritime law,
provided that the loss, damage or injury was sustained without
the privity or knowledge of the owner. The rationale behind the
philosophy of limitation in maritime law was to encourage the
development of the shipping industry by assuring that the
maritime entrepreneur's risks would not exceed the amount of his
investment. In this way the development of a merchant navy would
be encouraged. It has been noted that the right to limit
liability in United States admiralty law in terms of the 1851
Limitation Act56 ' ... was intended to promote investment in the
54M' Gonigle & Zacher, op ci t , 150.
55M 'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, pp126-128.
56Act of March 3, 1851; 9 Stat. 635; 46 use § 181-189
(1988) .
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American shipping industry by making the American industry
competitive with that of Great Britain. ,57
3.3.3.4 Limited liability: the 'Torrey Canyon' case
The United Kingdom and France followed the provisions of the 1957
Convention on Limitation of Liability (1957 Brussels
Convention) .58 The Brussels Convention required the owner of a
vessel to maintain a fund not in excess of 1,000 gold francs,
roughly equivalent to US$67 per adjusted gross ton of the vessel
causing the damage. 59 On this basis, the limitation of liability
for the Torrey Canyon amounted to approximately US$4,75
million. 60 Clearly the application of the 1957 Brussels
Convention was unsatisfactory in the case of the Torrey Canyon
because it provided inappropriate levels of compensation. This
is because the Convention was primarily designed to adjust costs
between shipowner and cargo owner in the event of damage to goods
carried at sea and did not anticipate compensation to third
parties suffering massive losses due to a major oil spill. 61
The 1957 Brussels Convention provided that any damages in excess
57In re: The Glacier Bay 448 AMC per Charles Wiggins,
Ct.J. at 450 see further Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 382, 385,
1941 AMC 430, 432 (1941); University of Tex. Medical Branch v.
United States, 1977 AMC 2607 , 2628-29, 557 F.2d 438, 454 (5
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.s . 820, 1979 AMC 2019 (1978).
58International Convention relating to the Limitation of
the Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships, 10 October, 1957,
reprinted in Benedict on Admiralty Vol.3 (7th Rev. ed., 1983)
5.11 or 1957 A.M.C. 1972. Significantly for claimants in the
Torrey Canyon litigation the United States never signed this
convention.
59International Convention relating to the Limitation of
the Liability of Owners of Sea-going Ships 1957, Article 3.1
(a) .
6°M' Gonigle & Zacher , op ci t, 153.
61Rosenthal & Raper 'Amoco Cadiz and Limitation of
Liability for Oil Spill Pollution: Domestic and International
Solutions' (1985) 5 Virginia Journal of Natural Resources Law
259 at 278.
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of that liability cap are borne by the damaged parties. 62
However, the owner will not be able to limit liability where it
is found that the ' ... occurrence giving rise to the claim
resulted from the actual fault or privity of the owner ... ' .63
The interpretation of the phrase 'actual fault or privity' is
fundamental to the outcome of limitation proceedings. As long ago
as 1894 under s 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, up until
the 1st December, 1986, the 'actual fault or privity' test had
applied in England where shipowners invoked their right to
limitation. 64 In 1958 the Merchant Shipping (Liability of
Shipowners and Others) Act 1958 followed and enlarged upon the
1957 Brussels Convention and amended s 503 to the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1894 but the 'actual fault or privity' test
remained the same. However, the Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC 1976) done at London, on the
19th November, 1976, entered into force on the 1st December,
1986. The United Kingdom had ratified LLMC 1976 on the 31st
January, 1980. Accordingly, as of entering force, the LLMC 1976
brought into application a revised test for owners limitation in
the United Kingdom. The revised test makes it easier for the
shipowner to successfully invoke the right to limit and was also
incorporated into the 1984 and 1992 Protocols to the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention. Nevertheless the construction of the former
'actual fault or privity' test continues to be of crucial
importance in oil pollution cases as it remains the relevant test
for limitation under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
An important aspect of the present application of this test by
the English courts within a corporate structure is that fault or
62 Id.
63International Convention relating to the Limitation of
the Liability of owners of Sea-going Ships, 10 October, 1957
Article 1.1, reprinted in Benedict on Admiralty (7th Rev. ed.,
1983) 5.11 or 1957 A.M.C . 1972 .
64Browne 'Oil Pollution Damage Compensation under the
Civil Liability Convention 1969' in McLean (ed) Compensation
for Damage: An International Perspective (1993) pp.137-164 at
144.
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privity need not attach to the owner himself for it to be legally
imputed to him. On the other hand the fault of anyone in the
employ of the shipowning company shall not necessarily suffice.
In the words of Buckley L.J . in Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. v.
Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd.: 65
the words "actual fault or privity" in my judgement
infer something personal to the owner, something
blameworthy in him as distinguished from constructive fault
or privity such as the fault or privity of his servants or
agents. But the words "actual fault" are not confined to
affirmative or positive acts by way of fault. If the owner
be guilty of an act or omission to do something which he
ought to have done, he is no less guilty of an actual fault
than if the act had been one of commission. To avail
himself of the statutory defence, he must shew that he
himself is not blameworthy for having either done or
omitted to do something or been privy to something. It is
not necessary to shew knowledge. If he has means of
knowledge which he ought to have used and does not avail
himself of them, his omission so to do may be a fault, and,
if so, it is an actual fault and he cannot claim the
protection of the section , 66
In the case of a corporation, some person (or persons), being the
equivalent of the owner has to be found at fault. In English law
one has to look to the 'alter ego' or the 'directing mind and
will' of the company such as a person on the Board of Directors
or in senior management of the company.67
Barracuda TankerThe registered owner of the Torrey Canyon,
Corporation, and the original charterer,
65[1914] 1 K.B. 419.
66 [1914] K.B. 419 at 432 .
UNOCAL, jointly
67Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.
[1915] A.C. 70S, 713, 715.
37
instituted limitation of liability proceedings in the United
States. 68 This application focused on the question as to whether
UNOCAL (the charterer of the Torrey Canyon) could in any way be
construed as an owner or demise charterer of the Torrey Canyon.
This was important because, as noted earlier, in the United
States under the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act,69 owners were
then entitled to limit their liability to the value of the ship
and cargo after the accident and freight then pending, unless
there is a finding of either negligence by the shipowner or of
negligent acts performed 'with[in] the privity or knowledge of
such owner.' 70 This protection is also extended to demise
charterers. 71 In the case of a demise charter (sometimes
referred to as a bareboat charter) the owner yields complete
control of the ship to the charterer. The charterer is
effectively put in the same position as the owner of a ship and
must procure the goods and services necessary to man, victual and
navigate the ship. 72
It was established that Barracuda Tanker Corporation, as owner
of the tanker, was entitled to limit liability under the United
States Limitation of Liability Act to US$48, which was the value
of a single lifeboat salvaged from the wreck. This finding in
favour of Barracuda Tanker Corporation applied in the
68 In the ma t ter of Barracuda Tanker Co., as owner of the
~s.s. Torrey Canyon", and Union Oil Co. of California, for
exoneration from or limitation of liability. 1968 A.M.C. 1711
reported also at 281 F. Supp . 228 (S .N .D.Y. 1968).
69Act of March 3, 1851; 9 Stat. 635; 46 USC § 181-189
(1988) since the passing of the Oil Pollution Act on 18th
August, 1991 the 1851 Act no longer applies to claims for oil
pollution damage. In non-oil pollution claims the 1851 Act
still applies in principle.
704 6 USC app. § 183 (a) (1988).
71 4 6 USC app. § 186 (1988) extends the right of limitation
to 'the charterer of any vessel, in case he shall man
v~ctual, and navigate such vessel at his own expense, , or by
hlS own procurement.'
72 1 9 68 A.M.C. 1714.
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jurisdiction of the United States. Government claimants of France
and the United Kingdom, who had previously taken action against
Barracuda Tanker Corporation in separate proceedings instituted
in Singapore, the Netherlands and Bermuda, did not contest this
decision regarding Barracuda Tanker Corporation.
However the presiding judge Metzner D.J. concluded, also, that
UNOCAL, the original charterer, probably would be entitled to
limit its liability. The judge considered well founded precedent
which favoured a broad interpretation of the term "owner" in
section 183 of the 1851 Act. 73 Benedict summarises the United
States authorities by saying that ownership ' ... inheres in the
party or group by whom, or for whom, the legal title is held.'74
For this reason Metzner D.J . concluded that, although UNOCAL was
not a demise charterer of the Torrey Canyon and could not limit
liability on that basis, nevertheless, he opined, if the
Government claims were to be successful in holding UNOCAL
accountable, it would probably be because UNOCAL was the "owner"
of the vessel. Upon this reasoning Judge Metzner concluded that
he was unable to reach a decision on UNOCAL's right to claim
limitation until the exact foundation of the Government claims
against UNOCAL was established by trial. 75
Judge Metzner also held that 'freight then pending' could not
form the basis of a limitation fund against UNOCAL from which
73Fink v. Paladini, 279 U.S . 59, 1929 A.M.C. 327 (1929);
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Southern Pacific Co., 268
U.S. 146, 1925 A.M.C. 779 (1925); Admiral Towing Co. v.
Wool en , 1961 A.M.C. 2333, 290 F . (2d) 641, 645 (9 Cir., 1961);
Austerberry v United States, 1948 A.M.C. 1682, 169 F. (2d) 583,
593 (6 Cir., 1948); In re Trojan, 1959 A.M.C. 201, 167 F.Supp.
576 (N.D. Cal., 1958); In re Petition of Colonial Trust Co.,
1955 A.M.C. 1290, 124 F.Supp. 73 (D . Conn., 1954); Milwaukee,
1931 A.M.C. 412, 48 F. (2d) 842 (E. D. Wis., 1931). These cases
ha~e held such d~verse parties as shareholders, morgagees,
prlor vendors, llfe tenants, trustees and government agencies
operating privately owned ships in wartime to be "owners"
entitled to limit liability.
74Benedict on Admiralty Vol. 3 (7th Rev. ed., 1983) 5.29.
751969 A.M.C. 1716.
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claims could be made . This was because the charter party
agreement between Union Oil and the sub-charterer (BP Trading
Ltd .) stipulated that freight became due only upon the completion
of the voyage. In 1886 in The Ci ty of Norwhich76 the U. S.
Supreme Court had interpreted ' f r e i ght then pending ' as meaning
the amount of gross freight actually earned on the casualty
voyaqe ."? In this instance the casualty clearly prevented any
freight from passing on to UNOCAL and thereby to the limitation
fund . 7 8
On interlocutory appeal, to the Second Circuit7 9 it was held
that the trial judge had erred in precluding the prosecution of
claims against UNOCAL . The Appeal Court held that at the time of
the disaster UNOCAL was not an owner or a demise charterer of the
Torrey Canyon but was in fact a time charterer. 80 This was
significant because under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851
a time charterer is not ent i t led to evoke the protection of
limitation. It was held that Judge Metzner had erred in
concluding that UNOCAL might be found to be an "owner" within
section 183 and that UNOCAL 's liabili t y could be predicated only
upon its status as an "owner" . 81
This finding conveyed an ominous message to the large companies
owning oil tankers through subsidiaries. The holding of the court
meant that a parent corporation (UNOCAL) of the ship's registered
76118 U.S. 468 (1886 ).
77Id. at 493-95.
781968 A.M.C. 1711.
79Complaint of Barracuda Tanker Co., as owner of the "SiT
Torrey Canyon", and Union Oil Company of California for
exoneration from or limitation of l i ab i li t y v. The United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Republic of
France, and The States of Guernsey, 1969 A.M.C. 1442 reported
a lso a t 409 F. (2d) 1013 .
801969 A.M.C. 1445 .
811969 A.M.C. 1442.
40
owner (Barracuda Tanker Co. ) was not deemed an "owner" under 1851
Act and was therefore subject to liability without limitation.
This message was to become even more evident in the context of
the Amoco Cadiz litigation which occurred much later . Gilmore and
Black make the following observation:
'It is difficult to disagree with the contention that Union
(UNOCAL) was, in truth, the owner of the Torrey Canyon . . . .
On the other hand, the limi t a t i on ideal is widely regarded
as unfair, unjust, and anachronistic. Once it is accepted
that the Limitation Act of 1851 is to be restrictively
rather than broadly construed, the Second Circuit's opinion
in the Torrey Canyon proceedings points the way to imposing
unlimited liability on l arge corporations which, for their
own corporate purposes , choose to describe themselves as
"time charterers" rather than as "owners" of their
fleets . ,82
Furthermore, the Court noted that the nature of the U.K. and
French Government claims were unrelated to the navigation of the
Torrey Canyon. It was held that the foundation of the Government
claim was that their damage was the result of UNOCAL's
participation in the original designing and manufacturing of the
Torrey Canyon in 1958, and t he vessels enlargement in 1965. 83
This train of argument was necessary because any claim founded
on the basis that UNOCAL was actually in 'ownership' or 'control'
of the Torrey Canyon would probably have allowed UNOCAL to assert
limitation. However, the official investigation into the
stranding of the Torrey Canyon found :
'Upon all the evidence, i nc l ud i ng
witnesses, Certificates i s sued by
Shipping and other documents, the
the testimony of the
Lloyd's Register of
Board concludes that
82G. Gilmore and C. Black Th e Law of Admiral ty 2nd ed .
(1975) § 10-10 at 843 .
~1969 A.M.C. 1445.
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there was no mechanical failure or defect aboard the Torrey
Canyon of any kind which could have in any way contributed
to this casualty . So far as is relevant, the vessel and her
equipment were at all times in perfect condition and
functioning properly. In the Board's opinion this casualty
was caused by human error alone. ,84
In the context of the above f inding the Government claim that
UNOCAL had been at fault during the construction and enlargement
of the Torrey Canyon is put to some doubt. Nevertheless the
Appeal Court held that because the claim against UNOCAL was
connected only incidentally with the navigation of the Torrey
Canyon such claims were not subject to limitation. 8s
The maritime law principle that shipowners are permitted to limit
liability was the focus of strong criticism throughout the appeal
judgment. In conclusion, Bonsal D.J . referred to Mr. Justice
Black dissenting in Maryland Casualty Co. vs. Cueb iriq ,"'
'Judicial expansion of the Limited Liability Act at this
date seems especially inappropriate. Many of the conditions
in the shipping industry which induced the 1851 Congress to
pass the Act no longer prevail. And later Congresses, when
they wished to aid shipping, provided subsidies paid out of
the public treasury rather than subsidies paid by injured
persons. ' 87
In their admiralty treatise, Gilmore and Black note that the
Limitation Act "has been attacked by many and defended by almost
84In the Matter of the Stranding of the Steamship Torrey
Canyon, on March 18, 1967 , 196 7 A.M.C. 569 at 576.
~1969 A.M.C. 1442, 1446 .
86
3 4 7 U.S. 409, 437; 1954 A.M .C. 837, 859 (1954).
871 9 6 9 A. M. C. 1442 at 144 6 .
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none" and further note that : 88
'The holding in the limitation cases which have been
decided since the mid-1950's have, with few exceptions,
been adverse to the petitioning shipowner. [T]he argument
that the Limitation of Liability Act has served its time
and should be repealed has become commonplace [The
Limitation Act,] passed in an era before the corporation
had become the standard form of business organization and
before present forms of insurance protection were
available, shows increasing signs of economic
obsolescence.'
In the final analysis, the claims arising out of the wreck of the
Torrey Canyon, which are estimated to have been in the nature of
US$15 million, were settled for US$3 mi.LlLon." The critical
obstacle to the successful prosecution of claims arising from the
Torrey Canyon incident was not establishing fault or negligence
but overcoming the overly protective laws guarding shipowners
right to limit liability.
The official investigation into the stranding of the Torrey
Canyon, conducted by Americans, at the request of the Liberian
government, found that the stranding was solely due to a high
order of negligence on the part of the master. 90 This led one
commentator to note that' [a]s a Liberian Board of Investigation
had found that the sole cause of the casualty was the
master's error of navigation . . . had the United States law been
applicable, [this] would have been a classic case for
limitation.' His reason for making this observation is because
he assumes it unlikely that the master's negligence would have
88Gilmore & Black The Law of Admiralty § 10-4(a) 2nd ed.
(1975) .
89Abecassis & Jarashow , op ci t, 435 .
90The findings of the official investigation into the
stranding of the Torrey Canyon are contained in 1967 A.M.C.
569.
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been construed as due to negligence within the 'privity or
knowledge of the shipowner' .91 One may recall that Bonsal D.J.
had unequivocally held that UNOCAL could not invoke the right to
limit because it was a time charterer and not an owner or a
demise charterer.
Even if at some later point in the judicial process it had been
determined that UNOCAL was in truth an "owner" it would have been
open to the claimants to attempt to break the owners right to
limit. The same rule would have applied to Barracuda Tanker
Corporation. It is worth emphasizing once more that in terms of
the 1851 Limitation of Liability Act the shipowner remains
vicariously liable for the faults of his employees but that he
may be entitled to limit this liability, depending on whether or
not he personally falls foul of the particular standard of fault.
The rationale behind this procedure is that it would be against
public policy to permit a "guilty" shipowner to claim the
privilege of limitation where he had been guilty of personal
fault. 92 It is important to understand the meaning given to the
phrase 'privity or knowledge' by the U.S. Courts. To cut to the
nub of this vast subject it had been held, prior to the Torrey
Canyon litigation, that shipowners must properly staff, equip,
and maintain vessels to ensure their seaworthiness. 93 Therefore,
to conclude that the master of the Torrey Canyon was solely to
blame is an inference which seems not to have taken the entirety
of circumstances into account. Captain Rugiati was clearly not
in good health; he was suffering from tuberculosis, and nervous
exhaustion. Furthermore, he had been on the Torrey Canyon for 366
days without leave. Whether he should have been permitted to
91Bartlett 'In Re Oil Spill By the Amoco Cadiz-Choice of
Law and a Pierced Corporate Veil Defeat the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention' (1985) 10 The Maritime Lawyer 1 at 6.
92Gaskell 'The Amoco Cadiz : (I) Liability Issues' (1985) 3
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 167 at 182.
93See, for example, In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d
708, 715-16 (2d. Cir. 1964 ) , cert. denied sub nom. and
Continental Grain Co. v. Buffalo, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
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command one of the worlds largest sea-going vessels under such
circumstances is certainly questionable in itself. It is
important to note that since the 18th August, 1990, the 1851
Limitation Act is no longer applicable to oil pollution claims
in the United States.
The above rules requiring personal fault of the shipowner must
be critically compared to ordinary principles of tort where the
owner would be vicariously liable for the negligence of his
employees and servants when they operate within the course and
scope of their employment. Limitation, in its form at the time
of the Torrey Canyon incident , may be described as a somewhat
out-moded principle of maritime tort which was particularly
onerous to claimants in significant oil pollution cases. In many
cases, the tanker often was a valueless wreck with no freight
pending. Breaking the owner 's right to limit through proof of
privity or knowledge on the part of the owner also proved a
difficult task for claimants. The outcome of the Torrey Canyon
litigation did not bode well for coastal states and the revision
of existing laws appeared necessary.
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter essentially provides the background in terms of
which the main body of work can unfold. The analysis and
differentiation between certain fundamental concepts was
necessary in order to clarify and define the scope of this study
against the wider context . The historical analysis has
highlighted the various difficulties which faced claimants
attempting to recover damage sustained by way of tanker-source
oil pollution. Inter alia, problems were encountered in
establishing jurisdiction, title to sue and in overcoming the
rules protecting the shipowner from unlimited liability. This
analysis therefore facilitates a discussion of how and why
attempts were made subsequent to the Torrey Canyon incident to
remedy these very real inadequacies on the law.
45
CHAPTER 4
The 1969 Civil Liability Convention
4.1 Origins of the "International Approach"
At the time of the Torrey Canyon spill the existing International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil of
1954, as amended, dealt primarily with the intentional discharge
of oil wastes from ships rather than compensation issues, and as
such provided little assistance to dispute-resolution. As a
result, it became clear to those involved that an attempt to
provide a uniform, equitable and enforceable framework for oil
pollution compensation was a matter of some urgency. The
challenge was taken up by two broad interest groups,
representatives of governments concerned with the issue of oil
pollution, and those bodies influential in the development of
policy for tanker owners and oil importers. Two parallel
responses resulted: which may be referred to as the 'Inter-
governmental response' and the 'Industry Response' .
4.2 Inter-governmental response: An overview
Liability for oil pollution is normally dealt with under the law.
As has already been illustrated there are, however, two areas of
difficulty in dealing with oil pollution from tankers . Firstly,
it may not be clear what law applied to the incident - the law
of the ship's flag, that of the place where the spill occurred,
that of the place where the damage is caused or that of the place
where jurisdiction can be established. In certain circumstances
following a maritime casualty all these laws may differ .
Secondly, it is a basic concept of maritime law that a shipowner
can limit the amount of his liability, usually to a sum related.
to the size of the ship involved .
Accordingly, Governments began to consider means of ensuring that
adequate compensation would be readily available for victims of
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oil pollution by developing a uniform regime for liability and
increasing the limits that then applied. This ultimately led to
the passing of the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage in December 1969 (referred to as the
Civil Liability Convention). Meanwhile, the oil industry had
evolved the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP).
At the time of passing the Civil Liability Convention a
Resolution was passed that a further International Convention
should be prepared to relieve the tanker owner of part of the
financial burden imposed by the Civil Liability Convention and
to ensure that full compensation would be available to victims
of oil pollution. There were two consequences - the oil industry
prepared the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) to cover the period before
any such Convention came into force, and in December 1971, the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution was passed (referred to
as the Fund Convention) .
Briefly the purpose of the Civil Liability Convention is to
provide swift compensation to private parties or governments of
a contracting state where a discharge of pers~stent oil from a
laden tanker causes harm within a contracting state. The Fund
Convention provides supplemental coverage in contracting states
to the Fund Convention and the Civil Liability Convention where
compensation under the Civil Liability Convention is insufficient
or is not provided for under that Convention. Compensation under
the Civil Liability Convention is borne by the tanker owner while
under the Fund Convention compensation is paid by the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund which receives
contributions from oil importers in states contracting to the
Fund Convention. The major benefit of the Civil Liability and the
Fund Conventions is that the flag State of the tanker and the
nationality of the shipowner is irrelevant for determining the
application of the Conventions .
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4.3 Introduction to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
After almost three years had e lapsed since the Torrey Canyon
disaster, an International Le gal Conference was convened in
Brussels by the Inter-Gov ernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) to cons i der two draft conventions on the
subject of marine oil pollution . 1 The draft conventions were the
International Convention Re l a t ing to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Ca s u a l t i e s , which has already been
alluded to,2 and the Internat ional Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage. The Comi t e Marit ime International
(CMI) ,3 had drafted a Convent ion pertaining to Oil Pollution
Liability seven months prior t o IMCO's Brussels Conference. The
CMI draft was subsequently rev ised by IMCO's Legal Committee and
presented to diplomatic representatives of 48 countries at the
Brussels Conference . 4 The preparatory work leading up to the
Conference and the Conferen ce itself were almost certainly
lThe Inter-Governmental Ma r i t i me Consultative Organization
(IMCO) is now called the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). IMO, headquartered i n London , is a branch of the United
Nations and is the primary forum through which attempts are
made at an international level to resolve environmental
problems associated with mari ne transport.
2Se e pp.27-31 of this wor k .
3The International Marit i me Commitee (CMI), formed in 1897
and domiciled in Belgium, is an international organization of
Maritime Law Associations of various nations, representing all
aspects of maritime law. The object of t h e CMI is to
'contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the
unification of maritime and commercial law, maritime customs,
usages and practices.' See Paulsen 'Why the United States
should ratify the 1984 Protocols to the International
Conventions on Civil Liabil ity for Oil Pollution Damage (1969)
and the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971)' (1984/85) 20 The
Forum 164 Appendix A at 177.
4Healy 'The Internat ional Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 ' (1 97 0 ) 1 Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce 317 .
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• 5brought about by the Torrey Canyon exper1ence.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (hereafter referred to as the Civil Liability Convention)
was signed in Brussels on the 29th November, 1969. The states
party to the Convention composed the following preamble to the
convention as a statement of intent:
'Conscious of the dangers of pollution posed by the
worldwide maritime carriage of oil in bulk,
Convinced of the need to ensure that adequate compensation
is available to persons who suffer damage caused by
pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of oil
from ships,
Desiring to adopt uniform international rules and
procedures for determining questions of liability and
providing adequate compensation in such cases,
Agreed (to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention).'
The convention was the first attempt by the international
community, in co-operation with tanker owners, to develop a
mechanism, which, if embraced by sufficient coastal state
governments, would provide a uniform method of compensation for
oil pollution occurring in those countries. It is submitted that
the implementation of a g lobal regime of this nature is a
desirable ideal. The tanker industry has an obvious international
character and, therefore, int ernational regulation, as opposed
to regional regulation, i s appropriate. The Civil Liability
Convention governs the liabi l i ty of shipowners for oil pollution
damage and encapsulates the principle of strict but limited
liability for shipowners . In mo s t circumstances the shipowner
50fficial Records of the In t er na t i on al Conference on
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connexion with the
Carriage of Certain Substances by Sea, 1984 and the
International Conference on the Revision of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention and the 1 9 71 Fund Convention, 1992,
vol.4 at 149 (hereinafter referred to as the Official
Records) .
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will be entitled to limit his liability to an amount which is
linked to the tonnage of his ship. The Convention also creates
a system of compulsory liability insurance.
At this stage cargo owners had managed to avoid any legally
imposed financial responsibility for oil pollution damage caused
by the spillage of oil cargoes transported at sea. Significantly,
however, at the 1969 Conference the focus of attention began to
turn towards the oil industry as a possible source of
compensation to meet the needs of oil pollution victims. Certain
States expressed the view that oil cargo interests should be made
to participate in the compensation regime. 6 The delegation from
the Netherlands, a state with significant oil company interests,
made the following statement on this important issue.
'It may be argued that the risk created by massive
transportation of oil in bulk is not, in the first place,
created by the carriers, but by technical developments in
transportation made primarily in the interests of the oil
industry as a whole. This "industrial risk" should be borne
by the oil industry rather than by the carrier."
These and other such arguments provided the basis for the 1971
Fund Convention. It is the inherently hazardous character of
crude oil compared to other marine cargoes that necessitated the
development of the two-tier compensation regime, which was then
unique in maritime law, whereby shipowners and cargo owners would
share the burden of oil pollution liability. In this Chapter the
complex legal and institutional provisions of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention are discussed. The analysis of this
instrument therefore prepares the pathway towards a consideration
of the second tier Fund Convention which is undertaken in the
next chapter.
60fficial Records vol.2 at 79 citing the Official Records
of the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution
Damage, 1969 (pages 84, 439-440, 537, 624, 633).
'Official Records, vol.2 at 79.
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4.4 Entry into force requirements
It is the norm that maritime conventions come into force either
upon ratification by a certain number of maritime nations or when
a certain "floor" of tonnage , registered in states ratifying the
convention is met. It is not unusual for the coming into force
provisions to require a combination of these two criteria.
Furthermore, upon the entering into force requirements being met
an additional, specified time period must elapse before the
convention finally comes into force.
Due to such pre-conditions valuable time can pass before a
convention enters into force. In order to circumvent this delay,
or the so called "lead" period, states sometimes choose to pre-
empt the entry into force of conventions in their domestic
statute law. The United Kingdom did so in relation to the Civil
Liability Convention by enacting the Merchant Shipping (Oil
Pollution) Act 1971, and in relation to the Fund Convention by
means of the Merchant Shipping Act 1974. 8 This often lengthy
"lead" period is significant when comparison is made between the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the international
conventions and the voluntary pollution regimes. The tanker and
oil industry are more decisive and flexible than the
international community of governments where the development of
instruments governing oil pol lution compensation is concerned.
Once a state has ratified a convention and the convention enters
into force, the state is obliged to enact domestic legislation
based upon the convention. However, it is not necessary for the
domestic legislative instrument to i ncor por a t e the precise text
of the convention. Accordingly i t is not unusual for the terms
8The 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage (Fund Convention), is supplementary to the Civil
Liability Convention, and establishes a regime for
compensating victims when the compensation under the Civil
Liability Convention is inadequate. The Fund Convention
entered into force in 1975.
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of a convention to be tailored to suit the particular
requirements of the enacting state when the convention is
incorporated into its domestic legislation. 9 Therefore, the
precise legal position pertaining to a particular oil pollution
incident, whether resolved under the Civil Liability Convention
or the Fund Convention, may depend on the local legislation
rather than the original convention texts.
Article XV of the Civil Liability Convention governs the coming
into force provisions of the Convention:
'1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the
ninetieth day following the date on which the Governments
of eight States including five States each with not less
than 1,000,000 gross tons of tanker tonnage have either
signed it without reservation as to ratification,
acceptance or approval or have deposited instruments of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the
Secretary-General of the Organization.
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts,
approves or accedes to it the present convention shall come
into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State
of the appropriate instrument .'
The coming into force provisions of the Civil Liability
Convention are fairly normal for international conventions of a
maritime nature except for the unusually short ninety day period
which must elapse after the initial requirements have been met
before the Convention comes into force, and the special hybrid
relationship devised between the number of ratifying states and
tonnage requirements. Upon these requirements being met the Civil
Liability Convention entered into force on 19th June, 1975 .
9As to the enactment of maritime law conventions in
English law, see Gaskell 'The Interpretation of Maritime
Conventions at Common Law' in Gardiner (ed) United Kingdom Law
in the 19905 10 (1990) pp.218-40 .
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4.5 Scope of application
Like most legal instruments , the definitions of essential
concepts governing the Civil Liability Convention have far-
reaching implications for all the parties potentially involved
in oil spills. For instance, the amount of compensation a victim
of oil pollution receives not only depends on the limits
applicable but also upon whether the loss or damage was sustained
in an area covered by the Civil Liability Convention, whether the
Convention covers the type of ship from which the oil emanated
and whether the type of oil causing the pollution will be
considered as "oil" for the purpose of the Convention.
The Civil Liability Convention applies to oil pollution damage
resulting from spills of "persistent oil" from laden tankers.
This is determined by Article 111.1 which, subject to certain
limited defences, provides that :
the owner of a ship at the time of an incident, or
where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at
the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for
any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or
been discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.'
Therefore, where no oil has escaped from a ship no claims under
the Civil Liability Convention arise. Consequently, pure threat
removal measures are not compensable.
4.5.1 Persistent oil spills
For the purpose of Article 111.1 and the Convention as a whole,
oil is defined as any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil,
heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and whale oil, whether carried
on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such ship.lo This
lOCivil Liability Convention, Article 1.5.
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includes all persistent oil including b i.t.umen i P a sphaLt.P and
waste oil. 13 Pollution damage caused by non-persistent
petroleum-based substances such as gas oil, gasoline,
automotive/light diesel oil, kerosene/paraffin oil, white spirit
and similar products are not covered by the either the Civil
Liability or Fund Convention . Clearly, non-persistent oil can
cause pollution damage. In this regard it is worth noting that
when Norway incorporated the Civil Liability Convention into its
domestic legislation it chose to extend the principle of strict
liability to encompass damage caused by non-persistent oil. 14
Experts are sometimes required to determine whether an oil is
persistent or not. 15 Non-hydrocarbon oil, such as silicon oil,
is not encompassed with in the ambit of the definition.
Whale oil was expressly included in the definition of 'oil' at
the request of the Japanese because it had the same viscosity and
persistence as heavy oil and was carried in bulk. 16 In the mid-
1960s, commercial whaling was widespread, even though quotas had
already been established for certain species. In 1964, for
example, the worldwide hunt used highly efficient factory ships
and harpoons to kill 63,001 whales. By 1985, quotas set by the
International Whaling Commission (IWC) had gradually reduced the
kill to 6,600. Finally, in 1986 , seafaring nations agreed to a
11IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.16 at 27 citing
the Qued Gueterini bitumen spill in port of Algiers, Algeria,
18 December 1986.
12IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 42-43
citing the Nancy Orr Gaucher asphalt spill in Hamilton
Harbour, Ontario (Canada) on 25 July 1989.
13IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 45-48
citing the Volgoneft 263 waste oil spill off the Swedish coast
on 14 May 1990.
l40fficial Records, vo1.2 at 346 para. 59.
150fficial Records, vol.2 at 341 para.29.
16Ab7cassis & . Jaras~ow Oil Poll ution from Ships:
Internat~onal, Un~ted K~ngdom and United States Law and
Practice 2nd ed. (1985) 197 fn .8 .
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worldwide prohibition on commercial whaling. In May of 1993 the
IWC voted 18/6 to extend the ban on whaling for another year.
Since the current ban came into effect, Japan, Iceland and Norway
have led a campaign to allow some whaling. Japan and Norway have
also continued to use an exemption in the IWC rules that permits
killing whales for scientific purposes. 17 The Fund Convention
covers only persistent hydrocarbon oils; accordingly, the IOPC
Fund will not pay compensation for pollution damage caused by
whale oil. Clearly the whale oil provision is of little
consequence, however, it serves as a sad reminder of humanity's
ruthless exploitation of wildlife for short term commercial gain.
4.5.2 Ships carrying oil as cargo
For the purpose of the Civil Liability Convention, '[a] "ship"
means any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type
whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo. ,18 As such
the Civil Liability Convention applies only to ships which
actually carry oil in bulk, for example, normally laden tankers.
Pollution damage caused by spills from the bunkers of tankers
during ballast voyages is not covered by the Convention, nor are
spills of bunker oil from ships other than tankers. Passenger and
dry cargo vessels are thus excluded, except in cases where at the
time of the incident oil in bulk is being carried as cargo. Where
this is the position the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
will also apply to the escape or discharge of bunker oil. 19
Similarly, where pollution damage is caused from the bunkers of
a tanker while that tanker is laden normally with a cargo of
persistent oil, that damage will be included within the ambit of
17Chisholm 'Prince of the tides' June 14 1993 Maclean's
50-52 . '
18Civil Liability Convention , Article I.l.
19Healy, op ci t, 318.
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the Civil Liability Convention. 20
Residues of persistent cargo oil which is discharged at sea while
a ship is on a ballast voyage will not fall within the ambit of
the definition of oil because such oil is not actually being
carried in bulk as cargo. 21 Abecassis and Jarashow et al suggest
that damage caused by the escape or discharge of persistent oil
from the slops or bilges of a ship laden with a bulk cargo of
persistent oil should be encompassed within the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions. 22 As residues are not carried in bunkers,
this view would be supported only if persistent oil in slops or
bilges could be described as 'carried on board the vessel as
cargo'. The word, cargo, analogous to goods, would seen to imply
something of value, to be delivered, therefore the position
adopted by the learned commentators may be difficult to support.
Pollution damage caused by combination carriers also known as
Ore/Bulk/Oil (OBO) carriers is included where such vessels are
transporting persistent oil in bulk as cargo. 23 But where an OBO
20ropc Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 49 citing
the Rio Orinoco where the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
applied to a spill of 30-40 tonnes of heavy fuel although none
of the cargo of asphalt escaped. This incident occurred on
16th October 1990, in the Gulf of St Lawrence, causing
pollution damage to the south coast of Anticosti Island which
is the territory of Canada. Canada was party to both liability
Conventions at the time of this incident.
21ropc Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 36 where
in the context of the alleged spill of residual oil from the
Tolmiros it was concluded that residual oil (slops) not
intended to be discharged to the owner/receiver was neither
'cargo' nor 'carried as cargo' in the ordinary sense of the
words or as these words should be construed for the purpose of
the Civil Liability or Fund Conventions.
22Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit 196 para.10-11.
23ropc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 73. While
approaching La Corufia harbour in Spain the Greek OBO carrier
Aegean Sea with a cargo of approximately 80,000 tonnes of
crude oil ran aground. Extensive pollution damage occurred. It
was accepted that this cargo met the requirements of both
compensation conventions.
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carrier has changed from an oil cargo to an ore cargo and has
retained oil residues on board in a slop tank, pollution damage
caused by a subsequent escape of oil from the slop tank or bunker
tanks will not be covered. 24 Pollution damage caused by sea-
going barges, whether propelled (towed or pushed) or self-
propelled, carrying persistent oil in bulk will certainly be
covered. 25
Difficulties arises where pollution damage is caused from a
discharge of persistent oil from tankers which are being used to
store oil in bulk. Abecassis and Jarashow et al suggest that this
source of oil pollution falls outside the application of the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions because such oil cannot
properly be described as constituting cargo. They suggest that
cargo must mean 'something which is on board for the purpose of
being moved by that ship ... rather than something which is on
board for the purpose of being stored prior to movement by
another ship.,26 In support of this view it may be added that
even if the meaning of the phrase 'actually carrying oil in bulk
as cargo' is held to include oil stored on a ship, it is
suggested from the preamble to the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions that these regimes were intended to cover only the
transport of oil and not storage. The preamble refers to 'the
dangers of pollution posed by the worldwide maritime carriage of
oil in bulk.' Unlike the words 'cargo' and 'carrying' which may
be broadly construed the word 'carriage' perhaps suggests the
conveying or transportation of oil. At this juncture it is
elucidating to consider a definition proposed by the Delegation
from the Government of Poland at the 19B4 Conference, in terms
of which the notion "carriage by sea" was defined to mean:
24Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit 195 para.1Q-QB.
25IO~C F~nd Annual Report 19?1, section 12.2 at 52 citing
the appllcatlon of the compensatl0n conventions to the spill
of a bulk cargo of heavy fuel oil from the sea-going barge
Vistabella in the Caribbean on 7 March, 1991.
26Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit , 196 para.1Q-Q9 .
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the displacement operation of the hazardous
substances between the point of loading on the ship and the
point of discharging therefrom; it comprises also the
period from the time when hazardous substances enter on
board ship on loading, to the time they cease to be present
on board ship on discharge. ,27
It would seem that this definition would encompass pollution
damage caused by tankers used for the storage of oil.
It must therefore be conceded that this is an open question at
present, which may reasonably be interpreted in favour of either
view. The particular circumstances and the intention of the cargo
owner may be persuasive. The present writer adheres to the view
that, in principle, storage tankers should be encompassed within
the ambit of the Convention.
It is suggested by the present writer that the view put forward
by Abecassis and Jarashow et al is unnecessarily restrictive and
that damage caused by spills from storage tankers should be
admissible under the Civil Liability Convention. Where persistent
oil is stored on board a tanker with the intention of trans-
shipping that oil to another tanker such oil should rightly be
considered cargo carried at sea . It is artificial to assert that
a load of bulk oil contained in a tanker is not a cargo because
the tanker is not in motion. Such an interpretation is not in
keeping with the purpose of the Civil Liability Convention which
is to compensate victims of pollution damage caused by spills of
persistent oil from tankers. It should be noted that the CRISTAL
contract covers spills from oil i n storage tankers
For the Civil Liability Convention to apply, the pollution must
stem from a discharge of persistent oil from a laden tanker. The
Civil Liability Convention would not therefore cover a spill from
a ruptured pipeline loading to a tanker at an offshore terminal.
270fficial Records, vol.1 at 321 para.2.
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This is because the oil would not at that point be on the tanker
and the offshore terminal and pipeline will not qualify as a
'ship' for the purpose of the Civil Liability CorrverrtLon v "
However, where a normally laden tanker is transferring oil to
another ship or an offshore terminal and a spill occurs, the
Civil Liability and the Fund Conventions will in principle be
applicable to pollution damage.
The 'ship' must be a sea-going vessel or capable of travelling
on the sea. warships and other state-owned or state-operated
ships used for the time being on non-commercial government
service are excluded from the provisions of the Civil liability
Convention. 29 State-owned ships used for normal commercial
purposes are, however, subject to the Convention.
4.5.5 Geographical application
The location where the pollution damage is caused is crucial to
the question of whether compensation will be available under the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. This is because both
conventions apply only in party states. Furthermore, many states
are party to the Civil Liability Convention but are not party to
the Fund Convention. 30 By choosing not to participate in the
Fund Convention such states are rejecting a large and certain
source of compensation which can be particularly important in the
28For an analysis of the Offshore Pollution Liability
Agreement (OPaL) which may provide compensation in such
circumstances see Annexure Two.
29Civil Liability Convention, Article XI.1.
30As at the 31 March 1993 the following States were Party
to the Civil Liability Convention but not to the Fund
Convention. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China,
Columbia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala,
Lebanon , New Zealand , Panama , Peru, Saint Vincent and the
Granadines , Senegal, Singapore , South Africa, Switzerland
Yemen Arab Republic. citing ; IOPC Fund General Informatio~ on
Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage February
1992, Annex at 21. IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 2 at
8-9.
59
event of major oil spills. The reason for doing so is usually
financial and involves the estimation and assumption of risk.
Risk, in this context, means, the expected net cost of
ratification, considering all possible costs and benefits,
weighted against the probability of an oil spill occurring.
Certain states may consider, because of a low historical
incidence of dangerous oil spills in their territory, that claims
exceeding the limits under the Civil Liability Convention are not
likely to arise. Also, they may think that joining the Fund
Convention would in effect mean that they would have to fund
other party states with higher i n c i de n c e s of oil pollution. Until
recently this had been the position adopted by the Australian
Transport Advisory Counc.i.Lv " However, Australia and certain
other states are expected to adopt the Fund Convention in the
near future. 32
Article II of the Civil Liability Convention governs the specific
geographical application:
'This Convention shall apply exclusively to pollution
damage caused on the territory including the territorial
sea of a Contracting State and to preventive measures taken
to prevent or minimize such damage.'
Neither the Civil Liability or Fund Conventions define the
meaning of 'the territorial sea '. The interpretation of this
term, and the extent of the area it encompasses has not been
constant and it is now wider than it had been in 1969.
Traditionally it was three naut ical miles . It is now generally
accepted, and is the case under Article 3 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention, that coastal states may claim 12 nautical miles
31Springall 'P&I Insurance and Oil Pollution' (1988) 6
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 25 at 34.
32Legislation implementing the Fund Convention is in an
advanced stage in Australia, Belgium, Brazil Chile Colombia
• I , ,
Malaysla, Panama, Saudi Arabia and Senegal. citing IOpe Fund
Annual Report 1992, section 2 at 9.
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(22 km) from the baseline as the physical extent of their
territorial sea. 33 The Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
apply also to pollution damage caused in the internal waters of
party states. Internal waters are waters landward of the baseline
including; estuaries, river mouths, rivers, lakes, canals,
harbours and ports. Pollution damage caused in the territory of
the party state is also included.
It is not necessary that an incident at sea giving rise to
pollution damage under the Civil Liability Convention actually
occurs within the territorial sea or internal waters of a party
state. An "incident" means any occurrence, or series of
occurrences having the same origin, which causes pollution
damage. 34 Accordingly, where persistent oil is discharged
outside the territorial sea but pollution damage is nevertheless
caused in the territorial waters or in the territory of a party
state such damage will be compensable.
Of course, pollution damage can occur outside the limits of the
territorial sea; and the Civil Liability and the Fund Convention
will not generally apply in such cases. Any damage done to
natural resources, fishing equipment or other property such as
ships and off-shore installations, will not be covered in these
non-territorial areas. However, the costs of preventive measures
which are undertaken beyond territorial waters are compensable
where such measures are reasonable and taken to prevent the
threat of pollution damage anticipated in the territorial seas
or in the territory of a party state. This approach is consistent
with, and complements, the rights conferred upon coastal states
by the 1969 Intervention Convention, which permit such states to
undertake preventive measures on the high seas.
When, it may then be asked, will preventive measures taken beyond
33Fields & Glazewski 'Marine Systems' in Fuggle & Rabie
(eds) Environmental Management in South Africa (1992) at 327.
34Civil Liability Convention, Article 1.8.
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the territorial sea in an attempt to minimize pollution damage
within the territorial sea be reasonable? Obviously, the further
seaward from the extent of the territorial sea that the
preventive activities are carried out the greater difficulty the
claimant may experience in establishing the reasonableness of his
c La i.m.:" In this regard, the argument is frequently made that
oil spills significant distances out at sea are better left to
disperse naturally and that such spills cause insignificant
damage to the marine environment. It is also argued that
unnecessary attempts to combat such spills can result in very
high claims for preventive measures which may prejudice the
likelihood of bona fide oil pollution victims recovering the full
extent of their damage. 36
It must be emphasised that the word 'exclusively' in Article 11
means that the Civil Liability Convention shall provide
compensation only for pollution damage in that specific
geographical area and does not mean that the Convention is the
exclusive remedy for oil pollution claimants in party states. 37
It will be seen how further remedies are available against other
parties to which liability may attach and how actions may be
initiated in jurisdictions other than the loci delicti.
4.6 Pollution liability under the Civil Liability Convention
4.6.1 Introduction
Most claims for oil pollution damage under the provisions of the
Civil Liability Convention are settled out of court by the
relevant P&l Club. The quantum and nature of these settlements
are strictly confidential and information is not made available
350fficial Records, vol.2 at 368 para.43 .
360fficial Records , vol.2 a t 362 para.8 and at 363 para.9.
37Ba r t l e t t 'In Re Oil Spil l By the Amoco Cadiz-Choice of
Law and a Pierced Corporate Veil Defeat the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention' (1985) 10 The Maritime Lawyer 1 at 10
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to the public . Consequently, t h e r e is dearth of information as
to the interpretation of the definition of "pollution damage" and
related definitions contained in the Civil Liability
Convention . 38 Furthermore , details concerning claims settled
under TOVALOP, TOVALOP Supplement and CRISTAL are also not made
pUblic. 39 By contrast, all settlements made by the IOPC Fund are
made public through the IOPC Fund Annual Reports. As such
settlements supplement those under the Civil Liability
Convention, and as the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions share
the same definitions of 'pollut ion damage', 'preventive measures'
and ' incident' ,40 the IOPC Fun d Annual Reports provide an
important source of information for the assessment of claims
under both conventions. Clause 6 of the IOPC Fund's Memorandum
of Understanding with the International Group of P&l Clubs
concluded on 5th November, 1980 states that:
. .. the Clubs and the IOPC Fund will exchange views and
will consult with one another when an incident occurs so
that the term "pollution damage" which has the same
definition in the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund
Convention, receives the same i n t e r p r e t a t i on by the Clubs
and by the IOPC Fund. ,41 (emp ha s i s provided by the present
writer)
In this regard, referring to the Memorandum of Understanding, R. H
38Jacobsson & Trotz 'The Definition of Pollution Damage in
the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and
the 1971 Fund Convention' (1986 ) 17 Journal of Maritime Law
and Commerce 467 at 470; Browne 'Oil Pollution Damage
Compensation under the Civil Liability Convention 1969' in
McLean (ed) Compensation for Damage: An International
Perspective (1993) pp.137-164 at 149 .
39Becker 'AcronYmS and Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage from Tankers' (1983) 18 Texas International Law Journal
475 at 478 .
4°Fund Convention, Article 1. 2.
41The text of this Memorandum of Understanding is
contained in the IOPC Fund Annual Report 1980, Annex 11 .
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Ganten, who was the first Director of the IOPC Fund, makes the
following important statement :
'The IOPC Fund co-operates very closely with the
shipowner's insurer when dealing with a claim for pollution
damage. This co-operation ensures that there will be no
conflicting decisions as to the justification of a claim
under the CLC (Civil Liability Convention) and the Fund
Convention. ,42
Abecassis and Jarashow note that' ... because of the IOPC Fund's
policy of reaching agreement with claimants without recourse to
the courts whenever possible , t he practice of the IOPC Fund on
what items are admissible is crucial. Clause 6 of the Memorandum
of Understanding makes this pract ice even more important, for it
affects the practice of the insurers belonging to the
International Group of P&l Clubs.'43 The definitions governing
the determination of pollution damage are identical in both
Conventions . Also the Conventions were developed to serve the
same purposes. Therefore, in the absence of compelling reasons
to the contrary, both Convent ions should naturally be based on
the same approach.
Accordingly, a better understanding of the notion of pollution
damage will be reached after the reader has been introduced to
the provisions of the Fund Convention and an analysis of the
actual claims practice of the I OPC Fund. Notwithstanding this
observation, a preliminary anal ys is of the notion of "pollution
damage" under the Civil Liabi l i ty Convention is necessary even
at this early juncture .
4.6.2 Pollution damage defined
42Ganten 'The International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund' (1984) vo1.4 No.12 Environmental Policy and Law 5 at 7 . .
43Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit , 274-75 para.11-53.
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Within the specified geographical area the type of pollution
damage claimable under the Civil Liability Convention is
determined by the following definition:
'"Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the
ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the
escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such
escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of
preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by
preventive measures.,44
The Civil Liability Convention applies only to loss or damage
caused by contamination and preventive measures taken after oil
has actually been discharged . Damage to property caused by oil
pollution clearly falls within the notion of 'pollution damage' .
The conventions also apply to consequential loss suffered by
owners or users of property or resources that has been
contaminated or damaged. Claims for personal injury and death
will also be included. Further, 'pollution damage' includes the
cost of 'preventive measures ' which are any reasonable measures
taken, after an incident has occurred, to prevent or minimize
pollution damage. 45 Government and private cleanup operations
are compensable as long as the measures are reasonable.
Preventive operations undertaken after oil has escaped into the
sea are also compensable. These would include salvage operations
with the primary purpose of preventing pollution and the use of
oil dispersants. This is a very important point and will be
further amplified in the analysis of the admissibility of claims
for pollution damage under the Fund Convention.
The Civil Liability Convention does not apply to so-called 'pure
threat removal measures ' which are either preventive measures so
successful that there is no actual spillage of oil from the ship
involved or where preventive measures are taken but the feared
44Civil Liability Convention, Article I.6.
45Civil Liability Convention, Article I .7.
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oil spill simply does not eventuate. The non-application of the
conventions in such cases is because no oil has actually escaped
from the ship.
'The definition of "pollution damage" in the Conventions is not
very clear. ' 46 This 'lack of c larity' was partly intentional.
The authors of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions intended
to provide a flexible definition of a general nature. The exact
interpretation and delimitation of the notion of 'pollution
damage' was largely left to the discretion of courts of the lex
fori. 47 Local courts will interpret the definition according to
their national legal traditions and the general principles of the
law of tort which apply in the particular jurisdiction. Wide
divergencies of interpretation occur in different jurisdictions
and a uniform meaning of 'pollution damage' may in truth be
unobtainable. Indeed the desirability of a uniform definition has
been questioned. 48 The notion of 'pollution damage' is a
constantly evolving concept and in the sphere of admiralty law
is as yet in an embryonic state of development. While admiralty
law is acknowledged as one of the oldest legal disciplines, in
contrast, environmental law i n general and marine environmental
law in particular, which began developing only during the 1960s,
has a much shorter history and a different emphasis. 49 A
flexible definition has the benefit of permitting courts the
degree of latitude required to develop and adapt the scope of
this concept and thereby meet the differing economic, social,
technological, moral and environmental needs of the international
community. This consideration was acknowledged at the 1992
International Diplomatic Conference on the Revision of the 1969
46IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.4 (a) at 58.
47Brodecki 'New definition of pollution damage' [1985] 3
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ 382 at 382.
48Brodecki , op cit, 383.
49White-Harvey ' Bl a ck Tide at t he Convergence of Admiralty
and Environmental Law' (1991) 1 Journal of Environmental Law
and Practice 259 at 260 .
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Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention in the
Presidential Address delivered by Dr L.M. Singhvi when he
expressed the view that; , .. . law should ideally be a product
of the conciliation of competing interests and a balancing of
conflicting pulls and pressures. ,50 A situation must be avoided
where the laws of liability and compensation are fixed within an
inelastic and unyielding framework, as such laws are the very
'tools of social engineering' and need to evolve. 51 For this
reason many of the interpretations of certain concepts must not
be taken as cast in stone but should preferably be seen as
tentative or provisional starting points from which the outer
limits of such concepts may be explored. However, it is conceded
that a non-uniform definition of pollution damage can raise
problems in respect of the Fund Convention. Such issues will be
better developed once the Fund Convention and the operation of
the lOPC Fund have been discussed in more detail.
4.7 Strict Liability
Strict liability, also referred to as 'no-fault' liability,
results in a pre-designated responsible party becoming legally
bound to provide compensation in the event of damage occurring
from a particular pre-identified type of activity regardless as
to fault on the part of the responsible party .
4.7.1 Who bears strict liability
Under the Civil Liability Convention the owner of a tanker is
said to be strictly liable for pollution damage. An "Owner" is
described as 'any individual or persons registered as the owner
of the ship or, in the absence of registration, the person or
persons owning the ship .' 52 The system whereby liability is
SOOfficial Records , vol .4 at 153.
slBrown ' The lessons of the Torrey Canyon: international
law aspects ' (1968) 21 Current Legal Problems 113 at 116.
s2Civil Liability Convention, Article 1.3.
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strictly channelled to the registered owner has generally worked
well because the owner is easily identifiable and is required to
establish that he is adequately insured as a precondition to
being permitted to trade with member states of the Civil
Liability Convention.
At the 1969 Conference the U.S.S.R. raised a specific problem
concerning ships in socialist countries. In socialist countries
the position was that the shipping fleet was owned by the State
but operated by shipping companies which constituted individual
corporate bodies. The U. S . S .R. wanted the shipping companies, not
the State, to be held liable under the Convention. To accommodate
this view a proviso was attached to the definition of an owner
which provides that: ' ... in the case of a ship owned by a State
and operated by a company which in that State is registered as
the ship's operator, "owner" shall mean such company. ,53 In such
situations it was agreed by the delegates that claimants would
still have recourse to the State which was the beneficial owner
of the ship. 54 The beneficial owner may be described as the
party which ultimately benefits from the operation of the ship.
This proviso is considerably less important in the light of the
dissolution of the U.S.S.R on the 26th December, 1991, and what
seem to be a resurgent market oriented economy in most formerly
socialist states. Nevertheless, numerous state owned tankers and
general cargo ships remain in operation world-wide.
4.7.2 The nature of strict liability
Within the context of oil pollution liability it is often stated
that strict liability means that the owner will be liable in the
absence of fault. This is not a particularly precise description
of the position for the purpose of the Civil Liability
Convention. The concepts of 'fault' and 'strict liability'
53Civil Liability Convention, Article I.3.
54Gaskell (A) 'The Amoco Cadiz : (I) Liability Issues'
(1985) 3 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 167 at
191.
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require more detailed elaboration .
As a general statement , liability based on fault requires
specific mental elements, ranging from intention to mere
inadvertence. Different forms of ' intention' may be required to
satisfy the element of fault in relation to different types of
tortious or delictual conduct . For example, some torts or delicts
demand malice, others mere knowledge or recklessness in relation
to certain circumstances. Furthermore , inadvertence or negligence
may be measured according to a subjective or objective standard .
In the same way, the legal term ' s t r i c t liability' is capable of
supporting various different meanings. Absolute liability is
strict liability in the purest form and excludes all defences .
If absolute liability applied to oil spills from tankers no
causal connection would be required between the person held
liable and the damaging event . The fact that an oil spillage
occurred from a tanker and damage resulted would automatically
imply the liability of the the r eby responsible party. Other
degrees of strict liability fit in between the standard of
absolute liability and liabil i ty based on fault. 55 The position
under the Civil Liability Convention is that the tanker owner has
been forced to assume a form of strict liability. This form of
liability is not absolute liability because the tanker owner is
permitted to invoke certain defences . The tanker owner may also
limit his liability to a determinable amount where he is able to
establish that the incident l eadi ng to the pollution damage
occurred without his actual fault or privity. Loosely speaking,
the tanker owner is permitted t o limit his liability under the
Civil Liability Convention i n exchange for accepting limited
liability for oil pollution damage without the claimant being
required to establish the fault of the owner. Claimants have only
to show that damage occurred wi t h i n a party state, which was
caused by a spill from a part icular vessel. The claimant does not
have to show fault on the part of the owner, charterer or
servants or agents of the owne r . This i s in keeping with the
55Englard The Philosophy of Tort Law (1993) pp. 21-27.
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primary objective of the Civil Liability Convention which is not
to attribute blame but rather to establish a reliable legal
mechanism providing compensation to victims of oil pollution
damage.
At the 1969 Civil Liability Convention Conference, in Brussels,
three broad positions were adopted by the delegates on the
question of strict liability. These different viewpoints were
largely determined by the dominant vested interest of the country
of origin.
Firstly, certain coastal states with environmental interests,
together with a significant number of developing nations with
negligible shipping interests favoured strict liability. Canada
headed this contingent, together with the United States, France,
Germany and Italy. These states took the position that strict
liability imposed on the shipowner would suffice without the
implementation of joint liability for oil interests. Proponents
of this position where often significant tanker owners (but at
the same time major oil importers) who were loath to impose an
additional burden on the expense of oil imports.
Secondly, other coastal states supported the implementation of
strict or absolute liability with shipowners and cargo interests
jointly liable for pollution damage. At the time, this was
considered a radical position, but subsequently certain
individual states of the United States have chosen to adopt
legislation which goes even further than this 'radical' proposal.
Thus, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina,
Oregon and Washington impose strict liability on both vessels and
cargo-owner and the right to limit liability for oil pollution
in those states is not available. 56 It is suggested, here, that
despite the protestations of the oil interest lobby groups this
approach will increasingly become more universally accepted.
56See generally Benedict on Admiralty Chapter IX 'Marine
Oil Pollution ' (W. T Miller and J.G. Braunreuther Rev. de .,
1992 ) § 113 State Pollution Laws.
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Thirdly, most shipowning countries supported the traditional
shipowner fault based liability . At that time, the four largest
shipowning countries; Liberia, the United Kingdom, Japan and
Norway opposed any change from the traditional scheme. Some large
shipping states wanted to maintain the shipowners' customary
liabilities but attach additional pollution liability to the
cargo owners. These states included Belgium, Greece, India,
Denmark, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden. The majority of
European maritime states opposed the imposition of strict
liability on the shipowner without, at the same time, the oil
interests bearing at least a portion of this liability.57
4.7.3 Absolute defences
Before discussing the provisions which allow the shipowner to
limit his liability under the Civil Liability Convention it is
appropriate to explain the limited criteria, which, if
successfully invoked, will exonerate the shipowner and his
insurer from liability. These criteria constitute a departure
from pure 'no-fault' liability or absolute liability.
4.7.3.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, at the Civil Liability Convention Conference
certain states were against strict liability in its purest form.
A compromise, proposed by the delegation of the United Kingdom,
saw the incorporation of traditional exceptions to the principle
of strict liability. The specific exemptions from the principle
of strict liability were incorporated into the Civil Liability
Convention as a practical matter because in 1969 the risks
57M'Gonigle & Zacher Pollution, Politics and
International Law: Tankers at Sea (1979) 170~ Rosenthal &
Raper :Amoco cadi7 and Limitation of Liability for Oil Spill
P~ll~t~on: Domestlc and International Solutions' (1985) 5
V~rg~n~a Journal of Natural Resources Law 259 at 280 .
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covered by these exceptions were uninsurable. 58 Therefore, it
was argued that had these risks not been excluded from the
compensation regime, tanker owners would not have been able to
obtain the requisite liability insurance. Without such insurance
the system of compensation would have been unworkable.
Certainly the implementation of an additional, separate liability
limit specifically to meet the risks of oil pollution damage over
and above the normal risks of the marine venture would inevitably
increase the exposure of the insurance market. Considerable
emphasis was placed on accommodating the professed commercial
limitations of the marine insurance infrastructure. However, not
all states placed such a high premium on the concerns of the
insurance market as did the United Kingdom. The United States,
for instance, adopted the position that the Convention should be
drafted in the interests of the victims of oil pollution and that
the substance of the Convention should not be dictated by a small
group of insurers. The United States delegation seemed to assume
that marine insurers would be able to adapt to whatever new
provisions were adopted. 59
As a result of the U. K. compromise the principle of strict
liability applies except where the limited absolute defences
contained in Article III. 2 are invoked successfully by the tanker
owner. These limited defences can be described as force majeure
58Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 204 also at 205 the same
authors, quoting from LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.35, OR 596, note that
the Delegation from the United Kingdom \ .. . made it clear
that insurance was available on the London market if, but only
. if, those exceptions to liability were adopted.'
59M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 171. It is noteworthy that
the present position adopted by the United States concerning
certificates of financial responsibility required under § 1016
of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 has not changed very much from
that expressed in 1969. The United States continues to demand
~ high degree of cover from largely European based maritime
lnsurers .
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type exceptions such as war, terrorism, other acts of God60 and
Governmental failure to maintain navigational aids. Generally the
grounds for exemption are very limited, and the owner is liable
for pollution damage in almost all incidents. Clearly any
combination of the exceptions, dealt with below, may be invoked
by the tanker owner.
4.7.3.2 Hostilities and irresistible natural phenomena
Article 111.2 (a) of the Civil Liability Convention provides
that:
'No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the
owner if he proves that the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil
war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character.'
On the 10th August, 1987, the Panamanian registered tanker Texaco
Caribbean (270,015 deadweight tons) fully laden with a cargo of
Iranian crude oil struck a mine off Fujariah in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) , spilling 7,500 tonnes of oil. At the time of this
incident the UAE was party to both the Civil Liability and Fund
Convent i ons c f' The spilled oil dispersed into the sea without
causing quantifiable damage. Nevertheless, a situation had arisen
which could possibly have caused significant pollution damage to
the UAE coastline and losses incurred by way of preventive
60Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, at 205 note that the
exception referred to in the Civil Liability Convention
Article 111.2 (a), which refers to oil pollution damage caused
by an irresistible natural phenomena, is more limited than the
traditional defence of an act of God. An 'act of God' may be
described as an event that is the result of natural forces and
which arises without human intervention.
61The United Arab Emirates had acceded to both the 1969
Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention on 15
December, 1983.
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measures. 62 Such damage would have been attributed to war, which
is specifically excluded from the Convention. It must be
appreciated that where damage results from one of the exceptions
this does not mean the shipowner is exempt from liability. All
this means is that the Civil Liability Convention will not apply.
The owners liability will be settled under other applicable law
and in most cases will be covered by P&l insurance or war risks
insurance.
For the second part of the defence to be successfully invoked the
tanker owner bears the burden of proving that the natural
phenomenon was exceptional and irresistible. Abecassis and
Jarashow et al are of the view that the exception would not seem
to include hurricanes because although a hurricane may be
described as an exceptional natural phenomenon it is not
irresistible as modern tankers are designed to navigate
hurricanes. 63 The owner must also prove that it was inevitable
that the natural phenomena had the effect on the tanker that it
did. Therefore, by implication, where the owner could have
avoided the exceptional and irresistible natural phenomena by
alternative action or by exercising caution he may not be able
to invoke this defence. It has been suggested that for the
exception to apply, the tanker owner must show that in no
circumstances could anyone have avoided the accident. 64 This
suggestion may well be correct in respect of the defence of 'a
natural phenomena of an except ional, inevitable and irresistible
character' but the same submission is more tenuous in respect of
the first part of the exception ie: the act of war provision.
From the point of view of shipowners the utility of the above
defence may not be as limited as the commentators above suggest.
62Browne, op cit, 152-153 .
63Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit 205 para.10-37.
64Forster ' Ci v i l Liability of Shipowners for Oil
Pollution ' 23 (1973) J.B.L. 26; cited by Abecassis & Jarashow,
op cit, 205 fn.28.
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Michael Bundock notes that under English maritime law an
'irresistible' circumstance has been held to be a situation which
the defendant could not have prevented through the exercise of
reasonable precautions65 and an ' i nev i t ab l e ' event is one which
could not possibly have been prevented by ordinary care, caution
and maritime skill. 66 The learned commentator furthermore notes
that the test for both standards of conduct is subj ective. 67
Therefore it is possible that a hurricane would satisfy the
stipulated conditions because al though modern tankers may be
designed to navigate such conditions a less modern tanker or
other oil carrying ship, such as a barge, may not. It must be
recognised that the interpretat ion of the provisions of the Civil
Liability Convention lies with the courts of the party state
where the damage was sustained . Therefore, in most instances,
English maritime law will not be applicable.
4.7.3.3 Intent of third parties
The tanker owner will also escape liability where he is able to
. prove that the pollution damage :
'(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with
intent to cause damage by a third party.' 68
The inclusion of the word 'wholly' effectively prevents the
t anke r owner from escaping liabi l i t y under the Civil Liability
Convention where the third party takes action or omits to take
action after an initial casualty . In this way governments are not
prejudiced where they deliber ately damage an already damaged
65Nugent v. Smith (1876 ) 3 Asp MLC 198,205.
66 Th e Virgi l (1 8 4 3) 2 Wm Rob 201, 205 .
67Bundock Solici tors Journal 5 February 1993 at 97.
68Civil Liability Convention, Article 111 .2 (b) .
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· d f . 69tanker in order to prevent pollutlon amage rom occurrlng.
Also it could be argued that even where a government agency
deliberately damages a tanker and that action is the whole cause
of the pollution damage which ensues, the shipowner may not be
able to invoke the exception i f the government agency acted
without the 'intent' to cause damage. For example the government
agency may have acted in a reasonable fashion under the
circumstances to prevent oil pollution from occurring . Generally
this exception envisages situat ions where, for instance, vandals,
arsonists, pirates or even perhaps extreme environmentalists
deliberately damage a tanker and oil pollution results.
The following case constitutes an example of a dispute where the
Article Ill. 2 (b) exception was unsuccessfully raised by the
shipowner . The facts of this ca s e are that on the 18th December,
1986, the Oued Gueterini , an Algerian tanker of 1,576 grt. was
unloading bitumen at the port of Algiers when a quantity of
bitumen escaped into the harbour . Fortunately no pollution damage
was caused in the actual harbour but about 15 tonnes of bitumen
did, however, enter the sea-water intake of a nearby power
station . This caused the temporary shut-down of the power station
while certain contaminated equipment was cleaned . The owner
suffered a financial loss a s a result of this closure and
incurred expenses in cleaning t he contaminated equipment.
At the time of this incident Algeria was party to both the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions . 70 Accordingly, owners of the
power station sought to recover their losses in the Court of
Algiers against the shipowner ' s P&l Insurer and the IOPC Fund as
is provided for under the Civ i l Liab i l i t y and Fund Conventions
69Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, at 205 cite the example of
the government intervention in the case of the Torrey Canyon
in 1967 and the Amoco Cadiz in 1979 to illustrate this
potentially problematic issue .
7°Algeria had acceded to t he 1969 Civil Liability
Convention on 14 June , 1974 and the 1971 Fund Convention on 2
June, 1975.
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respectively.71 During these legal proceedings the P&l Club
argued that the shipowner should be exonerated from liability in
accordance with Article 111.2 (b) of the Civil Liability
Convention. In support of this contention it was argued that the
damage complained of was wholly caused by an act or omission done
with intent to cause damage by a third party. It was argued that
the third party fault of the operator of the oil terminal, where
the unloading of the bitumen took place, justified the
exoneration of the shipowner . The grounds given in support of
this submission were that the terminal operator had continued to
discharge oil despite the danger posed to the power station by
the close proximity of the terminal to the water intake ducts of
the power station. Furthermore, the Club maintained that this
hazard was well established because similar incidents had
occurred in the past.
The IOPC Fund rej ected this defence on the ground that the
circumstances at hand could not be considered as being
encompassed by Article 111.2 (b) . On the facts available it would
seem likely that the requisite elements of third party 'intent'
and 'whole causation' were not in fact present. As such, the
refusal of the IOPC Fund to permit the exemption to be invoked
by the shipowner seems justified under the circumstances. The
futility of the Club position was apparently recognised by the
Club itself because it subsequently ceased to rely on this
exception. 72
4.7.3.4 Faulty government navigational aids
Governments and shipowners share a moral and economic interest
in maintaining safe standards of navigation, and, as such,
governments owe a duty to shipowners and seafarers to maintain
accurate navigational aids. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable
to hold the shipowner liable where an accident was caused by the
71IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 22.
72IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 22.
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negligent or wrongful act of a government in the exercise of this
duty. With these considerations in mind a third class of
exception was decided upon at the 1969 Conference. 73
This exception applies where oil pollution damage is ' ... wholly
caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or
other navigational aids in the exercise of that function. ,74 The
scope of this exception is narrow and once again the
qualification 'wholly' severely curtails its potential
application. Clearly, the sole cause of the damage must be due
to the either negligence or wrongfulness of the Government or
other authority before the exception can apply. While the
exception is frequently invoked by shipowners it rarely succeeds
as some conduct on the part of the ship usually contributes in
some degree to the accident. 75 It has also been suggested that
ship navigators should" not rely exclusively on navigational
aids. 76 If this argument is accepted then it would be rare for
the exception ever to be invoked. In addition the onus of proof
lies with the owner.
Notwithstanding these difficulties the exception was invoked
successfully by the owners of the Soviet tanker the Tsesis
against claims for pollution damage by the Swedish government.
In October 1977, while proceeding northwards, under the control
of a pilot, in the Landsort-SoderUilj e fairway, the Tsesis struck
a submerged shoal. As a result of running aground on the shoal
the Tsesis's bottom was severely damaged, oil leaked into the sea
and pollution damage ensued. The National Swedish Administration
of Shipping and Navigation knew of the shoal but had neglected
730fficial Records, vol .2 at 427 para.76.
74Ci v i l Liability Convention, Article 111.2 (c).
750 f f i c i al Records, vol.2 at 424 para.59.
760fficial Records, vo1.2 at 424 para.56.
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to indicate its presence in the -charts for the area. 77
Sweden had through the 1973 Oil Liability Act (1973: 1198)
preempted the coming into force of the Civil Liability Convention
by adopting the provisions of that Convention into its domestic
legislation. 78 The Swedish Oil Liability Act of 1973 provides
that the owner shall be free from liability where he can show
that the damage 'was wholly caused by the fault or neglect of any
Swedish or foreign authority i n the fulfilment of a duty to
maintain lights or other aids of navigation. ,79 The owner of the
Tsesis claimed in this case t o be exonerated from oil pollution
liability because of the fa ilure of the Swedish Government to
properly maintain the charts on which the tanker relied to
navigate safely. The owner alleged that this was the whole cause
of the accident and subsequent pollution damage. The foundation
of this plea was that hydrographical detail on such charts was
included within the meaning of 'other navigational aids.' The
Swedish Supreme court held that the conduct of the Tsesis had
been unobjectionable and imposed civil liability wholly on the
Swedish State . This conclusion was reached on the basis that the
exception for 'negligence in mai ntenance of lights and other aids
to navigation' was applicable to hydrographical surveying for the
purpose of producing new cha r t s. The State's negligence
constituted the surveyor's failure to report the presence of the
shoaLc "
In another case, that of the J os e Marti, the shipowner was not
as fortunate. Here on the 7th January, 1981, while navigating a
narrow channel under compulsory pilotage on the east coast of
7?Tiberg 'Oil Pollution of the sea and the Swedish
"Tsesis" decision' Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ (1984)
218 at 218-219; Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 205-206.
78Tiberg, op cit, 218. Sweden only subsequently ratified
the Civ~l Liability Convention on 17 March, 1975 and the
Conventlon came into force on 19 June, 1975.
79Tiberg, op ci t, 218.
8°Tiberg, op ci t, 220.
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Sweden the 27,706 grt. Soviet tanker Jose Marti ran aground on
an unmarked rock. As a result of this accident about 1,000
t.onnes'" of cargo oil escaped from the tanker, causing oil
pollution damage in the Stockholm Archipelago. 82 The owner of
the Jose Marti claimed to be exonerated, on grounds similar to
those successfully invoked in the Tsesis case, in that the
accident was wholly caused by the negligence of the Swedish
Government in the maintenance of navigational aids. 83
In the alternative the owner pleaded that if the court did not
exonerate him from liability on his first argument he should
nevertheless be exonerated from liability to the Swedish
Government claims, or that such compensation should be reduced,
because the Swedish Government had negligently failed to maintain
navigational aids which had contributed to the accident and
resulting pollution damage. This alternative plea was founded on
Article 111.3 of the Civil Liability Convention which provides
that:
\ If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted
wholly or partially either from an act or omission done
with intent to cause damage by the person who suffered the
damage or from the negligence of that person, the owner may
be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to
such person.'
Both the owner's primary and alternative arguments were rejected
by the Court of Appeal in Stockholm which determined that the
accident was caused wholly by the negligence of the owner in that
the pilot of the tanker had been at fault. Although the use of
the pilot had been compulsory and had been supplied by the
81A tonne is a metric measure of weight. One tonne equals
1000 kilograms (Kg) and is approximately 2205 lbs. One tonne
of crude oil is equivalent to about 7.4 barrels.
82Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 206 para.10-39.
83Civil Liability Convention, Article 111.2 (c).
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Swedish Government a well established principle of maritime law
holds that once such a pilot operates on behalf of a ship he
becomes a part of the ships crew and as such the shipowner is
held responsible for his actions. 84 The Court of Appeal rejected
the argument advanced by the owner of the Jose Marti that he
should be exonerated from liability because the pilot should be
construed as being included in the notion of a 'navigational
aid'. Contrary to the court a quo, the Court of Appeal held that
the owner had not proved any negligence on the part of the
Swedish Government in the maintenance of navigational aids or any
negligence by any public official. Accordingly, this Court
determined that the owner of the Jose Marti would bear full
responsibility for the Swedish Government's pollution damage
caused by the accident. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
against this judgement was refused.~
The ambit of the Article III.3 defence is further qualified by
the use of the words 'may be' as opposed to 'shall be'. Due to
this choice of wording, a court is permitted to exercise certain
latitude in favour of the State .
This construction in favour of coastal governments is illustrated
by the reasoning of the court a quo in the Jose Marti case. The
court a quo determined that there was a certain degree of
negligence on the part of the Swedish authorities in the
maintenance of navigational aids and that this negligence had
contributed to the accident. However, this negligence was
84The preferable view is that the 'pilotage exoneration'
is dependant upon the 'character of the act of pilotage'. In
normal circumstances, such as those which applied in the Jose
Marti case, where the pilot was subject to the control of the
ship's master no grounds for 'pilotage exoneration' exist.
Whereas, for example, in the Panama Canal, where the pilot
assumes full responsibility for navigation 'pilotage
exoneration' could be invoked. see ; Official Records, vol.2 at
151 para . 7 .
85The account of the Jose Marti accident and litigation is
taken from the Iope Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.3 pp
16 -17.
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considered relatively minor. For this reason, the court a quo did
not reduce the compensation to the Swedish Government on the
grounds of contributory negligence, but awarded the Swedish
Government full compensation for the pollution damage. 86
From the facts of the Jose Marti case it is evident that some
overlap may arise between the application of Article 111.2 and
111.3. The situation can arise where substantial claims under the
Civil Liability Convention originate from the costs of clean-up
and preventive measures incurred by a coastal government which
is also responsible for the accuracy of navigational aids in the
area concerned. 87 Thus where the shipowner fails to successfully
invoke the total exoneration under Article 111.2 he may still be
permitted to reduce his liability under Article 111.3. The
difference between the two provisions is that while Article 111.2
exonerates the shipowner from all claims under the Convention the
Article 111 .3 defence is limited in scope as against claims made
by the party who contributed to the resulting damage and as such
is aimed mainly at government controlled preventive measures.
Although Article 111.3 of the Civil Liability Convention,
together with the absolute exceptions to liability contained in
Article 111.2, make inroads into the principle of strict
liability, these provisions were incorporated into the Civil
Liability Convention in fairness to tanker owners. These
exceptions also recognise that some accidents at sea may in truth
be unavoidable.
It has been suggested that the application of Article 111.2 can
lead to delays in the procedure for compensating claimants under
the Civil Liability Convention. Clearly, before any money may be
paid to any claimant, including governmental claimants, it must
first be established whether the owner is exonerated under the
86IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987 , section 9.3 at 17.
870fficial Records, vo1.2 at 427 para .77.
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provision of Article 111.2. 88
4.8 Limitation of liability
The underlying principle of tort dictates that when one party
negligently causes damage to another the negligent party will be
required to compensate the injured party's loss. In maritime law
and other areas of law this principle does not apply in all
instances where damage is caused negligently. 89 Where certain
conditions prevail the owners of vessels which cause damage may
only be held accountable up to certain financial limits which are
determined in relation to the tonnage of the vessel. 90 This
practice is referred to as the "shipowne r ' s right to limit" and
is relevant to many kinds of maritime claims. In most
circumstances the privilege applies in some or other form to
claims for ship-source oil pol lution damage .
When a shipowner is confronted with potentially large claims he
will attempt to assert his right to limit liability in the court
where claims have been levelled against him. If he is successful
in asserting this right he wi l l be entitled to establish a
limitation fund within that court . The amount constituted by this
fund may not always be sufficient to meet all successful claims
brought against it. Where this is so the competing claims are
settled against the limitation fund according to their comparable
ranking, which is determined a ccording to the law of the state
880fficial Records, vol. 2 at 427 para. 75.
89The concept of limited liabi l i t y is by no means unique
to maritime law. The most wide -spread example of limited
liability is the protection afforded to businessmen operating
through limited liability corporat ions.
90Article 4 of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims pr ov i de s that:
' A person liable shall no t be entitled to limit his
liability if it is proved that the loss resulted from his
personal act or omission , committed with the intent to
cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that
such loss would probably r e su l t . '
83
where the action is heard. Where the liability limits under the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions or the limits set by the
voluntary compensation regimes of TOVALOP and CRISTAL have been
exceeded, competing claims are reduced proportionally and ranking
does not apply.
Where oil pollution damage occurs other claims will normally also
arise against the shipowner. Such claims may include damage to
another vessel, where, for example, oil pollution results from
a ship-to-ship collision . Claims for loss of life or injury to
crew and third parties, cargo claims, salvage claims and claims
for wreck removal, frequently exist concurrently with oil
pollution claims. The advantage afforded to claimants under the
compensation Conventions and voluntary compensation regimes is
that where the limits have been exceeded under those instruments
claimants are not required to compete with claims for non-
pollution damage because these instruments are pollution-specific
and do not provide compensation for claims which are not directly
related to pollution damage.
Shipowners argue that the right to limit liability is a
prerequisite for the maintenance and continued development of an
efficient fleet of ocean-going vessels. This argument is based
on the premise that shipping is such a costly enterprise attended
by such a high risk of prohibitive liability that without the
protection of limited liability investors would be disinclined
to become engaged in the industry. It is further argued that as
shipping plays an essential role in the global distribution of
raw materials and manufactured goods a balance needs to be struck
between the compensation awarded to successful claimants and the
policy requirement of allowing shipowners to limit their
liability to an amount which is readily insurable at a reasonable
premium. In this way it is arguable that investment in the
shipping industry is assisted by allowing shipowners to obtain
insurance commensurate with limited exposure thus mitigating the
high risks involved in operating ships.
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There is considerable truth to both assertions made by the
shipowners' argument described above . Initial capital investments
required to construct ocean-going vessels are considerable. 91
Returns on such investment are relatively slow and subject to
greater fluctuation and uncertainty compared with other fields
of investment. Such fluctuation can be unpredictable and
sudden. 92 Furthermore, running and maintenance costs are high
and ships depreciate in value rapidly. Not only do potential
investors have to contend with these immediate disincentives for
investment in the shipping i ndu s t r y but because ships are often
the instruments of serious damage investors may also be
disinclined to assume these potential risks. Examples of such
risks include cargo claims, col lision claims, claims for loss of
life and injury, wreck removal , pollution claims and other
maritime disasters. In modern time s the potential for catastrophe
claims has increased as more dangerous cargoes are being carried
at sea. 93 Where the shipowner is denied the right to limit
liability, such claims could make severe inroads into P&l Club
reserves and conceivably upset the entire system of marine
i n s u r a n c e .
It cannot be denied that shipping has a commanding role in the
viability of international trade and that shipping also has
considerable strategic importance . Oil tankers exemplify the
strategic importance of shipping more than any other area of the
shipping industry. History has proved this point on many
occasions. The transportation of oil and fuel at sea and the
control of oil supplies was c rucial to the result of both the
91'Rising demand sparks burst of tanker order' July 30,
1990, Oil & Gas Journal 23 at 24 .
15 .
92'Never up for long' Petroleum Economist August 1991 at
93Barker ' Ha za r dou s goods at sea ' (1 992) vol.16 NO.4
M~rine Policy 306 a t 30 7 ; Coghlin ' Sh i p own e r' s Liabilities
Flfty Years On ' (1 991 ) 22 J o urnal of Maritime Law and Commerce
415 at 417-8.
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First and Second World Wars. U The importance of oil and the
ability to transport oil from various sources by sea has also
been illustrated in more recent times. This was the case during
the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis,9s the 1967 Arab oil embargo which
was brought about by the Six Day War,96 and the 1974 oil crisis
triggered by the Yom Kippur War . 97
94Samson The Seven Sisters (1975) pp.81-83; Yergin The
Prize (1991) pp.176-177, 358, 362, 374-375, 410.
9sYergin, op cit, pp.496-497:
'In all the agitated discussion in 1956 about the Suez
Canal as the jugular, one point had not been given much
attention: If the canal and the Middle Eastern pipelines
were vulnerable, there was a safer alternative - the
route around the Cape of Good Hope. To be economical and
practical that route would require much larger tankers,
capable of carrying a great deal more oil .... Not only
would they prove to be eminently economical, they would
also provide the requisite security. Thus supertankers,
along with the decline of the British influence and
prestige and the ascendancy of Gamal Abdel Nasser, were
among the consequences of the Suez Crisis.'
96Yergin, op cit, pp.556-557:
'The closure of the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean
pipelines meant, as in 1956, much longer journeys around
the Cape of Good Hope and thus resulted in a mad scramble
for tankers .. .. Yet the requirements of much-longer
voyages could be more easily met than was expected owing
to the development of "supertankers", an innovation
spurned by the 1956 Suez Crisis.'
Further, at 558 the same author writes:
'The U.S. Department of the Interior, in its report on
the management of the crisis, drew two lessons: the
importance of diversifying sources of supply and of
maintaining a large, flexible tanker fleet.' (emphasis
provided by the present writer) .
97See Yergin, op cit, pp.519-525 generally and
specifically at 621 where that author writes:
'In such circumstance, the only logical response was on
of "equal sUffering" and "equal misery". That is, the
companies would try to allocate the same percentage of
cutbacks from total supplies to all countries by moving
both Arab and non-Arab oil around the world. They had
already gained some experience in how to organize a
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In conclusion, the true nature of the right to limit liability
in the context of maritime law is perhaps most aptly described
by Lord Denning MR in The Bramley taoore r"
limitation is not a matter of justice. It is a rule of
public policy which has its origin in history and its
justification in convenience.' 99
In terms of Article V.1 of the Civil Liability Convention, as (
amended by the 1976 Jamaica Protocol, the shipowner is entitled
to limit his liability to 133 Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
(US$186) per ton of the ship's tonnage or 14 million SDR (US$19.5
million), whichever is the smaller amount. 100
The shipowner loses the right to limit liability and will face
liability for all proven oil pollution damage caused by a spill,
where it is established that the incident occurred as a result
sharing system during the embargo that accompanied the
1967 war. But the scale and the risks in 1973 were much,
much larger.'
Samson, op cit, also comments on this prorationing of limited
supplies between the consumer nations at pp.260-265 and at 261
writes:
'The companies [multinational oil companies] were able to
perform this controversial task through the intricate
computer systems by which they regulated the movements of
their tankers and cargoes throughout the world.'
9SAlexandra Towing Co. Ltd v Miller and Egret &. others
(The Bramley Moore) [1964] PD 200 cited by Brusser 'The
Existence and Extent of a Carrier's Right to Limitation of
Liability in Collisions involving Negligence' (1982) Acta
Juridica 51 at 56.
99At 220.
100The amounts given in dollars above were calculated on
the basis of the exchange at 30 January, 1992
(US$1.39921 = 1 SDR) ; Dow Jones News Serv., January 1992.
These amounts may vary in relation to fluctuations in exchange
rates. For example, as at 4th September, 1992, 133 SDR was
equal to about US$197 .54 which amounted to a total limit under
the Civil Liability Convention of about US$20.8 million the
equivalent of 14 million SDR. '
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of the 'actual fault or privity' of the shipowner. 101 This topic
has been discussed in some detail under English and United States
admiralty law in association with the Torrey Canyon limitation
proceedings . The wording of t hi s crucially important provision
does not explicitly settle the question of whether the burden of
proof lies with the owner or the claimant.
4.8.1 Limitation tonnage
For limitation purposes the vessel's tonnage is calculated in
accordance with a formula contained in Article V.10 of the Civil
Liability Convention .
... the ship's tonnage shall be the net tonnage of the
ship with the addition of the amount deducted from the
gross tonnage on account of engine room space for the
purpose of ascertaining the net tonnage.'
The net tonnage of a ship i s not a measure of weight but
represents the cubic capacity of the ship, excluding engine room
space .102 However, for the purpose of calculating the ship's
'limitation tonnage' under the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions the tonnage of the engine room is added to the net
tonnage. The definition of goes on to provide that:
'In the case of a ship which cannot be measured in
accordance with the normal rules of tonnage measurement,
the ship's tonnage shall be deemed to be 40 per cent of the
weight in tons (of 2240 l bs) 103 of oil which the ship is
lOlCivil Liability Convent ion , Article V. 2.
1021 00 cubic feet of enclosed space is equal to one gross
registered ton.
103Th i s weight refers to the ' l ong ton ' (equivalent to
1 . 01 6 metric tons) and must no t be confused with the American
' s hor t ton ' which is equal t o 2, 000 lbs (equ i va l ent to 0.907
metric tons). The metric ton i s a wholly different measurement
of weight and is measured i n kilogr ams (1 pound = 0.454 kg) .
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capable of carrying.' 104
The basis of this rule is that the 'limitation tonnage' is
recognised as constituting approximately 40 per cent of the
deadweight tonnage of a tanker. The deadweight tonnage is the
difference between light and load displacement and generally
reflects the cargo carrying tonnage of a tanker. 105
4.8.2 Evolution of the 'unit of account'
The 'unit of account' initially used to determine the amount of
money for which the tanker owner and the IOPC Fund would be
liable under the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Convention
was originally expressed in the Poincare Franc, otherwise known
as the Gold Franc, consisting of 65,5 milligrams of gold of
millesimal fineness 900. 106
After the development of the 1976 Protocols to the 1969 Civil
Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions, 107 the 'unit of account'
was expressed in the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as formulated
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 108 One SDR was then
equal to 15 Poincare Francs .109 The IMF determines the value of
the SDR once every five years in terms of a 'basket' of 16
104Civil Liability Convention, Article V.10.
105M' Gonigle & Zacher, op ci t, 153.
l06Civil Liability Convention, Article V. 9 and the Fund
Convention, Article 1.4 .
107protocol to the 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, signed at London, 19 November, 1976;
entered into force 8 April, 1981. Protocol to the 1971
International Convention on the Establishment of an
I~ternational fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage;
slgned at London, 19 November, 1976; not yet in force.
108This is in terms of Article 11 of the 1976 Protocol to
the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and Article 11 of the 1976
Protocol to the 1971 Fund Convention .
109IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.1 (d) at 53.
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currencies. The official value of the SDR is given in five
currencies, the U.S. Dollar, British Pound, French Frank, German
Mark and Japanese Yen. The SDR can be converted into any other
national currency by referring to the comparative market exchange
rate of that currency. This procedure enables the value of the
SDR to fluctuate in relation to anyone currency. For example any
decline in the British Pound, relative to the other four official
currencies will increase the British Pound value of the SDR.110
The SDR is to be converted into the national currency of the
State in which the shipowner's limitation fund is constituted,
on the basis of the value of that currency by reference to the
SDR value on the date of the constitution of the limitation
fund. 111
The 1976 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention entered into
force in 1981 but has been ratified by only a limited number of
States. The 1976 Protocol to the Fund Convention has not yet (as
of October 1994) come into force . This state of affairs has
caused considerable difficulty concerning the uniform calculation
of limits under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. In
1978, the IOPC Fund Assembly adopted an interpretation of the
provisions in the Fund Convention dealing with Poincare Francs
in terms of which the amount expressed in francs shall be
converted into SDRs on the basis that fifteen francs are equal
to one SDR.112 The number of SDRs thus found shall be converted
into national currency in accordance with the method of
l1°For a thorough analysis of the creation and allocation
of the SDR by the IMF see Folsom et al. International Business
Transactions 2nd ed. (1991) at 803-805; cited by Smith 'An
analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the 1984
Protocols on Civil Liability for Pollution Damage' (1991) 14
Houston Journal of International Law 115 at 131 fn.112.
1111976 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention,
Article 11 (2).
112Resolution No.1 (a) - Unit of Account (November 1978);
cited Iope Fund Statistics 1 October 1992 at 8.
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evaluation applied by the IMF. 1u
The cause celebre associated with the above provisions arose out
of the destruction of the Haven off Italy on the 11th April,
1991. The 109,977 grt. Cypriot tanker Haven caught fire and
exploded while lying at anchor seven miles off Genoa. The tanker,
which was carrying approximately 144,000 tonnes of crude oil
broke into three and sank. Pollution damage was sustained in
Italy, France and Monaco which are all party states to the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. 114 It has been reported that
preliminary indications show that the cause of this accident was
due to an over pressuring of a cargo tank during the transfer of
oil from one tank to another . This resulted in structural failure
an explosion and subsequently the total loss of the ship.11s
Despite the existence of many theories attempting to explain the
cause of the accident the Italian Panel of Enquiry for the region
of Liguria (one of the various territorial entities which
sustained pollution damage) was unable to establish the cause.
The Enquiry did, however, conclude that the shipowner \ ... had
been guilty of gross negligence for not having ensured the
efficiency of certain essential equipment before allowing the
ship to return to commercial operation, for not having ordered
the ship to stop sailing in view of certain technical problems
which had arisen and for not having informed the classification
society of the fact that one inert gas generator was out of
order. ,116
The Haven, formerly Anloco Milford Haven, was on her maiden voyage
113Resolution NO.1 (b) - Unit of Account (November 1978);
cited ropc Fund Statistics 1 October 1992 at 8.
»<iosc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 59.
11SGray \Prevention of Pollution' at 8 contained in Oil
Pollution Claims, Liability & Environmental Concerns
International Business Communications Ltd. Conference
Documentation 3-4 November, 1992 London.
116ropc Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 36.
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following a two year refit in Singapore. Built in 1973, she was
coincidentally a sister ship to the now infamous Amoco Cadiz
which was wrecked off northern France in 1978, causing the worst
maritime pollution incident experienced in North West Europe. In
that case 1.6 million barrels (bbl) of oil spilled along the
coast of Brittany.117
During the Haven limitation proceedings, disagreement arose as
to the method to be used for converting the maximum amount
payable under the IOPC Fund (900 million [gold] francs) into
Italian Lire (LIt). The IOPC Fund anticipated that the conversion
would be made on the basis of the SDR. Certain claimants adopted
a different view, maintaining that the conversion should be made
according to the free market price of gold and that the SDR
methodology should not apply because the 1976 Protocol to the
Fund Convention (which replaced the [gold] franc with the SDR)
had not entered into force. 118
In March 1992, the judge presiding over the limitation
proceedings decided this question in favour of the claimants for
oil pollution damage. He held that the maximum amount payable by
the IOPC Fund should be calculated by the application of the free
market value of gold and not in relation to the SDR. This
resulted in the assessment of an artificially high limitation
fund, which together with the amount paid by the shipowner under
the Civil Liability Convention was set at Llt771, 397,947,400
(£350 million). If the more internationally accepted conversion
procedure (as suggested by the IOPC Fund based on the value of
the SDR) had been applied, a limit of Llt102,864,000,000 (£47
million) would have been derived . This amounts to a very
considerable difference (approximately £303 million). As would
be expected, the IOPC Fund lodged opposition to this
decision. 119 The appeal court upheld the decision of the court
1170il & Gas Journal April 22 (1 991 ) at 40.
118IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 70.
119IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 71.
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of first instance. u o
The IOPC Fund has also appealed against this judgment. 121 If
this finding is upheld the IOPC Fund will be placed in a very
difficult position because it will conceivably be forced to bear
a far greater ceiling of liability than was intended by the
authors of the Fund Convention and those states which became
party to the Convention. The balance of liability apportioned
between shipowners and cargo owners under the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions , respectively, will have been significantly
realigned in favour of the shipowner. Nonetheless the Italian
claimants will still be required to prove the quantum of their
respective claims. If such a precedent were set it could then be
that the system of compensation provided for by the IOPC Fund
would not continue to function . Major receivers of oil such as
Japan and the Netherlands would be reluctant to continue
contributing to the IOPC Fund where such a high ceiling of
liability is permitted. It is even questionable whether certain
states (particularly Japan) would be prepared to contribute in
this specific instance. The impact of the high limits would be
exacerbated even further if "damage to the environment" became
widely accepted as a permissible claim for pollution damage under
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions .
A discontinuation of the IOPC Fund would force Party States to
enact unilateral domestic legislation providing for compensation
of oil pollution damage and rely on the voluntary compensation
-,
regimes of TOVALOP, TOVALOP Supplement and CRISTAL. Considering
the disruptive consequences that would almost certainly result
it would be surprising if the decision of the court of first
instance is upheld to final appeal. The possibility of an out of
court negotiated settlement has been raised .122 Although the
probability of a settlement would seem unlikely it would not be
120 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 43.
121IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 44.
122 IOPC Fund Annual 1993, section 12.2 at 44.
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impossible. Certainly, in a dispute of this size and complexity
an out of court settlement would be a considerable achievement
for all parties involved.
4.9 The 'limitation fund'
The shipowner's right to limit, the historical development of
this right and the rationale for this rule has already been
discussed in some detail in this chapter and also in relation to
the litigation surrounding the Torrey Canyon incident. At this
point it is necessary to discuss limitation procedure in relation
to the special requirements of the Civil Liability Convention.
4.9.1 Establishing a limitation fund
When a tanker causes oil pollution damage in the territory of a
state party to the Civil Liability Convention, what most often
occurs is that the shipowner attempts to establish a 'limitation
fund' which is an amount of money equal to the limited liability
assessed against the vessel causing the spill. In terms of
Article V.3 of the Civil Liability Convention the shipowner is
required to wait until a claim is brought against him before he
is permitted to constitute a limitation fund which must also be
established in the state where the action is brought. This will
be the contracting state where the 'pollution damage' was
sustained .123 The Civil Liability Convention also provides that
once claims have been brought against the shipowner the
constitution of the fund is mandatory if the owner is to invoke
the protection of limited liability. 124 This is contrary to the
usual legal position under the 1957 or 1976 Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims Conventions in terms of which the
123Civil Liability Convention, Article IX .1. This is the
exclusive jurisdiction clause which ensures that the only
courts which are competent are those of the state where the
pollution damage had occurred . Clearly, the lex loci delici is
the natural forum for the resolution of disputes.
124Civil Liability Convention, Article V. 3.
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constitution of a limitation fund is not a precondition to
claiming limitation.
Claimants may seek to challenge the shipowner's right to limit
liability and it is generally accepted that under the Civil
Liability Convention the burden of showing absence of personal
fault is on the shipowner .125 Under certain conditions, to be
described later, the IOPC Fund may also challenge the shipowner's
right to limit. 126 The rules requiring the establishment of the
fund are clearly to the advantage of oil pollution claimants as
the fund provides a certain source from which claims can be paid.
4.9.2 Protection afforded to the shipowner
Where the shipowner has successfully asserted his right to limit
he may not be held liable for oil pollution damage, as defined
in the Civil Liability Conventiion, in excess of the amount in
the limitation fund. Furthermore, where an owner has established
a limitation fund claimants are barred from exercising any right,
or prosecuting any claim, against any other assets of the
owner. 127 Any ship or other property belonging to the shipowner
which may have been arrested or attached or any security lodged
to avoid such arrest shall be released. 128 These provisions
apply only if the claimant has access to the Court administering
the limitation fund and the fund is actually available in respect
of his claim. 129
4.9.3 Required form of payment and interest
125Gaskell (B) 'The Amoco Cadiz: (11) Limitation and Legal
Implications (1985) 3 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources
Law 225 at 235 fn.81.
126 IOpe Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 62 this
was so in the in the Haven case.
127Civil Liability Convention, Article VI.1 (a).
128Civil Liability Convention, Article VI.1 (a).
u9Civil Liability Convention, Article VI.2.
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The Civil Liability Convention by Article V. 3 regulates the
formulation of the shipowner's limitation fund:
\ ... The fund can be constituted either by depositing the
sum or by producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee,
acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State
where the fund is constituted, and considered to be
adequate by the Court or other competent authority.'
The limitation fund is usually established by the shipowner's P&l
insurer by means of a letter of guarantee in lieu of constituting
a fund . For example, in the Haven case the limitation fund was
established by the P&l insurer by means of a letter of guarantee.
However, in that case the IOPC Fund opposed acceptance by the
Court of a bank guarantee as a limitation fund because no
interest accrues on a bank guarantee. The IOPC Fund argued that
where the limitation amount had been paid in cash, it would have
been invested by the Court and would have earned interest to the
benefit of third parties and the IOPC Fund. In a decision
rendered in March, 1992, the judge in charge of the limitation
proceedings held that the bank guarantee should also cover
interest on the limitation amount. The judge further held that
the interest should accrue to the benefit of the victims of oil
pollution and not to the IOPC Fund. The shipowner and the P&l
Club opposed this decision on the ground that under Article V.l
of the Civil Liability Convent ion, the aggregate amount of the
shipowner's liability shall in no event exceed 14 million
SDR. 1 3 0 This argument is difficult to support.
Clearly, interest on the limitation fund accrues to claimants
only in relation to the amounts actually awarded to successful
claimants. Therefore, if the whole limitation fund is awarded to
claimants all interest which accrues to that limitation fund will
be awarded to such claimants. This is equitable because in
lengthy cases the interest awarded is intended to provide relief
130rope Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 63.
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to claimants against the depreciation in the value of the
original limitation amount through inflation. This can be a
significant factor considering "t he long delays frequently
experienced between the establishment of the limitation fund and
final settlement. Usually any amount left in the limitation fund
and interest on this amount will be returned to the shipowners
or his P&l Club at the close of litigation allowing for certain
expenditures made by the court.
4.9.4 Interest and other costs
The Civil Liability Convention does not stipulate any rules
relating to the distribution of interest from the limitation
fund. Therefore whether interest accrues to the victim or the
party establishing the limitation fund, or not, will be decided
by the law of the court where t he limitation fund is formed . For
example, under Danish131 and Swedish132 law an extra amount is
to be added to the limitat ion fund to cover interest and costs.
German,133 English and Italian law allow for the recovery of
interest. The Court may appoint a liquidator of the limitation
fund to invest the amounts deposited. Such was the case in the
limitation proceedings in the Cour t in Brest following the wreck
of the Tanio which broke in two on 7th March, 1980, while trying
to negotiating heavy weather conditions off the French coast . 134
In this case the Civil Liabili t y Fund had almost doubled due to
the accumulation of interest . 135
4.9.5 Distribution of the fund
131IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.7 at 22 the Jan
Denmark, 2 August 1985 .
132 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987 , section 9.12 at 29 the
Tunktank 5.
133 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9 .9 at 24 the
Brady Maria.
134IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987 , section 9 .2 at 11.
1350fficial Records, vol. 2 at 500 para . 59.
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After the limitation fund has been constituted in accordance with
Article V of the Civil Liability Convention, the Courts of the
State in which the fund is constituted are exclusively competent
to determine all matters relating to the apportionment and
distribution of the fund. 136 Significantly:
, Claims in respect of expenses reasonably incurred or
sacrifices reasonably made by the owner voluntarily to
prevent or minimize pollution damage shall rank equally
with other claims against the fund.,u7
Although the shipowner's P&l Club is not an 'owner', when they
act on behalf of the actual owner they will be entitled to claim
against the limitation fund as an owner . For example, in the
Tanio case, claims for compensation were submitted by nearly 100
claimants. The shipowner's P&l insurer claimed for the costs of
surveying the sunken fore-section of the Tanio and for the
expense of provisionally sealing holes in the sunken wreck. 138
The word 'incur' has been defined to mean 'to have liabilities
cast upon one by act or operation of law' .U9 It has been noted
that situations where there has been an actual expenditure and
situations where an obligation exists in term of which such
expenditure must be made in the future are both covered by the
word. 140 Therefore, where a shipowner voluntarily allows his
ship to be salvaged it is possible that an enhanced salvage award
(under Article 13.1 (b) of the 1989 International Convention on
Salvage which is payable by the shipowner to a salvor for
preventing or minimizing pollution damage or for merely
attempting to do so) could be recovered by such shipowner from
U6Civil Liability Convention, Article IX.3.
137Civil Liability Convention, Article V. 8.
138Iope Fund Annual Report 1988, Section 12.2 at 26.
139Black's Law Dictionary 5th ed . (1979).
140paulsen, op ci t, at 179 .
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a limitation fund established for the purpose of the Civil
Liability Convention. If this is actually the case, and the
limits of the Civil Liability Convention are exceeded, victims
of oil pollution would in effect be contributing to the enhanced
salvage award.
If the total extent of successful claims exceeds the limitation
fund, each claim suffers a pro rata abatement . 141 One of the
possible drawbacks of this system is that where many claims
compete against the limitation fund the court is unable to
determine the amount due to be paid to each claimant until the
aggregate or combined amount of all claims had been established
which can result in delayed payment of compensation. On the other
hand, the limitation fund constitutes a guarantee for victims and
has the advantage of offering a separate fund to claim against
in the case of the bankruptcy of the shipowner.
4.9.6 Waiver of the duty to establish a fund
Although the Fund Convention requires the shipowner to establish
a limitation fund in order to claim against the IOPC Fund, this
requirement may be waived in certain special circumstances. In
the cases of the Shinkai Maru No. 3142 and the Ha to Maru
No. 2143, considering the disproportionately high legal costs
that would have been incurred i n establishing the limitation fund
compared with the low limitation amount under the Civil Liability
Convention, the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund decided, as
an exception, to waive the requirement to establish the
limitation fund. In the above mentioned cases the limitation
funds under the Civil Liabil ity Convention were relatively low
141Civil Liability Convention, Article V.4.
142IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.5 at 68. The
Shinkai Maru No.3 incident occurred on the 21st June, 1983, in
the Japanese port of Ichikawa.
143 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 44. The
Hato Maru No.2 incident occurred on the 27th July, 1990, in
the Japanese port of Kobe.
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because the vessels were small coastal tankers. Limits under the
Civil Liability Convention are linked to the limitation tonnage
of the tanker from which the spill occurs, subject to an upper
ceiling. The operation of small coastal tankers is particularly
pronounced off the Japanese coast.
At the 1984 Conference to revise the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention the International Group of P&I Associations argued
that because the requirements of compulsory liability insurance
under the Civil Liability Convention and the secondary source of
compensation available from the IOPC Fund there was no need for
additional security by requiring the shipowner to establish a
limitation fund as a precondition for being able to claim the
privilege of limitation. l 44 This argument did not, however,
prevail.
4.10 Compulsory liability insurance (CLl)
The centre-pin of the system of compensation brought about by the
Civil Liability Convention is that shipowners maintain financial
capability to meet their obligations under the Convention. This
is ensured by requiring compulsory liability insurance. The
practical importance and utility of Article VII of the Civil
Liability Convention which governs the question of CLI can not
be over emphasised and it may even be argued that had this system
proved unworkable the entire system of compensation provided by
the Civil liability Convention could have been undermined.
4.10.1 When CLl is required
The Civil Liability Convention stipulates that an owner maintain
insurance or other financial security in respect of any ship
which is registered in a Contracting State and carries 2,000 tons
or more of persistent oil in bulk as cargo. This insurance must
satisfy the Civil Liability Convention limits applicable to the
1440fficial Records, vol.2 at 56.
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particular vessel. u s
4.10.2 Problems raised by small tankers
In certain circumstances the st ipulation of the 2,000 ton cut-in
point as an imperative for the maintenance of pollution liability
insurance under the Civil Liab i l i t y Convention can lead to
inequitable results. This is because cargoes of persistent oil
even though less than 2,000 tons can nevertheless cause
considerable pollution damage . For example, on the 24th August,
1987, while off Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, the Panamanian
coastal tanker Akari of 1,345 grt. experienced a switchboard
fire. The vessel lost electri cal power and the use of her main
engines and began to take on wa t e r . In an attempt to save the
Akari she was towed by tug towards the port of Jebel Ali, but
because the ship at that point posed a pollution hazard she was
refused permission to enter port . Listing badly, the Akari was
towed along the coast and subsequently beached. Approximately
1,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oi l escaped polluting 30-40 kilometres
of the coast before the Akar i was refloated and her cargo
transferred to another vessel . Cons i de r ab l e pollution damage was
sustained by the United Arab Emirates. u 6
Although Panama is party to the Civil Liability Convent.Lorr.Y"
at the time of the incident the Akari was carrying only 1,899
t onne s of oil in bulk as cargo and was therefore not required to
maintain insurance in accordance with the Civil Liability
Convention. Although the Akari was not required to maintain
compulsory liability insurance she was still subj ect to the
provisions of the Civil Liabi l i ty Convention. However, the owner
of the Akari was a single-ship company incorporated in Liberia
USCivil Liability Convent ion, Article VII.1.
146I OPC Fund Annual Report 1991 , section 12.2 at 31-32.
U7panama ratified the Civi l Liability Convention on the
7th January, 1976. Panama has not howeve r ratified the Fund
Convention.
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which had no assets besides the Akari which had been sold as
scrap. The owner was therefore financially incapable of meeting
his obligations under the Civil Liability Convention and was
unable to establish a limitation fund. l 48 This is an apt
illustration of the way in which a 'single ship' or 'brass plate'
company can frustrate the ability of claimants to pursue damage
claims.
The inequity of this case was further compounded in that grounds
existed which suggested that the Akari was unseaworthy at the
time of the incident. If this had been proved, the shipowner may
well have been deprived of the right to limit his liability under
the Civil Liability Convention. However, this was of limited
importance here, as the shipowner had no assets against which to
proceed. 149
4.10.3 Contracting State duties and CLl certification
A Contracting State shall not permit a ship in its registry or
operating under its flag, to which this Article applies, to trade
unless a CLI certificate has been issued. 150 Furthermore, ships
flying the flags of non-participating States are required to be
in possession of such certificates of insurance when entering or
leaving a port or terminal installation of a State Party to the
Civil Liability Convention .151 Clearly the latter provision was
inserted so that Party State ship owners are not placed at an
unfair competitive disadvantage to ships of non-participating
states. This provision also ensures that all ships carrying oil
in bulk visiting Party States which would be subjected to the
terms of the Civil Liability Convention are able to meet its
liability provisions. The certificate must comply with certain
148IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 32.
149 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 32.
150Civil Liability Convention, Article VIL10.
151Civil Liability Convention, Article VII.1l.
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substantive and formal requirements and must be carried on board
the vessel as evidence of coverage. 152 The purpose of this rule
is to enable the Contracting State to make sure that ships are
properly insured.
The certificate shall be either 'issued' or ' ce r t i f i ed ' by the
competent authority of the State of the ship's registry.153 The
State of registry also determines the conditions of issue and
validity of the certificate. 154 These powers were conferred on
the State of the ship's regis try because such State exercises
control of the ships registered in its register and is in the
best position to make the t rading of the ship conditional on
certificates being issued . u 5
Clearly, the State of the ship's registry may not be a State
contracting to the Civil Liability Convention. Consequently,
contracting States can perform one of two functions: either
'issue' or 'certify' certificates. The duality of functions is
necessary to meet the different needs of shipowners in different
situations. For instance, a cert if icate could not be 'issued' by
a Contracting State to a ship which was not registered in that
State since this would fail t o satisfy Article VII. 2 as the
certificate was not 'issued' by the competent authority where the
ship was registered. Also, a certificate 'issued' by a non-
contracting State to a ship r egi s t e r ed in that state are of no
use and may not be accepted for the purpose of the Civil
Liability Convention until a Contracting State had 'certified'
such certificate.
To further expedite the system of CLI certificates 'issued ' or
' ce r t i f i ed ' under the authori t y of a Contracting State are to be
152Civ i.L Liability Convent ion, Article VII .2-7 .
153Ci v.i L Liability Convent ion, Article VII.2.
154Civd L Liability Convent ion , Article VII.6.
155FUND/A.15/21, paragraph 6, page 2.
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accepted by other Contracting States and regarded by them as
having the same force as cert ificates issued or certified by
themselves . 156 The use of the peremptory 'shall' indicates an
obligation to do so. It has been noted if a discretion had been
conferred upon Contracting States to decide whether to 'issue'
or 'certify' a certificate the possibility exists that de facto
international trade barriers could have developed. Thus a State
must not refuse to 'issue' or ' c e r t i f y ' a certificate unless
reasonable grounds to do so exist. 157 It has been reported that
practical difficulties and confusion were frequently uncounted
during the early applicat ion of the Civil Liability Convention
certification provisions. 158 It would seem that these
difficulties have been overcome .
4.10.4 Bareboat charterers and CLl
The '''State of the ship's registry" means (in relation to
registered ships) the State of registration of the ship, and in
relation to unregistered ships t he State whose flag the ship is
flying .,u9 At its 66th session , held in March 1992, the Legal
Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
considered whether in certain cases of bareboat charter the
actual owner or the bareboat charterer should be considered as
the registered owner for the purpose of the provisions of the
Civil Liability Convention. H o This i s s u e had not been addressed
at the 1969 Diplomatic Conference which adopted the Civil
Liability Convention, since the practice of bareboat charter was
virtually unknown at the time. 161 In the case of bareboat
charter the original nationality of the ship is temporarily
156Civil Liability Convent ion, Article VII. 7 .
u70fficial Records, vol .2 a t 592 para.70.
1580fficial Records, vo1. 2 at 456 para .9.
159Civil Liability Convent ion, Article 1.4.
16°FUND/A.15 /21 , paragraph 1, page 1.
161FUND/A .15/21, paragraph 5 , page 2 .
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suspended and the ship is registered in
bareboat charterer's State. Where this
the register of the
occurs the actual
shipowner must surrender the original certificate of insurance
and obtain a new one from the State where his ship is temporarily
registered. 162
4.10.5 CLI and P&I Clubs
Compulsory liability insurance is usually obtained through an
owner's P&I Club or from a mutual fund specially set up for the
purpose - the International Tanker Indemnity Association (ITIA) .
The ITIA was established in 1969 by members of the U. S. oil
industry operating tanker fleets following the Torrey Canyon
incident. In August 1989 the ITIA Chairman cautioned that the
ITIA members were considering closure in the face of a huge
surplus of worldwide capacity in the marine protection and
indemnity markets and in the face of the wide variety of cover
available to tanker owners worldwide .163 This excess capacity
obtainable at reasonable rates did not last and the continuation
of special tanker owners' mutual Club providing cover for the
voluntary clean-up costs of the owner could well be called
for. 164
State owned ships may satisfy the requirements relating to
compulsory liability insurance under the Civil Liability
Convention by providing evidence of a State guarantee. 165 For
example, the Volgoneft 263 which caused pollution damage to the
Swedish coastline due to a collision with another vessel on the
14th May, 1990, was owned by a USSR shipping company. The vessel
did not have any P&I insurance but was covered by a State
guarantee, in accordance with Article VII.12 of the Civil
162FUND/A .15/21, annex F 143.
163Lloyd's List August 21 , 1989.
164For a description of the evolution of the ITIA see
M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 159 .
165Civil Liability Convent ion, Article VII .12.
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Liability Convention. 166
4.10.6 Direct action against insurers
The Civil Liability Convention provides a right of direct action
against the insurer. The right of direct action against insurers
also applies to P&I insurance policies even though P&I insurance
is indemnity insurance. In principle, as indemnity insurers, P&I
Clubs do not consent to direct liability and claimants are
required to proceed against the shipowner in the first instance.
Only once the shipowner has paid successful claims will he in
turn be indemnified by the P&I Club. 167 A high incidence of
claims against P&I Association membership has resulted in this
rule being adhered to with increasing strictness. Under the Civil
Liability Convention the insurer has the same defences as the
shipowner except that the insurer may not invoke the bankruptcy
or winding-up of the shipowner to avoid liability. The insurer
cannot avail himself of any defences under the policy of
insurance other than the wilful misconduct of the assured. Wilful
misconduct in this context would be equivalent to the wilful
performance of the act which causes the pollution damage; an
example would be where the owner of a tanker scuttles his vessel.
Here the insurers will be able to avoid liability, as the law
will permit no man to take advantage of his own wrong. 168 While
the shipowner may lose his right to limit liability because the
pollution damage resulted from his actual fault or privity, the
insurer's limits of liability, to the amount guaranteed by the
certificate of financial responsibility, is unbreakable. 169
166 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12 .2 at 43 .
.167K. Mitchell 'Direct recovery from P&I associations, The
Fant~i The Padre Island' [1987 ] Lloyd's Maritime and
Commercial LQ 406.
168Thompson v Hopper (1858) EB&E 1038. For a general
desc:iption of ~he princ~ples a~d case authority pertaining to
the lnterpretatlon of 'wllful mlsconduct' in marine insurance
law see Ivamy Marine Insurance 4th ed. (1985) pp 232-247.
169Civil Liability Convention, Article VII. 8.
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In the Akari case certain important conceptual problems were
raised relating to the right of direct action against the
insurer. It will be recalled that the shipowner had no assets and
therefore could not, without P&l support, establish a limitation
fund. Furthermore, the Akari was not required to be in possession
of a certificate of compulsory liability insurance because she
was not carrying a cargo of 2,000 tons or more of persistent oil.
The Akari's P&l Club maintained that the Akari did not possess
P&l cover for liability incurred by way of oil pollution damage.
The Club further argued that the right of direct action against
the insurer under Article VII. 8 of the Civil Liability Convention
did not apply in this case because the ship was carrying less
than 2,000 tons of oil. In other words the P&l Club adopted the
position that the right of direct action against any insurer
under the Civil Liability Convention was dependant upon the
actual existence of a Civil Liability Convention certificate of
financial responsibility. This argument was not accepted by the
IOPC Fund Director who maintained that a right of direct action
against the Club as the shipowner's liability insurer did exist.
This important conceptual problem was not resolved as the P&l
Club and the IOPC Fund agreed to settle out-of-court. The Club
offered to make an ex gratia paYment of U8$160,OOO (£82,900) to
the IOPC Fund, recognising its potential liabilities to third
parties but without any admission on this issue. The IOPC Fund
accepted this ex gratia paYment without conceding the validity
of the Club's contention that no right of direct action existed.
The IOPC Fund was also required to~~ve ,an undertaking not to (~
pursue any claims against the owner of the Akari or against the
Club and to hold the owner and the Club harmless for any claims
for compensation for pollution damage arising out of the
incident.~o This incident also highlights the way in which P&l
Clubs steadfastly adhere to the notion of indemnity insurance.
4.10.7 Conclusions on CLl
170IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 32-34.
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The development of enforceable financial responsibility
certification for oil tankers, together with the right of direct
action against insurers did much towards improving the claimant's
chances of attaining compensation, because a certain fund of
money was made available against which claims could be made.
Prior to the Civil Liability Convention it had been extremely
difficult to establish a claim against shipowners. If one
succeeded it was then necessary to enforce the judgement, usually
in a foreign jurisdiction, and the owner often did not have
sufficient assets to satisfy the claims . Many ships are owned by
'brass plate' or 'single-ship ' companies which have no assets
other than the ship.
4.11 Channelling of liability to the registered owner
The Civil Liability Convention was designed to facilitate
compensation regardless of fault and was intended to be in the
best interests of victims. In this regard, it has been suggested
that the purpose of the Civil Liability Convention is not to
apportion blame but rather to ensure that the victims of tanker
source oil pollution receive efficient, effective and certain
compensation, and, that claimants would not benefit from a system
under which several parties where jointly and severally liable.
As such, it was considered more effective to impute liability
solely to the shipowner.~l As a general statement of policy the
above views are accurate, however, it must also be borne in mind
that the aim of the Convention was not only to provide
compensation but also to protect the marine environment. By
protecting certain parties i nv o l v ed in the carriage if oil from
direct liability it is possible that those parties will not be
encouraged to adopt responsible attitudes towards the safety of
operational standards. For example, if a cargo owner is immune
from direct liability what incentive is there to compel him to
charter a good quality tanker when he can charter a lower and
even a poor quality tanker at a less expensive rate.
~10fficial Records, vol.2 at 415 para.42.
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4.11.1 Liability of the registered owner
Claims for 'pollution damage' under the Civil Liability
Convention may be made only against the registered owner of the
ship.~2 Where the registered owner is proceeded against under
the Civil Liability Convention, which will be the case in States
Party to the Convention, then the provisions of the Convention
govern all 'pollution damage' claims brought against the
registered owner. 173 Therefore, claims for 'pollution damage'
allowed by the Civil Liability Convention may not be made against
the registered owner in terms of the Convention and at the same
time under the provisions of other laws. This exclusionary rule
would presumably be enforced in contracting states by the
upholding of an application to strike out an action for
'pollution damage' brought against the registered owner where
such claims are not in accordance with the Civil Liability
Convention. 174 An owner who is not the registered owner will
probably not be afforded the right to limit liability under the
Convention.
Even where, for instance, the registered owner's right to limit
has been broken, through proof that the incident was a result of
actual fault or privity of the owner, the Civil Liability
Convention provisions relating to 'pollution damage', will still
apply. Accordingly, claims for pure threat removal measures may
remain inadmissible under the laws of the lex fori.
It has been seen, however, in the case of the Amoco Cadiz that
victims of oil 'pollution damage ' in states contracting to the
Civil Liability Convention may successfully circumvent the
exclusionary rule by initiating proceedings in a non-contracting
172Civil Liability Convention, Article III.1.
173Civ i.L Liability Convention, Article Ill. 4.
174Gaskell (A) (1985) ., op c i.t: 186.
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state whose laws do not afford the same protection to the
owner. 175 This observation will be further amplified during a
discussion of the litigation surrounding the wreck of the Amoco
Cadiz.
4.11.2 Servants and agents immunity
Subject to the exception below, victims of pollution damage in
states party to the Civil Liability Convention are not precluded
from claiming compensation under any other law from persons other
than the registered owner. The exception, Article 111.4 of the
Civil Liability Convention, explicitly stipulates that:
... No claim for pollution damage under this Convention
or otherwise may be made against the servants or agents of
the owner.'
The effect of this provision is that no Civil Liability
Convention claim for 'pollution damage' may be brought against
a servant or agent of the the registered owner. Furthermore, no
non-Civil Liability Convention claim for 'pollution damage' as
defined in that Convention may be brought against such servant
or agent under general principles of law. n 6 General principles
of law may be taken to include the common law governing tort,
nuisance and trespass, civil law codes and other statutory law.
The Civil Liability Convention does not define the terms
'servants' or 'agents'i therefore, the determination of what
kinds of individuals or legal bodies fall within this group will
be left to the courts of the l ex fori. 177 The master, crew and
ships ' managers would almost certainly be included. Whether
bareboat charterers, ship designers, builders and repairers,
175Abecassis & Jarashow , op cit , 201 para.10-24.
176Abecassis & Jarashow, op ci t, 201.
177For an analysis of the interpretation of these terms
under English law see Gaskell (A) (1985), op cit, 186-87.
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classification societies and salvors will be construed as
'servants' or 'agents' is uncertain. The view has been put
forward that the channelling provisions should not be constructed
in such a way as to extend the rights to limitation of liability
to parties unconnected with the actual navigation of the ship.
In accordance with this view it has been argued that the builder
of an unseaworthy ship should not be encompassed within the ambit
of the phrase 'servants or agents of the owner'. If this
reasoning is accepted then ship designers, repairers and
classification societies will also be excluded. u 8
Abecassis and Jarashow point out that certain contracting states
have expressly excluded certain types of operators from liability
under the Civil Liability Convention through the incorporation
of special provisions in their municipal legislation. 179 This
has been done in respect of charterers and salvors in certain
states. They also suggest that any servant or agent of the
registered owner may contractually agree to accept liability for
'pollution damage' ". 180 On this point it must be the case that
where such servant or owner does accept liability for pollution
damage the actual owner will nevertheless remain primarily liable
under the provisions of the Civil Liability Convention.
The objective behind channelling of liability is to clarify who
is actually liable, and at the same time afford some protection
to the wide range of parties involved in maritime endeavour
relating to the transportation of oil at sea. This procedure also
goes some way towards obviating the need for overlapping
insurance coverage which would be required under a regime where
a wide range of potentially responsible parties are
identified. 181 Channelling also reduces the possibility of
U80fficial Records, vol.1 at 157 para.7.
179Abecassis & Jarashow , op cit, 202 para 10-27.
180Abecassis & Jarashow, op ci t, 201 para.10-25.
1810fficial Records, vol.1 at 152 para.1; 154 para.10 and
155 para.13.
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excessive litigation which often works to the detriment of
victims.
The notion of liability channelling was essentially a creature
of international law which sometimes conflicted with national
law. 182 By way of illustration, at the 1984 Conference, the
concept of channelling was described as a principle 'alien' to
Canadian common and legislative law,183 and, that being so, it
would 'raise difficulties' for that country. 184 The delegation
from the United States pointed out that the concept of
channelling was 'unusual' in the jurisprudential history of that
country .F" The channelling provisions constitute an example of
the unique, exceptional and innovative character of some of the
developments contained in the Civil Liability Convention which
have thereby found their way into national legal systems. As
such, it is difficult to refute the idea that the Civil Liability
Convention, together with the Fund Convention, serve to
facilitate the evolution of private liability laws and
environmental law in nation states.
4.11.3 Actions outside the Convention
To recapitulate, nothing in the Civil Liability Convention
prevents actions by oil pollution victims, including the lOPC
Fund, against parties other than the owner or his servants or
agents. Therefore, it is clear that the present system of
channelling does not limit actions exhaustively to claims against
the owner since separate actions outside the Civil Liability
Convention are possible against a wide range of potentially
responsible parties. At the 1984 Conference it was noted that
claims outside the Civil Liability Convention did not cause great
1820fficial Records, vol.l at 153 para.4.
1830fficial Records, vol.2 at 416 para.49.
1840fficial Records, vol.2 at 619 para.75.
1850fficial Records, vol.2 at 434 para. 30.
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difficulty in practice because in the majority of cases it was
easier to proceed against the owner under the Convention in order
to obtain the benefit of the owner's compulsory liability
insurance. 186 The \no- faul t' liability of the owner under the
Convention will also serve as an incentive to claim against the
owner in the first instance. Nothing, however, prevents claimants
proceeding against the owner under the Convention and then
proceeding against parties which are not protected by the
channelling provisions to recover any outstanding damage claims.
A case which aptly illustrates the extent to which victims may
proceed against parties other than the registered owner and his
servants and agents is the Tanio. It must be recognised from the
outset that the Tanio case may be classified as an exception in
so far as the application of the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions are concerned . This case will now be discussed.
On the 7th March, 1980, the Tanio, a tanker of 18,048 grt.
registered in Madagascar, broke in half while navigating heavy
weather conditions off the coast of Brittany, France.
Regretfully, the master and seven other crew members lost their
lives in the incident.
At the time of the incident the Tanio was carrying 26,000 tonnes
of No . 6 fuel oil in bulk as c a r go . 187 About 13,500 tonnes of
this oil escaped into the sea and over 200 kilometres of the
Brittany coast was polluted. The Channel Islands were also
affected. The stern sect ion , containing about 7,500 tonnes of
cargo oil did not sink and was t owe d to the port of Le Havre. The
bow section, together with about 5,000 tonnes of cargo oil
remaining in its tanks, sank t o a depth of 90 metres. The oil
contained in the sunken bow section was pumped out to prevent
further pollution during operations which lasted 16 months. The
1860fficial Records, vol .2 at 55.
187No.6 fuel oil is classified as persistent oil for the
purposes of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
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claims for 'pollution damage' exceeded the limits of the Civil
Liability Convention and the Fund Convention. 188 The shipowner's
liability limit under the Civil Liability Convention amounted to
FFr11,833,717.79 (£1.2 million) which was paid by the U.K. P&l
Club. 189
In 1983 the French Government in joint pleadings with the lOPC
Fund took legal action in the Court of Brest, France. In
addition, twenty-nine local authorities in France and some 50
private claimants also proceeded against the same defendants.
These claimants first proceeded against the registered shipowner,
La societe Locafrance International Leasing (Locafrance), under
the terms of the Civil Liability Convention. They submitted that
Locafrance had failed to put the Tanio in a seaworthy and
navigable state. They alleged that the failure of the owner to
organise a proper mechanism of control of the quality of the
extensive repairs carried out by a shipyard in 1979 constituted
a personal fault 190 on the part of the owner, who was therefore
not entitled to limit his liability under Article V.2 of the
Civil Liability Convention. 191
The above claimants also proceeded against six parties other than
the registered owner. These claims were made independent from the
provisions of the Civil Liability Convention. The respondents are
each dealt with in turn below.
La societe Industrie Navale Meccaniche Assini
188IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 25-28.
189 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 28.
190Article XXI of the Civil Liability Convention provides
that' .:. [the] Convention is established in a single copy in
the Eng~ls~ and French languages, both texts being equally
authentlc . The French text of Article V.2 uses the term
' fa~ te personelle' (personal fault) as opposed to the English
equlvalent 'actual fault or privity' .
191IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.2 at 13 and
IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 28-29.
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Legal action was taken against the Italian shipyard that repaired
the Tanio in 1979 on the allegation that the shipyard had not
. h .. 192carrled out t e repalrs ln a proper manner.
La Societe Fran~aise des Transports Petroliers
The company responsible for the control of the repairs carried
out on the Tanio in 1979 and the technical management of the
vessel at the time of the incident. It was alleged that they had
not exercised due diligence in the supervision of the repair work
at the shipyard and in checking the results thereof .193
La societe Guardiola Shipping Corporation
The bareboat charterer of the Tanio at the time of the incident.
Claimants submitted that they had failed to supervise the
execution of the repair work properly. In addition the charterer
had an obligation to put the ship in a seaworthy condi.t i on i t'"
La compagnie Malgache de Transports Petroliers
The company having sub-bareboat chartered the vessel and being
responsible for the management of the Tanio at the time of the
incident. It was alleged that in their being responsible for the
operations of the Tanio they had an obligation to ensure that the
crew was competent and properly trained. It was further alleged
that they had failed to ensure that the Master of the Tanio was
properly instructed concerning cargo distribution. 195
Le Bureau Veritas
The Classification society responsible for monitoring the repairs
to the Tanio in 1979. It was alleged that they had not fulfilled
their obligation to check the quality of the repair work at the






The United Kingdom Mutual Steamship Assurance Association
(Bermuda) Limited.
The U.K. P&l Club was sued in its capacity as the insurers of the
civil liability of the charterer and sub-charterer .197
The Court ordered an investigation into the cause of the incident
which concluded that the initial fracture which broke the Tanio
originated in the vicinity of frame 131 in wing tank NO.6. It
concluded that there were three contributing causes for this
fracture. Firstly, insufficient reduction in speed to allow for
bad weather. Secondly , defective cargo loading at the time of the
incident and on previous voyages and, thirdly, defective
reconstruction and replacement of the bottom structure in wing
tank No.6 by the Italian shipbuilding company.UB
The merits of these actions taken outside the Civil Liability
Convention would not be tested by the Court because an out of
court settlement was agreed upon. This settlement was agreed to
on 15th December, 1987. Locafrance (the registered owner) and the
U.K. P&l Club paid, on behalf of all defendants, a total amount
of US$50 million to the IOPC Fund and the French State, less the
shipowner's limitation amount under the Civil Liability
Convention, FFr11,833,717.79 (US$l,931,089.71) .U9
Regarding the Tanio case it may be argued that the channelling
provisions in the Civil Liability Convention as it presently
applies are not sufficiently broad to protect the wide range of
potentially responsible parties from being held liable for






is certainly the view held be the oil company and ship owning
lobbies.
In conclusion, the astute observation has been made that the most
effective way to achieve channelling, and thereby prevent claims
being brought outside the Conventions with the resulting erosion
of the credibility of these instruments, is to ensure that the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions together provide possible
claimants with comprehensive compensation without undue
delays.20o The Conventions must meet the legitimate expectations
of claimants. Problems arise where states ratify the Civil
Liability Convention but not the Fund Convention. In such
circumstances when large damage cases occur claimants may be
forced seek supplementary compensation outside the Convention,
against, for example, the bareboat charterer or the ship
operator, in place of being able to obtain such supplementary
compensation from the IOPC Fund under the provisions of the Fund
Convention. In such cases the application of the voluntary
compensation agreements (i.e . TOVALOP and CRISTAL) may then form
part of the broader \package of tools' managing tanker- source oil
pollution liability which may serve as a further incentive
encouraging claimants to resist resorting to alternative ways of
obtaining full recovery. These observations give credence to the
argument that the purpose of the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions, together with the voluntary compensation agreements,
are rather to manage liability in the potentially explosive issue
of oil pollution damage as opposed to being mechanisms for
determining blame.
4.12 The registered owners right of recourse
It has already been pointed out that one of the primary reasons
for the channelling of claims to the registered owner was to
avoid the need for overlapping insurance by the wide range of
potentially responsible parties associated with the operation of
2000fficial Records I vol.2 at 443 para. 6 .
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tankers. However, the Civil Liability Convention expressly
permits the owner to take recourse action against any third
parties in accordance with national law. 201 For example, the
owners of a ship damaged in a collision can sue the owners of the
colliding ship at fault in respect of paYments made under the
Civil Liability Convention for pollution damage and the ordinary
rules of contributory negligence apply . It is further submitted
that the owner is even permitted to sue his own servants or
agents in the same way. Although the existence of this provision
is fair, it does, however, expose certain inconsistencies in the
argument that the channelling provisions diminish the need for
overlapping insurance coverage. It can be argued that although
parties, other than the registered owner are not directly liable
under the Civil Liability Convention such parties may ultimately
become liable for this damage by way of the owner's recourse
action. Such potentially responsible parties may also, therefore,
be forced to take out liability insurance in order to guard
against possible losses incurred in this way.
The operation of this principle, which ensures that liability may
ultimately rest with the blameworthy party, even where the no-
fault principle of the Civil Liability Convention applies, is
illustrated through the facts of three oil pollution incidents.
These incidents are discussed below.
Brady Maria/Waylink
On the 3rd January, 1986, a Panamanian tanker of 996 grt. the
BradyMaria was proceeding up the River Elbe carrying a cargo of
2,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil . The Waylink a dry cargo ship of
3,453 grt. registered in Gibraltar , which was proceeding down the
river, turned across the river and collided with the Brady Maria.
Approximately 200 tonnes of cargo oil escaped from the Brady
Maria into the river as a result of the collision. 202 Extensive
201Civil Liability Convention, Article 111.5.
202 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 38.
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pollution damage was caused in the internal waters and territory
of Germany. 203
The official investigation into the cause of the incident showed
that the pilot of the Waylink was mainly to blame for the
collision, since he gave a wrong order to the helmsman of the
Waylink, causing the vessel to cross the course of the on-coming
Brady Maria. The owners of the Waylink established a modest
limitation fund in the District Court of Hamburg of DM440,185
(£140,000) .204 Claims for a proportional indemnity of the amount
paid for pollution damage and other damage incurred by the owners
of the Brady Maria were made against this fund.
Agip Abruzzo/Moby Prince
On the 10th April, 1991, while lying at anchor two miles off the
Italian port of Livorno, the 84,544 grt. Italian tanker Agip
Abruzzo was struck at night by the Italian car ferry Moby Prince.
It was reported that dense fog had reduced visibility to a few
yards. 205 Both vessels caught fire and, sadly, 143 people on
board the ferry lost their lives. The Agip Abruzzo was carrying
about 80,000 tonnes of Italian light crude oil and as a result
of the collision about 2,000 tonnes of this oil escaped.
Considerable pollution damage was caused in the territorial sea
and territory of Italy. 206
It has been suggested that the collision was caused by the
negligence of the crew of the Moby Prince. 207 If this proves to
be the case the owners of the Agip Abruzzo will be able to
203Germany ratified the 1969 Civil Liability Convention on
20 May 1975 and the 1971 Civil Liability Convention on 30
December, 1976.
204IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 39.
205Daily Telegraph 12 April , 1991 at 1.
206IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 54-55.
207IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 58.
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recover a proportion of their pollution liability under the Civil
Liability Convention. Such claims against the Moby Prince's
limitation fund would necessarily compete with other claims such
as the Agip Abruzzo' s hull underwriters and cargo interests. 208
Amoco Cadiz/Astilleros Espanoles SA
A shipowner who is liable to pay oil pollution claims caused by
the negligent design or construction of his vessel may recover
an amount from the negligent shipbuilder in proportion to the
extent that such negligence contributed to the incident and
subsequent damage.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
ruled on the 24th January, 1992,209 that Amoco International Oil
Company and its various subsidiaries (Amoco) pay US$204 million
in pollution damage caused by the oil spill from the 230,000
deadweight ton Amoco Cadiz off the French coast in 1978. It was
also held that Amoco must pay an additional amount to Shell Oil
Co., the owner of the spilled oil.
This was an appeal from the ruling made in August of 1990 by
Federal Judge Charles R. Norgle of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois (Eastern Division) who then had
held that Amoco pay US$155 million in damages to French interests
and Shell Oil. Judge Norgle further determined that the yard
which had built the Amoco Cadiz, Spanish company Astilleros
Espanoles SA, was also liable for the failure of the ship's
steering gear and her subsequent grounding due to defects in her
design and construction. The Appeal Court upheld the trial
judgement, holding that Amoco could attempt to recover some of
the costs from the tanker's Spanish shipbuilders Astilleros
Espanoles SA but that Amoco must accept full primary liability.
208IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12 .2 at 59.
209In the matter of the ' Amo co Cadiz' off the coast of
France on March 16, 1978, 913 A.M.C. 1992.
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Clearly, the shipowner's rights of recourse under the Civil
Liability Convention are significant and must not be discounted
by other potentially responsible parties.
4.13 Jurisdiction
Actions for compensation of 'pollution damage' under the Civil
Liability Convention may only be brought before the Courts of the
State Party to the Convention in whose territory or territorial
sea such damage is sustained. This is determined by Article IX.1
of that Convention which states that:
'Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the
territory including the territorial sea of one or more
Contracting States, or preventive measures have been taken
to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory
including the territorial sea, actions for compensation may
only be brought in Courts of any such Contracting State or
States.
Because the Civil Liability Convention only facilitates claims
for compensation against the registered shipowner and is designed
to regulate this liability it is reasonable to interpret the
phrase 'actions for compensation' as meaning 'actions for
compensation under this Convention'. :.110 Accordingly, Article
IX.1 does not mean that all claims for oil pollution compensation
brought by anyone against anyone must be brought in the Courts
of the state where the pollution damage was sustained. Claims for
oil pollution damage arising outside the ambit of the Civil
Liability Convention, for instance, against a party who is not
the registered owner or a servant or agent of the registered
owner, would not necessarily be subject to this jurisdiction.
Furthermore, where the registered owner is domiciled in a non-
contracting state it may be possible for claimants to circumvent
(A)
210Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 220 para.10-86; Gaskell
(1985), op cit, 182.
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the provisions of the Civil Liability Convention by proceeding
in the jurisdiction of that non-contracting state. French
claimants successfully by-passed the application of the Civil
Liability Convention in the French jurisdiction by proceeding
against the registered owners and the actual owners of the Amoco
Cadiz in the United States. Clearly, claims related and unrelated
to oil pollution even though arising out of the same incident may
be brought in another jurisdiction provided that the rules
relating to Conflict of Laws in that jurisdiction permit. 211
4.13.1 Sovereign Immunity
It has been pointed out that state-owned ships may raise
Sovereign Immunity as a defence in proceedings under the Civil
Liability Convention. However, their ability to raise this
defence in most West European jurisdictions will be limited by
the European Convention on State Immunity (enacted in the U.K.
by the State Immunity Act 1978) which provides inter alia that
no state ship will enjoy immunity if, at the time when the cause
of action arose, it was being used for commercial purposes. 212
However, the Civil Liability Convention does not apply to
warships or other ships owned or operated by a State and used,
for the time being, only on Governmental, non-commercial
service. 213 The Convention further stipulates:
'With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and
used for commercial purposes, each State shall be subject
to suit in the jurisdictions set forth in Article IX and
shall waive all defences based on its status as a sovereign
State. ,214
211Browne, op cit, 148.
212Browne , op ci t , 148.
213Civil Liability Convention, Article XI.1.
214Civil Liability Convention, Article XI.2.
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Each Contracting State shall ensure that its Courts possess the
necessary jurisdiction to entertain such actions for
compensation. 215 On a strict construction of Article X. I, the
Courts of the Contracting State where the damage was sustained
must entertain actions for pollution damage within the meaning
of the Convention. If this rule were strictly adhered to,
inefficiency in the settlement process and greater legal expenses
could result. In the case of the Haven, where pollution damage
was done in the territorial sea and territory of three adjacent
contracting states; Italy, France and Monaco, all claims are
being brought against a single fund established by the Haven's
owners in Genoa, Italy. 216
The provisions in the Civil Liability Convention providing for
the lex loci delicti to be the jurisdiction, confer significant
advantages on victims of oil pollution damage. Claimants may
claim through the local lawyers of his choice, legal costs can
be kept lower than would be the case where actions are brought
in a foreign jurisdiction and jurisdiction can not be thwarted
on grounds of 'forum non conveniens'.
Except in cases of fraud, 217 or where the defendant was not
given reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to present his
case, final judgments of a court having jurisdiction are
enforceable in other contracting states. 218
4.14 Limitation of Actions
Rights to compensation under the Civil Liability Convention are
extinguished unless suit is commenced within three years of the
date when the damage occurred, but in no case may an action be
215Civil Liability Convention, Article IX. 2.
216 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992 , section 12.2 at 63.
217Civil Liability Convent ion , Article X. 1 .
218Civil Liability Convent ion, Article X.2.
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brought after six years from the date of the incident which
caused the dama"ge.:I19
4.15 Conclusion to the Civil Liability Convention
The Civil Liability Convention was a special dispensation which
evolved out of a particular problem and, as such, it was not
known how it would be received by the international community.
The Convention imposed completely new liabilities and, in 1969,
when it was developed there were fears that the insurance market
would not have the capacity to guarantee the additional
liabilities it introduced. Accordingly, a cautious approach was
adopted and these liabilities where relatively narrowly defined.
Nonetheless, the implementation of the Convention greatly
improved the procedure whereby claims for tanker- source oil
pollution damage could be pursued. Through channelling strict
liability to the registered shipowner claimants had an easily
identifiable and certain party against which to proceed. By
forcing registered tanker-owners to maintain compulsory liability
insurance the rights of claimants could not be thwarted where an
owner became insolvent or where the ship was operated by a single
ship company. There rights where further safe-guarded through the
Civil Liability Convention limitation fund which did not have to
be shared with non-oil pollution claimants and the right of
direct action against insurers of such liability. In the next
chapter it will be seen how the rights of oil pollution victims
would be further provided for through the 1971 Fund Convention
in terms of which oil importers would be required to contribute
towards the costs of oil pollution damage.
219Civil Liability Convention, Article VIII.
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CHAPTER 5
The 1971 Fund Convention
5.1 Introduction
At the 1969 Brussels Conference , certain delegates felt that the
limits set by the Civil Liabi l i ty Convention were inadequate to
provide full compensation to the victims of a major oil spill.
The Belgium delegation submit ted a proposal that the oil industry
should shoulder additional l iability by way of an international
compensation fund which would be funded by levies on companies
importing oil after transport by sea. 1 Although this proposal
was considered too 'radical ' a t the 1969 Conference to attract
large support the deliberations of an ad hoc working group,
meeting throughout the 1969 Conference, which considered the
Belgium proposal would eventual ly constitute the foundations for
the 1971 Fund Convention . 2 The delegates at the 1969 Conference
decided to adopted a resolution , submitted by the delegations of
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, requesting IMCO to convene an
International Legal Conference , not later than 1971, to consider
an International Compensation Fund . It was envisaged that this
Fund would compensate oil pollution claimants on the basis of
strict liability, and relieve shipowners of the additional
financial burden, in excess of shipowners' traditional liability
under the common law and statute, that had been imposed on then
by the provisions of Civil Liabi l i t y Convention . 3
The Inter-Governmental Marit ime Consultative Organization (IMCO)
subsequently decided that a supplementary layer of compensation
lM'Gonigle & Zacher Pollution , Politics, and International
Law: Tankers at Sea (1979) 172 .
2M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 182 .
3Healy 'The International Convent i on on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 ' (1970) 1 Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce 317 at 322.
1 25
should be made available over and above that provided by the
shipowner. It was felt that this supplementary layer of
compensation, would, as planned, be provided for by the oil cargo
interests . To this end, a second Diplomatic Conference was
convened, once again in Brussels, during December 1971 which
considered a draft compensation scheme based upon the
establishment of an International Fund. The Conference led to the
adoption of a Convention providing second-tier Compensation over
and above the Civil Liability Convention, this was the
International Fund for the Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage
(hereafter referred to as the 1971 Fund Convention). The unique
character and operation of the Fund Convention is considered in
this Chapter.
5.2 The premise for the Fund Convention
The preamble to the Fund Convention articulates, inter alia, the
following point of departure .
, ... the economic consequences of oil pollution damage
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil carried in
bulk at sea by ships should not exclusively be borne by the
shipping industry but should in part be borne by cargo
interests,
The justification for this approach was that the oil cargo
interests profited from the trade undertaken by the tanker owners
and to a large extent the potential hazards posed by tanker
source oil pollution relate to the noxious nature of the cargo.
5.2.1 The impact of the 1971 Convention
It is evident from the preamble to the Fund Convention that the
two-fold function of that Convention are : firstly, to provide
supplementary compensation to vic tims of oil pollution damage in
Con t r a c t i ng States who i t was f e a r e d may not be able to obtain
full compensation for such damage under the Civil Liability
1 2 6
Convention alone,· and, secondly, to indemnify shipowners for a
portion of the increased liability that was imposed upon them
under the Civil Liability Convention . s
The Fund Convention was thus a constructive attempt to determine
a satisfactory balance between the conflicting interests of the
three parties involved in t he development, implementation,
operation and application of the Conventions. Most importantly
the victims of tanker-source oil pollution received greater and
more certain compensation.
Shipowners were indemnified, i n part, for what they saw were
unfair liabilities imposed upon them at the earlier 1969
Conference. Under the 1957 Limitation of liability for Maritime
Claims Convention the shipowner's liability for damage was
limited per incident to a maximum of 1,000 gold francs per ton
of ship's tonnage. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention doubled
this amount to 2,000 gold francs per ton. M'Gonigle and Zacher
note that '... the draft articles [of the Fund Convention
prepared by lMCO' s Legal Committee] provided that the shipowner's
l iability would be reduced r ight back to its original limit of
1,000 [gold] francs per ton ... ' . s Unfortunately for tanker
owners, their liability limits did not in fact return to their
former levels during the deliberations of the 1971 Conference.
Under the 1971 Fund Convention, the shipowner's liability was
effectively 'rolled back ' to approximately 1,500 gold francs per
ton through a procedure whereby the lOPC Fund indemnified the
shipowner for approximately one half of the additional liability
imposed upon shipowners by the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
Cargo interests succeeded in persuading the delegates at the 1971
Conference that to releive shipowners of their entire additional
·This purpose is also expressed in Article 2.1 (a) of the
Fund Convention.
SAs is further articulated by Article 2 of the Fund
Convention.
EiM'Gonigle & Zacher, op ci t , 187.
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liability would be inappropriate. They argued that tanker
interests had already voluntarily agreed to carry such additional
limits under TOVALOP.7 This development aptly shows how prior
development of industry voluntary compensation agreements exert
profound influences upon the subsequent inter-governmental
agreements. The indemnification of the shipowner will be dealt
with in greater detail at a later stage of the analysis of the
provisions of the Fund Convention .
Owners of oil cargoes were forced to assume indirect
responsibility for oil pollution damage where previously they had
managed to avoid this legal obligation. To a large extent,
however, the oil companies had reason to be pleased with the
manner in which the legal dispensation had evolved because it was
the shipowner who remained primarily responsible for tanker-
source oil pollution damage . The supplemental character of the
compensation provided by the shippers of oil through the Fund
Convention is often emphasised by the oil industry. Clearly, it
is in the best interests of this group to remain as far removed
from the problem of oil pollution as possible. Arrangements
foisting primary liability upon the oil industry have, however,
been suggested. For example, the CMI has on occasion favoured the
channelling of primary liability for oil pollution damage towards
an international oil industry fund which in turn would have had
a right of recourse against negligent shipowners. 8 It is also
important, from the point of view of the oil industry, for
individual owners of oil cargoes to avoid becomming directly
involved in oil spill compensation wherever possible.
5.2.2 Entry into force requirements and denunciation
The 1971 Fund Convention was designed to enter into force after
ratification by at least eight States, provided that the States
which have become parties to the Convention have received during
70fficial Records, vol.2 at 81 .
80fficial Records, Vol.2 at 92.
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the preceding calendar year a total quantity of at least 750
million tons of contributing oil. 9
Membership of the Civil Liability Convention is open to states
without restriction. The Fund Convention, in contrast, is
designed to supplement compensation available under the Civil
Liability Convention, accordingly, only states which have become
party to the Civil Liability Convention may be party to the Fund
Convention. 10 Furthermore, the Fund Convention could not enter
into force before the Civil Liability Convention. 11 Accordingly,
where a State party to both Conventions, denounces the Civil
Liability Convention such action constitutes an automatic
denunciation of the Fund Conventic;m . 12
A denunciation of the Fund Convention takes effect one year after
that State has deposited an instrument of denunciation with the
Secretary-General of IM013 and oil receivers in a Contracting
State which has denounced the Fund Convention are obliged to pay
contributions to Major Claims Funds in respect of any incident
which occurred before the denunciation takes effect . 14
5.2.3 Structure of the lOpe Fund
By becoming party to the Fund Convention a state also becomes a
member of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC
Fund) which is a worldwide inter-governmental organisation,
headquartered in London, established for the purpose of
administering the regime of compensation created by the Fund
Convention. The IOPC Fund is established as a legal entity in
9Fund Convention, Article 40.1.
l°Fund Convention, Article 37 .4.
llFund Convention, Article 40.2.
12Fund Convention , Article 41.4 .
13Fund Convention, Article 41. 3.
14Fund Convention, Article 41. 5.
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Fund Convention States capable of assuming rights and obligations
and of being a party in legal proceedings before courts of such
States .15
The ropc Fund consists of an Assembly, an Executive Committee and
a Secretariat. The Assembly, which is composed of representatives
of the governments of all member states, is the supreme organ
governing the ropc Fund and holds regular sessions once a year.
The Executive Committee is elected by the Assembly and is
composed of 15 Member States. rts main function is to consider
and approve settlement of major claims against the ropc Fund
where the ropc Fund Director (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Director' ) 16 is not authorised to make such settlement . The
Secretariat, which also has its headquarters in London, is headed
by the Director, and has a staff of ten. n
At the time of the establishment of the ropc Fund, the Assembly
decided that the organisation should have a small Secretariat and
that it should use outside experts for the fulfilment of tasks
which could not be carried out by the permanent staff members.
Consultants, such as lawyers, surveyors and other technical
experts, are used by the ropc Fund, mainly in connection with
incidents in which the Fund has been involved. 18
15Fund Convention, Article 2.2.
16Fund Convention, Article 2.2 provides that:
'Each Contracting State shall recognize the Director of the
Fund as the legal representative of the Fund.'
There have been only two Directors during the existence of the
rOPC,Fund. At its 1st session, in November 1978, the Assembly
appo1nted Dr Reinhard H. Ganten of the Federal Republic of
Germany as Director from the 16th December, 1978. The present
Director is Mr Mans Jacobsson of Sweden. Mr Jacobsson was
appointed by the Assembly in October, 1984, and has held the
post of Director from the 1st January, 1985, see IOPC Fund
Annual Report 1988 , section 8 at 17.
17IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 7 at 11.
18IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 7 at 18.
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5.2.4 Supplementary/complementary compensation
The IOPC Fund pays compensation in respect of oil pollution
damage in a Contracting State where any claimant has been unable
to obtain full and adequate compensation under the Civil
Liability Convention for one of three reasons. In the case of the
first two caragories of situations the IOPC Fund plays a role
which is complementary to that of the Civil Liability Convention
and in the third situation the role of the IOPC Fund is
definitely supplementary.
The first situation is where no liability for pollution damage
arises under the Civil Liability Converrt.Lon i P This would be,
for example, where an incident occurs and the ship-owner
successfully invokes one of the exemptions or absolute defences
under the Civil Liability Convention. Here the role of the IOPC
Fund will be to provide primary compensation. The second
situation is where the owner is financially incapable of meeting
his obligations and rights of d irect action against the insurer
have been exhausted. 20 A case in point is that of the Akari
where the ship had no compulsory liability insurance because it
was carrying under 2,000 tonnes of oil in bulk as cargo at the
time of the incident and the shipowner had no assets other than
the Akari, which was sold as scrap. In this situation the IOPC
Fund provided primary compensation. 21
Finally, the IOPC Fund will pay compensation where the damage
exceeds the shipowner's liability as limited under the Civil
Liabili ty Convention. 22 The experience of the IOPC Fund has
shown that most incidents in which the IOPC Fund is required to
provide supplementary compensation fall within the last-mentioned
19Fund Convention, Article 4.1 (a) .
2°Fund Convention, Article 4 .1 (b) .
21IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at pp 30-34.
22Fund Convention, Article 4.1 (c) .
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category.23 The overwhelming application of the IOPC Fund in the
third type of situation is in accordance with the philosophy of
the two-tier system whereby the actual tanker owner is
responsible for primary compensation while the oil industry, as
a group, is responsible for the upper tier in the case of large
scale spills. The oil industry obviously feels it is important
to support and maintain the primary/supplementary organisation
of the international regime . ~
5.3 lope Fund's defences to liability
As is the position of the shipowner under the Civil Liability
Convention the IOPC Fund may also invoke the protection of
limited defences under the provisions of the Fund Convention.
Although these defences are similar to those available to the
shipowner under the Civil Liability Convention certain important
differences also exist.
5.3.1 Absolute exceptions
The IOPC Fund is relieved of its obligation to pay compensation
if it proves that the pollut ion damage resulted from an act of
war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or was caused by a
spill from a warship or other State-owned or operated ship being
used at the time of the incident only on Government, non-
commercial service. 25 The same exceptions may be invoked by the
registered shipowner under the Ci v i l Liability Convention.
In contrast to the Civil Liability Convention, however, the Fund
Convention permits the IOPC Fund to pay claims where the
pollution damage results from a natural phenomenon of an
23IOPC Fund General Information on Liability And
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage February 1992, section
3 .2 at 5 .
240fficial Records, vol .2 at 1 03 .
25Fund Convention, Article 4.2 (a).
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irresistible character. However, in such event the upper limit
of the IOPC Fund applies. 26 This is significant because if a
natural disaster occurs more than one oil pollution incident
could take place. For example, a number of oil tankers could be
wrecked during a severe hurricane. In such circumstances
claimants against the IOPC Fund are precluded from arguing that
each incident resulting from the natural phenomenon should be
afforded a separate limit. The same protection is not, however,
afforded to shipowners under the Civil Liability Convention and
if a number of tankers were wrecked in one 'incident' the better
view is that each tanker would have to pay liability under the
Convention up to his applicable limit. The IOPC Fund, by
contrast, would treat all the damage caused by all the tanker
cargoes in all Fund Convention States as one incident.
5.3.2 Where the claimant causes damage
Where the incident was wholly caused by the negligence or other
wrongful act of any Government or other authority responsible for
the maintenance of lights or other navigational aid the IOPC Fund
is not automatically exempt. This exception (in contrast to the
Civil Liability Convention) is not included in the Fund
Convention. In this way oil importers are forced to conform to
a more narrow form of strict liability under the Fund Convention
than shipowners bear under the Civil Liability Convention. In
this respect the IOPC Fund's liability is closer to the test of
absolute liability than that of the shipowner under the Civil
Liability Convention.
The lOPC Fund will, however, not provide compensation to the
extent that pollution damage was caused by the negligence or
intentional act or omission of the claimant. This provision
specifically does not apply to preventive measures undertaken by
the shipowner. 27
26Fund Convention, Article 4.4 (b).
27Fund Convention, Article 4 .3 .
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The Shinkai Maru No.3 incident, which occurred in Japan, on the
21st June, 1983, was the result of the negligence of the master
of the tanker, who was also the registered owner of the vessel.
Under these circumstances the ropc Fund had to adopt a position
as to whether or not the owner/master should be entitled to limit
his liability under the Civil Liability Convention. rn this
instance it would seem that the owner would have had considerable
difficulty disproving' actual fault or privity' because the owner
was also the negligent master. The ropc Fund Executive Committee
decided, however, that the owner/master should be entitled to
limit his liability since the negligent act was committed in his
capacity as master of the vessel not as owner.~8
The ropc Fund also had to consider whether or not the
owner/master could recover his expenses from the ropc Fund for
undertaking voluntary measures to minimise pollution damage.
Under Article 4.3 of the Fund Convention, the ropc Fund may be
wholly or partially exonerated of its obligation to pay
compensation to a person who suffered pollution damage, if the
damage was caused by the negligence of that person. rn this case
the ropc Fund Executive Committee interpreting Article 4.3
decided that the claim for expenses voluntarily incurred by the
owner/master for the taking of preventive measures would be
accepted by the ropc Fund. ~9
5.3.3 Unidentified sources of pollution
The rose Fund has no obligation to pay compensation if the
claimant cannot prove that the damage resulted from an incident
involving one or more specific or named ships. Spills from an
unidentified source are therefore not covered by the Fund
Convention. 30 rn October, 1993, the Assembly of the ropc Fund
expressed the considered opinion that: ' ... the claimant could
~8IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.5 at 68-69.
~9IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.5 at 69.
30Fund Convention, Article 4.2 (b).
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not discharge the burden of proof imposed upon him by the Fund
Convention solely by proving that there was a strong likelihood
that the damage was caused by a ship as defined [in that
Convention] or that the damage could not have been caused other
than by such a ship. ,31 Clearly, also, no tanker owner will be
liable under the Civil Liability Convention unless it is proved
that a spill emanated from his ship (or his ship and another ship
in the case of collision).
M'Gonigle and Zacher note that the question of the envisaged
fund's liability for pollution damage caused by unidentified
spills 'was of tremendous significance' at the 1971 Conference.
These commentators further note that if the fund had been made
liabile for unidentified spills it would have been forced to
'internalize all the identifiable environmental costs of its
operations' .32 It is noteworthy that the U.S. was in favour of
the fund having to bear the cost of unidentified spills. However,
the U.S. proposal to delete the exception was narrowly defeated.
Shipowner interests were 'wary of the precedent of anyone being
liable for such damage'. 33 This debate illustrates how the oil
industry sought to protect itself from being too closely
associated with the conduct of the oil shipping industry. It also
shows how the U.S. even at this early stage was beginning to show
that it was unsatisfied with the narrowness of certain provisions
which were eventually incorporated in the Fund Convention.
An incident which aptly illustrates the difficulties facing
claimants in cases of unidentified spills is that of the
Tolmiros. In August 1990 the Swedish Government instituted legal
proceedings in the Court of Gothenburg seeking compensation for
pollution damage from the owners of the 48,914 grt. Greek
31IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 56.
32M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 185.
33M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, pp.185-187.
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registered tanker the Tolmiros and the vessels P&l insurer. 34
The owner of the Tolmiros and the P&l Club refused to concede any
liability for the damage caused by the presence of oil on the
ocean, maintaining that the oil in question had not in fact
emanated from the Tolmiros. In support of their case they drew
the Court's attention to the fact that an investigation
undertaken by Greek authorities at the request of the Swedish
Government had acquitted the Tolmiros of the allegation of having
caused the spill. They also pointed out that the master and the
chief engineer who were prosecuted in Greece for pollution
offenses had been acquitted of these allegations in September of
1991 . The lOpe Fund took the view that the documentation
presented by the Swedish Government did not exclude sources other
than the Tolmiros and in the Court proceedings the primary
argument adopted by the IOPC Fund was that the oil in question
did not emanate from the Tolmiros. 35
In December 1991, the Swedish Government withdrew its action
against the shipowner and his P&l insurer. The Swedish Government
stated that further investigations into the winds and currents
at the time of the spill had shown that it was not possible to
prove that the oil which polluted the coast actually emanated
from the Tolmiros. 36 It may be noted that the texts of both the
Civil ·Li a b i l i t y and Fund Conventions impose a very heavy burden
of proof on the claimant.
As a postscript to this incident, the shipowner, its P&l insurer
and the IOPC Fund claimed compensation from the Swedish
Government for the costs incurred in defending this matter. In
July, 1992, the Court of Gothenberg issued a decision awarding
costs plus interest to the shipowner, its P&l insurer and the
34Sweden ratified both the Civil Liability Convention and
the Fund Convention on the 17th March, 1975.
35IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 39-40.
36IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 40.
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IOPC Fund. 37 By the same token, in appropriate circumstances
victims of oil pollution damage must also be able to recover
their legal costs under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
from the shipowner and the IOPC Fund.
If the IOPC Fund were required to accept claims for oil pollution
damage caused from unidentified sources it could result in oil
importers becornming potentially responsible for oil pollution
damage from sources other than tankers, such as drillling rigs,
underwater pipelines, other ships, natural seepage and land-based
sources. Therefore, in principle the strict policy adopted by the
IOPC Fund on this issue is appropriate.
5.4 Geographical scope of application
The geographical scope of the Fund Convention is identical to the,
Civil Liability Convention in that it applies exclusively to
pollution damage caused on the territory including the
territorial sea of a Contracting State, and to preventive
measures taken to prevent or minimize such damage. 38
5.5 Essential definitions
The terms "Ship", \\ Person" , "Oil", "Pollution Damage" ,
"Preventive Measures", "Incident" and "Organization" have the
same meaning in the Fund Convention as in the Civil Liability
Convention, provided that for the purpose of the Fund Convention
\oil' shall be confined to "pezs Ls t.ent; hydrocarbon mineral oils' .
Pollution damage caused by whale oil is therefore outside the
ambit of the Fund Convention. This is appropriate because there
is no reason why importers of hydrocarbon oil should contribute
to compensation for damage caused by the whaling industry.
5.6 Limit of compensation available
37IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 40.
38Fund Convention, Article 3.1.
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The original text of the Fund Convention provided for an
aggregate amount of compensation of 450 million Poincare francs
which are also known as gold francs. This amount includes the sum
actually paid by the shipowner, or his insurer under the Civil
Liability Convention. 39 The 1971 Protocol to the Fund
Convention, which has not yet entered into force, replaced the
amount of '450 million francs' with the equivalent figure of 30
million units of account (SDRs) . 40
For the Fund Convention to provide effective compensation to
victims of oil pollution over any length of time, the Convention
had to incorporate a means by which the amounts of 450 million
francs or 30 million SDRs could be increased in step with
inflation, scale of damages and an evolving and more
comprehensive interpretation of the definition of admissible
damage. This was achieved through Article 4.6 which provides a
flexible mechanism for changing the limits set by Article
4.4 (a).
Article 4.6 provides that :
'The Assembly of the Fund may, having regard to the
experience of incidents which have occurred and in
particular the amounts of damage resulting there from and
to changes in the monetary values, decide that the amount
of 450 million francs referred to in paragraph 4, sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b), shall be changed; provided, however
that this amount shall in no case exceed 900 million
francs41 or be lower than 450 million francs. The changed
39Fund Convention, Article 4.4 (a).
4°This was done in terms of Article III of the 1976
Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage , 1971 .
41In terms of Article III of the 1976 Protocol to the
International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
1971 the term '900 million francs' is replaced by '60 million
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amount shall apply to incidents which occur after the date
of the decision effecting the change .'
Since the inception of the ropc Fund the Assembly has increased
the aggregate levels of compensation available . For incidents
occurring after the 30th November , 1987, the maximum aggregate
compensation payable by the ropc Fund is 900 million francs or
60 million units of account (SDR) . 4:l Therefore, the maximum
ceiling of compensation permiss ible under Article 4.6 of the 1971
Fund Convention was attained in 1987. 43 For further compensation
to become available, it will be necessary for the 1992 Protocols
to the Civil liability Convention and the Fund Convention to come
into force. The 1992 Protocols largely incorporate the provisions
of the 1984 Protocols .
The ropc Fund has been in operat ion for seventeen years and since
its establishment in October , 1978 , up until the close of the
1993 year, it has been involved in the settlement of claims for
pollution damage arising out of sixty-eight incidents.
units of account or 900 million monetary units' .
4:lAt its 2nd session, the ropc Fund's Assembly decided to
increase the aggregate amount of compensation payable by the
lOPC Fund in respect of anyone incident to 675 million (gold)
francs (corresponding to 45 mi l lion SDR) for incidents
occurring after the 20th April , 1979. At its 9th session, the
lOPC Fund's Assembly decided to increase the aggregate amount
of compensation payable by the lOPC Fund in respect of anyone
incident to 787,500,000 (gold) francs (corresponding to
52 million SDR) for incidents which occurred after the 30th
November, 1986, and further to 900 million (gold) francs
(corresponding to 60 million SDR) for incidents occurring
after the 30th November, 1987 . See IOPC Fund Statistics 1
October 1992 , at 5 and IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section
13 . 1 (a) at 51.
43The aggregate amount of 60 million SDR is the equivalent
of US$84 million based on the exchange at 30th January, 1992
(US$1.39921 = 1 SDR) .
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The incidents in which the IOPC Fund has been involved have been
distributed over the years as shown in the table below: 44
Year Number Year Number
1979 4 1986 4
1980 5 1987 6
198'1 3 1988 5
1982 4 1989 6
1983 3 1990 8
1984 2 1991 6
1985 4 1992 2
1993 6
However, the IOPC Fund was only required to make paYments for
sixty-three of those incidents, thirty-five of which occurred in
Japan, twenty-two in Europe, one in Algeria, one in the
Caribbean, one in Canada and one in the Persian Gulf and two in
the Republic of Korea. 4S Only two incidents: the Tanio in France
during 1980 and the Haven in Italy during 1991, have given rise
to claims in excess of the limit of compensation that applied to
the incident. In all other incidents, the total amount of the
claims has been well below the amount of compensation available.
The total amount of compensation and indemnification paid by the
IOPC Fund as at the 31st December, 1992, was £51 million,46
which had increased to £67 million by the close of 1993. 47 The
fairly modest amounts paid out by the IOPC Fund since its
inception indicate the extent of the potential problem raised by
the decision of the Italian Court in Genoa in the Haven
limitation proceedings. Here the Court ruled that according to
the free market value of gold the IOPC Fund's potential liability
44The statistics contained in this table are derived from
the IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, Annex XII Summary of
Incidents (31 December 1993) pp 93-104; which is reproduced at
Annex Two in this work.
4SIOPC Fund Annual Report, section 12.1 at 22.
46IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.1 at 32.
47IOPC Fund Annual Report, 1993, section 12.1 at 22.
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arising out of that incident was to be set at an unprecedented
limit of £346 million.
The case involving the largest payments was the Tanio,48 where
the IOPC Fund paid FFr222 mdl l i.on" to claimants . In the Haven" 0
incident, the aggregate amount of the claims greatly exceeds the
maximum amount payable under the Civil Liability Convention and
the Fund Convention. Despite the serious nature of the Tanio
incident it has been reported that the Haven incident is the most
serious case in which the IOPC Fund has been involved. The
incident caused extensive pollution damage in Italy, France and
Monaco, and, as at 31st December , 1992, some 1350 claims for
compensation have been submitted to the IOPC Fund for a total
amount corresponding to approximately £715 million. 51 It is
possible that claims and clean-up costs from the Aegean Sea52
and the Braer,53 which caused pollution damage to the coasts of
Spain and the Shetland islands respectively, may also exceed the
ceiling of compensation provided for under the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions. If this proves to be the case, new impetus
may be given to the ongoing, and major question of how
responsibility for oil pollution damage should be apportioned
between shipowners and cargo owners.
5.6.1 Pro rata reduction
As is the case under the Civi l Liability Convention, where the
total amount of claims establ ished against the IOPC Fund exceeds
the limits available, all successful claims are reduced
48This tanker accident which caused considerable pollution
damage to the French coastline occurred in March 1980 .
49The equivalent to US$40 million.
50The Haven exploded off the coast of Italy in 1991.
51IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992 , section 12.1 at 32-33 .
52This incident occurred on the 3rd December, 1992.
53This incident occurred on the 5th January, 1993 .
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proportionally.54 A case which illustrates the partition of the
funds available under the Civil Liability and Fund Convention
amongst the successful claimants is that of the Tanio.
In the case of the Tanio, claims for compensation were submitted
by the French Government, local authorities, private persons and
the shipowner's insurer. The final amount agreed to by the IOPC
Fund Director was approximately FFr348 million (£37 million) .55
In terms of the Fund Convention at that point in time the
aggregate amount of compensation payable by the IOPC Fund in
respect of this incident was 675 million (gold) francs less the
sum actually paid under the Civil Liability Convention. The
shipowner's liability under the Civil Liability Convention was
FFr11, 833,717.79 (£1.2 million). The shipowner's P&l insurer
established the limitation fund in April 1980 by paying this
amount to the Court in Brest . The limitation fund was earning
interest at the market rate until the 1st March, 1988, and the
amount of interest earned was FFr10, 979,189. After a small amount
had been paid from the limitation fund in respect of fees and
costs, the aggregate amount available for paYment to claimants
was FFr22,605,357 (£2.1 million) .56 The Fund Convention does not
specify the date on which the amount of 675 million (gold) francs
should be converted into the applicable national currency. In
this case it was agreed that the method of conversion provided
for in the IOPC Fund's Internal Regulations should be applied (ie
that 15 [gold] francs are equal to 1 SDR) 57 and that the
relevant date was the day of the constitution of the limitation
Fund. 58 In keeping with this procedure the amount of 675 million
(gold) francs converted to FFr244,746,OOO. After subtracting the
54Fund Convention, Article 4 .5.
55IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 26.
56IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988 , section 12.2 at 27.
57Internal Regulations of the IOPC Fund, Regulation 2




shipowners limitation fund from this amount, the amount of
compensation due from the IOPC Fund was FFr222,140,643. 5 9
Bearing in mind that the IOPC Fund Director had reached agreement
on the quantum of accepted claims (amounting to approximately
FFr348 million) the compensation available under the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions (FFr244,746,OOO) was insufficient
to meet all successful claims. Consequently, all successful
claims were reduced proportionally. The claimants received
paYments from the IOPC Fund corresponding to 63.85 per cent of
the amount of their respective claims as accepted by the Fund.
In addition, the paYments from the shipowner's limitation fund
represented 6.46 per cent of the established claims. Therefore
the regime of compensation created by the Civil Liability and the
Fund Conventions provided each claimant compensation
corresponding to approximately 70.3 per cent of his successful
claim. 6 0 This case is by no means typical of those falling under
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. As the Tanio case was
a very large claim the IOPC Fund was required to payout an
unusually large proportion of the total liability.
In the aftermath of the Braer spill, which occurred in the
Shetland islands on the 5th January, 1993, the Government of the
United Kingdom which was estimated to have claims for clean-up
and preventive measures in the region of £2.6 million elected not
to compete with other claimants for the purpose of obtaining
compensation. 61 This is an unusual approach for governments to
adopt.
5.7 Shipowners' indemnification by the Fund
This function of the IOPC Fund demonstrates how the Fund operates
not only as a mechanism to compensate victims of oil pollution
59IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 27-28.
6°IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 28.
610fficial Records 1993, section 12.2 at 64.
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damage but also as a device to manage the financial stresses
which exist between the oil shipper and oil carrier in connection
with tanker-source oil pollution liability
Subject to certain conditions, which will be explained, the IOPC
Fund will repay to the shipowner a part of his total amount of
liability incurred under the Civil Liability ConverrtLon i P The
maximum indemnification payable by the IOPC Fund to the shipowner
under Article 5.1 of the Fund Convention, as amended by the 1976
Protocol thereto, is 33 SDR (US$46)63 for each ton of the ship's
tonnage for ships up to 83,333 tons. In respect of ships over
that tonnage, the indemnification payable on each ton of the
ship's tonnage increases until a maximum of 5,667,000 SDR (US$7. 9
million)64 is reached for ships of 105 000 tons. These amounts
generally work out to about 25 per cent of the shipowner's
liability under the Civil Liability Convention. In situations,
however, where very large ships cause oil pollution damage, the
indemnification paid by the IOPC Fund can exceed 25 per cent of
the shipowner's sum liability (ranging up to 40 per cent.) Where
the IOPC Fund provides indemnification, the shipowner is assumed
to have ceded those rights to the Fund, accordingly, the Fund
o
will, in principle, be able to recover its loss by way of
recourse actions against any third party from which the shipowner
could recover except the servants and agents of the owner. 65
Significantly, in the Haven case the Italian Court in Genoa ruled
that while the Civil Liability Convention determines liability
limits in terms of the SDR the Fund Convention will continue to
utilize the Gold Franc, and consequently the free market price
of gold, as the appropriate unit of measurement. Concerning the
assessment of the amount of indemnification due to the shipowner
62Fund Convention, Article 5.1.
63Calculated on the basis of the rate of exchange at the
30th January, 1992 (US$1 .39921 = 1 SDR)
64Ibid.
65Fund Convention, Article 9.2.
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under Article 5.1 of the Fund Convention the question then arose
as to whether the Gold Franc or the SDR was to be utilised.
Clearly, except where compelling reasons exist to the contrary
the approach adopted in both the Fund Convention and the Civil
Liability Convention should be the same. It is therefore implicit
and logical that the indemnification due to the shipowner from
the IOPC Fund should be calculated by using the same unit of
measurement which is used to calculate the shipowner's liability
under the Civil Liability Convention i.e. the SDR. To do
otherwise, it is argued, would result in a skewed relationship
between the portion of liability to be borne by the shipowner,
under the Civil Liability Convention, and, oil companies, through
contributions to the IOPC Fund made in accordance with the Fund
Convention.
In the Haven case the Italian Court in Genoa had to consider the
appropriate measurement to be utilized to calculate the amount
of indemnification due to the owner of the Haven. Certainly, it
is difficult to justify the argument that the limit of the Fund
Convention should be assessed in terms of the Gold Franc and then
to assert that the indemnification should be calculated in terms
of the SDR as this would be an inconsistent approach.
Nevertheless, the Italian Court of three judges in Genoa ruled
that the assessment of indemnification under Article 5.1 of the
Fund Convention would utilize a percentage calculation which in
the end ensures that the IOPC Fund shall pay indemnification to
the shipowner on the basis that 15 Gold Francs in the Fund
Convention would be the equivalent of one SDR in the Civil
Liability Convention."
In principle, the IOPC Fund may still be required to provide
"roll-back relief" to the shipowner under circumstances where the
shipowner 's right to limit liability under the Civil Liability
Convention has been broken. However, the IOPC Fund will not
indemnify the shipowner where certain pre-conditions are not
"Iope Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 43-44.
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fulfilled or where the shipowner fails to meet specific standards
of operation. Three general situations are relevant in this
regard. These exceptions relate only to the lOPC Fund's right not
to indemnify the the shipowner. The lOPC Fund is still obliged CS9
to compensate claimants were the requirements of the Fund
Convention are met.
5.7.1 Tankers registered in Fund party states
The shipowner or guarantor will only be indemnified by the lOPC
Fund where his ship is registered in, or is flying the flag of,
a State which has contracted to the Fund Convention. 67 '"State
of the ship's registry" means in relation to registered ships the
State of registration of the ship, and in relation to
unregistered ships the State whose flag the ship is flying.,68
The case of the Globe Asimi illustrates how the indemnification
of the shipowner by the lOPC Fund operates. On the 22nd November,
1981, the tanker Globe Asimi ran aground and broke up near the
port of Klaipeda which was at that time in the USSR. Several
thousand tonnes of heavy fuel oil spilled into the port and
subsequently drifted out to sea. Claims for compensation for
pollution damage in the USSR totalling Rbls813 million (£745
million) were made against the shipowner. The major part of this
amount related to environmental damage. At the time of the
incident, the USSR was party to the Civil Liability Convention
but not to the Fund Convention . As such, no pollution damage was
sustained in any Fund Member State and the lOPC Fund was not
called upon to pay any compensation. Nevertheless, because the
Globe Asimi was registered in Gibraltar, (which is encompassed
within the territory of the United Kingdom, a Party State to the
Fund Convention) and the damage in this case was sustained in a
State Party to the Civil Liability Convention, the lOPC Fund paid
indemnification to the shipowner in the amount of Rbls337,581
67Fund Convention , Article 3 .2.
68Civil Liability Convention , Article 1.4.
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(£326,509) in terms of the Fund Convention, Article 3 .2. 6 9
At the 1984 Conference to revise the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions it was noted that a number of States were party to
the Civil Liability Convention but not the Fund Convention. As
a consequence of this phenomenon it was observed that in many
instances' shipowners were not benefiting from the relief
envisaged under the Fund Convention .,70
5.7.2 Wilful misconduct of the owner
The ropc Fund is also rel ieved of its obligation to pay
indemnification to the shipowner if it proves that the damage
resulted from wilful misconduct on the part of the shipowner
h.irnseLf ."!
Where the ropc Fund is able to prove wilful misconduct on the
part of the shipowner himself , it will be very likely that the
shipowner will have lost his right to limit his liability under
the Civil Liability Convention . This is because wilful misconduct
is a higher standard of fault t ha n is the test for breaking the
shipowners right to limit under the Civil Liability Convention,
which is 'actual fault or privity' on the part of the owner.
Therefore, in such circumstances the shipowner will be liable for
all the damage caused by the oil pollution incident, in other
words, unlimited liability. The ropc Fund will still pay
compensation but has a right o f recourse against the shipowner.
Where the ropc Fund is able t o prove wilful misconduct by the
owner it is likely that the ships oil pollution insurer will do
likewise. As wilful misconduct on the part of the shipowner is
the single ground upon which the insurer is able to refute
liability, then not only wi l l t h e shipowner be subject to
69IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988 , section 13.5 at 67-68.
7°Official Records, vol . 1 at 163 para.10.
71Fund Convention, Article 5 . 1.
147
unlimited liability but he will also have lost his oil pollution
cover. This development could hold serious consequences for the
shipowner and in many instances would gravely retard the
prospects of claimants' successfully seeking compensation. Once
again, subject to its right of recourse, the IOPC Fund will still
provide compensation. In this way, the IOPC Fund constitutes an
important 'safety-net' for victims of oil pollution damage.
5.7.3 Non-compliance with specified instruments
Under Article 5.3 of the Fund Convention the IOPC Fund may be
wholly or partially exonerated from indemnifying the shipowner
or the shipowner's guarantor . Under this exclusionary provision,
the shipowner or guarantor will loose his right to "roll-back
relief" where the IOPC Fund is able to prove two things. Firstly,
as a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner, the
polluting ship did not comply with the provisions relating to
safety and operating standards encapsulated in certain
international instruments. 7J Secondly, that the incident or the
damage was caused wholly or partially by the ship's non-
compliance with these provisions . 73 Shipowners must abide by the
provisions of the listed instruments even where the Contracting
State in which the ship was registered, or whose flag it was
flying, is not a party to the relevant instrument.
As mentioned above, the IOPC Fund may still be required to
provide "roll-back relief" to the shipowner under circumstances
where the shipowner's right to limit liability under the Civil
Liability Convention has been broken. However, where the
shipowner has lost his right to limit liability through fault or
privity, and the nature of this fault also relates to the non-
compliance with the instruments listed in Article 5.3 (a) of the
Fund Convention, it is likely that the owner will loose his right
7JThese instruments are listed in The Fund Convention,
Article 5.3 (a).
73Fund Convention, Article 5.3 (b) .
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to obtain "roll-back relief". This is in keeping with one of the
aims behind "rolI-back relief", which is to encourage shipowners,
by means of indirect financial inducement, to make their ships
conform to the requirements of the instruments mentioned in
Article 5.3 (a). In this way it was hoped that the risk of
pollution incidents would be reduced . The main aim of "roll-back
relief" was to realign, in favour of the shipowner, the
proportional distribution of the costs of oil pollution damage
as paid by the tanker industry and the oil industry under the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions respectively.74
Article 5.4 of the Fund Convention provides a procedure for the
replacement of the instruments specified in Article 5.3 (a).
These instruments may, under certain conditions, be replaced by
new instruments if so decided by the IOPC Fund Assembly. Upon the
entry into force of a new Convention designed to replace, in
whole or in part, any of the instruments specified in Article 5.3
(a) the Assembly may decide that the new Convention will replace
such instrument or part thereof for the purpose of Article 5.3.
It is also stipulated that a 6 month period of notice must be
given prior to the date from which such a replacement will take
effect. At any time during the period of notice, any Member State
of the Fund Convention may declare to the director of the IOPC
Fund that it does not accept such replacement. Where this occurs,
the decision of the Assembly shall have no effect in respect of
a ship registered in, or flying the flag of, that state at the
time of the incident.
In October 1985, at its 8th session, the Assembly decided to
interpret Article 5.4 so as to allow the inclusion in the list
of instruments contained in Article 5.3 (a) not only new
conventions but also amendments adopted by a tacit amendment
procedure, provided that such amendments were significant for the
purpose of the prevention of oil pollution. 75 For a brief
74IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988 , section 13.1 (b) at 52.
75See documents FUND/A.8/12 and FUND/A. 8/15, 15 1para. "
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analysis of the tacit amendment procedure and the ammended list
of instruments which the shipowner must comply with if he is to
receive "roll-back relief" from the IOPC Fund refer to Annexure
Three.
5.7.4 Summary and conclusions on indemnification
The indemnification of the shipowner, by the IOPC Fund, was
origidnally conceived as a procedure through which the tanker 69
ownef would be relieved of the new and additional liabilities
that he was forced to assume under the liability provisions of
the Civil Liability Convention . It was origionally intended that
no pre-conditions would have t o be met before indemnification
would take place. The outcome of the 1971 Conference saw, not
only indemnification becoming conditional on compliance with
certain instruments governing maritime safety, but also, the
amount of indemnification finally agreed on was not as great as
shipowner interests had hoped for. This outcome was, however,
satisfactory to oil interests , as oil importers were not required
to pay as much indemnificat ion as was anticipated and also
foresaw opportunities for reducing or avoiding indemnification
to less responsible tanker owners. Environmentalist interests
were also pleased with the outcome because perhaps overly
optimistically, they hoped that the imposition of conditions
would act as an incentive t o i n c r e a s e the standard of tanker
oper atLon c " That a shipowner may lose the benefits of being
indemnified for a portion of his liability under the Civil
Liability Convention is not i n t r u t h likely to be a significant
incentive to abide with the prov isions of the listed instruments.
The main reason why tanker standards have dropped is not because
tanker owners want to run low-quality tanker fleets but because
they can not afford to do otherwise given current tanker-freight
market. Somehow the tanker industry must be made less competitive
and freight rates must increase . This will provide tanker owners
with the financial ability to i mp r ov e quality. For this reason
76M ' Gonigle & Zacher, op ci t, 189 .
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environmentalist need not be unduly perturbed that the 1984
Protocol to the Fund Convention discontinued the practice of
shipowner indemnification. No "roll-back" relief is due to the
shipowner under the provisions of the 1992 Protocol to the Fund
Convention.
5.8 Financing the lOpe Fund
A large proportion of oil pollution damage is compensated by way
of the IOPC Fund under the Lnat.Lt.ut i.onaL" and substantive
provisions of the 1971 Fund Convention. It is therefore important
to explain the unique procedures involved in bringing about this
source of compensation. As the quantum of damages resulting from
incidents involving oil pollution damage escalates it may be
predicted that the role played by the IOPC Fund in facilitating
compensation will become more pronounced relative to that of the
shipowner. Therefore, it may reasonably be expected that this
particular institution, as a means of promoting compensation will
become increasingly more significant .
The paYments of compensation and indemnification as well as the
administrative and operating expenses of the IOPC Fund are
financed by contributions levied on any person who has received
(in one calendar year) more than 150,000 tons of "contributing
oil" in a State Party to the Fund Convention after carriage by
sea. 78 In this context a '''person" means any individual or
partnership or any private or public body, whether corporate or
not, inclUding a State or any of its constituent
subdivisions. ,79
77The use of the term 'institutional provisions', within
the context of the Fund Convention, describes those portions
of the Convention which established the IOPC Fund and the
organization of the Fund. see; Official Records, vol.2 at 444
para.10.
78Fund Convention, Article 10.1.
79Explanatory Note 3 to the 'Report on contributing oil
receipts' contained in International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund: Texts of the 1971 Fund Convention, 1969
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The important notion of "contributing oil" is comprised of two
separate kinds of oil; crude oil and fuel oil, which are both
defined in terms of Article 1.3 of the Fund Convention. The
definitions do not encompass non-persistent oils.
\ (a) "Crude Oil" means any liquid hydrocarbon mixture
occurring naturally in the earth whether or not treated to
render it suitable for transportation. It also includes
crude oils from which certain distillate fractions have
been removed (sometimes referred to as "topped crudes") or
to which certain distillate fractions have been added
(sometimes referred to as "spiked" or "reconstituted"
crudes) .
(b) "Fuel Oil" means heavy distillates or residues from
crude oil or blends of such materials intended for use as
a fuel for the production of heat or power of a quality
equivalent to the "American Society for Testing and
Materials' Specification for Number Four Fuel Oil
(Designation D 396-69) ,BO or heavier ."'
The definition of "contributing oil"
Diplomatic Conference on the basis
organisations representing t he oil
behind the texts, at that time, were
was elaborated at the 1971
of a text presented by
industry . The intentions
inter alia, the following:
\ (a) to cover all crude oil carried by sea and to prevent
a situation arising where a simple treatment or steaming of
crude oil, or the addition of an extra component would
enable an operator to claim that the material was not crude
oil but something different and that he was therefore not
Civil Liability Convention, 1976 Protocol to the Fund and
Civil Liability Conventions , Internal Regulations and Rules of
Procedure 2nd ed . (1987) at 59.
8°Designation D396-69 has been updated, most recently by
designation D396-90A; however, the definition of Number Four
Fuel Oil has not been changed ; see FUND/A.15/17 page 3.
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liable to contribute for this material;
(b ) to define fuel oi l so as to exclude lubricating oil
and blendstocks therefor , bitumen and process stocks which
were not intended to be burned as fuel.'81
Oil is counted for contribution to the IOPC Fund each time it is
received after carriage by sea, i nt o tankage or storage, at ports
or terminal installations82 in a Fund Member State. The analysis
which follows examines the various circumstances by which oil is
considered as contributing oil as well as the practical and
conceptual difficulties which arise in this regard.
Oil received from a non-Contracting State at an installation in
a Contracting State which had originally been carried by sea to
the non-Contracting State is counted as contributing oil even
though it did not in fact reach the Contracting State by sea-
transport. 83 For example, such oil may have been transported to
the Contracting State in ques tion by pipeline, non-sea-going
barge, road or rail. 84 In such cases the oil in question is only
counted for contibution purposes where it is first received in
the Contracting State.~
The place of loading is irrelevant ; the oil may be imported from
81FUND/A.15/17 page 2 .
82A 'terminal installation ' would include a Single Buoy
Mooring (SBM) which is a float ing facility to which large oil
tankers moor in order to discharge cargo. From the 5MB the oil
is then pumped through an underwater pipeline to a shore
facility such as an oil refinery or into storage .




84Explanatory Note 5 (b ) t o the 'Report on contributing
receipts' contained in International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund : Texts of the 1971 Fund Convention
Civi l Liability Convention, 1 976 Protocol to the Fund
Civil Liability Conventions , I nternal Regulations and
Procedure 2nd ed. (1987 ) at 59.
oil
85Fund Convention, Article 10. 1 (b) .
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abroad, carried from another port in the same Contracting State
or transported by ship from an offshore production rig. Oil which
is received after carriage at sea at a storage tank for trans-
shipment by ship to another port in the same Contracting State
or elsewhere is counted as contributing oil . Thus where trans-
shipment is to the same Contracting State or another Contracting
State the same oil will be assessed twice .
Oil received after carriage by sea for further transport by
pipeline or any other means is considered received for
contributing purposes. 8 6 This statement must be qualified in the
light of ship-to-ship transfers. In 1980 the IOPC Fund Assembly
attempted to clarify when oil should be considered received in
terms of Article 10.1 of the Fund Convention. The Assembly
adopted the position that a '[slhip-to-ship transfer shall not
be considered as receipt, irrespective of where this transfer
takes place (ie within a port area or outside the port but within
territorial waters) and whether it is done solely by using the
ships' equipment or by means of a pipeline passing over land.'
However, the Assembly further noted that 'in the case where the
oil passed through a storage tank before being loaded to the
other ship it has to be reported as oil received at that tank in
that Contracting State.'~
The application of this rule has significant financial
implications in a wide variety of circumstances one of which is
as follows. The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt was
considering becoming a Member State of the Fund Convention but
was concerned about the levies it would be required to make to
the IOPC Fund for quantities of oil transfered through the SUMED
pipeline. Large tankers are unable to pass through the confines
of the Suez Cannal. In order to avoid such tankers having to sail
around the Cape of Good Hope to deliver cargo to Europe the SUMED
86International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund: General
Information on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage February 1992 section 3.5 at 8.
87IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 9 at 18.
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pipeline was constructed. The pipeline consists of a terminal on
the Gulf of Suez which receives oil from tankers into oil storage
tanks. The oil is then pumped through the pipeline to the
Mediterranean coast where it is again received into storage tanks
and then trans-shiped to other tankers. The Egyptian Government
attempted to argue that if Egypt became a member of the Fund
Convention the oil transfered through the pipeline should not be
considered as contributing oil . To this end the Government argued
that \ [t] ransport through the SUMED pipeline should be considered
as a ship-to-ship transfer and t he quantities received for such
transport should therefore not be taken into account for the
purpose of levying contribut ions to the ropc Fund.' rn October,
1993, the ropc Fund Assembl y rejected this argument. 88 rn
principle it would seem that this decision is correct.
The levy is based on reports on oil receipts in respect of
individual contributors. A member State is required to
communicate every year to the Director of the ropc Fund the name
and address of any person in that State who is liable to
contribute to the ropc Fund , as well as data on the relevant
quantities of contributing oi l received by any such person."
Although the reports are submitted by governments of Fund Member
States, the contributions are paid by the individual contributors
directly to the ropc Fund . Governments have no responsibility for
these payments, unless they have voluntarily accepted such
responsibility. 90 Although the obligation to pay contributions
to the ropc Fund rests directly on the individual oil receivers
and not on the State Parties t o the Fund Convention, the legal
basis for the obligations of the oil receivers to make
contributions to the ropc Fund is the treaty obligations under
the Fund Convention of the State in which they received the
88The account of the SUMED pipeline debate is taken from
the IOpe Fund Annual Report 1993, section 9 at 17-18.
89Fund Convention, Article 15 .2.
90Fund Convention, Article 14 .1.
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oil. 91
Each Contracting State has a duty to ensure that all
contributions due from parties within that State are made. Where
a party who is required to make such contributions fails to do
so, measures must be taken against the erring party by the State
in question to ensure that this obligation is fulfilled. 92 In
terms of the Internal Regulations of the IOPC Fund, if a
contributor is in arrears with the payment; of an initial or
annual contribution, the Director of the IOPC Fund may notify the
State within whose territory the relevant quantities of
contributing oil were received and request advice on the action
to be taken to ensure that the obligations of that contributor
are fulfilled. 93 Where a person liable to make contributions to
the IOPC Fund does not fulfil his obligations in respect of any
such contribution, or any part thereof, and is arrear for a
period exceeding three months, the Director shall take all
appropriate action against such person on behalf of the Fund with
a view to the recovery of the amount due. However, where . the
defaulting contributor is manifestly insolvent or the
circumstances otherwise warrant, the Assembly may, upon
recommendation of the Director, decide that no action shall be
taken or continued against the contributor. 94 The Director is
allowed a wide discretion on this issue .
Contributions are also levied against holding companies which
import oil to the Contracting State, in which they operate, by
means of sUbsidiary companies or other commonly controlled
91FUND/A.15/19, paragraph 11, page 2-3.
92Fund Convention, Article 13.2.
93lnternal Regulations of the IOPC Fund, Regulation 3.9.
~hese Regula~ion~ were ,adopted by the IOPC Fund's Assembly at
ltS 2nd seSSlon ln Aprll 1979. The Regulations were amended at
the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th sessions of the Assembly in
accordance with Regulation 15.1 . '
94Fund Convention, Article 13.3.
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entities. 95 Contracting States are required to report any person
who, in the relevant calendar year, has received contributing oil
in a quantity not exceeding 150,000 tons if the quantity of
contributing oil received in that year by that person, when
aggregated with quantities received in the reporting State in
that same calendar year by a person or persons associated with
that person, exceeds 150,000 tons. 96 An \ \\ [a] ssociated person"
means any subsidiary or commonly controlled entity. The question
whether a person comes within this definition shall be determined
by the national law of the State concerned.' 97 In this way, a
large oil importer is prevented from circumventing the IOPC Fund
levies on contributing oil by operating a number of subsidiaries
each importing less than 150,000 tons of oil per annum.
5.8.1 Initial and Annual contributions
Two general catagories of contributions are made to the IOPC Fund
i.e. initial and annual contributions.
5.8.1.1 Initial contributions
Initial contributions are payable when a State becomes a member
of the IOPC Fund on the basis of a fixed amount per tonne of
contributing oil received during the year preceding that in which
the Fund Convention entered into force for that State. 98 The
IOPC Fund Assembly was required to determine this fixed amount
within two months after the entry into force of the Fund
Corrverrt Lon i " At the 1st session of the IOPC Fund Assembly in
95Fund Convention, Article 10 .2.
96IOPC Fund, Texts of the 1971 Fund Convention, 1969 Civil
Liability Convention, 1976 Protocols to the Fund and Civil
Liability Conventions, Internal Regulations and Rules of
Procedure 2nd Ed. (1987) Explanatory Note 8 at 59.
97Fund Convention, Article 10.2 (b) .
98Fund Convention, Article 11.1.
99Fund Convention, Article 11.2.
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November, 1978, the sum of 0 .04718 (gold francs) per tonne of
contributing oil was decided upon. 100 Accordingly, initial
contributions are calculated on the basis of 0.04718 (gold)
francs (O. 003145 SDR or US$O . 0044) 101 per tonne of contributing
oil received by each contributor in the relevant Contracting
State. If there is no one who has received contributing oil in
a quantity exceeding 150,000 tonnes in the year preceding that
in which the State becomes a Member of the IOPC Fund, then there
are no initial contributions payable in respect of that State.
At the 1984 Conference to revise the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions, Dr Reinhard H. Ganten, the Director of the IOPC Fund
at that time, observed that \ . . . the very high known level of
initial contributions had been an obstacle to the ratification
of the Fund Convention .' 102
5.8.1.2 Annual contributions
Annual contributions are levied to meet the anticipated paYments
of compensation and indemnification by the IOPC Fund and the
administrative expenses during the coming year and any deficit
from operations in preceding years. 103 Each contributor pays a
specified amount per tonne of contributing oil received. The
amount levied is decided each year by the lOPC Fund Assembly.
Annual contributions are of two kinds; those levied in respect
of the General Fund and those levied in respect of Major Claims
Funds.
5.8.1.2.1 General Fund contribution
100IOpe Fund Statistics 1 October 1992, at 5.
10115 (gold) francs = 1 SDR see Internal Regulations of
the IOPC Fund, Regulation 2 (a ) ; the amount given in U.S.
dollars is calculated on the rate of exchange at 30 January
1992 (US$1.39921 = 1 SDR) .
1020fficial Records I vol .2 at 515 para. 77 .
103Fund Convention, Article 12 .1 (i).
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Contributions to the General Fund are levied, as described
earlier, on the basis of the quantity of contributing oil
received by the contributor in question during the year preceding
that in which the IOPC Fund Assembly decides to levy the
cont.ri.but.Lona P'" The General Fund is designed to cover the
costs and expenses of the administration of the Fund in the
relevant year and any deficit from operations in preceding
years .105 It should, also, cover payment s to be made by the Fund
in the relevant year in satisfaction of claims against the Fund,
where the aggregate amount of such claims, in respect of anyone
incident, does not exceed 1 million SDR. 106
5.8.1.2.2 Major claims contributions
As for Major Claims Funds, the contributions are calculated on
the basis of the quantity of contributing oil received during the
calendar year preceding that in which the incident in question
occurred, provided that the State in which the oil was received
was a party to the Fund Convention at the date of the
incident. 107 Major Claims Funds are used to satisfy claims
against the Fund to the extent that the aggregate amount of such
claims in respect of anyone incident is in excess of
1 million SDR. 108
5.8.1.3 Contribution returns
104Fund Convention, Article 12.2 (a).
105Fund Convention, Article 12.2 (a) read with Article
12.1 (i) (a).
l06Fund Convention, Article 12.2 (a) read with Article
12.1 (i) (a) and [(b) as amended by Article III (d) of the 1976
Protocol to the Fund Convention which provides that the sun of
15 million (gold) francs shall be substituted for 1 million
units of account, which in turn equals 1 million SDR] .
l07Fund Convention, Article 12 .2 (b).
108Fund Convention, Article 12.2 (b) read with Article
12.1(i) (c) [as amended by Article III (d) of the 1976 Protocol
to the Fund Convention] .
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The ropc Fund's Director issues an invoice to each contributor,
following the decision taken by the Assembly to levy annual
cont.rLbut.Lons P'" Unless otherwise decided by the Assembly,
annual contributions are due on 1 February of the year following
that in which the Assembly decides to levy contributions. 110
Contributions are levied retroactively, and sometimes
contributions to a Major Claims Fund are levied a long time after
the incident occurred. This is because it may take time to assess
the full extent of any given claim.
rf contributions levied in respect of a major claims fund are not
totally used for the paYments made by the ropc Fund in respect
of the particular incident for which they were levied, the
balance is repaid to the contributors. 111 For example, the ropc
Fund Assembly decided that an amount of £13.9 million of the
balance remaining on the Tanio maj or claims fund should be
reimbursed pro rata, on 1 February 1989, to the persons who had
made contributions to that major claims fund, and that any amount
in excess of £13,9 million should be transferred to the general
fund. rn addition, the Assembly decided that each contributor
should be given the option to choose whether the amount to which
he was entitled should be repaid to him, or whether the amount
should be credited to his account with the ropc Fund for set-off
against annual contributions that would be levied in subsequent
years. 112 The particularly high balance on the Tanio maj or
claims fund stemmed from the recovery of a substantial amount of
money through recourse proceedings and the subsequent conclusion
of an out-of-court settlement to the benefit of the ropc
Fund. 113
109rnternal Regulations of the ropc Fund, Regulation 3.7.
l10rnternal Regulations of the ropc Fund, Regulation 3.8 .
l11rnternal Regulations of the ropc Fund, Regulation
4.4.l.
112 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 7.1 (c) at 14.
113 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 9 at 24.
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5.8.1.4 Variations in contributions
Payments made by the lOPC Fund in respect of claims for
compensation for pollution damage vary considerably from year to
year. As a result, the level of contributions to the lOPC Fund
also fluctuate from one year to another. The table below sets out
the contributions levied by the lOPC Fund during the period 1979-
1993 and illustrates how contributions fluctuate in accordance
with different claims experience. The amounts are shown in Pounds
Sterlingl 14 and the very high amounts in 1993 relate primarily
to the Haven Major Claims Fund.
Year General Fund Major Claims Total Levy
Fund
1979 750 000 0 750 000
1980 800 000 9 200 000 10 000 000
1981 500 000 0 500 000
1982 600 000 260 000 860 000
1983 1 000 000 23 106 000 24 106 000
1984 0 0 0
1985 1 500 000 0 1 500 000
1986 1 800 000 0 1 800 000
1987 800 000 400 000 1 200 000
1988 2 900 000 90 000 2 990 000
1989 1 600 000 3 200 000 4 800 000
1990 500 000 0 500 000
1991 5 000 000 21 700 000 26 700 000
1992 0 10 950 000 10 950 000
1993 8 000 000 70 000 000 78 000 000
Certain similarities exist between the manner of meeting claims
under the lOPC Fund and the system of initial and supplementary
calls used by the P&l Clubs to meet claims brought against their
members. However, there are also fundamental differences between
the two systems. The main difference is that under P&l insurance
(which is indemnity insurance) the P&l Club does not customarily
accept primary liability. However, as an insurer of pollution
liabilities under the Civil Liability Convention the insurer,
which in mosst instances will be a P&l Club, does conceed to
114IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 9 at 24.
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limited direct action. The lOPC Fund, by contrast, in the role
of providing supplementary compensation, accepts primary (albeit
strictly limited) liability .
5.8.2 Contribution difficulties
Generally the system of contribution to the lOPC Fund works well.
The apparent success of this system can largely be attributed to
the nature of the industry engaged in the importation of
persistent oil in bulk by sea. Most contributors are oil
companies which receive large quantities of oil in relatively
large tankers. The extensive infrastructure of these oil
companies allow them to have experts trained to understand the
contribution mechanism . lls The co-existence of the CRISTAL
voluntary fund makes this procedure even more complex.
However, like any system which requires the cooperation of so
many diverse entities, and the payment of money, it is to be
anticipated that certain practical and conceptual difficulties
will inevitably arise. Some of these difficulties are discussed
below.
5.8.2.1 Orimulsion
A new petroleum product, known as orimulsion, is being
transported at sea in tankers and combination carriers. The lOPC
Fund had to consider whether or not orimulsion should be classed
as "persistent oil" for the purpose of Article 1.5 of the Civil
Liability Convention, and if so, whether it should also be
considered as falling within the definition of "contributing oil"
set out in Article 1.3 of the Fund Convention. This product is
derived from a bituminous hydrocarbon found in the Orinoco Belt
of Eastern Venezuela which until recently had been too viscous
to exploit economically . A procedure was developed which now
permits this energy source, when mixed with water and an emulsion
llSOfficial Records I vol .2 at 345 para. 56.
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stabiliser, to be transported and used as fuel for power stations
and other heavy industries. Hence the origin of the product's
name.
Under Article 1.2 of the Fund Convention, "oil" has the same
meaning for the Fund Convention as in Article I.5 of the Civil
Liability Convention, provided that for the purpose of the Fund
Convention "oil" shall be confined to "persistent hydrocarbon
mineral oils". On an examination of the definition of "oil"
contained in Article I.5 of the Civil Liability Convention it is
clear that there is no exact or exhaustive definition of "oil".
"Oil" is merely defined as meaning ' ... any persistent oil such
as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and
whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the
bunkers of such ship'. In colour and viscosity, orimulsion is
indistinguishable from heavy fuel oil and its specification
points are within the range of those for heavy fuel oil .
Accordingly, it was decided at the 15th session of the IOPC Fund
Assembly held from 6 to 9 October 1992 that the product known as
orimulsion should be considered as "persistent oil" for the
purpose of Article I.5 of the Civil Liability Convention. 116
It was explained in the text above how "contributing oil", as
defined in Article 1.3 of the Fund Convention, can either fall
wi thin the category of crude oil117 or fuel oil. 118 It was
decided by the IOPC Fund Assembly that orimulsion could be
considered as falling within either of the categories referred
to in Article 1.3 of the Fund Convention. This is because
orimulsion could be considered as "crude oil" as it is a
, ... liquid hydrocarbon mixture occurring naturally in the earth'
116IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 6.1 (i) at 15.
The description of the above deliberation was obtained from
FUND/A. 15/17, para 3-5 at 2.
117Fund Convention, Article 1 .3 (a).
118Fund Convention, Article 1.3 (b).
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and has been 'treated to render it suitable for
transportation' .119 On the other hand, it could also be
considered as "fuel oil", which is defined as ' ... residues from
crude oil . . . intended for use as a fuel for the production of
heat or power' .120 The bituminous hydrocarbon material which
constitutes the major component of orimulsion is not suitable for
refining as a normal crude oil and is only used for the
production of heat and power. For this reason the Director of the
ropc Fund advised the Assembly that orimulsion should be
considered as "fuel oil" for the purpose of the definition of
"contribution oil." The suggestion was endorsed by the ropc Fund
Assembly. 121
The ropc Fund Assembly also decided that the assessment of
contributions on quantities of orimulsion received in parties to
the Fund Convention would not be reduced on account of its water
content. This was decided on the advice of the ropc Fund Director
who stressed that the contribution system established by the ropc
Fund Convention was based on the principle that each tonne of
contributing oil received after carriage at sea would result in
the same amount in contribution being levied. This fundamental
feature of the ropc Fund's operation may be described as the
principle of "fair shared sacrifice". The amount of contribution
is independent of any other factors, such as differences in
pollution potential of the cargo, relative ease or difficulty of
cleaning up after spills of different oil, length of journey or
route undertaken, mode of loading and delivery, the place of
delivery or the quality, age or class of the vessel used or its
crew. 122
119See the definition of "crude oil" contained in Article
1.3 (a) of the Fund Convention.
120See the definition of "fuel oil" contained in Article
1.3 (b) of the Fund Convention .
121IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 6.1 (i) at 1S.
The description of the above deliberation is extracted from
FUND/A.1S/17, paragraphs 6-9, pages 2-3.
122FUND/A.1S/17, para.9, page 3 .
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The deliberations concerning the inclusion of the new product
orimulsion under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions is
noteworthy in that it shows how the two tiered compensation
regime evolves when faced with new situations. Another
characteristic which is illustrated by these proceedings is the
interaction and convergence between the Fund Convention and its
voluntary equivalent, CRISTAL. Thus, the Board of Directors of
Cristal Limited123 had decided in May 1990 that orimulsion would
be regarded as contributing oil under the CRISTAL Contract and
that no deduction would be allowed for water content. This was
a factor which the IOPC Fund Director and the IOPC Fund Assembly
took into account in approaching problems posed by orimulsion.
In certain specific circumstances, which will be explained,
interaction sometimes occurs between the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions on the one hand and the voluntary compensation
agreements on the other. Therefore, it was decided that it would
be beneficial to both compensation systems and to possible
claimants that the policy adopted towards orimulsion was
consistent under the two regimes. 124 Significantly, the
voluntary regimes were able to respond far more rapidly to the
issue of whether or not to include orimulsion within the ambit
of the voluntary compensation system than was the case under the
Conventions. This would seem to support the notion that the
voluntary regimes have greater flexibility as opposed to the
Conventions. However, flexibility is not the only criterion to
be considered in comparing the respective strengths and
weaknesses of these compensation systems. Considerations such as
the ability to have recourse to public, impartial and independant
courts which are in a position to decide upon the admissibility
of claims, determine liability and the levels of compensation
awards, are very important considerations which strongly favour
the international compensation conventions over the voluntary
compensation agreements .
123Cristal Limited is the company which manages the
CRISTAL Contract on behalf of CRISTAL Members.
124FUND/A.15/17, paragraph 11, page 3.
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In contrast to the inclusion of orimulsion, the IOPC Fund
Assembly decided in October, 1993, that cohasset-panuke crude oil
should not be considered as a persistent oil for the purpose of
Article 1.5 of the Civil Liability Convention and as such should
be considered as falling outside the definition of contribution
oil as determined by Article 1 .3 of the Fund Convention. ras
5.8.2.2 Interpretation of "received"
One of the basic concepts of the system of contributions to the
IOPC Fund established by the Fund Convention is that
contributions are payable by the person who has "received"
contributing oil after sea transport. 1:l6 Four storage companies
in the Netherlands have argued that the interpretation of the
notion "received" in the Fund Convention applied by the IOPC Fund
is incorrect. They submitted that because they were only storage
companies who "received" oil on behalf of other persons they
could not be considered "receivers" of contributing oil as
defined by Article 10 of the Fund Convention (or applicable Dutch
legislation) . The position adopted by the Dutch storage companies
is that the person for whom the storage is carried out should be
considered as the "receiver". The following arguments in support
of their claim were put forward.
Firstly, they conceded that Dutch law does not support the
interpretation relied on by the Dutch storage companies. A Royal
Decree of 18th August, 1982 (No.491) was issued which elaborated
on the notion of "receiver". The Royal Decree contains some
provisions relating to the notion of "receipts of oil" and
includes those who receive contributing oil on behalf of someone
else. But it was submitted by the Dutch storage companies that
Dutch legislation exceeds the meaning of "receiver" contained in
Article 10 of the Fund Convention and that the obligation to
contribute to the IOPC Fund can be based only on the Convention.
l:zSIOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, Section 6.1 at 9 .
1:l6Fund Convention, Article 10.
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In accordance with this position, they submitted that the
background to the Fund Convent ion and its preamble makes it clear
that the intention was that the financial burden of the
contributions should fall upon the oil companies which have
financial interests in the oil and who are instrumental in the
transport of that oil by sea . Fu r t h e rmo r e , the Fund Convention
uses the expression "has received" and not "has taken receipt of"
or "discharged" or "stored" .ln
These arguments were judged contrary to the interpretation given
to the notion of "receiver" by t he Assembly of the IOPC Fund. The
IOPC Fund Assembly has determined that, within the scope of
Article 10 of the Fund Convent ion, Member States should have a
certain flexibility to adopt a practical reporting system
allowing an effective and easy c he ck i ng of the figures and taking
into account the peculiarities of the oil movement and local
circumstances of a particular c oun t r y . Reports may designate a
person as a "receiver" who was not the immediate actual
(physical) "receiver" of the oil after shipment by sea.
Accordingly, reports may designate a person as a "receiver" who
has their place of business or r e s i de n c e outside the Contracting
State . But the IOPC Fund Assembly has emphasised that, failing
paYment by persons reported as "receivers" other than the
immediate physical "receivers" , the immediate "receivers" shall
ultimately become liable fo r contributions. This is so
irrespective of whether the persons in fact reported have their
place of business or residence in a Member State or not .128 In
conclusion the IOPC Fund Assembly did not accept the arguments
put forward by the Dutch s torage companies in question and
adopted the position that the i r outstanding contributions had to
be made .
This method of defining contributions under the Fund Convention
is probably the most effective in practice . Although, strictly
127FUND/A .1S/18, paragraph 18, page 4.
128FUND/A/ES .1/13 , paragraph 1 0 , pages 7-8.
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speaking, it is most equitable for the actual oil importer to
make the contribution to the IOPC Fund this can not always be
achieved. In practice, storage companies will incorporate the
amount of capital expended in making contributions to the IOPC
Fund into the price of the service rendered to the oil company.
The oil company will ultimately incorporate this cost into the
price of the product eventually sold. Therefore, in effect, the
cost of pollution is ultimately borne by the consumer of the
petroleum product. This is equitable because in the final
analysis it is the public demand for petroleum based products
that has brought about the transportation of persistent oil by
tanker at sea - and hence oil pollution. The final consumer also
has a so called "financial interest" in the oil.
5.8.2.3 Oil "receivers" in the for.mer USSR
On the 26th December, 1991, the Russian Federation instructed the
Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) that the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) in all Conventions concluded within the
framework of IMO would be continued by the Russian
Federation. 129 Accordingly, as from that date the membership of
the USSR in the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions is continued
by the Russian Federation. None of the other independent States
which had previously formed part of the USSR had, at the close
of the 1991 year, made similar declarations or submitted an
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession in
respect of the Fund Convention. It was not clear, at that time
whether any of these other States would continue to be, or would
choose to become, Parties to the Fund Convention. 130
In November 1991 the IOPC Fund issued invoices to ten receivers
of contributing oil which had been designated in a report
129The Fund Convention had entered into force for the USSR
on 15 September, 1987.
130FUND/A.lS/19, paragraph 1, page 1.
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submitted to the IOPC Fund by the Government of the former USSR .
Five of the designated receivers were situated in the Russian
Federation. As the Russian Federation had elected to remain a
member of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions no legal
difficulties existed in respect of contributions from these
receivers. In respect of the other five oil receivers located
outside the Russian Federation (one in Georgia, two in Azerbaijan
and two in Turkmenistan) certain conceptual problems arose
concerning the obligations of t he s e receivers to contribute to
the IOPC Fund. The difficulty wa s in that contributions to the
IOPC Fund are levied retroactively, and that sometimes
contributions to a Major Claims Fund are levied a long time after
the incident.
The question arose whether or not the five non Russian Federation
receivers should be permitted t o neglect their responsibility to
make contributions for that period during which they received oil
in the former USSR which was then a State Party to the Fund
Convention? If this was permitted other receivers would be
prejudiced in having to make up this loss. On the other hand
could these receivers be expected to contribute for that portion
of 1991 subsequent to the 26th of December during which they were
no longer receiving oil i n a State Party to the Fund Convention?
The Director of the IOPC Fund suggested to the lOpe Fund Assembly
the following method of resol ving this unique situation. In
respect of annual contribut ions to the General Fund the five
receivers in question should pay 359/365 of the contributions
which normally would be payable by a contributor who received the
same quantity of contributing oil. The receivers would be under
no obligation to make annual cont r i bu t i ons to the General Fund
for 1992 and subsequent years . 131 In respect of contributions to
Major Claims Funds arising from i nc i dent s occurring prior to the
26th December, 1991, the oi l r ece i ve r s i n question should be
required to pay not only the t ota l annual contributions for 1991,
131FUND/A.15 /19, paragraph 18 (a) and (b ), page 4.
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but also any annual contributions to be levied in 1992 or
subsequent years to these Major Claims Funds, without reduction.
In respect of annual contribut ions to Major Claims Funds arising
from incidents occurring after the 25th December, 1991, the oil
receivers in question should be under no obligation to make
cont r i.but.Lons c P!
5.8.3 Conclusions on the contribution system
The crucial difference between the settlement of liability for
oil pollution by oil receivers through the ropc Fund in terms of
the provisions of the Fund Convention compared to liability of
the shipowner under the Civil Liability Convention is this. Under
the Civil Liability Convention t he shipowner is personally liable
and his right to limit can be broken thereby resulting in
unlimited liability. Under the Fund Convention the oil receiver
or the shipper of the oil can neve r become personally liable for
the resulting oil pollution . The IOPC Fund incurs liability on
their behalf thereby insulat ing the actual oil owner from
becoming directly implicated in the question of liability. One
can conclude that the oil companies are insulated from the
question of liability and hence responsibility in two important
ways . Firstly, the shipowners bares primary liability. This in
effect allows oil companies t o pollute the seas vicariously
through the shipowner at little personal risk. Secondly the ropc
Fund bares second tier liability on behalf of all oil receivers
not the individual oil company r e spons i b l e for transporting the
particular cargo at sea in a t anke r which may in truth well be
unfit to carry out such hazardous operations.
Nevertheless, for oil companies t o fund the IOPC Fund and thereby
accept in principle that they are responsible for oil pollution
is to set a "dangerous" precedent which if carried to its logical
conclusion may well result ult imately in the actual oil cargo
owner being forced to accept primary liability together with the
132FUND/A.15/19, paragraph 18 (c) and (d ) , page 4.
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shipowner.
5.9 Conclusion to the Fund Convention
The Fund Convention and the IOPC Fund was unique in conception
and implementation. It evolved to meet the particularly high
liability levels associated with tanker-source oil pollution and
reflected the reality that the cargo owner was just as
responsible for this type of damage as the shipowner. In this way
victims of oil pollution damage where given access to a certain
source of additional compensation over and above that available
from the shipowner under the Civil Liability Convention. The
development of the Fund Convention also afforded significant
relief to shipowners who would have been hard-pressed to carry
the ever increasing burden of oil pollution liability without
contributions from the considerable financial resources of oil
cargo owners.
Because the legal and organisational provisions of the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions have been dealt with in Chapters
Four and Five, respectively, it is now possible to examine claims
practice under those Conventions in the following Chapter. In
turn the a~alysis of claims practice leads on to an examination




Civil Liability & Fund Conventions' Claim Practice
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to explain the actual operation
of the two-tier system of compensation brought about by the
international Conventions. The way in which claims are settled
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions is of importance
to a complete understanding these instruments. In the subsequent
chapter, chapter seven, the admissibility and assessment of
claims brought by victims of oil pollution damage in terms of the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions against the shipowner and
the IOPC Fund respectively is discussed in detail. Clearly it is
necessary to explain the mechanics of claims settlement before
dealing with the substantive issues of admissibility and
assessment of damage claims under those instruments. Accordingly,
two fundamental issues will be discussed in this chapter.
Firstly, the relationship between the IOPC Fund and the Civil
Liability interests in the settlement of oil pollution claims
will be discussed. Secondly, the special institutional provisions
of the IOPC Fund which facilitate the payment of claims through
this organisation must also be considered.
It is the express policy and practice of the P&I Clubs and the
IOPC Fund that claims for oil pollution damage under the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions are settled without recourse to
litigation. As a result there are few judicial interpretations
of these international instruments . The P&I Clubs are privately
owned organizations which manage the delicate issue of their
members' liability within a highly competitive commercial
environment . Accordingly, detailed information relating to the
settlement of oil pollution c laims under the Civil Liability
Convention or otherwise is seldom disclosed by the individual
Club involved. By contrast the IOPC Fund is a single inter-
governmental organization and has an expressed policy of
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disclosing information about its activities, including claims
settlement practice, to interested members of the public.
Notwithsstanding these differences in approach between the P&l
Clubs and the IOPC Fund strong similarities exist between the
provisions of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and
consequently the claims settlement policy under both instruments
are also similar. Therefore, the analysis of the claims policy
articulated by the IOPC Fund within the context of claims
settlement under the Fund Convention is also a strong indicator
as to the scope of application of the Civil Liability Convention.
In this analysis of claims settlement under the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions greater emphasis is placed on the policy
expounded by the IOPC Fund than that of the P&l Clubs. This is
so because the settlement of claims by the P&l Clubs is
confidential and information on the subj ect is not readily
available.
6 .2 Relationship between the Fund and shipowners in claims
settlement
In its claims settlement procedures, the IOPC Fund endeavours to
cooperate closely with the insurer of the shipowner's oil
pollution risks. As stated previously, tanker owners' third party
liability for oil pollution damage is usually covered with one
of the Clubs participating i n the International Group of
Protection and Indemnity Clubs or indemnity associations such as
the Bermuda-based International Tanker Owners' Indemnity
Association (ITIA).
6.2.1 Joint and separate investigations
Where the IOPC Fund feels it may be required to provide
compensation for pollution damage or indemnify the shipowner in
respect of an incident , the investigation of the incident and the
assessment of the damage is usually carried out jointly by the
shipowner's P&l Club and the IOPC Fund . This cooperation is based
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on a Memorandum of Understanding signed on the 5th November,
1980, by the International Group of P&l Clubs and the IOPC Fund.
Under this Memorandum, the Clubs will report to the IOPC Fund
each escape or discharge of oil which is likely to involve a
claim against the IOPC Fund . The parties will exchange views
concerning the incident and cooperate in an attempt to avoid,
eliminate or minimise pollution damage . A special Memorandum of
Understanding, signed on the 25t h November, 1985, governs the
cooperation between the Japan Ship Owners' Mutual Protection and
Indemnity Association (JPIA) and the IOPC Fund . This Memorandum
contains provisions in respec t of cooperation similar to those
in the Memorandum signed by the International Group.l
These arrangements suggest strongly that the P&l Clubs, which
represent the interests of shipowners, and the IOPC Fund which,
inter alia, represents oil importer interests, collaborate to a
definite degree to safe-guard the i r collective self-interest by
ensuring (or attempting to ensure) that third party liability is
kept within manageable limits . At the same time, it is necessary
for the two organizations t o be jointly, or in certain
circumstances, separately , involved in the investigation from the
outset as conflicts may well aris e between the interests of the
P&l Clubs and the IOPC Fund.
The IOPC Fund follows a flexible policy on this issue. It
appoints legal and technical experts to carry out independent
investigations into the cause of a particular incident involving
the ropc Fund only in those cases where the Director considers
it to be in the best interest of the Fund to do so . 2 The
decision of the Director in this regard, and the course of action
decided upon, will, of course , depend largely on the particular
circumstances of each case. In some cases, for example the
lFUND/A .15/13, paragraph 6 , page 2.
2IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992 , section 6 .1 (h) at 14-15.
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Volgoneft 2633 and Haven4 incidents, the IOPC Fund has appointed
its own experts at a very early stage in order to make an
independent assessment as to the cause of the incident. In the
Tanio case, the IOPC Fund and the French Government jointly
carried out an extensive investigation into the cause of the
incident. s In other cases, for example the Tolmiros 6 and
Amazzone7 incidents, the IOPC Fund has waited for the results of
investigations carried out by the public authorities of the
States concerned. After having examined the results of such
investigations, the IOPC Fund decided to appoint its own experts
for the purpose of assisting the Director in his assessment of
the findings of the investigation by the public authorities. In
many cases, for example the Brady Maria8 and the Thuntank 59
3ropc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 45-46; this
incident occurred 22 kilometres off the Swedish east coast,
south of Karlskrona, as a result of a collision between the
USSR tanker Volgoneft 263 and the general cargo vessel Betty.
4ropc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 59-71;
three separate inquiries into the cause of this incident have
been conducted; these are a Summary Enquiry, a Formal Enquiry
and a Criminal Investigation. The IOPC Fund followed these
enquiries through lawyers and technical experts.
Sropc Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 25-30.
6ropc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 39-41; in
this instance Sweden suffered pollution damage but was unable
to prove the actual source.
7ropc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 41-44; here
investigations into the cause of the incident were carried out
on behalf of the Commercial Court in Antwerp and by an
investigating judge in Paris. The French Government and the
ropc Fund employed their own experts for the same purpose.
8ropc Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 38-41.
9ropc Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 41-43 and
ropc Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 36-37. This
incident occurred on the 21 December, 1986. The Swedish vessel
T~untank 5 (2,866 ~RT), carrying 5,024 tonnes of heavy fuel
011 , ran aground, ln very bad weather, outside Gavle on the. 'east coast of Sweden, 200 kl10metres north of Stockholm It
was estimated ~ha~ between 15~-200 tonnes of oil escaped as a
result of the lncldent. The 011 caused considerable pollution
damage in areas along a 150 kilometre stretch of coast around
Gavle, including a number of small islands.
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incidents, the Director accepted the findings of the
investigations carried out by the respective public authorities,
and did not elect to undertake any further investigations.
6.2.2 Possible consequences of investigations
The cause of the incident can be significant to the ropc Fund for
a number of reasons which are discussed below.
6.2.2.1 Recourse recovery may be possible
rt has already been shown how in the Tanio case the ropc Fund
recovered a substantial amount of money it had paid to claimants
under the Fund Convention through recourse action against the
registered shipowner, his guarantor and certain other responsible
parties .10 The ropc Fund's right of recourse is conferred by
Article 9 of the Fund Convention. As against the shipowner or his
guarantor the ropc Fund is placed "in the shoes" of claimants to
whom it pays compensation. This is according to Article 9.1 of
the Fund Convention which specifically provides that:
the Fund shall, in respect of any amount of
compensation for pollution damage paid by the Fund
acquire by subrogation the rights that the person so
compensated may enjoy under the Civil Liability Convention
against the owner or his guarantor.'
An important point to consider here is that the the owner and his
guarantor are still afforded the protection conferred upon them
by the Civil Liability Convention. Article 9.2 goes on to
preserve the Fund's rights of sUbrogation against any other party
who may be liable to claimants that the Fund has paid
compensation to. For the purposes of subrogation this provision
provides that the ropc Fund's rights of recourse will be
l°This aspect of the Tanio case was discussed under the
topic of actions brought against various parties outside the
parameters of the Civil Liability Convention; see pg. 113.
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identical to those enjoyed by an i nsur e r of such claimants. rn
this way the ropc Fund may recover paYments made to claimants
from persons other than the shipowner or his guarantor. One of
the limitations placed upon the Fund's right of recourse against
such persons is that due to the channelling provisions contained
in Article rrr.4 of the Civil Liability Convention claimants are
precluded from bringing actions against the 'servants or agents
of the owner'. Consequently, the ropc Fund can not acquire any
enforceable rights of recourse against those catagories of
persons under the provisions of Article 9.2 of the Fund
Convention. Therefore, the ropc Fund is placed in a less
advantageous position that the shipowner regarding its ability
to recover its losses through the recourse action because the
shipowner is able to recover by way of recourse action against
all third parties including its servants and agents.
The rights of recourse confered upon the ropc Fund by Article 9.1
and 9.2 of the Fund Convention were used to considerable effect
in the Tanio incident. rn that case the total amount paid by the
rose Fund was FFr222, 140,643 , corresponding to approximately
£18 .3 million at the rate of exchange prevailing when the
respective payment.s were made . 11 rn practice, the ropc Fund's
rights of recourse are one of t he most important factors to be
considered by all potentially r e s pons i b l e parties.
6.2.2.1.1 'Actual fault or privity of the shipowner'
An investigation may reveal a strong possibility that the
incident occurred as a result of the 'actual fault or privity'
of the shipowner, in which case the shipowner may well loose his
right to limit liability under the Civil Liability Convention.
This would be of particular i nte r e s t to the ropc Fund because,
where the shipowner looses the r i ght to limit liability in terms
of Article V.2 of the Civil Liability Convention, the ropc Fund
may be able recoup i t s l os s e s (by having provided compensation)
11The ropc Fund paid part compens a t i on to claimants during
1983-1985 and a remaining amount was paid in October 1988.
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though a recourse action against the shipowner. It has been seen
how this was done with considerable effect in the Tanio case.
In the Amazzone case, the IOPC Fund also took legal action
against the shipowner, the charterer and the P&l insurer. During
the night of 30-31 January, 1988, the Italian tanker Amazzone
(18,325 GRT) was damaged in a severe storm off the west coast of
Brittany (France). The vessel was on a voyage from Libya to
Antwerp (Belgium), carrying about 30,000 tonnes of heavy fuel
oil. Several covers were lost from the Butterworth openings12 of
two cargo tanks and, as a result, approximately 2,000 tonnes of
the cargo escaped when displaced by seawater entering the open
holes. Over the following three to four weeks, oil came ashore
in patches along 450 -500 kilometres of coastline, affecting four
different departments in France and the Channel Islands of Jersey
and Guernsey.13 Considerable pollution damage was caused.
The amounts paid in settlement of claims for pollution damage,
caused as a result of this incident, under the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions appear in the table below: 14
Total amount of claims paid
Amazzone limitation fund
Add interest on limitation fund










. 12T~e Amazzone was equipped with deck openings which made
lt posslble to clean the cargo tanks by using pressurised
water (the so called "Butterworth" system). Many tankers had
this system before it was gradually replaced from the 1980s
by cleaning facilities integrated in the tanks which use th~
cargo as a cleaning fluid (crude oil washing) .
13IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 41.
14IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 42.
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Investigations into the cause of the incident were carried out
on behalf of the Commercial Court in Antwerp and by an
investigating judge in Paris. The French Government and the IOPC
Fund employed their own experts for the same purpose. After
having examined the results of these investigations, the French
Government and the IOPC Fund Director came to the following joint
conclusions:
'The Amazzone was not seaworthy at the time of the
incident, as a result of inadequate maintenance of the
Butterworth system. The shipowner and the charterer had not
taken any measures to examine the condition of the
Butterworth holes, neither when the ship was acquired in
1987 nor thereafter, not even by taking samples of the
thickness of the steel plates. Immediately after the
incident, during the night in the Port of Antwerp, the
charterer of the Amazzone cut the edges of certain
Butterworth openings, disregarding the most elementary
safety rules. He then replaced the system for tightening
the deck covers by a conventional mechanism, ie using nuts
for tightening. The experts interpreted this act as a
clumsy attempt to "eliminate the trace of the most flagrant
corrosion". The action taken by the charterer shows that he
must have been aware of the bad condition of the ship in
this regard. In addition, the shipowner and the charterer
had not given their personnel the necessary training and
proper instructions so as to ensure that the Butterworth
deck covers remained fastened in bad weather. The shipowner
was responsible for the proper maintenance of the vessel
and he could not escape this responsibility by chartering
out the vessel.' 15
Accordingly, the IOPC Fund and the French Government decided to
take legal action in the Court of Cherbourg (France) against the
owner of the Amazzone and the charterer of the vessel, as well
15IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 42-43.
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as against the Standard P&l Club, in its capacity as third party
liability insurer of the charterer. In respect of the action
against the shipowner the French Government and the IOPC Fund
invoked the strict liability laid down in the Civil Liability
Convention and maintained that the owner was not entitled to
limit his liability, since the incident had occured as a result
of the actual fault or privity of the owner. The action against
the charterer was based on fault as regards the lack of
maintenance of the Butterworth system, and it was argued that his
lack of care would deprive him of the right to limit his
liability under the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability
for Maritime Claims. 1 6 However, these arguments were not tested
in court. After the French Government's claim had been paid out-
of-court in November 1991, the Government withdrew its action.
What occurred was that in March 1992 the parties to the court
action entered into negotiation for the purpose of reaching an
out-of-court settlement. A Settlement Agreement was signed in
June 1992 in terms of which the shipowner waived his claim for
indemnification under Article 5 of the Fund Convention in the
amount of FFr3,465,092 (£416,400) . The shipowner, the charterer
and the Standard Club undertook to indemnify the IOPC Fund for
FFr1 million (£102,830) in respect of paYments made by the IOPC
Fund to the victims of pollution damage. This amount was paid to
the IOPC Fund in June 1992. Accordingly, the amount recovered by
the IOPC Fund constituted a high proportion of the total amount
paid out. The total paid out by the IOPC Fund was FFr1,286,977
(£132,300) of which FFr1 million (£102,830) was recovered. 17
This incident depicts how all parties, the IOPC Fund, P&l Clubs
and even government seemed to display a preference for a
negotiated settlement in favour of litigation.
6.2.2.1.2 Proof of third party fault
16IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12 .2 at 43.
17IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 43-44.
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An incident may have been caused by a third party; for example
a colliding vessel, and the IOPC Fund may then consider it
appropriate to take recourse action against that third party in
order to recover any amount which the IOPC Fund has paid in
compensation or indemnification . As a result of the experience
gained by the IOPC Fund from the Tanio incident, the IOPC Fund
Executive Committee adopted the position that, except in
collision cases, the IOPC Fund should only take recourse action
in cases where there are very strong reasons for taking such
action, and where, in addition, there was a considerable
likelihood of success . 18 In eight collision cases, the IOPC Fund
successfully recovered from the owner of the colliding vessel
part of the amount paid by the Fund in compensation and
indemnification. Six of these cases were in Japan, one in Sweden
and one in the Federal Republic of Germany.19
In cases where the third party is the owner of a colliding
vessel, the question arises as to whether that shipowner is
entitled to limit his liability under the applicable
international convention or national law . An incident which
illustrates this issue, as dealt with by the IOPC Fund, is the
Kazuei Maru which occurred on 11th April, 1990. The Japanese
tanker Kazuei Maru No.10 (121 GRT) was supplying heavy fuel oil
to a ferry in the port of Osaka in Japan, when it collided with
a cargo vessel, the Sumryu Maru. As a result of the collision,
a cargo tank of the Kazuei Maru No.10 was damaged, and
approximately 30 tonnes of the cargo oil escaped into the sea.
Considerable pollution damage was caused in the territorial sea
and territory of Japan. 20 In February 1991, the IOPC Fund paid
¥49, 443,626 (£191,724), representing the total amount of the
agreed claims, minus the shipowner's liability, ¥3,476,160
(£13,470). Indemnification of the shipowner, amounting to
18FUND /EXC . 20/6, paragraph 4. 2 .
19FUND/A.15/13, paragraph 14, page 4.
20Japan acceeded to the Civil Liability Convention on 3
June, 1976 and ratified the Fund Convention on 7 J~ly, 1976.
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¥869,040 (£3,730), was paid in September 1991.
In the view of the IOPC Fund 's l awy e r in Japan, the incident was
entirely due to the negligent navigation of the Sumryu Maru.
Accordingly, the IOPC Fund prepared to initiate recourse action
against the owner of that v e s s e l . Investigations into the
incident showed that the Sumryu Maru would be entitled to limit
her liability under the 19 76 Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Cla ims . 21 The limitation amount
applicable to that vessel was ¥60,574 ,645 (£320,500) In a
recourse action, the IOPC Fund would have competed with other
claimants, mainly the hull underwriters, for the distribution of
the limitation amount of the Sumryu Maru. After negotiations with
the other parties concerned , t he IOPC Fund agreed in May 1992
that its share of the limitation amount would be ¥45,038,833
(£212,447). The IOPC Fund received that amount in September
1992. 22 This illustration shows how, in circumstances where the
shipowner establishes the right to limit competing claims can
often be of considerable significance . This incident also
illustrates an important policy of the IOPC Fund in operation.
This policy is to avoid litigation and settle out-of-court
wherever possible.
Another important issue which must be resolved in collision cases
is to what degree the respective parties negligence contributed
to the incident. The Eiko Maru No.l incident, which occurred on
the 13th August, 1983, aptly illu s t r a t e s this feature (which is
frequently considered in the r e s o l u t i on of collision claims).
Here, the Japanese tanker Eiko Maru No.l (999 GRT), loaded with
2,459 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, collided with the Panamanian
cargo ship Cavalry (4,827 GRT ) in dense fog off Karakuwazaki,
Miyagi , Japan. Approximately 357 tonnes of cargo oil spilled from
the Eiko Maru No.l and considerable pollution damage was caused
21This Convention was done at London , 19 November 1976 and
entered into force on 1 December , 1986. Japan acceded to this
convention on 4 June, 1982 .
22IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 992 . section 12.2 at 44-45.
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in the territorial sea and territory of Japan. In 1984 the IOPC
Fund paid compensation amounting to ¥24,735,109 (£76,722),
representing the amount of agreed claims (minus the shipowner's
liability under the Civil Liability Convention of ¥39,445,920).
Indemnification of the shipowner of the Eiko Maru No.l, in the
amount of ¥9,861,480 (£32,018), was paid in 1985.
The official investigation into the cause of the incident led to
the conclusion that the incident was caused by improper
navigation on the part of both vessels. The IOPC Fund started
negotiations with the owners of the Cavalry with the intention
of recovering part of the amount paid by the IOPC Fund. In 1987,
agreement was reached between the Cavalry representatives and
those of the Eiko Maru NO.I, which included the IOPC Fund, on the
apportionment of liability in the ratio 41:59 in favour of the
Cavalry. In line with this apportionment the amount recovered
from the owner of the Cavalry for pollution damage was ¥28
million, of which the IOPC Fund received ¥14, 843,746
(£ 65, 800) .:13
6.2.2.2 Proof of exoneration
An investigation may show that the IOPC Fund is exonerated from
its obligation to pay compensation in accordance with Article 4.2
of the Fund Convention, because the pollution damage resulted
from an act of war or a similar act or was caused by oil escaping
from a warship or another State owned ship on non-commercial
service. The investigation may reveal facts of the sort which
could be invoked by the ship-owner in order to exonerate him from
any liability pursuant to Article III.2 of the Civil Liability
Convention. In certain circumstances, for example where
'irresistable natural phenomena' cause incidents leading to
pollution damage, the shipowner may be wholly exonerated in terms
of the Civil Liability Convention, while the IOPC Fund is not
afforded the same protection.
:l
3 r opc Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.4 at 17-18.
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6.2.2.3 Claimant at fault
The pollution damage may have resulted, wholly or partially,
either from an act or omission, done with intent to cause damage,
by the person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of
that person. The IOPC Fund may then be exonerated wholly or
partially from its obligation to pay such person. 24
6.2.2.4 Cancelled or reduction of indemnification
If it is established that the pollution damage resulted from the
wilful misconduct of the ship-owner himself, the IOPC Fund is
exonerated wholly or partially from its obligation to indemnify
the ship-owner for part of his liability.25 Finally, the
investigation may show that, as a result of the \\actual fault or
privity of the owner", the ship did not comply with the
requirements laid down in any of the instruments included in
Article 5.3 (a) of the Fund Convention. In such a case, the IOPC
Fund may be exonerated wholly or partially from its obligation
to indemnify the shipowner for part of his liability.
6.2.3 Adversarial or collaborative relationship in legal
proceedings
The Internal Regulations of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund, Regulation 7.1 and 7.2, govern the
Intervention of the Fund in legal Proceedings. The wording of
these regulations depicts the ambivalence of the relationship
between the IOPC Fund and shipowners, who are simultaneously
partners and opponents in the complex task of compensating
victims of oil pollution. 26
6.3 lOPC Fund settlement procedure
24Fund Convention, Article 4 .3.
25Fund Convention, Article 5 .1.
26These sub-regulations are reproduced in Annexure Four.
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The machinery set up to compensate claims through the ropc Fund
is unique and the smooth operat ion of this system is intrinsic
to the success of the Fund Convention . rt can be argued that the
ropc Fund functions as an international quasi-judicial body. The
provisions of the Fund Convent ion and ropc Fund Regulations, in
this regard, will now be discussed .
6.3.1 Role of the Executive Committee and Assembly
rn terms of Article 26.1(b) (i i ) of the Fund Convention read in
conjunction with Article 18.7 , the settlement of claims against
the ropc Fund is approved by t he Executive Committee of the ropc
Fund. Article 26 provides that :
'1. The functions of the Executive Committee shall be :
(b) to assume and exercise i n place of the Assembly the
following functions :
(i)
(ii) approving settlements of claims against the Fund and
taking all other steps env isaged in relation to such claims
in Article 18, paragraph 7 ;'
Article 18.7 goes on to provide :
'The functions of the Assembly shall, subject to the
provisions of Article 26 , be :
7 . to approve settlements of claims against the Fund, to
make decisions in respec t of the distribution among the
claimants of the available amount of compensation in
accordance with Article 4 , paragraph 5, and to determine
the terms and conditions according to which provisional
payments in respect of claims shall be made with a view to
ensuring that victims of pol l u t i on damage are compensated
as promptly as possible ; '
185
These provisions aptly illustrate the manner in which the Fund
Convention places emphasis on negotiated settlements and how by
adopting this philosophy, to some extent, in effect usurps the
traditional role played by the courts in the settlement of
disputes . It may be argued that the continued success and
legitimacy of the Fund Convention may lie in ability of the IOPC
Fund to reach acceptable negotiated settlements with claimants.
6.3.2 Director's responsibility
As mentioned previously, the Director exercises considerable
powers regarding the settlement of claims under the Fund
Convention. The wide discretion that has been confered upon the
Director is significant because it facilitates more frequent
success of out-of-court settlements, greater flexibility and the
more speedy settlement of claims .
Regulation 8.4.1 of the IOPC Funds Internal Regulations permits
the Director of the IOPC Fund to settle certain types of claims
without the approval of the Executive Committee.
'Where the Director is satisfied that the Fund is liable
under the Fund Convention to pay compensation for pollution
damage, he may, without the prior approval of the
Assembly , 27 make final settlement of any claim, if he
estimates that the total cost to the Fund of satisfying all
claims arising out of the relevant incident is not likely
27The wording of Regulation 8.4.1 refers to the Assembly
and not the Executive Committee, but, as explained above, for
certain functions the Executive Committee wields effective
power. Regulation 1.6 of the Internal Regulations of the
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund reiterates this
distinction by way of an extended definition of the term
"Assembly":
'''Assembly'' means the Assembly referred to in Article 17
of the ,Fund Co~vention or , where appropriate, the
Executlve Commlttee referred to in Article 21 of that
Convention when it performs functions in accordance with
Article 26 of the Fund Convention.'
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to exceed 37.5 million francs. The relevant date for
conversion shall be the date of the incident in
question. ,28
Thus, in terms of Regulation 8 .4.1, the relevant ceiling above
which the Director may not settle claims without the prior
approval of the executive Committee is 37.5 million francs. As
previously discussed, this unit of measurement refers to (gold)
francs or Poincare Francs. In 1976, Protocols were adopted
amending the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions by replacing
the (gold) francs with the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the
International Monetary Fund. The method of conversion is applied
by the IOPC Fund in accordance with Regulation 2 of the Internal
Regulations of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund;
which provides that:
'Where an amount is expressed in francs in these Internal
Regulations such amounts shall be converted into the
currency of the Headquarters State in accordance with the
following rules:
(a) the amount determined in francs shall be converted
into Special Drawing Rights as defined by the
International Monetary Fund on the basis that 15
francs are equal to one Special Drawing Right;
(b) the number of Special Drawing Rights found
pursuant to (a) shall be converted into the currency
of the Headquarters in accordance with the method of
evaluation applied by the International Monetary Fund
in effect for its operations and transactions at the
. 28The general limit of the Director's authority to make
f~nal settlements of claims for compensation without prior
approval by the Executive Committee was increased from 25
million francs to 37.5 million francs at the 14th session of
the Assembly of the IOPC Fund, held from 8 to 11 October 1991.
The Internal Regulations of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund may be amended by the Assembly in accordance
with Regulation 15.
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date applicable under these Regulations.'
Accordingly, the current ceiling over which the Director may not
settle claims arising from one incident is 2.5 million 8DR. On
the basis of the rate of exchange at 30th January, 1992,29 the
Director's ceiling was then set at U8$3.5 million. This ceiling
is reviewed by the IOPC Assembly and Executive Committee every
four years. Furthermore, where an incident has occurred, the
Assembly may authorize the Director to settle claims in respect
of that incident beyond the limit established in regulation
8.4.1. 30 In addition, the Director may make final settlements of
claims from individuals and small businesses up to an amount of
10 million francs, in respect of anyone incident. This is
equivalent to 0.667 million 8DR, or upon the rate of exchange
given at 30th January, 1992, U8$930,000.31
In terms of Regulation 8 .4 .3, it is a condition for making a
final settlement to any claimant under Regulation 8.4.1 or 8.4.2 ,
that the Director obtains a full and final release in favour of
the Fund from the claimant in respect of all claims of that
claimant arising from that incident. Also, subject to Regulation
8.4.1, where a claim has been submitted to the Fund and agreement
has been reached between the Fund and the claimant as to the
value of the majority of items of the claim, but further
investigation is considered necessary with respect to the
remaining items, the Director may make paYment in respect of the
agreed items. Regulation 8.4.3 also applies to this provision. 32
Where the Director exercises this discretion, he must satisfy the
usual conditions set for him by the Internal Regulations. The
Director must be satisfied that the Fund is liable under the Fund
29U8$1.39921 = 1 8DR.
30Internal Regulations of the IOPC Fund, Regulation 8.4.2 .
31This was achieved at the 14th session of the Assembly of
the IOPC Fund held from 8 to 11 October 1991.
32Internal Regulations of the IOPC Fund, Regulation 8.4.4.
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convention to pay compensation for pollution damage and that the
total cost to the Fund of satisfying all claims arising out of
the relevant incident is not likely to exceed 37.5 million
francs. For those items where the Director provides compensation,
he is first required to obtain a full and final release, from the
claimant, in favour of the Fund, in respect of those claims.
Clearly, the Internal Regulations confer important discretionary
power upon the IOPC Fund Director and the Director is required
to make decisions which often involve very large sums of money.
6.3.3 Provisional payment
On certain conditions, and within limited amounts, the IOPC Fund
Director may make provisional payment, before the final settlement
of a claim, where it is necessary to do so in order to mitigate
undue financial hardship to the victim. This is facilitated
through Regulation 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8 of the Internal
Regulations. 33 What is envisaged are circumstances where an oil
pollution incident has caused such devastation in a particular
area that inhabitants (who, for instance may depend wholly on
oceanic resources for survival are unable to persue income-
generating activities or a subsistence livelihood.
In the El Rani case, the Director refused to grant a request by
Indonesian Authorities for advance paYment. Here on the 22nd
July, 1987, the Libyan tanker El Rani (81,412 GRT), bound for the
Republic of Korea, ran aground outside Singapore in Indonesian
territorial waters. As a result of the grounding, fractures were
caused to the hull of the vessel and approximately 3,000 tonnes
of crude oil escaped. In August 1987, the Indonesian authorities
informed the IOPC Fund that the incident had caused pollution
damage in Indonesia and that they would claim compensation from
the IOPC Fund. 34 No information was given as to the nature and
33The s e sub-regulations are reproduced at Annexure Five.
34Indonesia ratified the Civil Liability Convention and
acceded to t~e Fund Conv7ntion on the 1st September, 1978. TheFund Conventlon entered lnto force for Indonesia on the 30th
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extent of the damage. The Indonesian authorities requested urgent
advance payment from the IOPC Fund of US$242,800 to enable them
to carry out an assessment of the damage. The Director informed
the Indonesian authorities that the IOPC Fund could provide such
compensation only where the aggregate amount of damage sustained
in all States involved in the incident (Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore) exceeded the shipowner's limitation amount under the
Civil Liability Convention. Since the extent of the total damage
sustained in these States could not be estimated when the
Indonesian Authorities applied for provisional payment, the IOPC
Fund Director declined to furnish such payment. 35
6.3.4 Arbitration as a for.m of Dispute Resolution
Arbitration is a means of settling disputes legally, without
going to court. A qualified person, whose appointment has been
agreed to by the parties involved, will hear the case and give
a decision. If the IOPC Fund cannot reach agreement with any
claimant, the Director may agree with any claimant to submit a
claim to binding arbitration. Claims established by such
arbitration shall be promptly satisfied by the Director. 36
In many respects the courts are better suited to dealing with
complex disputes relating to oil pollution claims than is the
arbitration forum. Arbitration has serious disadvantages: (i) the
outcome is unpredictable; (i i ) furthermore, it is seldom
satisfactory to the parties due to the compromising nature of the
decision, the lengthy procedure, and high costs; (iii) other
serious disadvantages are : that awards are not published and they
do not therefore serve as guidelines for future disputes and:
that arbitrators seldom provide reasons for their decisions. The
hostility between the parties is, typically, no less than that
between parties in the courts and the pool of arbitrators is
November , 1978.
35IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.14 at 32.
36Internal Regulations of the IOPC Fund, Regulation 8.3.
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Li.rni t ed ;?"
Public disclosure of pollution awards and the reasons for such
awards is especially relevant in cases which relate to
environmental degradation of the type caused by oil spills.
Environmentalists have consistently criticised the oil industry
for their philosophy of secrecy. Secrecy is particularly
prevalent in connection with oil spills from tankers. Both
shipowners, as represented by their P&l associations, and oil
companies, in this particular instance most often represented by
Cristal Limited and the OCIMF, are especially guarded on the
subj ect of oil pollution. This is understandable from the
position of industry members, because no one will willingly wish
to provide the "rope" which could very well be used for his own
"execution" at some stage in the future . However, full disclosure
will, in the long term, enhance the viability of both the oil and
shipping industry. Disclosure would improve the image and
reputation of the shipping and oil industries in the eyes of the
public and also improve relationships with public authorities,
thereby enhancing mutual-trust and co-operation.
The IOPC Fund is a welcome exception to the general attitude of
secrecy surrounding oil pollution claims. It is noteworthy that
although the IOPC Fund is funded by the oil industry it is
independant in that its authority and ultimate enforceability is
sanctioned by the Contracting State in which an oil pollution
incident has occurred.
6.3.5 Claims may ultimately be settled by the courts
Claimants may pursue claims against the IOPC Fund before the
courts of the Contracting State where the damage occurred. Such
courts will usually first decide the question of liability and
37Bentgarde 'Drafting catastrope wordings: how to avoid
disputes' in Leading Developments in International Reinsurance
and Pollution Insurance: An Industry Report Lloyd's of London
Press (1991) 42 at 44.
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the assessment of damages is usually dealt with at a later stage.
Such was the case in the Tanio litigation. 38 Claims against the
IOPC Fund shall be brought only before those courts which are
competent under Article IX of the Civil Liability Convention in
respect of actions against the shipowner, who is, or who would,
but for the provisions of Article 111.2, of that Convention, 39
have been liable for pollution damage caused by the relevant
Lnc i.derrt.v " Article IX.1 of the Civil Liability Convention
provides:
'Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the
territory including the territorial sea of one or more
Contracting States, or preventive measures have been taken
to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory
including the territorial sea, actions for compensation may
only be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting State
or States.'
However, where an action for compensation for pollution damage
under the Civil Liability Convention has been brought before a
court in a State party to the Civil Liability Convention, but not
to the Fund Convention, any action against the IOPC Fund under
Article 4 (general pollution compensation) or under Article 5.1
(indemnification of the shipowner) of the Fund Convention shall,
at the option of the claimant, be brought either before a court
of the State where the IOPC Fund has its headquarters (the United
Kingdom) or before any court of a State Party to the Fund
Convention competent under Article IX of the Civil Liability
38IOPC Fund Annual Report 1888, section 12.2 at 29. This
proceedure was also followed by the courts in the United
States during protracted litigation associated with the Amoco
Cadiz incident.
390ne will recall that Article III.2 of the Civil
Liability Convention relates to the three categories of
absolute defences available to the ship-owner.
4°This is in terms of Article 7.1 of the Fund Convention.
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Convention . 41
The Director of the IOPC Fund has a duty to promptly satisfy any
claims for pollution damage under Article 4 of the Fund
Convention which have been established by judgement against the
Fund enforceable under Article 8 of the Fund Convention. 42 For
an exppsition of Article 8 and related provisions see Annexure
Six of this work.
6.4 Conclusion on claims practice
The significance of the emphasis upon out of court negotiated
settlements between claimants and the IOPC Fund and the P&l Clubs
cannot be under estimated. This policy serves to defuse potential
conflict in a highly emotive and politically charged area of law,
speeds up the settlement of claims and reduces legal costs. While
negotiated settlements are to be encouraged it is also important
that claimants have the right to resort to the Courts of their
own country when no agreement can be reached. What is
particularly interesting is the role played by the ropc Fund in
the settlement of claims under the Fund Convention . The ropc Fund
does not seem to adopt an adversarial role as against claimants
but, rather places a priority upon principles of fairness. For
example, it has been seen how the ropc Fund may provide interim
relief to victims where there is a demonstrable need. However,
the IOPC Fund must always operate within the constraints of its
rules. In this regard the ropc Fund's rights of recourse against
the shipowner and other third parties in certain conditions is
of considerable practical importance. It has also been seen how
under the Civil Liability Convention the shipowner also enjoys
considerable opportunities to recover paYments made under that
Convention by way of recourse actions. Now that the actual claims
practice under the Civil Liability and Fund Convention has been
dealt with it is appropriate to discuss the admissibility of
41Fund Convention, Article 7.3.
42Internal Regulations of the ropc Fund, Regulation 8.2.
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certain categories of pollution claims under those Conventions





The main aspects of damage claims arising out of an oil pollution
incident under the Fund Convention and the Civil Liability
Convention will be considered from the point of view of the
victims of oil pollution and those who provide compensation for
their damage. Claims for pollution damage were not dealt with in
depth during the analysis of the Civil Liability Convention. The
main reason for not doing so was to avoid repetition because both
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions share definitions of
fundamantal concepts such as "Ship", "Person", "Oil", "Pollution
Damage", "Preventive Measures", and "Incident", accordingly,
these Conventions apply in similar ways to similar claims. 1 The
uniformity of treatment of claims for "pollution damage" by the
IOPC Fund and the P&I Clubs, under the Fund and Civil Liability
Conventions respectively, is also further enshrined in Clause 6
of the Memorandum of Understanding between the IOPC Fund and the
International Group of P&I Clubs of the 5th November, 1980. The
uniform approach to the compensation of oil pollution damage is
further facilitated by the close cooperative relationship which
exists between the IOPC Fund and the P&I Clubs during the actual
on-site management of claims procedure . This cooperative
relationship becomes especially close in cases where large oil
spills occur; for example, the Haven, Aegean Sea and Braer
spills. In these cases the shipowners' P&I insurers and the IOPC
Fund set up joint claims offices in the polluted areas to
distribute to potential claimants claim forms provided by the P&I
Clubs and the IOPC Fund. For this reason it is possible to
consider the question of the admissibility of claims under the
respective Conventions together in the same Chapter.
lFund Convention, Article 1.2.
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7.1.1 Admissibility of claims
In order for a claim to be accepted by the IOPC Fund, it has to
be proved that the claim is based on real damage or expense
actually incurred. There must be a link between the damage or
expense and the incident which caused the pollution and all
expenses must have been incurred for reasonable purposes. These
criteria are significantly more favourable for claimants than the
traditional position under English law, for example. Under
English law, a claimant had to prove that the shipowner had
caused an oil spillage as a result of negligence, that the
shipowner owed a duty of care to the claimant, had failed to
exercise that duty of care and that such failure was causally
linked to the resulting damage . 2
For the purpose of the Fund Convention, pollution damage has the
same meaning as in Article I.6 of the Civil Liability Convention
provided that, for the purpose of the Fund Convention, "oil" in
the definition of "oil pollution damage" means persistent
hydrocarbon mineral oils and does not include whale oil .
'"Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the
ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the
escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such
escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of
preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by
preventive measures .'
As was pointed out in the preliminary analysis of pollution
damage, undertaken in the context of the Civil Liability
Convention, varying interpretations exist as to the parameters
set by the definition. However , the IOPC Fund has, during the
time of its existence, acquired a wide range of experience at
2F~r a detailed consideration of English Common Law, see
Abecass1s & Jarashow Oil Pollution from Ships: International
United Kingdom and United States Law and Practice 2nd ed. I
(1985) Chapter 15.
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deciding the admissibility or non-admisibility of claims and has
formulated certain guiding principles as to the meaning of
pollution damage. The IOPC Fund has also articulated certain
significant statements of policy pertaining to the ambit of the
definition of pollution damage . I n addition both Directors of the
Fund have developed and e laborated upon certain important
principles during their negotiations with claimants. It may be
said that the definition is constantly evolving as a result to
new pressures being brought t o bear upon the IOPC Fund by
claimants. As a general rule i t can be said that the ambit of the
definition is getting broader.
It has previously been noted that although the normative function
of the IOPC Fund policy is f r e que n t l y adhered to this is not
always the case. Further examples of significant departures from
Fund policy will appear from t he ensuing commentary. On this
issue, however, the view has been expressed that the Fund
Convention has had \. .. a beneficial influence on the paYment of
compensation to victims, by helping to harmonize compensation
approaches internationally and by speeding up procedures. ,3
Indeed, the IOPC Fund Assembly has expressed the opinion that a
uniform interpretation of the de f i n i t i on of pollution damage is
essential for the functioning of the regime of compensation
established by the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund
Convention. 4 This is because the Fund Convention is founded upon
the principle that, theoretica l ly , each party state will recover
from the Fund in proportion to the contributions made. This, of
course, is not true in pract ice because some party states do not
receive contributing oil and a lso certain states are more prone
to oil pollution damage because o f particular local conditions
which may prevail.
The consequence of disparate i n t e r p r e t a t i on s of the notion of
30fficial Records, vol.2 a t 372 para.81.
4IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988 , section 13 .4 (a) at 58.
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pollution damage is that states which favour a narrow
interpretation of pollution damage are forced to contribute to
the compensation of claimants in those states which favour a
broader interpretation. In other words, the principle of "fair
shared sacrifice" is upset. This is especially relevant to the
disparty between those states which do not permit compensation
for damage to the environment per se and those states which do. s
7.2 Loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil
Although the definition of pollution damage applies to loss or
damage caused outside the ship carrying the oil this does not
necessarily preclude damage caused on another ship from being
admissible under the Conventions. This point is illustrated by
the approach adopted by the IOPC Fund's interpretation of the
Civil Liability and Fund Convention in a series of Japanese
pollution claims.
On the 18th May, 1989, during a transfer of heavy fuel oil from
a Japanese registered tanker of 74 grt., the Tsubame Maru No.58
to a fishing boat at Shiogama in Japan, a crew member inserted
the fuel supply line into a cargo inlet hole of the fishing
vessel instead of into the bunker tank inlet. In this way about
seven tonnes of oil entered the cargo hold and polluted a cargo
of about 140 tonnes of fish. No oil escaped into the sea. The
question which arose was could the damage caused to the cargo of
fish and the expense of cleaning the cargo hold of the fishing
boat be construed as damages within the definition of "pollution
damage" laid down in the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions?
According to the definition, such damage must necessarily be
caused by contamination caused outside the ship carrying the oil
which caused the damage .
In previous cases experienced in Japan, the IOPC Fund had paid
compensation for damage caused by an overflow of oil during the
SBrodecki 'New definition of Pollution damage' [1985]
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ 382 at 382 .
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transfer of oil from a tanker to another vessel, but in those
cases the oil had escaped into the sea and necessitated clean-up
operations. For example on the 15th May, 1989, a Japanese tanker
of 94 grt. the Fukkol Maru No.12 was supplying heavy fuel oil to
a fishing boat at Shiogama through a supply line connected to a
tank on board the fishing boat . The tank was overfilled and oil
overflow spread across the deck of the fishing boat escaping into
the sea and also onto a pier . Some fishing nets on the pier, as
well as cars parked there, were contaminated by oil. Claims were
submitted to the ropc Fund relating to the expenses of clean-up
operations at sea, for washing polluted cars and for replacing
polluted fishing nets. These claims were accepted as constituting
"pollution damage" within the meaning of both the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions and received full compensation as such. 6
However, the facts of the Tsubame Maru No.58 were distinct from
those of the Fukkol Maru No. 12 because, in the former case, no
oil escaped into the sea and no expenses for clean-up operations
at sea were made. Nevertheless, the Executive Committee of the
ropc Fund decided in 1989 that the damage in the Tsubame Maru
No.58 should be considered as being covered by the definition of
"pollution damage".7
This principle is now well established and was subsequently
endorsed by the ropc Fund in a another case . On 27th July, 1990,
the Japanese tanker of 31 grt. the Hato Maru No.2, was supplying
heavy fuel oil to a dry cargo vessel in the port of Kobe in
Japan, when, due to the mishandling of the valve of the supply
line, the oil spread over the deck and into the hold of the cargo
vessel. A cargo of acrylic fibre was contaminated but no oil
leaked into the sea. The ropc Fund Director decided that, in view
of the previous position adopted by the ropc Fund in the Tsubame
Maru No.58 incident, the damage caused to the cargo of the Hato
Maru No.2 would be considered as "pollution damage" as provided
6IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990 , section 12.2 at 41.
7IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990 , section 12.2 at 41.
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for in the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. 8
The approach adopted by the IOPC Fund in the cases of the Tsubame
Maru No.58 and the Hato Maru No.2 was also adopted in a more
recent case that of the Fukkol Maru No.2. 9
It is submitted that this interpretation is correct based on the
wording of the definition of "pollution damage". However, a
strong argument could be made that, from the moment that the oil
was pumped off the tanker and into the holds of either a fishing
boat or a dry cargo ship, it was no longer being carried on board
the tankers in question but in the other vessels. Strictly
speaking, this would have been true in these cases. If this
argument were to be accepted then the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions would not be applicable because these conventions may
only apply in circumstances where '"pollution damage" is caused
outside the ship carrying oil ... '. In these cases no damage
would have been done outside the 'carrier' vessels. Of course,
a fishing boat or a dry cargo ship is unlikely to satisfy the
requirements of being a "ship" for the purposes of the Civil
Liability or Fund Conventions because they would seldom, if at
all, be carrying persistent oil in bulk as cargo. Nonetheless
this question could be relevant where a tanker is lightering a
cargo of oil into another tanker and damage is done on board such
tanker. Despite the possibility of this alternative argument, the
liberal interpretation adopted by the IOPC Fund on this matter
is to be commended. The IOPC Fund has recognised that in the
first instance the oil which caused the damage was dischaged from
a "ship" as defined for the purpose of the Conventions. The IOPC
Fund Executive Committee did not choose to interpret the fact
that the oil was put on board another vessel as constituting
grounds upon which compensation under the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions could be refused. That the Liability Conventions
should apply in such circumstances is good in principle.
8IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 48.
9IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 46.
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A further observation incidental to this issue is that every
accident of this type that the IOPC Fund has had occasion to deal
with (so far) has occurred in Japan. Significantly, Japan is also
by far the largest contributor to the IOPC Fund. This factor may
have had some influence on the readiness of the Fund to accept
this particular type of claim .
7.3 Preventive measures
The definition of pollution damage contained in the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions includes the cost of "preventive
measures", which are defined as ' ... any reasonable measures
taken by any person after an incident has occurred to prevent or
minimise pollution damage. ,10 For the purpose of this definition
and the Conventions as a whole an '"incident" means any
occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same origin,
which causes pollution damage. ,11
Significantly, the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the Fund
Convention reads:
'Considering that the International Convention of 29
November 1969, on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
by providing a regime for compensation for pollution damage
in Contracting States and for the costs of measures,
wherever taken, to prevent or minimize such damage,
represents a considerable progress towards the achievement
of this aim,
The wording of this paragraph confirms the view that preventive
10The definition of "preventive measures" is contained in
Article 1.7 of the Civil Liability Convention. This definition
is incorporated by reference into the Fund Convention by
Article 1 .2 of that Convention.
llThe definition of an "incident" is contained in Article
1.8 of the Civil Liability Convention. This definition is
incorporated by reference into the Fund Convention by Article
1.2 of that Convention.
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measures undertaken outside the territory or territorial sea of
a Contracting State will nevertheless also in principle be
recoverable under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
7.3.1 Only reasonable measures are compensable
It must be emphasised that the definition of preventive measures
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions only cover
expenses for reasonable preventive measures. Some preventive
measures may not be considered \ reasonable' under all the
circumstances.
For example, on the 10th December, 1988, while carrying
approximately 1,100 tonnes of heavy fuel oil the Kasuga Maru
No.I, a Japanese coastal tanker of 480 grt., capsized and sank
off the west coast of Japan during a storm. Oil continued to
escape from the tanker, which was lying at a depth of 270 metres
within an extensively used fishing ground. After having
considered various ways of preventing further oil from escaping
from the sunken tanker the IOPC Fund and two maj or Japanese
salvage companies agreed that it was impracticable to carry out
salvage work at that depth. This finding was accepted by the
Japanese authorities and the local fishery interests. However,
the Marine Safety Agency which was co-ordinating the preventive
and clean-up operations requested that an inspection of the
sunken tanker be undertaken using a robot-controlled video camera
to examine the possibility of taking measures to prevent further
leakage. The IOPC Fund opposed this request as unreasonable under
the circumstances as such preventive operations had already been
determined as unfeasible. 12
The requirement of reasonablenss constitutes an important defence
which may be invoked by shipowners, their insurers and the IOPC
Fund where allegedly unreasonable preventive operations are
embarked upon by governments in order to satisfy political
12IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 36.
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pressure .13 The concept of reasonableness is not defined in
either the Civil Liability or Fund Conventions; accordingly this
question fall to be decided by the courts where the disputes are
heard. It has been suggested, however, that the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the measures taken must be gauged by an
objective standard, considering the extent of information
available to the actor at the time when the measures in question
where taken. 14 Jacobsson and Trotz have expressed their support
for the application of the following principle.
'The costs incurred must not be disproportionate to the
results achieved or to the results which could reasonably
be expected. However, it must be recognised that the
authorities concerned and the parties involved in the
operations will often have to decide very rapidly, and
without full knowledge of the circumstances, on the taking
of preventive measures. For this reason, it appears that
when the test of reasonableness is to be applied, they
should be allowed a certain margin of error in their
judgements. ,lS
It is to be welcomed that these commentators advocate a degree
of leniency in assessing the "on-the-moment" judgements of
decision makers made while carrying out preventive measures. This
is in keeping with the well established standard used to assess
decisions made by salvors who are also required to act under
difficult circumstances and on the spur of the moment. It is also
noteworthy that the same commentators refer to the reasonableness
of the measures being dependant upon the 'results' acheived by
13Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 210 para.10-54.
14D.W . Abecassis the Law and Practice Relating to Oil
Pollution from Ships 1st ed. (1978) at 137 referred to with
approval by Jacobsson & Trotz 'The Definition of Pollution
Damage in the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention' (1986) 17 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 467 a t 472.
lsJacobsson & Trotz, op ci t, 472.
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such measures. If the submission is that preventive, clean-up and
remedial measures will only be regarded as reasonable where the
cost of such measures is proportionate to the risk of damage
posed or the chances of success of such operations then certain
fundamental difficulties arise. Such views are especially
vulnerable to critisism in respect of environmental damage caused
by oil spills. For example, if a mangrove swamp is polluted,
which will cost US$30 million to rehabilitate, then it could be
argued that rehabilitation measures will be reasonable (and
therefore justified) only where the mangrove swamp is worth US$30
million or more. The difficulty is how to measure the value of
that natural resource. This very important issue will be dealt
with under an analysis of claims for "environmental damage" as
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, the voluntary
compensation regimes and under the United States Oil Pollution
Act 1990.
7.3.2 Pure threat removal measures
Significantly, because the definition of pollution damage refers
to 'damage done outside a ship carrying oil by contamination
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship',
preventive measures will only be considered pollution damage once
persistent oil has actually escaped from the ship carrying the
oil. For this reason, pure threat removal measures may not
receive compensation under the Civil Liability or the Fund
Convention.
The problem of obtaining compensation for pure threat removal
measures under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions came to
the fore in the Tarpenbeck case where claims were made for
preventive measures undertaken in the United Kingdom. Here, on
the 21st June, 1979, the Tarpenbeck, a tanker registered in the
Federal Republic of Germany collided with the Sir Geraint an
auxilliary ship of the British Royal Fleet with the result that
the Tarpenbeck capsized in the English Channel near the coast of
the United Kingdom. The cargo tanks of the Tarpenbeck fortunately
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remained undamaged and none of her cargo of about 1,600 tonnes
of persistent lubricating oil escaped. However, a quantity of
non-persistent light diesel oil escaped from the Tarpenbeck's
bunkers into the sea. 1 6 The United Kingdom Government and local
authorities carried out various measures to prevent a possible
spill of oil which could have caused damage to beaches or the
marine environment. There was considerable doubt as to whether
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions applied on the facts in
this case because there was insufficient evidence to establish
whether or not persistant oil had actually escaped into the sea
as a result of the incident. Despite uncertainty on this
important issue, the IOPC Fund nevertheless compensated various
parties for preventive measures. In settling these claims the
IOPC Fund Director took into account the uncertainty that existed
both as to whether a spill of persistent oil had in fact taken
place and as to the interpretation of the Conventions and
relevant United Kingdom legislation. 17 Had the bunker oil been
persistent oil there could have been no room for dispute on this
issue.
The exclusion of all pure threat removal measures, regardless of
the appropriateness of such actions, is distinctly unfortunate
because timely measures taken to assist a tanker in distress can
often avoid significant pollut ion damage. Salvage operations, in
particular, remain the first line of defence against accidents
occurring at sea which could cause pollution damage. Essentially,
prevention is better than cure. This time-tested adage is
especially true of marine oil pollution incidents where the cure,
if indeed one can be found and effectively administered, is
likely to be a painful and lengthy experience for polluters and
victims alike. Of course, in most instances, there is no cure
available for the numerous species of marine wildlife which
perish in such spills. Because the strict, literal interpretation
of the Conventions on this issue has such an undesirable result,
1 6Ab • J h .ecaSS1S & aras ow, op c~t, 198 para.10-16.
17IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.2 at 10.
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it has been noted that in some jurisdictions the Civil Liability
Convention has been interpreted to include reasonable measures
taken in anticipation of a spill. 18 In circumstances where pure
threat preventive measures are taken and the anticipated spill
does in fact subsequently occur and the threat preventive
measures adopted do in fact prevent or minimize pollution damage,
the strict application of the rule excluding pure threat measures
is particularly inequitous and is not conducive to optimum
practical outcomes. Nevertheless, even in these circumstances,
such measures will not receive compensation under the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions . 19 At this point it is important
to note that threat removal measures are admissible under the
1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions,
TOVALOP, TOVALOP Supplement and CRISTAL.
The central provision of the Civil Liability and the Fund
Conventions provides that the respective conventions apply
exclusively to pollution damage caused on the territory,
including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State and to
preventive measures taken to prevent or minimize such damage. The
question therefore arises as to whether or not preventive
measures taken beyond the territorial limits of a Contracting
State will be admissible under the Conventions? In circumstances
where it is reasonable to expect that an incident outside the
territorial limits of a Contracting State threatens to cause
pollution damage in the territory or territorial seas of a
Contracting State such measures will be admissible. A
prerequisite to the success of such claims will be that the
measures taken were reasonable under the circumstances.
Preventive measures may result, for example, in expenses for the
sealing of fractures in a grounded vessel to prevent oil from
l8pOpp \Liability and
caused by ships revisited
international conference'
Law 118 at 127.
compensation for pollution damage
- report on an important
(1985) Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial
19Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 472-3.
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escaping. Measures may have to be taken to prevent oil which has
escaped from a ship from reaching the coast by placing booms
along the threatened stretch of coastline. Dispersants may be
uses at sea to combat the oil. Costs for such operations are, in
principle, all classed as costs for preventive measures. It is
convenient to divide preventive measures into two broad
catagories: firstly, the salvage type measures and, secondly,
clean-up measures.
7.3.3 Salvage operations
The IOPC Fund and the P&l Clubs regard only the cost of salvage
operations as preventive measures and as such compensable as
pollution damage under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions,
if the primary purpose of such operations is to prevent or
minimise pollution damage . 2o In most instances the prime
objective of salvage operat ions is to save the ship and its
cargo, not prevent pollution damage. But with increased
environmental awareness and high levels of liability for
pollution damage, every shipowner, ship management company and
P&l insurer of ships in general (and ships carrying oil in bulk
in particular) are well aware of the very real possibility of
being faced with extensive liability where a ship for which they
are responsible has an oil spill. For this reason where a tanker
sustains structural damage, or is involved in a collision, a
grounding, catches alight or experiences mechanical failure, the
party responsible for such ship will be especially concerned to
prevent pollution damage. Salvage operations are usually the
first option available to owners and operators through which they
will attempt, amongst other considerations, to avoid damage to
the environment. In such circumstances it is obviously very
difficut to determine whether the primary purpose of such
operations is to prevent or mitigate pollution damage or to save
2°Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 475; Browne 'Oil Pollution
Damage Compensation under the Civil Liability Convention 1969'
in McLean (ed) Compensation for Damage: An International
Perspective (1993) pp.137-164 at 150.
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the ship and its cargo. Disputes have arisen as to the primary
purpose of salvage operations in circumstances where the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions apply.
A case in point is that of the Patmos, where disagreement arose
between the IOPC Fund and various claimants as to the primary
nature of certain salvage operations. On 21st March, 1985, the
Pa t mo s , a Greek registered tanker of 51,627 grt. carrying 83,689
tonnes of crude oil, collided with the Spanish tanker Castillo
de Montearagon of 92,289 grt . which was fortunately unladen at
the time of the collision. As a result of the collision
considerable pollution damage was caused in the territory and
territorial sea of Italy when approximately 700 tonnes of oil
escaped from the damaged hull of the Patmos. A further
consequence of the collision was that the Patmos caught alight
and the crew were forced to abandon ship. On the 22nd March, 1985
a state of emergency was declared by the Harbour Master of
Messina due to the serious danger of explosion and consequent
excessive pollution, since the structure of the Patmos had been
severely damaged. The unmanned, burning, structurally weakened
tanker containing a large quantity of oil clearly continued to
pose a serious pollution hazard . The danger of further pollution
damage became more acute when the out-of -control tanker drifted
onto a beach, discharging several tonnes of oil in the vicinity
of a Sicilian coastal village. However, the possibility of
considerable additional pollut ion damage was averted when the
tanker was refloated by salvors. After two days of fire fighting
operations, salvors were able to extinguish the fire with the use
of fire-fighting tugs. These actions permitted the Patmos then
to be towed into the port of Messina where her remaining cargo
was discharged. On the 1st Apri l, 1985, the state of emergency
was lifted. 21
In accordance with Article V. 3 of the Civil Liability Convention,
the owner of the Patmos and the owner's P&l insurer established
21IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.9 at 16-18.
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a limitation fund with the Court of Messina. The Court fixed the
limitation amount at Llt3,263,703,650 (£5.6 million). The IOPC
Fund was notified of the limitation proceedings in accordance
with Article 7.6 of the Fund Convention. Since the sum total of
claims submitted for pollution damage greatly exceeded the
shipowner's limitation amount, the IOPC Fund became involved in
the settlement process. Many claims were submitted to the IOPC
Fund, of which twelve claims totalling about Llt40,OOO million
(£20 million) related to the cost of operations which, in the
view of the IOPC Fund Director , would normally be considered as
salvage operations and related measures . The key point was
whether, and to what extent, the costs of such operations fell
within the definition of "pollution damage" contained in Article
1.6 of the Civil Liability Convention as incorporated by
reference into the Fund Convention. Specifically, could the
operations in question be considered "preventive measures" as
defined in Article 1 .7 of the Civil Liability Convention as also
incorporated by reference into the Fund Convention?
The IOPC Fund Director adopted the view that operations could be
encompassed within the definition of "preventive measures" only
where the primary purpose of such operations was to prevent
pollution damage. If the operations primarily had another
purpose, such as salvaging hull or cargo, the operations would
not be covered by the definition. 2 2 At its 16th session, held in
1986, the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund endorsed the
position adopted by the Director on this issue. 23 Despite the
policy adopted by the IOPC Fund, seven of the claimants pursued
their claims in the Court of first instance in Messina. The trial
outcome was that the conceptual analysis formulated by the IOPC
Fund Director was endorsed by the decision of this Court on the
30th July, 1986. The Court made a general statement to the effect
that salvage operations could not be considered as "preventive
22IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 986 , section 9.9 at 17.
23IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 34 and
section 13.4 (e) at 60.
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measures" since the primary purpose of such operations was that
of rescuing the ship and its cargo. This general principle
applied even if the operations had also had the further effect
of preventing oil pollution damage. The Court further stated
that, to the extent that an extra component of the operations
were considered as "preventive measures", only that fraction of
the costs and losses could be compensated under the Civil
Liability Convention. Accordingly, the actual salvage reward,
over and above the salvors expenses, would certainly not be
recoverable under the Civil Liability or Fund Conventions. On the
application of this principle to the facts of each claim, the
Court rejected four of the seven claims and the others were
reduced to differing degrees . 24
In a further instance, claims arose under the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions when the car-ferry Moby Prince collided with the
Italian tanker Agip Abruzzo. Two claimants submitted claims to
the IOPC Fund which resulted in deliberations as to the primary
purpose of salvage operations. The IOPC Fund Director adopted the
following approach to these claims. He rejected certain items
which could not, in his view, be considered as falling within the
definitions of "pollution damage" and "preventive measures" as
defined for the purpose of the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions . In his view the primary purpose of such operations
was to salvage the Agip Abruzzo and not to prevent pollution.
However, the Director also observed that it was not possible to
ascertain the primary purpose in every case because certain
operations had a dual purpose.
It was therefore decided that the costs of these operations
should be proportionately distributed between pollution
prevention measures and activities with some other purpose. 25
This was an important conceptual break-through because the strict
24IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.9 at 18.
25IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 54-59 and
IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992 , section 12.2 at 54-57.
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application of the "primary purpose rule", which was essentially
an "all-or-nothing", inflexible , approach, would inevitably have
led to unfair results. At its 30th session, in December 1991, the
Executive Committee of the ropc Fund endorsed the position
adopted by the Director, stating that the costs of such
operations should be apportioned between pollution prevention and
other activities in the light of the surrounding circumstances
in which such operations are carried out. 26
Another case where the proportionality principle was applied was
that of the Portfield.
On the 5th November, 1990, the Portfield a 481 grt. British
Registered tanker with a cargo of 80 tonnes of diesel oil and 220
tonnes of medium fuel oil sank at her berth in Pembroke Dock,
Wales. Consequently approximately 110 tonnes of medium fuel oil
escaped. Amongst other claims submitted for pollution damage
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, the owner of the
Portfield submitted a claim to the ropc Fund which related to
clean-up operations, salvage and preventive measures. The
shipowner maintained that the primary purpose of the salvage
operations was to prevent pollution. He argued that, had the
operations been carri~d out primarily to salve the vessel, such
operations would have been completed in a much shorter time and
at a considerably lower cost. The ropc Fund accepted that the
salvage operations were carried out partly for the purpose of
salving the vessel and partly for the purpose of preventing oil
pollution, and that the risk of pollution had made the shipowner
carry out the operations in a more expensive way than would have
been necessary in order to salve the vessel. An agreement was
reached to apportion the cost of these operations, with % for
preventive measures and % for salvage. 27
26FUND/EXC.30/5, paragraph 4.2.3 and FUND/EXC.32/3/Add.1,
paragraph 3.2.
27IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 51.
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Protracted salvage operations were undertaken in the Rio Orinoco
case. On the 16th October, 1990, the 5,999 grt. asphalt carrier
Rio Orinoeo with about 9,000 tonnes of heated asphalt, and about
300 tonnes of intermediate fuel oil and heavy diesel oil on
board, went aground on the south coast of Anticosti Island in
Canadian territorial waters. Under Canadian Law, the Government
may take the necessary measures to minimise or prevent pollution
damage from a ship, including the removal and destruction of the
ship. Accordingly, the Canadian Coast Guard determined that the
bunker oil remaining in the vessel should be removed. To the
extent that this was possible, the bunker oil in question was
removed by contractors on behalf of the shipowner in December
1990. In March 1991 the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund
determined that these operations fell within the definition of
"preventive measures", as there had been a considerable risk
posed that the remaining bunker oil could have escaped and caused
further harm to coastal areas surrounding the grounding site.
Accordingly these expenses incurred on behalf of the shipowner
by his P&I insurer were admissible under Article V.8 of the Civil
Liability Convention and Article 4.1 of the Fund Convention. 2 8
The Executive Committee also recognised in principle that the
unsuccessful attempts: firstly, to drag the Rio Orinoco free and
secondly to refloat the vessel were encompassed within the
definitions of "pollution damage" and "preventive measures" laid
down in Articles I.6 and I.7 of the Civil Liability Convention,
•
since the primary purpose of these operations had been to prevent
pollution. Nevertheless, the IOPC Fund Director decided that
during certain periods of activity the operation in question had
a dual purpose which was to prevent and minimise pollution and
additionally, to salve the vessel. In presenting its claim the
Canadian Government had anticipated this controversy and had
formulated the cost distribution between salvage and pollution
prevention measures which the IOPC Fund accepted. 29 In September
28I~PC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 45-48.
29IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 47 and 50.
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1991, the Director also accepted a claim by the Canadian
Government for the expense of operations undertaken by a private
salvage company to remove the Rio Orinoco from her grounded
position and to tow her to a place of safety.30
It would seem that the Rio Orinoco case was resolved with a
minimum of difficulty and it is referred to as something of a
legal showpiece. At the 31st session of the Executive Committee
of the IOPC Fund, the Canadian Government expressed its great
satisfaction with the speed with which the Canadian Government's
claims had been settled and paid. The Canadian delegation
stressed the value of the close co-operation between the Canadian
administration and the IOPC Fund during the clean-up and salvage
operations and in the preparation and examination of claims. In
the view of the Canadian delegation, this incident demonstrated
the high quality and viability of the system of compensation
established by the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund
Convention. 31
At that time it was very important to the IOPC Fund and
shipowners and P&l Clubs that this incident was resolved without
any major disagreements as the United States had rejected the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and had passed unilateral
oil pollution control and compensation legislation in the form
of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 on the 18th August, 1990. If the
Canadian authorities had been dissatisfied with the operation of
the Liability Conventions, they may have considered denouncing
the Conventions and adopting unilateral action.
At the 1969 Brussels Conference which formulated the Civil
Liability Convention Canada had been at the fore of the so-called
"environmental" delegations. The Canadian delegation proposed
'strict and unlimited liability imposed jointly on the ship- and
cargo-owners. Canada's extreme demands remained unaffected by the
30IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 50.
31IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 6.2 at 17.
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negotiations and compromises going on around it and, in the end,
cast the only negative vote against the convention' .32 This may
have been further reason why it was important to the P&l Clubs
and the IOPC Fund that the Canadian Government be satisfied with
the resolution of the Rio Orinoco incident. There may well have
been an element of "putting old ghosts" of discord to rest. It
is interesting to note that the more progressive environmental
states in the US; Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland, North
Carolina, Oregon and Washington, all now expressly provide in
their State legislation, not only strict liability for ship- and
cargo-owners but further stipulate that such liability is
unlimi ted. In the U. S. legal trends in California are often
emulated by other states and Federal legislation, and by the same
token the rest of the world often looks to the U.S. to determine
the direction of domestic legislation. Accordingly strict and
unlimited liability imposed jointly on the ship- and cargo-owner
for tanker-source oil pollution damage could be a portent of
things to come. This would be something of a harbinger for oil
importer interests, but, it is submitted, for reasons which will
subsequently be explained such evolution in the law would
ultimately redound to the benefit of the shipping and oil
industries. If this change does in fact take place, and the
benefits which this writer predicts results, the original
position adopted by the Canadian Delegation during the pioneering
days of 1969 shall have been justified.
Certain anomalies exist in the traditional law of salvage which
discourage salvors from taking preventive action in circumstances
where environmental damage may occur from a vessel in distress.
In an attempt to remedy these deficiencies certain legal
instruments evolved within industry and through the work of the
International Maritime Organization to encourage salvors to take
action to prevent or mitigate environmental damage. These
developments are directly relevant to oil pollution damage and
thus by implication the issue of oil pollution liability. In
32M'?onigle & Zacher Pollution, Politics, and
Internat~onal Law: Tankers at Sea (1979) 176 .
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keeping with the holistic approach adopted in this work these
important legal innovations are briefly discussed in Annexure
Seven of this work.
7.4 Clean-up expenses
The lOPC Fund pays compensation for expenses incurred by way of
clean-up operations at sea or on the shore. The cost of materials
and equipment specially purchased for combatting a particular oil
spill are claimable. By the same token the cost of equipment and
materials purchased prior to t h e spill as a precaution against
the occurrence of a spill can a lso be claimed for where such
equipment is actually used to combat the spill. At the
termination of clean-up operat ions certain equipment will be
capable of being cleaned and used again. Allowances are however
made for the depreciation i n t he value of such equipment.
Compensation will also include the cost of cleaning, repairing
and replacing material and equipment. 33
Certain conceptual difficulties may arise as to the determination
and delimitation of such costs . As a result of the second Antonio
Gramsci 3 4 incident which occur red on the 6th February, 1987, on
the south coast of Finland, t he Finnish Government incurred
considerable costs carrying out clean-up operations. A maj or part
of the claim submitted by the Finn i s h Government related to the
purchase of equipment and mater ials which were not in fact used
during the clean-up operation . Th e Finnish Government argued that
the total cost of these purchases should be recoverable, under
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, as preventive measures
and therefore falling under t h e definition of pollution damage.
The lOPC Fund did not accept this assertion and adopted the
posit ion that reasonable h ire charges were compensable for
equipment which was actual ly u s e d but which had a considerable
33Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 474 .
34The first Antonio Gramsci i n c i de n t occurred off Sweden
on 27th February, 1979 .
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remaining value after the completion of the operations. Stand-by
rates would be paid as compensation for equipment which was not
used but which was reasonably placed on stand-by. After
negotiation the Finnish Government accepted the position advanced
by the IOPC Fund. 3S
7.4.1 Operations at sea
The costs incurred for operations at sea may relate variously to
the use of vessels for applying chemical dispersants, emulsion
breakers, gelling agents, nutrients, burning agents, sorbents,
deploying booms or for skimming.
Chemical dispersants break up surface oil into smaller component
parts which become suspended in the water and diluted by the
turbulent motion of the sea. The dispersion, or more accurately
dilution, of oil into the water helps prevent the formation of
persistent water-in-oil emulsions and residues which are
difficult to recover. 36 The toxicity of modern dispersants is
significantly less than the early formulations as used, for
example, in the Torrey Canyon spill. Nevertheless environmental
concerns are still voiced as to the appropriateness of
application in many instances. It has been suggested that oil
treated with dispersants may have a greater detrimental effect
on some marine biota (and specifically on certain developmental
cycles of marine animals; e.g. fish spawning) than the oil on its
own. In the light of these hazards the use of dispersants is
sometimes limited by local regulations. Accordingly, measures
must be taken within the parameters of such regulation and where
required responders must obtain authorisation for the use of
specific chemicals. 37 Ultimately the decision whether or not to
3SIOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 28.
36 \Use of oil spill dispersants' (1982) The ITOPF Ltd.
Technical Information Paper No .4 at 1.
37Report No.9/81 (1987) A Field Guide to Coastal Oil Spill
Control and Clean-Up Techniques Prepared by CONCAWE'S Oil
Spill Clean-up Technology Special Task Force No.1 at 23-24 and
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use dispersants will be influenced by the circumstances of each
case. Such decisions may even involve exposing certain resources
to possible harm in order to protect a resource of higher
priority. In most cases governmental authorities are best suited
to make the necessary dec i s ions , since the economic and
environmental values to t h e community have to be assessed. 38
The aerial application of oil spill dispersants from helicopters,
as well as single and multi - engined fixed wing aircraft, is an
accepted means for combating o i l spills . Aerial spraying has the
advantage of rapid response and the ability to deliver a
significant quantity of dispersant in a short space of time. 39
However, the cost effectiveness and merit of aerial spraying is
frequently questioned. 40
Aerial reconnaissance and surveillence is also essential for an
effective, efficient and co-ordinated response to oil spills at
sea . 41 For example, at the height of the clean-up operations
carried out as a result of the Kasuga Maru No.l incident, there
were some 13 vessels and four helicopters involved. An estimated
200 tonnes of dispersants were applied, mainly from
helicopters. 42 These catagories of costs are recoverable.
Emulsion breakers are used to b reak-up the water-in-oil emulsions
while gelling agents are chemi cals which when added to oil can
'Use of oil spill dispersants' (1982) The ITOPF Ltd. Technical
Information Paper No.4 at 6- 7.
38'Contingency planning fo r o il spills' (1985) The ITOPF
Ltd. Technical Information Paper No.9 at 2 .
39,Aerial application of o i l spill dispersants' (1982) The
ITOPF Ltd. Technical Information Paper No.3 at 1.
40See for example "Aerial spraying of oil spills 'a waste
of time '" Lloyds List June 23, 1 993 and 'The thick black line'
New Scientist vol.137 No.1858 30 January 1993 at 24.
41 'Aerial observation of oil at sea ' (1981) The ITOPF Ltd.
Technical Information Paper No . 1 a t 1.
42IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 989 , section 12.2 at 36.
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gel the oil into a semi-solid form which can then be more easily
recovered. The addition of nutrients or fertilizer to the area
affected by a spill can facilitate biodegrading of oil by certain
bacteria. The costs of these techniques may be recovered where
reasonably used. The intentional burning of oil from a spill is
seldom a success. 43 However, considerable amounts of oil may be
burned off by spontaneous ignition at the site of the accident,
where the concentrations of oil are high. This phenomenon has
been observed in the Agip Abruzzo, Haven, Mega Borg, Aegean Sea
and Maersk Navigator incidents.
There are many different types of floating barriers or booms
which are used in various ways to combat oil spills.
Generally, booms may enable surface oil to be intercepted,
contained and collected. Surface oil may be collected by skimmer
vessels or other mechanical means once it has been gathered in
greater concentrations by booms. A skimmer is any device designed
to recover oil or oil/water mixtures from the surface of the
water. These devices are most effective where the oil has been
concentrated against a boom or other obstacle such as a weir,
quay, pier or a cliff. 44 Booms may be used to divert or deflect
surface oil to a specific point where it can more easily be
collected. They may be used to contain oil in sheltered areas
where spilled oil has collected naturally. Such action serves to
minimise the extent of the pollution damage, by preventing the
oil from moving should weather conditions change, and also
facilitates the controlled removal of contained oil. The
arrangement of booms around damaged ships to contain the oil in
that immediate vicinity frequently occurs. Booms may be deployed
to deflect surface oil away from, or to protect, sensitive areas
such as fish farms and freshwater inlets for fish farms, lobster
43Report No.9/81 (1987) A Field Guide to Coastal Oil Spill
Control and Clean-Up Techniques Prepared by CONCAWE'S Oil
Spill Clean-up Technology Special Task Force No.1 at 91-92.
44'Use of skimmers in combating oil pollution' (1983) The
ITOPF Ltd. Technical Information Paper No.5 at 1.
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and crab grounds, shell-fish be d s , locations where mariculture
such as sea weed farming is car r ied out, inlets to marshy areas,
sal t marshes and mudflats, estuaries, mangrove swamps, coral
reefs , bird and wildlife sanctuaries, yachting marinas or cooling
water intakes for power stat ions and industry.45 The mechanical
recovery of spilled oil is not v e r y successful, rarely achieveing
a ten per cent retrieval rate . 46
A summary of the important res ourc e s at risk from oil spills
should be contained in a map o f the affected area. These maps
should incluce the location and nature of biological, industrial
and recreational resources . I f s u c h maps do not exist they should
by created as soon as possibl e . As it is seldom possible to
defend all important resource s , decisions to set priority will
be necessary . 47
The salaries of crew, use - value of equipment and cost of
materials will be recoverable .
7.4.2 On-shore operations
In respect of on-shore clean-up, the operations may result in
major costs for personnel and equipment. Extensive manual labour
may be required to collect oil on beaches or to spray cobble
stones, rocks, boulders , clif f s or man-made structures by way of
hot water washing or high p ressure steam washing procedures.
Sorbent boom may be used to contain released oil prior to
collection. It may also be ne c e s s a r y to use dispersants in
certain circumstances. Equipment such as mechanical grabs ,
45See generally, Report No .9/81 (1987 ) A Field Guide to
Coastal Oil Spill Control and Cl e an - Up Techniques Prepared by
CONCAWE'S Oil Spill Clean-up Te chnology Special Task Force
No.1 at 75 -80 and 'Use of booms in combating oil pollution'
(1981) The ITOPF Ltd. Technical Information Paper No.2 .
46 'The thick black l ine ' Ne w Scientist vol.137 No.1858, 30
January 1993 at 24.
47'Contingency planning fo r o i l spills' (1985) The ITOPF
Ltd. Technical Information Pape r No.9 at 2.
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tippers, vacuum trucks and fleets of lorries to transport
collected oil debris to suitable disposal sites will usually be
required. 48 The expense incurred in the rehabilitation of
affected wildlife can also be recovered as it constitutes
pollution damage within the meaning of the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions. For example, in the case of the Amazzone which
occurred off France on 31st January, 1988, a claim for FFr50,949
(£5,300) relating to the cost of cleaning oiled sea-birds, which
was submitted by a private organisation, was accepted in full by
the shipowner's P&l Club. 49
Experience in Europe has shown that where the clean-up sites are
generally accessible and the necessary clean up equipment is
available, it is reasonable to deploy between 500-800 persons per
kilometer (800-1300 persons per mile) of heavily oiled
coastline. 50 Under normal conditions, such manpower will have to
be hired at commercial rates i for example, from construction
companies who may also supply earth-moving equipment. Manpower
may be commissioned for specific tasks by appropriate government
authorities who may choose to make use of the armed forces. 51 In
this context the Norwegian Minister of the Environment, Thorbj e rn
Berntsen, has expressed the view that the Norwegian defence
forces will play a prominent role in both the prevention of and
emergency response to marine oil pollution incidents. It was
pointed out that the defence forces are well suited for these
operations as they are mobile, flexibile, have strong
48See generally, Report No.9/81 (1987) A Field Guide to
Coastal Oil Spill Control and Clean-Up Techniques Prepared by
CONCAWE'S Oil Spill Clean-up Technology Special Task Force
No.1 and 'Shoreline clean-up' (1983) The ITOPF Ltd. Technical
Information Paper No.7.
49IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 37.
50Report No.9/81 (1987) A Field Guide to Coastal Oil Spill
Control and Clean-Up Techniques Prepared by CONCAWE'S Oil
Spill Clean-up Technology Special Task Force No.1 at 61-62.
51Report No.9/81 (1987) A Field Guide to Coastal Oil Spill
Co~trol and Clean-Up Techniques Prepared by CONCAWE'S Oil
Splll Clean-up Technology Special Task Force NO.1 at 26.
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organisational structures, have clear pre-established chains of
command, are accountable and already possess certain useful basic
equipment which can be used in logistic support roles. The
Norwegian defence forces, which are at present responsible for
Norway's Coast Guard service for coastal and offshore
surveillance, are due to become more closely involved in coastal
protection. 52
7.4.3 Calculating costs
The policy of the IOPC Fund is to pay the salaries and allowances
of personnel directly involved in clean-up operations, whether
undertaken by private entities,53 local authority contr-actor-s i "
government aqenc i.es'" or voluntary actors. 56 In most instances
the task of cleaning inshore waters and coastlines falls to port
authorities or local governments.
52L.H. Halvorsen 'Norway tightens green controls' June
1993 Statoil at 14.
53See for example the Vistabella, in IOPC Fund Annual
Report 1992, section 12.2 at 54 where claims for clean-up
costs submitted by the owner of a hotel on Peter Island,
British Virgin Islands, was accepted in full.
54See for example the Agip Abruzzo, in IOPC Fund Annual
Report 1992, section 12.2 at 57 where claims submitted by RTI
Castalia, a contractor, were settled by the IOPC Fund. This
claim related to clean-up operations at sea and the supply of
vessels, booms and skimmers in response to the requirements
laid down by the Livorno Harbour Master.
55For example the IOPC Fund compensated the Coast Guard of
the United Arab Emirates in the Akari incident IOPC Fund
Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 39.
56See for example the Amazzone in the IOPC Fund Annual
Report 1992, section 12.2 at 42 and further the Nestucca in
IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 40 In the latter
case the IOPC Fund Director was compelled to reject the claims
by 12 voluntary workers who participated in the clean-up of
the shores of Vancouver Island. This was because at the time
of the incident Canada was not Party to the Fund Convention.
However the IOPC Fund Director did not reject these claims on
the basis that the actors were voluntary.
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Where clean-up operations involve the use of army and navy
personnel and equipment or other state personnel or equipment the
question arises as to whether compensation should be made for
'additional' as well as 'fixed costs' incurred. The disinction
between these concepts arose i n connection with the Swedish
Government's claims for compensation in the Thuntank 5 incident.
On the 21st December, 1986, the Thuntank 5, a Swedish vessel of
2,866 grt., carrying 5,024 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, ran aground
on the east coast of Sweden . About 150-200 tonnes of oil escaped
and significant pollution damage was suffered by the Swedish
coastline. Extensive clean-up operations were undertaken by the
Swedish Coast Guard and five municipalities affected by the
spill. n Various claims where submitted to the shipowner, the
shipowner's P&l Club and the IOPC Fund. It may be noted that the
cost of certain experimental measures were voluntarily borne by
the Swedish Government. In principle, there is no reason why the
cost of experimental clean-up measures can not be claimed where
such measures are reasonable in the circumstances.
The IOPC Fund took exception to the way in which Swedish
authorities had calculated the costs of certain clean-up
operations. The IOPC Fund argued that the rates charged for the
utilization of oil-combatting vessels owned by Swedish public
authorities and the rates levied for government and and municipal
personnel used in clean-up operations where too high. The Swedish
authorities in question had assessed these amounts according to
fixed tariffs issued by the Swedish Customs Board, as authorized
by Statute. 58 In a previous case, the Jan, which was settled
under the provisions of the Civil Liability and Fund Convention,
a similar dispute had also arisen in respect of the tariffs
applied by Danish Authorities. 59
57IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 23.
58IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 25-26.
59IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988 , section 12.2 at 38.
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The grounds upon which the ropc Fund questioned the
appropriateness of these costs was that certain items claimed for
related partly to 'fixed costs' (which would have been incurred
even if the incident had not happened) and not 'additional
costs', which constitute expenses incurred solely as a result of
the incident (which would not have arisen had the incident, and
the operations relating thereto, not taken place) .60 For
example, in respect of personnel permanently employed by public
authorities, costs of overtime allowances, additional allowances
for heavy duties and travel costs attributable to an oil spill
are recognised additional costs . By contrast, the normal salaries
of such personnel are considered as fixed costS. 61 rn this case
the ropc Fund and the Swedish authorities reached an agreement
as to an acceptable rate. The challenge to the Swedish claims
based on fixed costs is in keeping with the policy decision
adopted by the ropc Fund Assembly in October 1988, which stressed
the necessity of following a restrictive approach to the
admissibility of claims for fixed costS. 62
Since 1981 it has been established that additional costs are
always recoverable under the Civil Liability and the Fund
Conventions. Furthermore, a reasonable proportion of fixed costs
is also recoverable under the Conventions where these costs
correspond closely to the clean-up period in question and do not
include remote overhead charges. 63
Australia is party to the Civil Liability Convention but has not
yet agreed to become party to the Fund Convention. Nevertheless,
it is noteworthy that this method of assessing clean-up costs has
6°IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 25.
61IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 988 , section 13.4 (d) at 59.
62IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13 .4 (d ) at 60.
63IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 988 , section 13.4 (d) at 59-60.
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been used by the Australian Courts. 64 The United States Court of
Appeals also had to consider this issue in the Amoco Cadiz case,
where France and certain French Municipalities had claimed the
expense of salaries and equipment utilized during the clean-up
operations. They had not claimed the costs of holding men and
material at the ready. The Appeal Court held that the court a quo
had erred in deducting certain operational costs which would have
been incurred by the French authorities even if the spill had not
occurred. The Appeal Court held that under French law, the
government was entitled to recover the full expense of salaries
and equipment involved in the c lean-up.65 From the general tenor
of the Appeal Judge's comments on this issue, it seems quite
likely that, had the French claimants claimed certain standing
costs, these costs may also have been awarded.
The motivation for adopting this policy under the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions was primarily economic self-interest rather
than considerations of equity. Initially, the Working Group
considering this issue erroneously adopted the view that the P&I
Clubs and the IOPC Fund could rely on private firms to undertake
clean-up operations and that in this way fixed costs would not
be incorporated in the cost of the clean-up. At the same time,
it was recognised that where private clean-up operations were
utilized, additional costs would be much higher. Indeed this
could be unavoidable because private contractors would inevitably
and necessarily incorporate their fixed and additional costs into
the price exacted from the P&I Clubs and the IOPC Fund and,
furthermore, include a signif icant profit margin. There is, of
course, the possibility of this additional expense being off-set
by greater efficiency.
This hypothesis is substantiated if one draws parallels with the
64Mari time Services Board of New South Wales v. Poseidon
Naviga tion Inc. (The "Stol t Sheaf" and The "World
Encouragement".) [1982] 1 NSWLR 72.
65In the Matter of Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" off the
Coast of France on March 16, 1 9 78 ; 1992 AMC 913 at 951-953.
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costs incurred and charged fo r salvage operations. Where a salvor
uses his vessel, equipment, crew and fuel to rescue a ship in
distress, it is incorrect to maintain that he should only recover
his additional costs. Salvage equipment must be purchased and
maintained at the ready at a substantial fixed cost. Where such
equipment is used the salvage award or the rates charged must
cover the entire, appropriate f i x e d cost, plus additional costs,
and permit a profit to encourage further salvage operations.
Accordingly it was incorrect to argue that fixed costs could be
avoided by use of private contractors as opposed to use of State
agencies. This fundamental p r inciple of economics was it seems
appreciated by the Working Group since they recognised the
possibility that private responders additional costs could well
be greater than would be the case where the clean-up operations
had been undertaken by State employees with fixed costs
included. 6 6 Presumably this wou ld be the case as State agencies
are not forced to make a prof i t in order to remain in operation.
The final outcome, as already stated, was that a reasonable
proportion of fixed costs wou ld properly be recoverable. Also,
if public authorities were no t compensated for fixed costs
incurred during the clean-up operations, the oil industry in
these states would be in effect , subsidising states which do not
maintain an efficient public f orc e to deal will oil spills. This
is because where a member of the I OPC Fund does not maintain such
capabili ty, probably more expensive private contractors will have
to be utilized. Contributions t o meet this added cost will be
made from all Party States.
The Working Group considered t h a t the policy of reimbursing
certain fixed costs served the l ong term interests of both the
P&l Clubs and the IOPC Fund , as well as the State suffering
pollution because this pol icy would encourage party states to
continue the upkeep of a response force capable of responding
quickly and economically to an oil spill. It is worth emphasising
66IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 988, section 13.4 (d) at 60 .
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again, however, that the ropc Fund Assembly at present follows
a policy decision to adhere to a restrictive approach to fixed
costS. 67
Despite the statements of policy issued by the ropc Fund, the
final decision as to the extent of fixed costs recoverable will
be made by the courts of the state in which the pollution damage
was sustained. Such courts could well consider the claims of
their own governments more favourably than the concerns of the
ropc Fund and the p&r Clubs to keep liability levels within
manageable levels. The courts should also be aware that an
interdependant relationship exists between the compensation
regimes and the victims of oil pollution. Nevertheless, the
compensation regimes have to avoid being seen as unwilling to
compensate legitimate kinds of damage which are considered
equitable in the eyes of the public and goverment. Where such a
perception becomes "main-stream", the compensation regimes will
tend to loose legitimacy and fail. The response will very
probably be the enactment of relatively draconian, unilateral
domestic legislation. Here, the claims environment would become
more hostile and probably less predictable than is the case under
the regimes. This is not a desirable situation from the
perspective of shipowners or oil shippers, which is partly why
the ropc Fund is generally willing to take a fairly lenient view
in settling claims for pollution damage.
As previously discussed, the oil industry, through the ropc Fund
has as at the 31st December, 1993, paid an amount of £67 million
for pollution damage caused in Fund Convention States and by way
of providing indemnification to shipowners. 68 This represents
nearly fifteen years of quite frequent heavy oil pollution and
with a large part of the transportation of oil in comparatively
low quality, cheaply constructed and operated tankers. rn other
words the amount of compensation paid through the ropc Fund could
67IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.4 (d) at 60.
68IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.1 at 22.
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be viewed as a very good "investment" from the perspective of oil
companies. Such compensation serves in part as a palliative to
appease governments and an unsympathetic public and restrain
these groups from adopting measures which they would very
probably be forced to take if such compensation were not
available. Harsher measures and more widely defined damages would
inevitably increase the cost of carrying oil at sea. The fact
that the oil companies greatly benefit from the existance of the
compensation regimes and the continuation of the status quo is
well illustrated by the wide support given to these regimes by
the oil industry. For example, when making recommendations for
more greater state supervision of tankers at a European
Commission on tanker safety, Shell International Marine Ltd. also
strongly urged European States to quickly ratify the 1992
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and
emphasised speed of payments under the IOPC Fund. 69 On the other
hand the courts are often reluctant to extend the parameters of
compensation theoretically available under the Conventions for
fear of placing the two tier compensation system under
significant financial stress.
7.4.4 Disposal operations
The large volumes of material requiring disposal following clean-
up operations often result in substantial storage, transportation
and disposal costs. For example, approximately 25,000 cubic
metres of collected oily waste had to be disposed as a result of
the Haven spill. In addition, some 20,000 metres of contaminated
booms had to be cleaned or disposed of. 70 Booms cost between £50
to £200 per metre so the cost in lost booming could be
considerable. 71 These costs are recoverable as pollution damage,
69 0 '1~ & Gas Journal Feb. I, 1993 at 18. See also Oil & Gas
Journal Dec. 14 , 1992 at 24 .
70IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 61.
71'The thick black line' New Scientist vol.137 No.1858 30
January 1993 at 24.
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but, because numerous options for the separation and disposal of
oil and debris exist, the question may arise whether the method
of disposal utilized was reasonable.
The most common form of disposal is dumping at designated
landfill sites. Materials intended for direct dumping should have
a maximum oil content of about 20 per cent. Precautions should
be taken to ensure that ground water is not contaminated.
Landfill sites can vary in cost from US$3 per tonne of oily waste
to as much as US$100 per tonne, depending on the type and
sophistication of the site. Sometimes oil and sand mixtures are
stabilized through the addition of binding agents. The resulting
substance can be disposed of under less stringent conditions
because the procedure forms an inert substance from which oil is
unlikely to leach. It is also possible to use such substances in
road construction. Oil has also been disposed of by burning and
biodegradation. 72 Difficulties may arise in obtaining
administrative authorization for certain disposal operations. For
instance in the Rio Orinoco case, about 300 tonnes of oily waste
was recovered during clean-up operations carried out in autumn
of 1990. It proved impossible to obtain permission from the local
authorities for disposal within the Province of Quebec. After the
disposal operations had been put out to tender, the waste was
exported to disposal facilities in the United States. 73
When a claim for costs of preventive measures and clean-up
operations is made under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
it should include the following information.
'(a) Delineation of the area affected describing the extent
of pollution and identifying those areas which were most
heavily contaminated. This should be presented in the form
of a map or nautical chart, supported by photographs or
72'Disposal of oil and debris' (1984) The ITOPF Ltd.
Technical Information Paper No.8.
73IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 48.
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video tapes.
(b) Analytical and/or other evidence linking the oil
pollution with the tanker involved in the incident (eg
chemical analysis of oil samples,74 relevant wind, tide and
current data, observation and plotting of floating oil
movements) .
(c) Summary of events, including a description of the work
carried out at sea, in coastal waters and on shore,
together with an explanation of why the various working
methods were selected.
(d) Dates on which work was carried out.
(e) labour costs (number and categories of response
personnel, regular or overtime rates of pay, hours or days
worked, other costs) .
(f) Travel, accommodation and living costs for response
personnel.
(g) Equipment costs (types of equipment used, rate of hire
or cost of purchase, quantity used, over what period)
(h) Consumable materials (de s c r i p t i on , quantity, unit cost
and where used) .
(i) In respect of purchased equipment and materials, any
remaining value at the end of the operations.
(j) In respect of equipment not purchased for the incident
in question, the age of the items. 7S
(k) Transport costs (number and types of vehicles, vessels
or aircraft used, number of hours or days operated, rate of
740'Donovan 'Presentation and Handling of Claims for Oil
Pollution Damage' at 25 contained in Oil Pollution Claims,
Liability & Environmental Concerns International Business
Communications Ltd. Conferences Documentation 3-4 November,
1992 London; makes the following important point:
'If English law is applicable, it may be possible to invoke
the jurisdiction of the Court to order the taking of samples
under ~SC Ord. 29 r.3 (see e.g. the "Erikoussa" LMLN 131, the
"Othonl" - unreported and , more recently, the reported
decision of Sheen J. in The "MARE DEL NORD" [1990] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 40 . '
7spresumably this is to enable the estimation of
depreciation costs.
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hire or operating cost) .
(1) Cost of temporary storage (if applicable) and of final
disposal of recovered oil and oily material.'76
In relation the categories of information described in points
(c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (k) and (1) above, it is suggested
that: ' .,. scrupulous records should be kept - preferably in the
form of a log - so that individual items of claim can be linked
to action taken in specific areas and, on separate work sites,
separate logs should be kept to record this information. The
imperative need is to link the action taken to the resulting
costs. ,77
7.5 Proprietary damage
The general principle that a victim of a tort or delict shall be
restored to the same position that he had enjoyed before the tort
or delict occurred, and that he will be compensated for his
losses, has been recognised in all jurisdictions where
controversies under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions may
be entertained. 78 The definition of pollution damage contained
in Article 1.6 of the Civil Liability Convention (which is also
incorporated by reference into the Fund Convention by Article 1.2
of that Convention) refers to 'loss or damage caused outside the
ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or
discharge of oil from the ship' .
This indicates that more than just physical damage caused by
contamination is admissible. 79 The use of the word 'resulting'
as opposed to 'caused' seems to support the argument that the
authors of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions wanted to
76IOPC Fund Claims Manual 2nd ed. (1990) section 7.2 at
p.5
770'Donovan (1992), op C1.t, 25-26.
78Jacobsson & Trotz, op ci t, 471.
79Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 209 para.10-50.
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include consequential damages. Accordingly, claims for direct
physical damage and claims for consequential loss are in
principle admissible. Under the Civil Liability and the Fund
Conventions, restitution is made by providing compensation in
money for the reduction in value of property, for necessary costs
of repairs owing to contamination, as well as consequential
losses incurred as a result of such contamination.
In principle, it seems that all legal systems recognise the
recoverability of consequential loss. However, a diversity of
jurisprudential traditions apply in the various States in which
claims under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions may be
decided. The admissibility of consequential losses may vary
according to whether the principles of forseeability, remoteness
and causation are widely or narrowly construed in anyone
Contracting State. Who mayor may not have locus standi to bring
an action under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and the
method of quantifying damage will also be decided by the courts
of the lex fori and as such no uniform approach can be
identified. 80
It must be recognized that the system of compensation under the
Civil Liability and Fund Convention does not purport to provide
full restitution to victims of oil pollution. Firstly, the level
of compensation under these regimes is limited to an upper
ceiling. Once this ceiling is reached, all excess damage shall
remain uncompensated unless the injured party can recover from
a responsible party who is not a registered owner or an agent or
servant of the owner. Clearly where the incident was caused by
the actual fault or privity of the registered owner, the
shipowner will not be entitled to limit his liability under the
Civil Liability Convention and further claims may be brought
against him. Secondly, although consequential loss is usually
recoverable by claimants having a proprietary interest in
property which sustains actual physical damage by contamination,
80Ab ' hecassls & Jaras ow,
Trotz, op cit, 471.
op cit 209 para.lO-50; Jacobsson &
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the same is not always true for claimants who suffer economic
loss unconnected to actual physical damage to a proprietary
interest held by them. The admissibility of claims under the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions for so-called "pure economic
loss" are discussed in a separate section below. Thirdly, certain
categories of damage in which no one is said to have a
proprietary interest are not recoverable. This problem arises in
connection with damage to the environment and aesthetic
depreciation of the environment and amenities caused by oil
contamination. This issue is also discussed separately. Fourthly,
where the shipowner and the IOPC Fund is able to invoke one (or
a combination of) the absolute defences successfully, liability
will not be due under the respective Conventions. Fifthly, the
Conventions may not cover all forms of damage which may derive
from persistent oil carried at sea. For example it has been
suggested that the term "contamination" as used in the definition
of pollution in the Civil Liability and Fund Convention was
chosen with the specific purpose of excluding the recovery of
damage caused by fire or explosions of persistent oil carried at
sea in bulk as cargo. 81 Nevertheless, claims for death or injury
of workers and and loss or damage to equipment sustained during
"preventive measures" as defined in the Conventions, are
admissible even where caused by fire, explosion or other
accidents which could not be described as contamination. It has
already been illustrated how pure threat preventive measures are
not admissible.
It has also been suggested that damage caused by soot and smoke
which emanates from a burning tanker or from burning surface oil
spilled by a tanker is not covered by either the Civil Liability
or Fund Convention. The basis for this view is that soot or smoke
damage is not damage caused by oil contamination. 82 This view
would not seem to be supported by the wording of the definition
. 81~00d. '~ !ntegrated International and Domestic Approach
to C1Vl1 Llabl1lty for Vessel-source Oil Pollution' 7 (1975)
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1 at 28-29.
82Ab' hecaSS1S & Jaras ow, op cit, 208-9 paragraphs 10-49/50.
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of "pollution damage" contained in Article I. 6 of the Civil
Liability Convention. Nowhere in either the Civil Liability or
Fund Conventions is it stipulated that pollution damage must be
caused by actual oil-contamination in order for such damage to
be admissible. Article I. 6 of the Civil Liability Convention
merely provides that contamination must result from the escape
of oil from the ship and does not stipulate that there must be
an escape of oil in the form of oil. By definition when a given
quantity of oil inside a ship burns into the atmosphere, oil has
escaped from the ship. Accordingly, all types of contamination
caused by that escape should be admissible as "pollution damage" .
Furthermore, contamination is a general term which does not
specifically refer to pollution or infection by liquids. For
example, the term may refer to contamination by radioactive
substances or clouds of radioactive smoke. The question of
whether damage caused by smoke is admissible has been settled by
the Aegean Sea incident. Here, on the 3rd December, 1992, the
Aegean Sea grounded on the North-Western coast of Spain, broke
in two and burned fiercely for about twenty-four hours. A number
of houses were contaminated by smoke generated by the burning
oil. One hundered and ninety-four claims for the expense of
cleaning these houses were approved by the lOPC Fund for a total
of Pts 30,470,229 (£145,096) .83
Contamination by oil-sourced smoke or soot may, besides causing
extensive property damage, also have a bearing on claims for
injury or death. A study conducted by Dr Parris Georghiou, a
chemist at the university of Newfoundland, determined that in
general those components of crude oil which cause mutations in
cells and hence genetic damage have a greater propensity to cause
genetic harm after burning. 84
Oil spills may result in damage to property by, for example,
contaminating fishing boats and fishing equipment, yachts,
83IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 49.
84The Economist August 26, 1989 at 85.
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beaches, piers and embankments. In the Volgoneft 263 a Swedish
fisherman sustained significant damage when 400 of his salmon
nets and the deck of his fishing boat became contaminated by oil.
In this instance, in order to mitigate undue financial hardship
to the fisherman, the IOPC Fund made provisional paYments to the
fisherman during June and August 1990 amounting to SKr442,890
(£41,047). The fisherman's final claim amounted to Skr530,239
(£49,157) and was accepted in full; the balance being paid in
September 1990. 85
The IOPC Fund accepts the cost of cleaning polluted property. For
example, in the Haven incident, oil entered a marina in Arenzano,
resulting in the oiling of moorings, harbour walls and about 130
yachts and fishing boats. Smaller quantities of oil entered a
marina at Varazze and approximately 200 boats became polluted.
Subsequently, the owners of 33 yachts and 150 fishing boats
claimed compensation under the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions, for contamination of their boats, in the amounts of
Llt168,143,771
respectively. 86
(£77,000) and Llt1,264,303,328 (£579,000),
If the polluted property cannot be cleaned, the IOPC Fund
compensates the cost of replacement, subject to deduction for
wear and tear. 87 When claims are submitted for the replacement
and repair costs the following details should be included.
\ (a) Extent of pollution damage to property.
(b) Description of items destroyed, damaged or needing
replacement, repair or cleaning (eg boats, fishing gear,
roads, clothing.
(c) Cost of repair work, cleaning or replacement of items.
(d) Age of items to be replaced.
(e) Cost of restoration after clean-up, such as repair of
85IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 12.2 at 47.
86IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 60, 64.
87Jacobsson & Trotz, op ci t., 474.
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roads, piers and embankments damaged by the clean-up
operations. ,88
The definition of \ "pollution damage" includes the costs of
preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by
preventive measures.' For example, measures taken to combat an
oil spill may cause damage to roads, piers and embankments.
Reasonable costs for necessary repairs of such property are
accepted by the ropc Fund. For example, in the Tanio incident,
the ropc Fund settled claims made by local authorities for damage
to roads caused by the heavy traffic that the clean-up operation
produced. 89 Clearly, in some cases, complex questions of
remoteness may arise. For example, a claim for damage caused by
a traffic accident occurring during clean-up operations was
rej ected because the loss did not result directly from the
incident in question. 90 Damage caused by the contamination of
ground water caused by the inappropriate disposal of oily waste
at land-fills will, however, be admissible. Where oily waste is
disposed through controlled incineration and damage is caused by
smoke or soot, such damage will, also, be admissible.
7.5.1 Loss of life and personal injury
Claims for loss of life and personal injury claims will be
admissible where they occur as a result of contamination. For
example if people get sick due to contact with or breathing fine
particles of persistent oil carried from a spill by high winds,
their costs and damages will be recoverable. Clean-up workers who
are exposed to the various components of crude oil may be
particularly susceptible to adverse side effects. That such
claims could arise is by no means impossible. Research indicates
that exposure to oil fumes (and especially the more harmful
88IOPC Fund Claims Manual 2nd ed. (1990) section 7.3 at
p.5
89IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.2 at 11.
90Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 474.
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benzene components) can cause mutations in cells and lead to
certain cancers. 91 The IOPC Fund has had limited experience in
respect of claims for personal injury and death but in one case
paid the costs of necessary medical treatment of personnel who
had been involved in clean-up operations. 92 Where salvors die or
are injured in the process of attempting to prevent oil pollution
damage, these claims will in principle be admissible. Clean-up
personnel who suffer injury or die accidentally during such
operation will also be in a position to receive compensation . For
example, a clean-up worker lost his life during clean-up
operations in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. He was
on board a supply-ship's dumb waiter when a hatch was closed at
the top crushing him to death . 93
The cost of oil pollution can not always only be measured in
purely financial terms or by the extent that damage is caused to
the environment because in this particular instance the spill
also took a life.
7.5.2 Pure economic loss and remoteness of damage
Generally speaking, there has often been a reluctance to permit
claims where the damage complained of is purely ecomomic in
nature and unrelated to actual physical damage to a proprietery
interest of a claimant. Of course, it is very unlikely that the
national courts of the countries where claims for pure economic
loss may be brought under the provisions of the Civil Liability
and Fund Conventions will treat this issue in a uniform manner.
There are as yet no firmly fixed rules as to what types of claims
for economic loss are admissible. Each case has to be considered
of the surrounding
It may be expected
a normative effect
contextthewithinandmeritsits
circumstances in each particular incident.
that the practice of the IOPC Fund may have
on
91The Economist August 26, 1989 at 85.
92Jacobsson & Trotz, op ci t, 471.
93The Economist August 26, 1989 at 85.
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upon the diverse legal systems in which it operates.
For example, the IOPC Fund regards economic loss suffered by
those who depend directly on earnings from coastal or sea-related
activities is recoverable even though such claimants do not
strictly possess proprietary rights in the ocean or its
resources. 9 4 However, compensation under the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions may only be made according to the provisions of
those Conventions. The definition of oil pollution damage
specifically covers 'loss or damage caused by contamination'. In
this regard, the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund has
expressed the view that a causal link must exist between the
claim for damage or loss and the alleged contamination by oil. 9 5
This statement brings into issue the degree of remoteness of
damage required.
7.5.2.1 Fisher.mens' claims for economic loss
Although it has not always been the case, fishermen are now
increasingly viewed as a favoured class of claimants in cases of
marine pollution, and their claims for loss of earnings are
usually considered sympathetically under most jurisdictions.
Where such claimants are able to prove economic loss it is
usually compensated by the IOPC Fund. Where a fishing ground
becomes contaminated by oil, fishing may be impossible in that
area until the oil is cleaned-up or dissipates. This sometimes
results in considerable economic loss to fishermen who do not
have access to alternative fishing grounds. Also, where fishing
equipment has been contaminated by oil, fishermen may suffer
damage through lost catches while restoring equipment or until
new equipment can be obtained. In the Thunktank incident, a
situation arose where certain Swedish fishermen refused to fish
because they feared that, by doing so, they would risk fouling
94General Information on Liability and Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage IOPC Fund , February 1992 at 13.
95IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 41.
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their fishing boats and nets, thereby incurring damages. By not
fishing, the fishermen were behaving in a way which would give
rise to claims for economic loss under the Conventions. When the
fishermen resumed fishing certain equipment was in fact
damaged. 96 Where, however, a refusal to fish is unreasonable in
the circumstances claims made by fishermen in terms of the
Conventions will be inadmissible .
In Japan, members of fishery co-operative associations are
endowed with a legally recognized right to fish within
specifically designated fishing grounds. Such rights, in effect,
confer a group proprietary interest upon the marine resources of
a particular area . 97 In December 1989 as a result the Kasuga
Maru No.l incident the IOPC Fund paid four Japanese fishery co-
operative associations an amount of Y53,500,000 (£230,850). This
was in settlement of claims which related mainly to loss of
income incurred during a certain period during which oil
emanating from the Kasuga Maru No.l prevented fishing. 98
7.5.2.2 Fishing restrictions and destruction of marine produce
Where spills occur, local or national authorities may expressly
prohibit fishing and related activities from being undertaken in
the area.
For example, as an immediate response to the Aegean Sea incident,
the Spanish Government declared a fishing ban over the near shore
waters and the shoreline in the vicinity of the spill. In this
area, over 2,500 fishermen who were licensed to collect clams,
cockles, sea urchins and goose barnacles, suffered a loss of
revenue as the ban on fishing extended to the gathering of all
96IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 98 7 , section 9.12 at 28-29.
97Jacobsson & Trotz, op ci t, 477.
98IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 37.
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edible marine resources, not only fish. 99 Two observations may
be made regarding the granting of licences to exploit the marine
resources of the affected area. Firstly, the regional government
of Galicia had granted the licences to thirteen local fishermens'
unions which in turn issued the licences to individual fishermen.
Secondly, the unions negotiate the settlement of claims on behalf
of their members through the joint claims office of the P&l Club
and the IOPC Fund. In this case the IOPC Fund also decided that
it would compensate claimants who exploited marine resources
without a licence to do so .100
A dispute also arose regarding the destruction of cultivated
mussels, salmon, oysters and scallops which were being cultivated
in an area polluted by the Aegean Sea spill. The Fisheries
Council of Galicia ordered the entire destruction of these
categories of mariculture in that area. The IOPC Fund, the
shipowner and the shipowner's P&l insurer obj ected to the blanket
destruction of these products. Such draconian measures were, in
their view, unnecessary and therefore unjustifiable. Despite
these objections total destruction was in fact carried out. 1 01
In another case, that of the Braer, which on the 5th January,
1993, ran aground on the west coast of the Shetland Islands,
resulting in a serious spill, an exclusion zone was declared in
the area affected by the spill. The exclusion zone prohibited the
... capture, harvest and sale of all fish and shellfish species
from within the zone.' 102 Compensation has been made under the
provisions of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions to
fishermen who normally fished within this area but were prevented
from doing so due to the ban. The IOPC Fund and the shipowner's
P&l Insurer have also agreed to pay £7,175,470 in compensation
99IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 77.
1ooIOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 49.
101IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 50.
102 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 58.
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for the slaughter and disposal of salmon farmed in cages within
the exclusion zone but which had not been harvestered prior to
the pollution incident. 103
Where fishing prohibitions or the destruction of marine produce
are reasonable in the surrounding circumstances, the IOPC Fund
will pay such claims and will have no right of recourse against
the authorities or private organizations implementing such
measures.
7.5.2.3 Fishing related industries
In the Aegean Sea incident the Executive Committee of the IOPC
Fund accepted in principle the admissibility of claims brought
by self-employed fish porters who allegedly lost oportunities to
unload fishing boats as a result of the spill. In the view of the
IOPC Fund this category of ecomomic loss was recoverable since
the activities of fish porters were integral to the fishing
industry in the polluted area. 104 By contrast the IOPC Fund
declined to accept the losses allegedly suffered by employees at
fish farms and fish processing plants due to the reduction of
emploYment within those industries. The IOPC Fund took the view
that these losses were not directly attributable to contamination
by oil because 'the losses of the employees were the result of
their employers being affected by the consequences of the
spill' .105 This policy is difficult to support. The different
approaches adopted by the IOPC Fund concerning the distinction
between self-employed fish porters and employed workers seems
artificial and unnecessarily rigid. Clearly, courts of the lex
fori could justifiably extend the notion of pollution damage to
incompass the claims of employed workers in contradiction of the
policy of the IOPC Fund.
103 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 59.
104IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 52-53.
105IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 53.
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7.5.2.4 Loss of income to tourist activities
In the Tanio incident the IOPC Fund paid compensation to local
authorities for the loss of earnings of municipal camping
sites. 106 Claims for loss of earnings suffered by hoteliers,
restaurateurs and shop-owners at seaside resorts are also in
principle admissible under the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions. 107
In most instances such claimants will not sustain direct
contamination of their businesses by oil. Nevertheless pure
economic loss to business is often alleged. The approach adopted
by the IOPC Fund to determine the admissibility of these
catagories of claims has been to ascertain whether or not a
causal link between the loss alleged and the act of contamination
actually exists. For example, in the Haven case the Executive
Committee of the IOPC Fund decided that the reduction in income
caused to the operators of beach facilities, owners of hotels,
restaurants and shops located along the Italian Coast from Genoa
to the French border should as a matter of principle be
admissible even though these establishments had not been directly
affected by the oil spill. In amplification of this principle the
Executive Committee also stated that where a causal link was
established between the contamination of beaches and the
reduction of tourist trade in any particular town or village, the
negative impact would probably affect all establishments of the
same kind in the locality irrespective of the particular position
of individual businesses in that 10cality.108
7.5.2.5 Establishing economic loss in fishing and tourist cases
106IOPC Fund Annual Report 1987, section 9.2 at 11.
107The Tanio case, (FUND/EXC. 10 /WP. 1, paragraph 3. 1) ;
~ee,also, , c omme n t a r y on claims settlement in the Aegean Sea
lncldent In IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 52.
108IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 41.
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With respect to claims for economic loss allegedly suffered by
the tourist industry and fishermen as a result of the Patmos
incident, the Executive Committee of the ropc Fund expressed the
opinion that compensation in respect of such damage could only
be claimed by each individual person having suffered the damage
who, in addition, was able to prove the amount of economic loss
sustained. l09 Fishermen and owners of other businesess affected
by marine oil pollution often face considerable difficulty
establishing the validity and amount of their damages. llo
A method through which the quantum of loss suffered by a claimant
may be assessed is by a comparison with earnings during a
comparable period of time in previous years. Any variables such
as investments made by the claimant prior to the incident to
expand his operations must, also, be taken into account. Where
some time has elapsed since the damage was alleged to have been
suffered, it may be possible to compare the claimant's income
during an appropriate period some years after the incident. l ll
For example, in the case of the Showa Maru which occurred off
Japan on the 9th January, 1980, over 3,000 nets in an important
seaweed farming area were polluted requiring cleaning or
replacement and fishermen lost earnings because polluted seaweed
could not be sold. The fishery claims of ¥184 million were
eventually agreed at ¥100 million (£225,000). The loss of income
109IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 30.
110rn the IOPC Fund Claims Manual 2nd ed. (1990) section
7.4 at 6 the ropc Fund advises claimants claiming for economic
loss to include the following basic information in their
claims:
\ (a) nature of loss, including proof that the alleged
loss resulted directly form the incident.
(b) Comparative figures for earnings in previous periods
and during the period when economic loss was suffered.
(c) Comparison with similar areas outside the areas
affected by the oil spill .
(d) Method of assessment of loss.'
lllJacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 478.
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was assessed on the basis of a comparison of the harvests of
polluted farms with those of unaffected adjacent farms and
. l' d 112 An drecords of preva.ous years were a so exarru.ne . y save
overheads or other normal expenses not incurred as a result of
the incident must be subtracted in the claims calculation.
Furthermore, where a claimant has received any extra income as
a result of the incident, this should be indicated. For example,
information should be given of any proceeds from the sale of
recovered oil. Similarly, a llowance should be made for income
earned as a result of the incident, for instance, by fishermen
through employment in the clean-up operations. 1 13 This reasoning
may not be readily endorsed by the courts of the State where the
damage was done.
7.5.2.6 Costs of measures taken to mitigate pure ecomomic loss
Recently a new type of claim for oil pollution damage has been
brought under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. Claimants
in communities damaged by oil spills have claimed compensation
for the cost of measures undertaken to counter the negative
public perception created of their regions attributable to an oil
spill. In October, 1993, the Executive Committee considered this
issue and decided that measures taken to prevent or mitigate pure
economic loss should be admissible as preventive measures
provided that they satisfied four preconditions.
'(a) the costs of the proposed measures were reasonable;
(b) the costs of the measures were not disproportionate to
the further damage or loss that they were intended to
mitigate;
(c) the measures were appropriate and offered a
reasonable prospect of being successful; and
(d) in the case of a marketing campaign, the measures
112IOPC Fund Annual Repor t 1 988 , section 13.5 at 66.
113IOPC Fund Claims Manual 2nd ed. (1990) section 7.4 at
6 .
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related to actual targeted markets.,lU
Furthermore, the Executive Committee has adopted the position
that the IOPC Fund should only consider the actual merits and
quantum of such claims once the preventive measures have been
carried out. 115 In circumstances where claimants did not,
however, possess the financial resouces to undertake such
measures the IOPC Fund may in its discretion make funds
available. 116
In two recent cases this problem has been considered. In the
Haven case the City of Cannes (France) claimed damages under the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions relating to costs incurred
by the City for publicity to counter damage caused by the Haven
spill to the reputation of the City as a tourist resort. The
Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund did not approve this claim
since in its view the claimants had not established that the
Haven spill had damaged the touristic reputation of Cannes. 117
By contrast, in the Braer case, the IOPC Fund gave favourable
consideration to three Associations which undertook a publicity
campain to counter the negative effect that the Braer oil spill
had had on the reputation of Shetland Island fish products. The
IOPC Fund also advanced funds to enable these Associations to
carry out the proposed campain. The IOPC Fund is also considering
the admissibility of a proposed five-year £3,395,800 publicity
campain launched by Shetland Island Tourism, a tourist industry
interest group, which is envisaged will counter the negative
effect of the Braer spill on tourism in the area. 118 In such
cases the actual effect of advertising could be relevant to the
114IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 63.
115Hence the past-tense construction of the of the four-
pronged test cited above.
116 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 63.
117 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 42.
118IOPC Fund Annual Report 1993, section 12.2 at 63-64.
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admissibility of this catagory of damage.
7.5.3.7 Other catagories of pure economic loss
Claims for pure economic loss do not relate to fishing and
tourist activities in all instances. For instance, in the Patmos
incident, the IOPC Fund reached an out-of-court settlement with
the owner of a Libyan vessel who had claimed compensation for
loss resulting from that vessel having to be moved from its
shipyard in the port of Messina to a shipyard in Palermo in order
to make room available for undertaking emergency repairs to the
Pa tmos at the port of Messina. 119 Claims for economic loss
suffered as a result of the closure of coastal industrial or
processing installations due to an oil spill are, in principle,
admissible under the Civil Liability and Fund Convention. 120
Compensation for costs incurred for pre-spill preventive measures
are not admissible under either the Civil Liability or Fund
Conventions. This rule will also apply to pure economic loss
incurred during pure threat removal measures.
5.7.3 Environmental loss
Noting that under the Civil Liability Convention, a claim for
ecological pollution damage, based on a theoretical model, had
been raised against a shipowner, the IOPC Fund Assembly
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 3, in October 1980, which
confirmed its intention that: the assessment of
compensation to be paid by the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund is not to be made on the basis of an abstract
quantification of damage calculated in accordance with
theoretical models.,ul
6 .
119IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 12.2 at 35.
120IOPC Fund Claims Manual 2nd ed. (1990) section 7.4 at
121IOPC Fund Statistics 1 October 1992 at 8.
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Claims for "non-economic" environmental damages, such as those
based on calculations according to "theoretical models", are not
as yet accepted, in principle, by the lOPC Fund. This is a
particularly complex and controversial issue and is by no means
settled. This issue is discussed in more detail below, where it
is shown that the policy adopted by the lOPC Fund cannot in
practice preclude such claims under the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions.
The incident which brought about the adoption of this resolution
was that of the Antonio Gramsci which occurred in the territorial
sea of the former USSR on 27th February, 1979. Here the Antonio
Gramsci, a 27,694 grt. tanker registered in the USSR, grounded
in the Baltic sea, spilling about 5,500 tonnes of crude oil.
Pollution damage was sustained in Sweden, the USSR, and Finland.
At the time of the incident, Sweden was party to the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. Accordingly, second-tier
compensation from the lOPC Fund was available to cover pollution
damage in the territory and territorial sea of Sweden. The USSR
was only party to the Civil Liability Convention and Finland was
party to neither the Civil Liability nor Fund Convention. The
Swedish Government claimed an amount of SKrl12 million (£10
million) in the City Court of Stockholm against the shipowner and
the lOPC Fund under the provisions of the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions , respectively. Soviet authorities claimed a
total of Rbls48 million (£44 million) in the Soviet Court of
Riga. The amount claimed included a claim for Rbls47 million for
environmental damage claimed by the Soviet Ministry for
Conservation and Control and Utilization of Water. The quantum
of environmental damage had been assessed according to a
mathematical formula known as the "metodika" which had been
incorporated into Soviet Legislation subsequent to the
accident. 1 2 2
U2This legislative act, made by the Minister responsible
for Water Economy, is called METODlKA: Moscow, 10th February,
1981 No.13-5-01/117.
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The "metodika" is a theoretical model which leads to the abstract
quantification of loss according to the following procedure .
Firstly, the quantity of oil s p il l e d is estimated and taken to
disperse into the marine envi ronment at a concentration of 50
parts oil per million water (ppm) . Secondly, the quantity of
water affected is estimated by dividing the quantity of oil
spilled by sOppm. Finally the quantity of affected water derived
is multiplied by an amount per cubic metre read from tables
giving expenses per cubic met re for restoration. 123 The result
is the amount of notional damage inflicted on the State by the
pollution. In this case the amount of damage was calculated at
2 Roubles per cubic metre of polluted water which in total came
to Rbls48 million (£44 million). 124 These claims were accepted
by the Soviet Court of Riga.
As the USSR was not Party to the Fund Convention at the time of
the incident the IOPC Fund was not obliged to provide
compensation for damage sustained in the USSR. Nor was the IOPC
Fund obliged to indemnify the shipowner for any proportion of
compensation paid by him in settlement of claims in the USSR.
Nevertheless, the IOPC Fund was concerned at the quantum and
nature of the Soviet claims under the Civil Liability Convention
because such claims competed with the claims submitted by the
Swedish Government against the shipowner's limitation fund. The
owner of the Antonio Gramsci ha d established a limitation fund
under the Civil Liability Convention in the Court of Riga for an
amount of Rbls2,431,8s4 (£2.2 mi ll ion) and the Soviet claims (£44
million) under the "metodika" a lone were over twenty times this
amount. To the extent that the c l a i ms of the Swedish Government
were not satisfied by the shipowner 's limitation fund because the
fund was exhausted by the Sovie t claims, the Swedish Government
would be forced to recover thei r outstanding losses from the IOPC
Fund. Accordingly, the IOPC Fund was disadvantaged by the
admissibility of the Soviet claims established in terms of the
123Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 209 para.10-SI.
124IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 988 , section 13.5 at 63-64.
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"metodika". The position adopted by the Executive Committee of
the IOPC Fund was that claims based on the "metodika" were not
covered by the notion of "pol lution damage" as defined in the
Civil Liability and Fund Conve n tions in that such claims were not
based on quantifiable losses which could be attributed to a
particular incident. Although t he IOPC Fund notified the Soviet
Authorities of their position on t he issue, the IOPC Fund decided
not to attempt to intercede i n the actual legal proceedings. The
adoption by the IOPC Fund Assembly of Resolution No . 3 was a
direct result of the deliberat ions of the Executive Committee of
the IOPC Fund in relation to t he Antonio Gramsci incident and the
problems raised by the use of t he "metodika" to assess pollution
damage .125
In conclusion, the "metodika" was accepted as a method of
calculating pollution damage in the context of the Civil
Liability Convention. In doing so the Court of Riga effectively
pronounced that claims for pure environmental loss assessed
according to abstract theoret ical models could be admissible
under the Civil Liability Convention where municipal law (ie.
state law) facilitated this p rocedure. It has been pointed out
that the underlying premise fo r t he admissibility of such claims
for compensation for purely environmental damage was that the
Soviet State had proprietory righ t s in nationalized industry,
l a n d and sea encompassed withi n the USSR. In keeping with this
view, the Constitution of the USSR and the civil codes of
particular Soviet Republics , de f ine the territorial sea as State
property. Accordingly, the Soviet State, through the Minister
responsible for Water Economy , h a d the right to claim for the
impairment of the marine environment by pollution. 126 This
precedent could well have caused considerable consternation to
tanker owners and the oil i ndu s t r y in general beyond the ranks
of the IOPC Fund. All industries connected to the transportation
of oil in bulk at sea could conceivably become subject to claims
125IOPC Fund Annual Report 1 9 8 8 ., sectlon 13.5 at 64.
126Brodecki, op ci t, 387.
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for environmental damage which had previously been unquantifiable
and therefore deemed inadmissible.
Following the adoption of Resolution No.3 a Working Group was
assembled to consider whether, and to what extent, claims for
environmental damage should be admissible under the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. The Working Group concluded that,
where a claimant possesses a legal right to claim under national
law and has further suffered quantifiable economic loss,
compensation may be paid. The position adopted by the Working
Group on this issue was endorsed by the Assembly of the ropc Fund
at its 4th session held during September and October of 1981. 127
Notwithstanding such action, it is still conceivable that claims
by governments and other claimants for damage to the environment
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions may be deemed
admissible under municipal law.
Certainly it is true that, if Resolution No .3 had binding force
over all claims submitted under the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions, it would effectively preclude the recovery of non-
economic environmental damage. However, the definition of
pollution damage as it appears in the texts of the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions actually does not preclude the
recovery of damage assessed according to theoretical models.
\ "Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the ship
carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or
discharge of oil from a ship, .. . ' .us The actual interpretation
and delimitation of the notion of pollution damage as defined in
the Conventions is left to the laws of the State in which
disputes regarding the provisions of the Conventions are
entertained. Disputes as to the meaning of any concept used in
the Conventions must be resolved according to the texts of the
Conventions as incorporated in the domestic legislation of the
127IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.4(g) at 61-62;
Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 480 -481 .
12SCivil Liability Convention, Article r. 6 as incorporated
by reference into the Fund Convention, Article 1.2.
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particular State. Accordingly, where the municipal State laws
permit the calculation of damage according to theoretical models
such methodology may in principle be used notwithstanding the
existence of Resolution No.3 as adopted by the Assembly of the
IOPC Fund. The effect of Resolution No.3 is more in the nature
of an important policy guideline and legally does not supercede
or modify the meaning of the original texts of the Conventions
as interpreted by a party State unless such state has
incorporated the resolution into its domestic legislation.
Nevertheless, the policy statement expressed in any resolution
passed by the Assembly of the IOPC Fund will be of significant
persuasive force and domestic courts may be reluctant to go
against the the policy articulated by such resolutions. However,
caution does not always prevail over claimants and judges as has
previously been observed in relation to the decision of the
Italian Court in Genoa to assess the Haven limitation amount
under the Fund Convention in accordance with the Gold Franc and
not the SDR as was the preferred method of conversion contained
in Resolution No.1 passed by the Assembly of the IOPC Fund in
November 1978.
The significance of a statement of policy in the form of a
resolution passed by the Assembly of the IOPC Fund is that, if
a claim is submitted to the IOPC Fund which is founded on an
argument contrary to the position adopted in any resolution, the
IOPC Fund .will not compensate such claim. Furthermore, where the
claimant pursues his claim in the domestic courts where the
damage was sustained, the IOPC Fund will strongly contest such
claims and persevere in most instances until every opportunity
for appeal has been exhausted. The Director of the IOPC Fund will
seldom if ever allow any matter (which is, in his view, a matter
relating to principle) to prevail against the lOPC Fund without
the issue being thoughly contested through the courts. The
knowledge that disputes relating to an important statement of
policy contained in a resolution of the Assembly of the IOPC Fund
will be strongly opposed will often make claimants reluctant to
adopt a position contrary to such policy because such claimants
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will usually be aware that the eventual legal costs will be
considerable and final settlement will inevitably be delayed.
The application of Resolution No. 3 often results in certain
damage going uncompensated. Accordingly, there have been various
attempts made, subsequent to the first Antonio Gramsci incident,
to circumvent the implications of this resolution. In the second
Antonio Gramsci incident, which occurred on 6th February, 1987,
the Antonio Gramsci ran aground on the south coast of Finland
resulting of a spill of about 600-700 tonnes of crude oil.
Pollution damage was sustained in Finland and the USSR. At the
time of the incident Finland was party to the Civil Liability and
the Fund Conventions while the USSR was party only to the Civil
Liability Convention. As was the case in the first Antonio
Gramsci case, a limitation fund was established in the Court of
Riga on behalf of the owner of the Antonio Gramsci for the
purpose of limiting his liability under the Civil Liability
Convention .
Once again the IOPC Fund had an interest in the quantum of claims
accepted under the Civil Liability Convention in the USSR because
the greater the extent of the USSR claims the less Finnish
claimants would be able to recover under the Civil Liability
Convention from the Antonio Gramsci limitation f und . In turn, the
IOPC Fund would be required to compensate a higher amount to the
Finnish claimants. The Soviet Government, through the Estonian
State Committee for Environmental Protection, submitted a claim
for environmental damage . The amount claimed was Rbls712, 200
(£720,200), which had been derived through the application of the
"metodika". In contrast to the methodology used in the first
Antonio Gramsci incident, in this case the assessment of the
damage was linked to the quantity of the oil allegedly recovered
in the territorial waters of the USSR, as opposed to the amount
of oil spilled. The IOPC Fund once again argued against the
application of the "metodika", stating that it was contrary to
the definition of "pollution damage" in the Civil Liability
Convention as interpreted by the IOPC Fund Assembly through
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Resolution No.3. However, the IOPC Fund did not intervene in the
legal procedings in the Court of Riga. The the IOPC Fund and the
shipowner's P&l Club submitted that the quantity of oil collected
in USSR territorial waters was in fact less than the quantity
used for the purpose of the "metodika" calculations and further
that an allowance should be made to reflect the water content of
recovered oil. In the light of these observations, the Estonian
State Committee revised the calculations and reduced the amount
claimed from Rbls712,200 to Rbls436,448 (£441,350). This amount
was accepted by the Court of Riga. 129 It is noteworthy that the
Finnish Government submitted a claim for FM2,146,000 (£329,300)
relating to environmental research. The IOPC Fund objected to
this claim since, in its view, the cost of environmental research
was not an admissible claim under the definition of "pollution
damage" as laid down in the Civil Liability Convention. The
Finnish Government subsequently withdrew this claim. D o
The fundamental point made by the second Antonio Gramsci case is
that the adoption of Resolution No.3 by the IOPC Fund Assembly
failed to preclude the subsequent recovery of environmental
damage assessed by way of abstract quantification and the use of
theoretical models. Therefore in conclusion the courts of the
USSR did not in principle consider the restrictions imposed by
Resolution No. 3 on the recovery of environmental damage as
appropriate. The next forum in which the appropriateness of
Resolution No.3 would be questioned was Italy.
In the Pa tmos Lnc i dent.P", the Italian Government through the
Ministry of Merchant Shipping submitted a claim for environmental
damage under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions for an
amount of LIt20,000 million (£10 million) which was subsequently
reduced to Llt5,000 million (£2.5 million). The claim failed to
129IOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 26-30.
13OIOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 28.
131Italy, 21st March, 1985. The facts surrounding this
incident are described at pg.208 of this work.
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stipulate the nature of the alleged damage caused and also did
not explain how the quantum of damage had been assessed.
Furthermore, no explanation was offered to indicate why the
initial claim had been so substantially reduced. 132 In
accordance with Resolution No. 3, the IOPC Fund adopted the
position that this claim was not covered by the definition of
pollution damage because it related to the abstract
quantification of non-economic environmental damage calculated
in accordance with theoretical models. For this reason the IOPC
Fund considered these claims inadmissible under either the Civil
Liability or Fund Conventions . During proceedings to determine
the admissibility of claims against the shipowner's limitation
fund in the Court of the 1st Civil Division of Messina, the
Italian Government contested the view adopted by the IOPC Fund.
On the 18th February, 1986, the Court of Messina, composed of a
single judge, rejected the admissibility of the Italian claim,
stating that no evidence had been given that ecological damamge
had been caused to the Italian coast or that there was any damage
to the marine fauna. D 3
The saga of the Italian Government claims for environmental
damage did not end with this decision. According to the laws of
civil procedure in Italy, oppositions to the decision of a court
on the admissibility of claims in limitation proceedings may be
brought in the same court . The Italian Government utilized this
opportunity, alleging that the damage sustained to the
environment constituted a violation of the right of sovereignty
over the territorial sea of the Italian State. It has been
suggested that this was an "ingenious" attempt to overcome
difficulties in establishing locus standi which in this case
necessitated that the Government claimants show a legal interest
in the marine environment allegedly damaged before the
institution of legal proceedings would be allowed. In support of
their claims the Government furnished the Court of Messina with
132 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.9 at 17.
133 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.9 at 18.
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the report of an expert who had used abstract models and
theoretical calculations to assess the nature and extent of the
pollution damage allegedly done to the marine environment. 134
The Court of Messina, comprising three judges, rendered its
judgement on the merits of this claim on 30th July, 1986. 135 The
Court held that the rights of sovereignty over the marine
environment enj oyed by the Italian Government could not be
equated with the right of ownership and accordingly could not be
violated by acts of private subjects.
'The Ministry of Merchant Shipping has also claimed
indemnity for ecological damage to marine flora and fauna.
This claim cannot be admitted. Territorial waters are not
state owned property but a res corrununis omnium and the
public right to sovereignty over territorial waters cannot
be injured by private persons. ,136
The Court held that the Italian Government, as represented in
this instance by the Ministry of Merchant Shipping, had not
suffered any loss of profit or incurred any costs as a result of
the alleged damage to the territorial waters, or the fauna or
flora. 137 Significantly, the Court made reference to the
statement of policy expressed in Resolution No.3 of the Assembly
of the IOPC Fund when coming to their decision. Abecassis
suggests that the consideration by the Court of Resolution No.3
'lends support to the view that the claims practice of the IOPC
Fund can have a legally normative effect under some
134Abecassis 'Oil Pollution The Pa tmos' [1987] Lloyd' s
Maritime and Corrunercial LQ 275 at 277.
135General Na tional Mari time Transport Company v. The
Patmos Shipping Corporation and another, The International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund and Mellina Francesco v. The
Patmos Shipping Corporation and others. Civil action Gen. Reg.
No .676/86 , 337 .
136Translation of the judgement obtained from Abecassis
(1987), op cit, 277.
137IOPC Fund Annual Report 1986, section 9.9 at 18-19.
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jurisdictions' .138 This may well be true of that case but the
learned commentator's apparent support for such a "legally
normative" influence may not, in fact, serve the best long-term
interest of the international community and the natural
environment or principles of equity. In order for any legal
system to develop with changing conditions the "legal norm" must
be able to evolve in response to fluctuating economic, political,
social, environmental and philosophical conditions. A strict
adherence to Resolution No.3 in the context of environmental law
pertaining to oil pollution is not conducive to flexibility and
the incremental development of law. In any event, developments
in the Italian courts relating to the Patmos, and subsequently
in the Haven litigation, indicate that the policy of the IOPC
Fund can not prevent courts from interpreting the notion of
pollution damage in a different way.
The Italian Government appealled against the decision of the
Court of first instance to the Court of Appeal of Messina. On
appeal, the Italian Government formulated their claims for damage
to the environment so as to avoid directly infringing the
requirements of Resolution No.3. In this regard it was important
to plead quantifiable economic loss. To this end it was pleaded
that the nature of the claim was for actual damage to the marine
environment and to actual economic loss suffered by the tourist
industry and fishermen as a consequence of that damage.
The IOPC Fund opposed these claims by emphasizing again, that it
was unreasonable to claim damage to the marine environment
according to the abstract quantification of damage calculated in
accordance with theoretical models. Furthermore, in the opinion
of the IOPC Fund, economic damage allegedly suffered by fishermen
and the tourist industry could only be claimed by the individual
persons having suffered the damage who would also be required to
prove the amount of economic loss sustained. On 30th March, 1989,
the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the court of first
138Abecassis (1987), op cit, 277.
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instance by holding that the Italian Government's claims were,
in fact, admissible as pollution damage within the meaning of the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. u 9 The Court stated that
the owner of the Patmos, the U.K. P&l Club and the IOPC Fund were
liable for the damage covered by the claim made by the Italian
Government. 140
Although these claims were admissible it was necessary to assess
the quantum of such damage. On the 30th March, 1989, the Court
of Appeal appointed three experts to ascertain whether or not
damage had been caused to Italian marine resources as a result
of the oil spill from the Patmos and to advise the Court as to
the nature and quantum of such damage. In March 1990, the Court
considered the report of the experts in which they had only been
able to identify, assess and quantify damage to fishing
activities. The amount of this damage was assessed as being no
less than Llt1,OOO million (£465,000). The experts' report also
stated that the lack of reliable data had precluded the
evaluation of the economic impact and damage sustained by other
(non-fishing) activities (eg tourism). In the opinion of the
experts it was not possible to quantify the damage to the tourist
industry. The experts suggested that the Court was in the best
position to evaluate the damage to non-fishing activities. 141 In
October 1991, the Court of Appeal requested information from the
experts. In April 1992, the Court experts produced a second
report in which they indicated that their conclusions were
hypothetical and not confirmed by factual evidence.
'The quantity of water affected by the oil was estimated,
and the experts then considered how the oil might affect
U9The Ministry of the Merchant Marine and others v.
Patmos Shipping Corporation & the United Kingdom Mutual
Steamship Assurance Association and others, Com Cas Reg
No .391, 392,393 , 398, 426 , 459 , 460 and 570/1986, The Court of
Appeal of Messina, Civil Section, decided 30 March 1989.
14oIOPC Fund Annual Report 1989, section 12.2 at 20-2l.
141IOPC Fund Annual Report 1991, section 12.2 at 30.
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the plankton and the development and growth of fish. A
mathematical formula was used to calculate a quantity of
fish which allegedly were not born or did not develop, due
to lack of nutrition. The experts stated that only a
percentage of the quality of fish not having come into
existence would have been caught and gave a nominal value
to the quantity which would have been caught.' 142
It may be noted that the method used by the Italian experts was
not in principle very different to the "metodika" used in both
the Antonio Gramsci cases.
It has been reported that in its final judgment delivered on the
14th December, 1993, the Court of Appeal in Messina held that:
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions the
term "pollution damage" embraces deterioration and
destruction in whole or in part of the environment and
includes any damage caused to the coast and to the interest
of the coastal states which relate to the environment, such
as interest in the preservation of marine biological
resources, both in so far as fauna and flora are
concerned. ' 143
The importance of the question of admissibility and assessment
of claims for environmental damage under the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions has become of even greater importance in Italy
as a result of the Haven incident which occurred off the Italian
coast on 11th April, 1991. The Italian Government has submitted
claims for damage to the marine environment in the amount of
LIt100,OOO million (£45 million) . 144 Essentially the same
142IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 36.
143Trotz & de la Rue ' Admi s s i b i l i t y and assessment of
claims for pollution damage ' i n CMI Yearbook (1993) 90 at 114
fn.75.
144 IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 12.2 at 64.
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parties will be involved as in the Patmos incident: the Italian
Government, the U. K. P&l Club and the IOPC Fund and it would seem
the same rules apply. The outcome cannot yet be predicted and a
long and interesting legal struggle can be expected to unfold in
the Italian Courts.
7.6 Particulars of Claims against the lOPC Fund
In terms of Regulation 6.1 of the Internal Regulations of the
International Oil Pollution Fund, where a claim is presented to
the Fund, the Director shall request the claimant to support his
claim by a notice in writing containing, to the extent possible,
the following particulars:
\ (a) the name and address of the claimant and his
representative; if any;
(b) the identity of the ship involved in the incident;
(c) the date, place and specific details of the
incident;
(d) the type of pollution damage and the place where
it was experienced;
(e) the amount of the claim.'
Regulation 6.2 provides that the Director shall request any
claimant to provide such further information and such documents
as he deems necessary to determine the validity of the claim.
7.7 Conclusions on the 1969/71 Regime
The 1969/71 Regime represented an improvement upon the laws
applicable in the pre Torrey Canyon era. Strict but limited
liability is channelled in the first instance to the shipowner
under the Civil Liability Convention. Where the compensation
available from the shipowner is insufficient oil cargo interests
provide additional sources of compensation under the provisions
of the Fund Convention through the IOPC Fund up to a
supplementary limit. The idea of making the shipowner primarily
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liable for pollution damage has been questioned by the
International Maritime Committee (CMI), which suggested that the
channelling of primary liability for oil pollution damage towards
the IOPC Fund \ ... would have given victims of oil pollution an
accessible and convenient remedy and the cost of providing that
remedy would have been mitigated by recoveries the International
Fund could then obtain from negligent shipowners.,Hs For the
time being, however, shipowners will continue to provide primary
liability under the Conventions. It is submitted that the role
played by oil cargo interests in financing oil pollution
compensation is becoming increasingly important relative to that
played by the shipowner and that this trend will become more
pronounced with the passage of time.
The two-tier system has successfully been able to deal with small
pollution incidents as well as large scale pollution disasters
through the availability of comprehensive liability limits. This
system facilitates the speedy settlement of claims with minimum
leg~l and administrative costs . The second tier Fund provides
what amounts to reinsurance for pollution caused by tankers and
helps to maintain the shipowners' limit of liability under the
first tier Civil Liability Convention. In this way shipowners are
able to obtain insurance cover for the high risks associated with
tanker-source oil pollution damage. One of the principle virtues
of this system is its potential for worldwide acceptance. The
capital intensive tanker and oil industry are truly international
operators which ideally require internationally uniform and
stable legal dispensations so that they can continue to fulfil
the function of energy supplier with maximum efficiency. One of
the perceived ideals which has yet to be attained in the actual
operation of the Conventions is a uniform interpretation of the
notion of pollution damage. The attitude of the Courts in a given
jurisdiction can obviously affect the extent of oil pollution
claims. Claims brought in a jurisdiction which applies a
mathematical formula for the computation of claims or has a wider
HSOfficial Records, vol.2 at 92.
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concept of pollution damage may be disproportionate to claims
settled in a jurisdiction where a more conservative approach is
adhered to.
Generally speaking, by adopting the Conventions, Contracting
States secure for their citizens comprehensive compensation for
oil pollution damage, and, at the same time, ensure that such
compensation will be affordable and made in the most cost
effective way possible. However, as with most international
arrangements established to deal with rapidly changing
situations, the 1969/71 regime has become less adequate than it
was when it was originally established. This has become
especially evident with regard to the levels of compensation
provided for victims of oil pollution damage. The limitation
amounts agreed upon in 1969 and 1971 have declined in value
because of inflation and cost increases. Furthermore,
developments in the law of the sea during the existence of the
1969/71 Regime, and the expansion of the concept of environmental
damage in national legislation, have exposed certain inadequacies
in the existing compensation Conventions. A number of serious oil
pollution incidents in 1978, 1979 and 1980 resulted in increased
pressure to revise the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. This
pressure led to an International Conference held in 1984 where
Protocols to both Conventions were developed. The substantive
revisions effected by these Protocols, the failure of those
instruments and the further development of the 1992 Protocols to
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions are discussed the next




Revi s i on of the Compensation Conve ntions
8.1 Introduction and analytical approach
The International Conference on Liability and Compensation for
Damage in Connexion with the Carriage of Certain Substances by
Sea, 1984, achieved two ob jectives. First, it adopted the
Protocol of 1984 to amend the 1969 Civil Liability Convention,
and, secondly, it adopted the Protocol of 1984 to amend the 1971
Fund Convention. When it became clear that these two protocols
would not enter into force work was initiated by the IOPC Fund
to elaborate two new protocols with the same substantive
provisions as those of 1984 but with lower entry into force
requirements. Following this preparatory work, IMO convened an
international conference to consider the resulting draft
agreement, and, in 1992, the International Conference on the
revision of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund
Convention adopted two new protocols; the Protocol of 1992 to
amend the Civil Liability Convention and the Protocol of 1992 to
amend the 1971 Fund Convention .
It is now very unlikely that the 1984 Protocols will enter into
force and in practice the 1992 Protocols will replace the 19 94
Protocols. Therefore, the approach adopted in this part of the
analysis undertaken by this work is to assume that the 1984
Protocols will not enter into force. The method of analysis used
here is to analyse the changes brought about to the 1984
Protocols from the framework of the of the 1992 Protocols. In
keeping with this approach the reasons for the failure of the
1984 Protocols will first be discussed. Then the advent of the
1992 Protocols and the changes that the subsequent Protocols
brought about to the 1984 Protocols will be explained. Once the
latest developments have been f u lly explained then the changes
brought about to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions in 1984
and which were incorporated i n t o the 1992 Protocols may be
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explained more effectively. In this way the reader is able to
appreciate the broad developments before the more detailed
amendments are dealt with. In most instances the amendments
introduced by the respective Protocols are common to both
Conventions. For this reason the Protocols to the two Conventions
are considered together in this Chapter, and, in this way,
repetition is avoided or reduced to a minimum.
8.1.1 The impact of the "Amoco Cadiz" spill
The Civil Liability Convention entered into force on the 19th
June, 1975, while the Fund Convention entered into force on the
16th October, 1978. The Civil Liability Convention had not been
in force for very long and the Fund Convention had not yet
entered into force, before the wreck of the Amoco Cadiz, off the
coast of France, took place on the 16th March, 1978. The extent
of pollution damage which ensued demonstrated the need for the
amendment of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. 1 In 1984,
french experts reported that the cost of the Amoco Cadiz clean-up
operations would reach US$160 million in 1984 values. 2 This was
almost twice the amounts available under the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions. Clearly, the Conventions had to be amended to
ensure that their specified liability limits would realistically
reflect the potential levels of liability which could arise as
a result of catastrophic oil spills. Although the main objective
of the 1984 Protocols was the amendment of the original
Conventions so as to increase the amount of compensation
available to victims of oil spills by raising liability limits,
the Legal Committee of IMO also realized that other amendments
lAbecassis & Jarashow Oil pollution from ships:
International, United Kingdom and United States Law and
Practice 2nd ed. (1985) 227; also M. Jacobsson 'Future of the
International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage' Proceedings of the 1991 Oil Spill
c~nference, American Petroleum Agency, March 4-7 (1991) San
Dlego. CA 689 at 689.
20fficial Records, vol.2 at 45 pa a 10r. .
262
would also have to be made. 3
In May, 1984, a Diplomatic Conference was convened in London,
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization,
to revise the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions.
From this Conference, Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention emerged. These Protocols
never came into force, because the United States, whose
participation was to bring into play the higher ceiling of
compensation provided for in the 1984 Fund Protocol, did not
ratify either the Civil Liability or the Fund Protocols. 4
Instead of participating in an enhanced, international regime
governing oil pollution compensation, which probably would have
come into effect had the United States ratified the 1984
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, the United
States developed its own Federal oil pollution compensation
legislation in the form of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA) which
entered into force on the 18th August, 1990. The OPA contains no
provisions which would facilitate the implementation of the 1984
Protocols and expressly rej ects the Protocols as providing
insufficient protection and compensation for oil spills.
8.1.2 Why U.8. support was required to effect the 1984 Protocols
3pOpp 'Liability and compensation for pollution damage
caused by ships revisited - report on an important
international conference' (1985) Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial
Law 118 at 119.
4For an analysis of the arguments advanced urging U.S.
ratification of the 1984 Protocols see Paulsen 'Why the United
States should ratify the 1984 Protocols to the International
Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969)
and the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971)' (1984/85) 20 The
Forum 164; Van Hanswyk 'The 1984 Protocols to the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in United
States Law' (1988) 22 The International Lawyer 391.
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The entry into force of the 1984 Protocol to the Civil Liability
Convention would have required ratification by ten States,
including six States each with not less than one million units
of gross tanker tonnage. s While the 1984 Protocol to the Fund
Convention would have entered into force after ratification by
at least eight states where the total quantity of contributing
oil, received in the preceding calender year, in all ratifying
States was at least 600 million tons. 6 A further pre-condition
for the entry into force of the 1984 Fund Convention, was that
the 1984 Civil Liability Convention should already have entered
into force.'
Had the 1984 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions come into
force, the basic coverage provided by both Conventions would have
been 135 million units of account (SDR).8 This provision would
have increased the Civil Liability and Fund Convention's maximum
compensation limits by 225 per cent. 9 However, the ultimate
purpose behind the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention was to
achieve an expanded ceiling of cover of 200 million units of
account (SDR). This level of expanded cover would have increased
the Civil Liability and Fund Convention's maximum compensation
limits by 333.3 per cent. 10 It was envisaged that the expanded
ceiling would come into effect when the combined quantity of
SArticle 13(1) of the 1984 Protocol to the Civil Liability
Convention.
6Article 30 of the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention.
'Article 40.2 of the 1971 Fund Convention as incorporated
into the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention by Article 36 of
that Protocol.
8Article 4.4 (a) of the 1971 Fund Convention as amended by
Article 6.3 of the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention.
9This figure of 225 per cent is based on the increases of
~gg7egate limits relating to liability for a single pollution
lncldent under both the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
lOThis figure of 333.3 per cent is based on the increases
of agg7ega~e ~imits relating to liability for a single
pollutlon lncldent under both the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions.
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contributing oil received by persons in the territories of any
three Parties to the Fund Convention equalled or exceeded 600
million tons during the preceding calender year. 11
This two-stage 1984 Fund Convention maximum and the procedure
whereby it would be brought into being, was specially designed
to meet U.S. demands for high liability limits and to assure
other large oil importer States such as Japan that their
contribution would not be dramatically increased without the U. S.
assuming a large proportion of that increase. 12 States would
participate in the expanded coverage only after the Fund had been
joined by the United States and at least two other large oil
importing countries. Three possible combinations existed: (a) the
U.S. with Japan and France or (b) the U.S. with Japan and Italy
and (c) the U. s. with Japan and the Netherlands. 13 In other
words the participation of both the U.S. and Japan in the 1984
Protocols was a prerequisite for its entry into force.
8.2 The 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Protocols
In view of the implications that the development of the OPA had
for the coming into force requirements of the 1984 Protocol to
the Fund Conventions it was unlikely that either Protocol would
ever enter into force because the revised regime was designed to
function as a two-tier compensation system. Clearly, the 1969
Civil Liability Convention and 1971 Fund Convention had to be
revised to ensure their continued viability. To this end, upon
the initiative of the Government of the United Kingdom, the IOPC
Fund Assembly at its 13th session, held in September 1990,
undertook to establish a 6th Intercessional Working Group to
consider the amendment of the 1984 Protocols. Mans Jacobsson, the
. 11Article 4.4(c) of the Fund Convention as amended by
Artlcle 6 .3 of the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention.
12pOpp, op ci t, 129; Paulsen, op ci t, 176.
13Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 292; Official Records,
vol.2 at 299.
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Director of the IOPC Fund provides an abridged summation of the
important suggestions made to the IOPC Fund Assembly by the
Government of the united Kingdom in elaboration of their
initiative." It was proposed: that the IOPC Fund should
undertake a thorough review of the conventions, including the
following points:
[1] The continued relevance of the definition of "pollution
damage" found in the conventions.
[2] The geographical scope of the conventions.
[3] The future inadequacy of the limits of compensation in
the conventions in the light of recent oil pollution
incidents and the maintenance of appropriate balance
between shipowning and cargo interests.
[4] The future availability and cost of Protection and
Indemnity Club cover.
[5] The distribution of costs across developed and
developing countries of possible increased contributions
from cargo interests.
[6] The relationship between the intergovernmental scheme
and any compensation that may be available in future from
voluntary, industry-based oil pollution compensation
schemes. '
The same commentator reported that the U.K. also expressed the
view that the conventions required amendment in the light of
increases in the cost of oil pollution response which had been
brought to the fore during the preparatory work for the
Conference on International Co-operation on Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response. 15 This conference, held under the
auspices of the International Maritime Organization in November
1990, led to the development of an international convention by
14M. Jacobsson 'Future of the International Conventions
Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage'
Proceedings of the 1991 Oil Spill Conference, American





The actual mandate given to the 6th Intercessional Working Group
was to consider the future development of the intergovernmental
oil pollution liability and compensation system. This entailed
examining the prospects for the entry into force of the 1984
Protocols and to consider whether it would be possible to
facilitate the entry into force of the content of these Protocols
by amending their entry into force provisions. The Working Group
was also called upon to consider which substantive provisions in
the existing Conventions and the 1984 Protocols appeared to form
the main obstacles to their continued relevance, including a
review of the existing contribution scheme. 16
The report of the 6th Intercessional Working Group was considered
at the 14th session of the Assembly of the IOPC Fund during
October 1991. As a result, the IOPC Fund Assembly adopted
Resolution No.8, in which it requested the Secretary-General of
IMO to convene an International Conference, to be held if
possible before the end of 1992 to consider draft protocols
modifying the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund
Convention. Further, this Conference was to consider whether
there should be introduced to the Fund Convention a system
setting a cap on contributions , payable to the IOPC Fund, in any
given State, for a transitional period. 17 Consequently, on the
7th November, 1991, the Assembly of IMO adopted a resolution
requesting the Legal Committee of IMO to consider draft protocols
modifying the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Convention
and the issue of "capping" contributions. The Resolution also
provided for the convening of a Diplomatic Conference. 18
The International Conference was held in London, under the
auspices of IMO from 23 to 27 November, 1992. The Conference
l6IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, section 7 at 16.
l7IOPC Fund Statistics 1 October 1992 at 10.
l8IMO Resolution A.729(17).
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adopted two Protocols (the 1992 Protocols) which will amend the
1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention
when, and if, these Protocols enter into force. These Protocols
are now individually referred to as the 1992 Protocol to the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1969 (the 1992 Civil Liability Convention Protocol) and
the 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage,
1971 (the 1992 Fund Convention Protocol) .
With the exception of the lowering of the entry into force
provisions contained in the 1984 Protocols and the inclusion in
the Fund Convention of a system of setting a transitional "cap"
on the contributions payable by oil receivers in any given State,
the substantive and administrative provisions of the 1992
Protocols are identical to those of the 1984 Protocols. This is
because the provisions of the 1984 Protocols, were largely
incorporated by reference into the 1992 Protocols.
The inter-relationship between the 1992 and 1984 Protocols and
the original 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions
follow the principle that the later Protocols, although
elaborating and often altering the provisions of the original
Conventions, still retain the basis _ structure, format and
organisation of the original Conventions. Although the 1984
Protocols retained the original structure and organisation of the
1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions they would have
brought about significant changes to the original Conventions if
they had come into force. By contrast the 1992 Protocols make
very minor changes to the 1984 Protocols. Therefore, in the
discussion of the 1992 Protocols which follows, one should be
aware that in most instances the changes in the original




achievements of the 1992 Diplomatic Conference, the
the 1992 Protocols are not certain and could
share a similar fate to the 1984 Protocols. It
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/~ difficult to avoid the inference that the hurried development of Q?
the 1992 Protocols was at least partly motivated by a desire to
send a political message to the U. S. that the international
community was capable of adopting positive measures to control
oil pollution liability despite non-participation of that
influential State. It was felt necessary to demonstrate that the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions could have a viable future
notwithstanding the existence of the more comprehensive, but not
necessarily superior, provisions of the OPA and U.S. State Oil
Pollution Legislation. The regional system of managing tanker-
source oil pollution liability which was adopted by the U.S.
disconcerted many of the interest groups which favoured the
continued operation of the international approach. A note by the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) delivered at the 1992
Conference articulates some of these concerns.
~ The credibility of the concept of global agreement on oil
pollution liability issues is at stake, and the development
of regional agreements - which would be as damaging to IMO
as much as to the shipping industry - must be anticipated
if the Conference should unexpectedly fail in its
obj ectives. ,19
It is also true that the high limits contained in the 1984
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions were
largely agreed upon at the 1984 Conference in an attempt to
obtain the support of the U.S. in the inter-governmental oil
pollution liability and compensation system. Without u. S. support
and contributions, the limits provided for by the 1984 Protocol
to the Fund Convention were unrealistically and insupportably
high. Therefore, allowing for inflation, the amendments brought
about by the 1992 Protocols can be seen as the realistic
reflection of what the delegates may have agreed to in 1984 had
the - U. S. delegation not intimated that they were willing to
support the intergovernmental regime. After a delay of six years,
190fficial Records, vol.4 at 84.
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the international community was in essence rectifying a mistake
brought about by the fact that the U. S. had "led them up the
garden path" in 1984. During the discussion of limitation amounts
at the 1984 Conference the lead U. S . representative, Rear Admiral
B.F. Hollingsworth, acknowledged that: \ ... he was aware that
some delegations believed that his Government had no serious
intention of ratifying the instruments that would establish a
revised CLC2°/ rOpc Fund regime.' 21 He then also conceded that:
\ [s]uch scepticism was understandable, based as it was on the
fact that his Government had not ratified the 1969 and 1971
Conventions, as well as other transportation treaties, not
necessarily maritime, in spite of all the efforts of the co-
signatories of those instruments. ,22 With hindsight such
scepticism was justified and it would seem that within this field
of international law the credibility of the U. S. Executive Branch
as a negotiating partner has been severely tarnished.
8.2.1 Main 1992 amendments
The main amendments to the 1984 Protocols to the Civil Liability
and the Fund Conventions brought about by the respective 1992
Protocols are discussed below.
8.2.1.1 Entry into force requirements
The most significant amendment brought about to the 1984
Protocols by the 1992 Protocols is that the subsequent Protocols
contain less stringent requirements for their entry into force.
The 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention requires for
its entry into force, that it is ratified by ten States,
including four States each with not less than one million units
20CLC is a commonly used acronym for the Civil Liability
Convention.
210fficial Records, vol.2 at 399-400 para.16.
220fficial Records, vol.2 at 400 para.16.
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of gross tanker tonnage. 2 3 These requirements are less stringent
than those of the 1984 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention
because although the 1984 Protocol also required a minimum of ten
States it had stipulated six, as opposed to four, States with
such large tanker registries.
Both the 1984 and 1992 Civil Liability Convention Protocols,
stipulate that upon their respective requirements being met
twelve months must elapse before these instruments would enter
into force.
The 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention requires that at least
eight States have agreed to be bound to it24 and that the total
contributing oil received in contracting States together is at
least 450 million tons per annum. 25 Thus the necessity for
minimum of eight ratifying States remains the same under the 1984
and 1992 Protocols, but, the amount of contributing oil was
reduced from 600 million tons in the 1984 Protocol to 450 million
tons in the 1992 Protocol i.e. a twenty-five per cent reduction.
Both the 1984 and 1992 Fund Protocols, stipulated that upon their
respective requirements being met twelve months must elapse
before these instruments would enter into force.
The 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention shall not be permitted
to enter into force before the 1992 Civil Liability Convention
has entered into force. 26 There is no equivalent provision in
the 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention stipulating
that the 1992 Civil Liability Convention will only enter into
force at the same time as the 1992 Fund Convention. This was also
the position under the 1969/71 regime and under the 1984
231 9 92 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention, Article
13.1.
24 1 992 Protocol to the Fund Convention, Article 30.1(a) .
25 1 9 92 Protocol to the Fund Convention, Article 30.1(b) .
26 1 9 92 Protocol to the Fund Convention, Article 30.2.
271
Protocols. The strong possibility exists that the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention could enter into force before the 1992 Fund
Convention. If this should occur the liability limits for
shipowners will be substantially increased without the benefit
of the complementary increase in the revised Fund Convention
limits. The possibility also e x ists that certain States could be
satisfied with the increased limits of the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention and opt not to r a ti f y the 1992 Fund Convention. In
this way such States would avoid the obligation of having to make
contributions to the 1992 IOPC Fund. At both the 1984 and 1992
Conferences shipowner interests were particularly concerned with
this potential problem. Signif i cantly, the International Chamber
of Shipping (ICS) and the Baltic and International Marine Council
(BIMCO) expressed fears that Cou r t s in States where only the
Civil Liability Convention applied could be tempted to break the
shipowner's right to limit under that Convention so that greater
funds would become available to compensate victims of large oil
spills. 2 7 The ICS urged States t o co-ordinate the ratification
of both Protocols so as to faci litate the simultaneous entry into
force of the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. 28 It
remains to be seen whether t he desired co-operation between
States on this important issue will i n fact eventuate.
8.2.1.2 Transitional contribution limit
The 1992 Fund Protocol provides that the aggregate amount of the
annual contributions payable (in respect of contributing oil
received in a single Contract ing State during a calendar year)
is not to exceed 27.5 per cent of the total annual contributions
from all States. 2 9 The "capping system" is a transitional
measure which will only operate until either the total quantity
of contributing oil, received i n all Contracting States in a
calendar year, has reached 750 mi l l i o n tonnes or until the elapse
270fficial Records , vol .4 at 84 (I CS) i and at 94 (BIMCO).
280fficial Records , vol.4 at 84 .
29
1 9 92 Protocol to the Fund Convention, Article 36 ter 1.
27 2
of a period of five years after the date of entry into force of
the 1992 Fund Protocol, whichever occurs earlier. 3o
No "capping system" had been incorporated into the 1984 Fund
Protocol and none applies to the present system of contributions
to the lOPC Fund under the 1971 Fund Convention. As such, this
provision constitutes an unprecedented departure from the "fair
shared sacrifice" principle which had previously always been the
underlying principle of the lOPC Fund contribution system. The
idea of "capping" is not, however, unique in the history of the
development of the Fund Convention. At the 1984 Conference the
u. S. had suggested that during the interim stage of the operation
of the 1984 Fund Convention the aggregate contribution made by
anyone Contracting State should not exceed 25 per cent of the
total contribution to the lOPC Fund. 31 The concerns of the U.S.
in 1984 were the same as those of Japan in 1992. Large oil
importer States which represented a substantial proportion of the
total contributions to the lOPC Fund did not wish to assume an
inordinate proportion of those contributions. The concerns of
large oil importers are well founded because during the initial
period after the entry into force of the 1971 Fund Convention
certain States had carried an inordinate proportion of
cont r i.but i.ons i P
During the Working Group discussions leading up to the
development of the 1992 Fund Protocol, most delegations expressed
a reluctance to accept the idea of a "capping system". They
pointed out that contributions to the lOPC Fund were not levied
on Member States but on individual contributors in these States.
Following this reasoning it was argued that the implementation
of a "capping system" would distort competition between
industries in various Member States as contributors in Member
States entitled to "capping" would be paying a lower amount per
30
1 9 92 Protocol to the Fund Convention, Article 36 ter 4.
310fficial Records, vol.2 at 284 para.3 and 5.
320fficial Records, vol.4 at 226.
273
tonne of contributing oil t ha n oil receivers in other Member
States. In principle it is difficult to justify the "capping"
procedure but the rationale f o r the decision was based on
political expediency, not cons iderations of equity . The
delegation from Japan pointed out that the introduction of a
"capping system" was of vital importance to its domestic oil
industry which without a "cap" on contributions could be called
on to carry a very heavy burden during the initial phase. In a
revealing admission by a government of the powerful influence
that the oil industry can exert over governmental initiatives on
oil pollution, the Japanese de legation emphasised that strong
opposition from the oil indust r y could lead to the Government of
Japan loosing the possibility of ratifying the 1992 Protocols at
an early stage. 33 In the l ight of this statement, one may
question whether governments or oil companies exert actual
control over the management o f oil pollution liability. This
issue is discussed in greater detail in Part Three of this work.
The 1992 Conference resolved that the "capping system" should not
be interpreted as setting a precedent which could be used to
influence the form of other existing or future International
Conventions. 34 Where this precedent could have been influential
was in the context of the deve lopment by IMO of the Convention
for the compensation of pol lut i on damage caused by hazardous and
noxious substances carried a t sea. 35 It is, however, difficult
to ignore the example that this development has set in the field
of international law. Under c ircumstances where a particular
33Paragraphs 127 and 129 'Extract from the Report of the
Legal Committee on the Work of i t s Sixty-Sixth Session' (IMO
document LEG 66/9, paragraphs 12 5-141) reproduced in
FUND/A.15/15 Annex 11 .
34Resolution 5 (Resolut ion on the Acceptance of an Interim
Cap on Contributions Payable by Oil Receivers in any Given
State) see Official Records , vol .4 at 225/6.
35Gaskell 'Compensation fo r Oi l Pollution: 1992 Protocols
to the Civil Liability Convent ion and the Fund Convention'
(1993) 8 International Journa l of Marine and Coastal Law 286
at 290.
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State's support is indispensable to the success of an
international convention it i~ possible for that State to dictate
favourable terms of entry. This does not bode well for the future
of the intergovernmental oil pollution liability and compensation
system established by the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
Clearly, the adoption of the "capping system" is a striking
concession to encourage the participation of Japan in the 1992
Protocols to the Fund Conventions. Japanese ratification of the
1992 Fund Protocol is undeniably a prerequisite for the
successful implementation of the 1992 Protocol. This is
illustrated by the relative quantities of contributing oil
received in the territories of the three largest oil receiver
Fund Member States in 1991. 3 6 In the table which appears below,















It will be observed that Japan contributed 28.89 per cent of the
total contributions to the IOPC Fund during 1991 and the Japanese
contribution was 5.18 per cent above the summed proportional
contributions made by Italy plus the Netherlands; respectively
the second and third largest contributors. According to the
"capping system" the aggregate amount of the annual contributions
payable in respect of contributing oil received in a single
Contracting State during a calendar year is not to exceed 27.5
per cent of the total annual contributions to the IOPC Fund.
Accordingly, in terms of the 1991 statistics as reported at 31st
December, 1992, the Japanese contribution would be reduced by
1.39 per cent. This amount would be distributed pro rata amongst
the other contributors.
36IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, Annex X at 91 (as reported
by 31st December, 1992).
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During 1989 calendar year the contribution made by Japan
constituted 27 per cent of the total contributions to the IOPC
Fund and therefore had the "capping system" applied it would have
not come into operation during that year. 37 However, in 1990 the
contribution made by Japan constituted 28.92 per cent of the
total contributions to the IOPC Fund and thus the "capping
system" would certainly have come into operation during that
year. 3 8 The Japanese contribution would have been reduced by
1.42 per cent. An example will show the monetary effects of this
reduction. On 4th October, 1991, the IOPC Fund Assembly levied
an amount of £15 million for the Haven Major Claims Fund, to be
paid by 1st February, 1992 . The amount payable by each
contributor, per tonne of contributing oil received, in 1990, was
£0.01596753 9 (1990 was the year before the incident). Japan's
proportional contribution in this instance was £4,121,099. 4 0 If
the "capping system" had been in operation during that year this
contribution would have been reduced by 1.42 per cent.
Accordingly the Japanese contribution would have been reduced by
£58,520.
8.3 Substantive changes implemented by the 1984 Protocols and
incorporated in the 1992 Protocols
Now that the amendments made to the 1984 Protocols by the 1992
Protocols have been explained, the amendments brought about to
the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and 1971 Fund Convention by
the 1984 Protocols, .wh i c h were in turn incorporated into the 1992
Protocols can be described and explained within the broader
framework.
37IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, Annex VII at 61 (as
reported by 31st December, 1990).
38IOPC Fund Annual Report 1990, Annex X at 83 (as reported
by 31st December, 1991).
39IOPC Fund Annual Report 1992, section 9 at 22.
4°IOPC Fund Statistics 1 October 1992 at 17.
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8.3.1 Higher Limits of Compensation
The most important change is the increase in the maximum limit
of liability for the shipowner and the maximum compensation
available from the IOPC Fund. In determining these limits the
delegates at the 1994 Conference were required to balance three
major conflicts. Firstly, an acceptable apportionment of
liability between shipowner interests and oil importer interests
had to be made. 41 Secondly, less developed countries perceived
that they where required to pay relatively higher amounts for
compensation as opposed to developed countries due to the fact
that their currencies had lower value. 42 Thirdly, and perhaps
most importantly, an attempt had to be made to reconcile the
inherent conflict between the demand for industrial development
and the preservation of the environment. 4 3
8.3.2 The revised limits of shipowners
In their revision of provisions of the 1969 Civil Liability and
1971 Fund Conventions the delegates at the 1984 Conference were
obliged to consider, inter alia, \ the costs of the maritime
industry. ,44 This is so in terms of the November, 1981, IMO
Assembly Resolution A.SOO, which is reproduced at Annexure Eight
of this work.
The cost of obtaining liability insurance for shipowners is
primarily determined by three inter-related factors: the number
of incidents, the quantum of damage per incident, and, most
importantly, the limitat ion amounts applicable to such accidents
under relevant national legislation. 45 Reliable limitation
4lOfficial Records, vol .1 at 329 para.6.
420fficial Records, vol.1 at 329 para.4.
430fficial Records, vol.1 at 328 para.1.
440fficial Records, vol.2 at 83.
450fficial Records, vol.2 at 124-5 para.46.
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levels are important for insurers so that they are able to
predict their maximum potential exposure per insured incident. 4 6
Insurers operate on the assumption that the shipowner will be
able to limit his liability to a pre-determinable amount under
the national laws of most States. 47 Where the insurance of oil
pollution risks is undertaken the existence of liability limits
which can be relied upon is particularly important because the
frequency of oil spills is unpredictable and the costs associated
with these spills are often exceedingly high and difficult to
predict.
At the 1969 Conference the limited availability of marine
liability insurance forced delegates to exercise caution in
setting liability limits applicable to shipowners under the Civil
Liability Convention. At the 1984 Conference it was recognised
that the capacity of the marine insurance market had. increased
and that the shipowners could reasonably be required to assume
higher liability limits. 48 In this regard it has been suggested
that the increased availability of insurance for oil pollution
risks was brought about by the existence of the IOPC Fund and the
CRISTAL contract. These additional sources of compensation for
tanker-source oil pollution damage had the 'profound effect' of
maintaining shipowners' liability limits by satisfying claims
which exceeded those limits. 4 9
At the 1984 Conference the limit of the shipowner's liability
under the Civil Liability Convention was changed through the
introduction of a special minimum liability limit for owners of
small vessels and a substantial general increase in the
limitation amounts. The "fixed tranche" for small ships was
recommended by the Oil Companies International Marine Forum
460fficial Records, vol.2 at 142.
470fficial Records , vol.2 at 29 para.34.
480fficial Records, vol.2 at 380 para.14 and vol.1 at 161
para.3.
490fficial Records, vol.2 at 29 p 34ara. .
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(OCIMF), a lobby group for the oil industry, which had become
concerned that oil importers were increasingly being called upon
to contribute though the IOPC Fund to oil spills from small ships
which had very low limitation funds under the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention. 50 This phenomenon still remains prevalent,
especially in relation to oi l spills in Japan, where small
coastal tankers are involved. 51
The revised limits under 1984 Protocol to the Civil Liability
Convention were incorporated into the 1992 Protocol and are
described below.
( l e
Ships which do not exceed 5,000 gt. (gross tons) are subject to
a fixed limit of 3 million SDR. 52 As at 31st December, 1992, the
amount of 3 million SDR corresponded to £2.7 million or US$4.1
million. Ships measuring between 5,000 gt. and 140,000 gt. are
subject to the fixed sum of 3 million SDR and then, on an
escalating scale, an additional 420 SDR53 for every gross ton
above the 5,000 gt. measurement. Ships exceeding 140,000 gt. are
permitted to limit their liability to 59 .7 million SDR. 54 As at
31st December, 1992, the sum of 59 .7 million SDR corresponded to








3 million SDR plus
, -J' J
I~ [ - 1)
50popp, op cit, 129; for a 'Review of the limits of
liability and compensation' submitted by the OCIMF at the 1984
Conference, see, Official Records, vol.2 pp.98-113.
51For an analysis of this i s s ue see pg.99 of this work.
52Article 6.1 of the 1992 Protocol replacing Article
V.1(a) of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
534 2 0 SDR as at 31st December, 1992 corresponded to £382
or US$577.
54Article 6.1 of the 1992 Protocol replacing Article
V.1(b) of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
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140,000 and above - _ 420 SDR per gt. over 5,000 gt.
59.7 million SDR
Nowhere in the 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention
is this critical measurement of 140,000 gt. specifically
mentioned. But the 1992 Protocol stipulates that the overall
maximum limits of the shipowner shall not exceed 59.7 million
SDR. On the escalating scale referred to above, this upper
ceiling is reached at 140,000 gt.
8.3.2.1 Revised tonnage measurement
Under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention as it presently applies
tonnage is measured according to "limitation tonnage" which
essentially reflects the net tonnage of the ship plus engine room
space. 55 For the purpose of assessing the shipowner's limitation
fund under the 1992 Protocol, it is significant that the use of
limitation tonnage has been replaced by gross tonnage, which is
calculated in accordance with the tonnage measurement regulations
contained in Annex I of the 1969 International Convention on
Tonnage Measurement of Ships.56 The gross tonnage measurement of
a ship is greater than its measurement according to limitation
tonnage. Accordingly, larger limitation funds will be assessed
using the gross tonnage measurement than had the limitation
tonnage continued to apply.
It has been observed that the difference between the systems of
tonnage measurement under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and
the 1992 Protocol makes accurate direct comparison between the
respective limits difficult. 57 This difficulty may be further
exacerbated because most ships have not yet been measured for
gross tonnage according to the 1969 International Convention on
55Civil Liability Convention, Article V.10.
56Article 6.5 of the 1992 Protocol replacing Article V.10
of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention. The 1969 International
Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships entered into force
on the 18th July, 1982.
57Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 241 para.10-143.
280
Tonnage Measurement of Ships. Where such ships become involved
in claims for oil pollution damage under the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention it may become necessary to re-measure the vessel so
that an accurate limitation Fund can be assessed. 58 Despite such
fears, the general consensus at the 1984 Conference was that
these difficulties were more of a theoretical nature than of
practical significance. For example, delegates from Norway, India
and the United States agreed that the gross limitation tonnage
could be ascertained even in cases where the ship had sunk as
sufficient ship's documentation and drawings would usually exist
to permit an ex post facto assessment. 59 The delegate from New
Zealand expressed the view that in the case of large oil tankers
the differences between the old and the new tonnage measurements
would not be very significant. 6o
One can, however, state with
14 million SDR under the 1969
considerably increased to
Protocol thereto.
certainly that the upper limits of
Civil Liability Convention has been
59.7 million SDR under the 1992
8.3.3 The revised lope Fund limits
The guiding principle of the existing, two tier, oil pollution
compensation arrangement is that shipowners and cargo owners
share liability. This principle remains fundamental to the
amended compensation regime which evolved from the 1984 and 1992
Conferences.
The maximum compensation payable by the IOPC Fund under the 1992
Protocol to the Fund Convention in respect of anyone incident
58Browne 'Oil Pollution Damage Compensation under the
Civil Liability Convention 1969' in McLean (ed) Compensation
for Damage: An International Perspective (1993) pp.137-164 at
143 .
590fficial Records, vol.2 at 474 paras.8,9 and at 475
paras.11,14.
6°Official Records, vol.2 at 473 3para ..
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is increased to 135 million SDR, which includes the amount of
compensation available from the shipowner under the 1992 Protocol
to the Civil Liability Converrt i.on i P As at the 31st December,
1992, the sum of 135 million SDR corresponded to £123 million or
US$186 million.--
An arrangement is provided for under the 1992 Protocol to the
Fund Convention whereby the limitation ceiling, of 135 million
SDR, may automatically be increased to 200 million SDR,62 if,
and when, certain circumstances prevail. The enhanced ceiling of
limitation shall be activated when three States, Party to the
1992 Fund Convention have a combined quantity of contributing
oil, received during a given year, in their respective
territories, which exceeds 600 million tonnes. 63 These are the
same conditions which were agreed upon at the 1984 Conference.
However, it must be recognised that under the 1992 Protocol
different conditions prevail because it must be assumed that the
U.S. will not ratify the 1992 Protocols. In spite of additional
funds becoming available from the oil industry through the
expanded ceiling, shipowners' limits under the Civil Liability
Convention, will remain the same.
Given that the 1992 Fund Protocol, in fact, enters into force,
it is unlikely that the enhanced ceiling of 600 million SDR will
come into effect in the foreseeable future. This is because the
sum total of contributing oil received in the territories of the
three largest oil receivers presently party to the 1971 Fund
Convention only amounted to 485,156,807 tonnes during the 1991
61Article 6.3 of the 1992 Protocol replacing Article
4.4(a) of the 1971 Fund Convention.
62As at the 31st December , 1992 , the sum of 200 million
SDR corresponded to £182 million or US$275 million.
63Article 6.3 of the 1992 Protocol replacing Article
4.4(c) of the 1971 Fund Convention.
282
calendar year. 64
Were the upper ceiling of liability is reached under the 1971 or
1992 Fund Convention, the total amount paid by the ropc Fund can
not be predicted exactly because this amount will be influenced
by the amount of the shipowner's limitation fund as established
under the Civil Liability Convention. The greater the shipowner's
limitation amount the less the ropc Fund will be required to pay
in compensation. Conversely, the smaller the limitation fund the
larger the amount paid by the ropc Fund. This principle applies
whether the liability ceiling under the Fund Convention is
reached or not . At the 1984 Conference the argument was made by
the oil industry that the amount of compensation available from
the Fund Convention should also be determined in relation to the
tonnage of the ship causing the spill. 65 This proposal was not
adopted at the 1984 Conference . Accordingly, the smaller the ship
causing the oil spill the greater the potential liabilty of cargo
interests will be relative to that of the shipowner. The oil
industry also failed to persuade the delegates at the 1984
Conference that the ropc Fund should only be responsible for a
fixed supplement which would not fluctuate in accordance with the
tonnage of the polluting ship . 66
A statistical analysis of oil spills occurring during 1970-82
concluded that under the 1984 Protocols, as opposed to the 1969
Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions, the shipowner's share
of liability would rise from 26.4 per cent to 55.9 per cent while
the oil receivers share would drop from 49.4 per cent to 44.1 per
cent. 67 This redistribution of liability in favour of the oil
64As reported by 31 December 1992 Japan received
266,411,278 tonnes of contributing oil, rtaly 121,292,963
tonnes and the Netherlands 97,452,566; see Iope Fund Annual
Report 1992, Annex X at 91.
650fficial Records , vol.2 at 113.
660fficial Records, vol .2 at 619 para.79.
67Seatrade Magazine July 1 984 . at 25 quoted by Paulsen, opci t, 175.
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importer interests was partly attributable to the abolition of
"roll-back relief" under the 1992 Fund Convention Protocol.
Although these statistics are interesting history, they can no
longer be taken as an accurate reflection of the relative
theoretical proportional distribution of liability between
shipowners and oil importers under the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions as amended by the 1992 Protocols thereto. Firstly,
the upper limits of the 1971 Fund Convention have been raised
twice subsequent to the quoted study. Once on 30th November,
1986, and then again on 30th November, 1987. By contrast, the
upper ceiling of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention has not been
raised since its inception in 1969. The increases in the
liability ceiling of oil importers under the 1971 Fund Convention
relative to that of shipowners under the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention will have the effect that liability will now be
distributed between shipowners and oil importers more favourably
for the shipowner than was the case before these increases
occurred. Secondly, claims for oil pollution damage have showed
a marked tendency to be larger nowadays than was the case in
1984. Consequently, the second tier compensation under the 19,71
Fund Convention will be invoked with greater frequency. As such,
oil importers will be required to pay an increased proportion of
total liability through the advent of higher claims exceeding the
limits of liability under the Civil Liability Convention and
thereby becoming compensable under the 1971 Fund Convention.
8.3.4 Updating of 1992 Protocol limitation amounts
The 1992 Protocols to both the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions incorporate a simplified procedure by which the
limits can be increased if the claims experience justifies such
action. This innovation constitutes a significant improvement on
the Conventions in their original forms. One of the most
significant faults of the 1969 Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions was that they did not allow for the flexible
adjustment of limits to reflect inflation and a continued
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escalation in the quantum of claims. The new procedure which is
described below has the potential to mitigate this fault.
Where one-quarter of the Contracting States to the 1992 Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions propose that the liability limits
be raised, the other Members shall be made aware of the proposal
and not less than six months thereafter the Legal Committee of
IMO shall be required to consider the proposal. All Contracting
States have the right to participate in the deliberations of the
Legal Committee. Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds
majority of Contracting States present and voting at the Legal
Committee, on condition that at least one-half of the Contracting
States are present. 68 The Legal Committee must consider the
experience of incidents, and in particular the amount of damage
resulting therefrom, and inflation. It shall also take into
account the relationship between the respective limits contained
in the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. 69 Upon all
Contracting States being made aware of the amendment it shall be
deemed to have been accepted after 18 months, unless one-quarter
of Contracting States obj ect. 70
Certain prerequisites must be met before such amendments may be
considered. No amendments shall be considered before the
Protocols have entered into force. Also, at least five years must
have elapsed from the date on which the Protocols are opened for
signature. Further a period of at least five years must elapse
between entry into force of an amendment and a subsequent
invoking of the procedure. 71 There are also limits imposed on
68 1 992 Civil Liability Convention Protocol, Article 15.1-4
and the 1992 Fund Protocol, Article 33.1-4.
69
1 9 92 Civil Liability Convention Protocol, Article 15.5
and the 1992 Fund Protocol, Article 33.5.
70
1 9 92 Civil Liability Convention Protocol, Article 15.7
and the 1992 Fund Protocol, Article 33.7.
(a)
711992 Civil Liability Convention Protocol, Article 15.6
and the 1992 Fund Protocol, Article 33.6 (a).
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the amount of any increase. 72
8.3.5 "Roll-back relief" abolished
"Roll-back relief", it will be recalled, is a phrase used to
describe the indemnification of shipowners, and their guarantors,
by the IOPC Fund, of a proportion of the liability assumed by
shipowners under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention. 73 This
procedure is abolished by the 1992 Protocols to the Fund
Convention. 74 Therefore, should the 1992 Protocols to the 1969
Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions enter into force the
liability level under the revised Civil Liability Convention will
be borne entirely by the shipowner and his guarantors.
In principle, the loss of "roll-back relief", and the way in
which such relief was linked to compliance with certain
international safety conventions is regrettable. The IOPC Fund
will have lost one means through which it could encourage
shipowners to be especially conscientious in obeying the
applicable safety conventions. On the other hand the abolition
of "roll-back relief" will serve to simplify the liability regime
instituted by the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
8.3.6 Extended geographical application
The 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions apply only to
pollution damage caused on the territory and the territorial sea
72 1 9 92 Civil Liability Convention Protocol, Article 15.6
(b), (c) and the 1992 Fund Protocol, Article 33.6 (b), (c).
73For an analysis of "Roll-back relief" see pg.143 of this
work .
74Article 5 of the Fund Convention is deleted by Article 7
of the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention. All other
references to the indemnification of the shipowner in the text
of the 1992 Protocols are also removed.
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of a Contracting State. 75 The geographical scope of application
of the original Conventions is enlarged by the 1992 Protocols to
encompass pollution damage caused in the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). The expanded geographical application applies equally to
both Protocols which is consistent with the common approach
followed in both components of the two tier regime.
The EEZ, established under Part V of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea,76 extends 200 nautical miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured. The Law of the Sea Convention attributes to coastal
States preferential rights for the purpose
exploiting, conserving and managing the living




also recognizes State jurisdiction over the protection of the
marine environment of the EEZ, including special rights to
control ship-source pollution in 'special areas' .78 In addition,
States are obliged to co-operate to ensure that adequate
compensation in respect of all damage caused by pollution to the
marine environment is provided . 79 Furthermore, the preamble to
the Convention emphasises that the international community
should, through the various conventions governing maritime
matters, encourage the evolution of laws which are consistent
with one another.
A.H.E. Popp, who was a member of the Canadian delegation at the
1984 Conference, describes the debate surrounding the
75This is so in terms of Article 3.1 of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention and Article 11 of the 1971 Fund
Convention.
76This Convention was developed at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS Ill)
77Law of the Sea Convention , Article 56.1(a).
78Law of the Sea Convention, Article 56.1(b) (iii) and
Article 211.6.
79Law of the Sea Convention, Article 235.3.
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geographical application of the 1984 Protocols as 'one of the
dramatic highlights of the conference'. 80 This appraisal is
confirmed by the Official Records of the Conference.
Certain issues, one of which was that the geographical scope of
both Conventions should be extended to cover all areas in which
Contracting States exercised sovereign rights over natural
resources, were crucial to the United States. 81 In this regard,
Rear Admiral B.F Hollingsworth, the lead U.S. representative,
stated that the U.S. . .. could not support any text which did
not include at least the exclusive economic zone. ,82 He
justified U.S. policy by pointing out that U.S. oil pollution
legislation, in effect at that time, regulated and maintained
jurisdiction over areas beyond the territorial seas of the United
States. 83
Many other States also supported extending the geographical scope
of application of the Conventions because to do so was consistent
with developments in international law and the Law of the Sea
Converrt i.on c " Mr Douay, the representative from France, stated
that [i] t was impossible to ignore the Law of the Sea
Convention, which provided for States to exercise their
jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone in order to preserve
the marine environment.' 85
However, many States which were already Party to the Conventions
argued that such extension was unwarranted as most pollution
8Opopp, op ci t, 123.
8l0fficial Records, vol.2 at 317 para. 28.
820fficial Records, vol.2 at 522 para. 48.
830fficial Records, vol.2 at 522 para.47.
840fficial Records, vol.1 at 147 para.4.
850fficial Records, vol.2 at 367 para . 35.
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damage occurred within the territorial seas,86 and that, if such
extension was permitted, it would result in the assumption of too
great a risk by Contracting States.~ These arguments put
forward by the States which were opposed to the extension would
seem to have been contradictory, and as such, self-defeating. On
the one hand they argued that t h e extension to the EEZ was not
necessary because little pollut ion damage would be caused in that
zone, then they claimed that , i f the Conventions were extended
to the EEZ the potential liabi l ity would be prohibitive.
The stand adopted by the U.S . eventual ly prevailed. This would
appear in principle to be the most desirable outcome because it
lends uniformity to internat ional maritime law, protects the
rights of coastal states and e xtends the rights of, for example,
fishermen to claim for pollut ion damage beyond the territorial
seas but within the EEZ .
The geographical application of both the 1992 Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions shall, upon entry into force, be governed by the
following provision.
'This Convention shall apply exclusively:
(a) to pollution damage caused :
(i) in the territor y, including the territorial sea,
of a Contracting State, and
(ii) in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting
State, established in accordance with international
law, or, if a Contracting State has not established
86For example, this was the approach endorsed by the
Federal Republic of Germany, see Official Records, vol.2 at
362 para.8; the United Kingdom , Official Records, vol .2 at 363
para.9; Sweden, Official Records, vol .2 at 367 para.31 and the
Netherlands, Official Records, vol .2 at 368 at 43.
87pOpp , op cit, 123, for example, this concern was
art iculated by the Federal Republ ic of Germany, Official
Records, vol.1 at 362 para .8 , Bahamas , Official Records, vol.1
at 364 para.14 and the Nether lands, Official Records, vol.1 at
368 para.43.
2 8 9
such a zone, in an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea of that State determined by that state
in accordance with international law and extending not
more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured;
(b) to preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or
minimize such damage.' 88
Clearly this amendment is an improvement upon the equivalent
provisions of the original Conventions as compensation for
tanker-source oil pollution damage shall be made more certain
within a wider area of potential application. The geographical
application is also described with greater certainty which will
diminish the possibility of different interpretations of the
geographical scope being employed in different jurisdictions.
The extended geographical application may also benefit
shipowners. Under the existing regime where pollution damage is
caused within the EEZ but beyond the territorial sea neither the
Civil Liability or the Fund Conventions apply and national law
will normally apply. The application of different liability laws
under diverse national legal systems leads to uncertainty and
poses the risk of unlimited liability under those systems. By
contrast shipowners benefit from legal uniformity and reliable
rights to limit liability under the 1992 Protocols. 89
8.3.7 Pollution from tankers in ballast
Pollution damage caused by spills of persistent oil from unladen
tankers and combination carriers shall be compensated for under
the provisions of the 1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability and
88This important amendment was implemented by Article 3 of
the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol replacing Article 11 of the
1969 Civil Liability Convention and Article 4 of the 1992 Fund
Protocol replacing Article 3 of the 1971 Fund Convention.
890fficial Recordss, vol.1 at 147 para.4 and 148 para.5.
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Fund Conventions provided certain conditions exist. This
constitutes a departure from the provisions of the 1969 Civil
Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions, which only provide
compensation where pollution damage is caused from laden tankers.
This change was conceived at the 1984 Conference by way of an
amended definition of a "ship" .
8.3.7.1 The existing definition of a "Ship"
The 1969 Civil Liability Convention, defines a "Ship", for the
purpose of that Convention, 'as any sea-going vessel and any sea-
borne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk
as cargo' .90 The 1971 Fund Convention provides that a "Ship" for
the purposes of the Fund Convention has the same meaning. 91
8.3.7.2 "Ship" as defined in the 1992 Protocols
The definition of a "Ship" contained in the 1992 Protocols to the
1969 Civil Liability Convention, is broader, and will, if the
1992 Protocols enter into force, permit more sources of oil
pollution damage to be recovered under the 1992 Conventions. For
the purpose of the 1992 Protocols a "Ship" includes:
'any sea-going vessel and any sea-borne craft of any type
whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil
in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of carrying
oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when
it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any
voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it
has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard. ,92
90Civil Liability Convention, Article 1.1.
91Fund Convention, Article 1 .2.
92Article 2 of the 1992 Protocol to the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention replaces the original definition of a
"Ship", and this definition is incorporated by reference by
Article 2.3 of the 1992 Protocol to the 1971 Fund Convention.
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The revised definition is more complex than that of the original
Conventions and envisages two kinds of situations. The first part
of the definition is fairly clear and extends the scope of the
Conventions to cover unladen tankers. The second part of the
definition is a proviso which relates to dual-purpose bulk
carriers, also known as combination carriers. These vessels are
specially designed, and are capable of carrying liquid and/or
solid cargoes. According to the wording of the second part of the
definition oil pollution from such vessels shall only qualify for
compensation under the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Convention
under two circumstances.
(a) the combination carrier is in fact carrying persistent oil
in bulk as cargo. ~
(b) the combination carrier has carried persistent oil in bulk
as cargo and the shipowner or the IOPC Fund is unable to prove
that no oil residues remained on board. Here the important points
are that the burden of proving the negative is on the shipowner
or the IOPC Fund and the proviso can apply to any succeeding
voyage not only the immediately succeeding voyage. 93 The
adoption of the phrase 'any voyage' in preference to 'the voyage'
raises the possibility of the applicability of the 1992
Conventions to incidents entirely unconnected with the
transportation of oil or oil residues at sea in combination
carriers. 94
In conclusion, the definition of "ship" in the 1992 Protocols is
wide enough to include tankers on ballast voyages, when they are
returning empty, and combination carriers only when they are in
fact carrying oil as cargo or in a subsequent voyage with
residues of oil on board. During the preparatory work leading up
to the 1984 Conference the suggestion that the regime be extended
to encompass damage caused by the escape of oil from non-tank
93pOpp, op c i t, 128.
940fficial Records, vol.2 at 6 .
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vessels was rej ected. 9S
The envisaged contribution of oil cargo owners towards the
compensation of oil pollution damage in circumstances where the
ship causing the spill is not in fact carrying oil as cargo
raises certain conceptual problems. At the 1984 Conference the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International
Group of P&l Clubs argued that the cargo interests derived an
economic benefit from ballast voyages of tank-vessels in that
such voyages were an integral part of the process whereby oil was
transported at sea. 96 Accordingly, they asserted that oil cargo
interests should share the risks involved in these voyages. On
the other hand, the Oil Companies International Marine Forum
(OCIMF), attempted to argue that oil pollution caused by tank-
vessels on ballast voyages was unconnected with the carriage of
oil at sea and that the Fund Convention should not be made
responsible for this damage . 97 As has been explained the
shipowner interests prevailed in this respect.
8.3.8 Pre-Spill Preventive measures
The 1992 Protocols permit recovery of "pure threat" preventive
measures where certain conditions prevail.
8.3.8.1 The existing position
The notion of "pollution damage" contained in the 1969 Civil
Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions, does not cover expenses,
costs or damages incurred in responding to "pure threat"
situations. Regrettably this is an absolute rule which originates
in the meaning contained in the circular reading of the
9SOfficial Records, vol.1 at 336.
960fficial Records , vol .2 at 6 ( I CS comment) and vol.2 at
53 (P&l comment ).
970fficial Records, vol.2 at 334 para.27 this view was
also shared by Popp, the Canadian representative, see Official
Records, vol.2 at 334 para.27 .
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definitions of "pollution damage", "preventive measures" and
"incident".
\ "Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the ship
carrying oil by contamination resul ting from the escape or
discharge of oil from a ship, wherever such escape or discharge
may occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures and
further loss or damage caused by preventive measures .,9B
\ "Preventive measures" means any reasonable measures taken by any
person after an incident has occurred to prevent or minimize
pollution.' 99 An \ "incident" means any occurrence, or series of
occurrences having the same origin, which causes pollution
damage. ,lOO (emphasis added by the present writer) .
The above definitions read together has the unfortunate
consequence that for measures to qualify as preventive measures
and as such receive compensation those measures must have been
undertaken to prevent or minimize pollution damage. The
definition of pollution damage is worded to exclude situations
where oil has not in fact escaped, or been discharged, from a
ship. Therefore preventive measures will only be "preventive
measures" and as such receive compensation where an oil spill
actually occurs. It has previously been explained in relation to
salvage and other preventive measures how this rule was not
conducive to the prevention of pollution damage. It was also
noted that in certain jurisdictions this rule had been
interpreted generously to include "pure threat" removal measures.
9BThis is in terms of Article 1.6 of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention which is incorporated by reference into
the 1971 Fund Convention in terms of Article 1.2 of that
Convention.
99This is in terms of Article 1.7 of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention, which is incorporated by reference into
the 1971 Fund Convention in terms of Article 1.2 of that
Convention.
100Th i s is in terms of Article 1.8 of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention, which is incorporated by reference into
the 1971 Fund Convention in terms of Article 1.2 of that
Convention.
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In order to clarify the position under the Conventions and
formulate a more practical and equitable dispensation the
definition of "incident" was amended at the 1984 Conference to
facilitate the recovery of "pure threat" removal measures .101
These important improvements are explained below within the
context of the 1992 Protocols.
8.3.8.2 The position under the 1992 Protocols
The 1992 Protocols permit the recovery of expenses incurred by
way of preventive measures, even in those situations where oil
has not actually escaped or been discharged from a ship.
Claimants must, however, prove that they responded to a grave and
imminent danger of pollution damage and that in doing so they
acted reasonably.
Article 2.3 of the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol replaces Article




(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or
damage caused by preventive measures.'
The 1992 Civil Liability Protocol does not replace or delete the
definition of "preventive measures" contained in Article I.7 of
the 1969 Convention. Therefore for the purpose of the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention "preventive measures" remains 'any
reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident has
occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage' . The definition
of an "incident" has however been altered in a manner which
facilitates claims for pure threat preventive measures. Article
. 101Jacobsson & Trotz 'The Definition of Pollution Damage
ln the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
and the 1971 Fund Convention' (1 986 ) 17 Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce 467 at 490-491 .
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2.4 of the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol replaces the Article 1.8
definition of an "incident" contained in the 1969 Convention with
a new definition:
'''Incident'' means any occurrence, or series of occurrences
having the same origin, which causes pollution damage or
creates a grave and imminene02 threat of causing such
damage.' (emphasis and footnote added by the present
writer)
The definition of the terms "pollution damage", "preventive
measures" and "incident" in the 1992 Fund Protocol have the same
meaning as in Article I of the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol. l03
Therefore pure threat pollution damage will also be included as
a claim for pollution damage under the 1992 Fund Convention.
At the 1984 Diplomatic Conference the D.S. delegation expressed
concerns that the term 'grave and imminent' in conjunction with
'threat' ... might result in a failure to compensate
Governments for wholly necessary preventive measures.' 104 On
this issue the CMI pointed out that the word 'grave' as used in
this context in conjunction with the word 'imminent' means
approximately the same as 'extremely serious' and 'imminent'
means 'near at hand ... on the point of happening' .105 'I'he CMI
further noted that the words 'grave and imminent' are used in the
parallel section of the 1969 International Convention Relating
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
102As an alternative to the phrase 'grave and imminent'
the word 'serious' was considered by the delegates at the 1984
Conference, see, Official Records, vol.2 at 241.
103Article 2.3 of the 1992 Fund Protocol.
104paulsen, op cit, 170; see Official Records, vo1.2 at
317 para.28.
1050fficial Records, vo1.2 at 49 quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 5th ed. (1979).
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Casualties .106 For these reasons the CMI preferred the
incorporation of the proviso 'grave and imminent threat' as
opposed to 'serious threat' because in their view it would
... avoid frivolous claims and unnecessary expenditures.' 107
At the 1984 Conference the International Salvage Union (ISU)
favoured the incorporation of the phrase 'serious threat' into
both Protocols. The ISU believed that the opportunities for
successfully preventing the threat of a pollution incident were
greater where action was taken while the threat was 'serious'
rather than 'grave and imminent'. 108 Clearly, there is
considerable merit in this view as it is not ideal to defer
salvage measures to the last hour.
It has been noted that the application of the phrase 'grave and
imminent' will exclude from compensation the costs of general
measures to prevent oil pollution. 109
A further point is that according to Articles 3 and 4 of the 1992
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
respectively the 1992 Conventions shall apply to preventive
measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimize pollution
damage. In other words in respect of a claim for costs and losses
sustained as a result of preventive measures these can be
claimed, wherever taken, even where there is no physical damage
to property. For instance salvors may be able to recover their
losses where they prevent threatened damage to the environment.
Such measures must in any event be reasonable under the
circumstances. The concept of reasonableness is not defined in
the 1992 Protocols and will therefore have to be decided by the
106The International Group of P&l Clubs also cited this
consideration as a reason for adopting the qualifying phrase
'grave and imminent', see, Official Records, vol.2 at 53.
107paulsen, op ci t Appendix A at 180, Official Records,
vol.1 at 49.
1080fficial Records , vol.2 at 42 para. 3.
109Jacobsson & Trotz, op ci t, 491.
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courts of the lex fori.
8.3.9 Definition of "Pollution Damage"
The 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention contains a
new definition of "pollution damage". This definition retains
some of the wording of the 1969 definition with certain
additions. Firstly, pure threat pollution damage is included in
the 1992 definition through the amendment to the definition of
an "incident". Secondly, the 1992 definition incorporates a
phrase which clarifies . the question of whether, and to what
extent, damage to the environment is included within the
definition of pollution damage.
Article 2.3 of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention provides that:
'"Pollution damage" means:
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the
ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided
that compensation for impairment of the environment other
than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually
undertaken or to be undertaken;
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or
damage caused by preventive measures .' (the emphasis has
been provide by the present writer in order to draw
attention to the additional phrase added in 1984 to the
original definition) .
This definition is incorporated by reference into the 1992 Fund
Protocol by Article 2.3. Therefore if the 1992 Civil Liability
and 1992 Fund Conventions enter i n t o force compensation for the
impairment of the environment, other than loss of profit from
such impairment, shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures
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of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken.
The proviso was devised to sat isfy the concerns of the IOPC Fund
for greater certainty in the type of claims which would be
considered admissible under the Conventions. The IOPC Fund was
anxious to incorporate a p roviso which would prevent the
admissibility of claims for e nvi r onme n t a l loss of the type
declared admissible by the Cour t of Riga in the Antonio Gramsci
case. One may note that the Pat mos incident occurred subsequent
to the 1984 Conference. It has been submitted that the resulting
amendment was not intended to \ ... change the substance of the
present definition as to its general scope, but only to give a
clearer delimitation of the scope, thus ensuring a uniform
i n t e r p r e t a t i on in Contract ing States'. 110 Strictly speaking,
this observation is only accurate if the general scope of the
notion of pollution damage i s taken to be the meaning attributed
to that concept by the IOPC Fund . It is, however, true that prior
to the 1984 Conference compensation had been provided for the
reinstatement of the environment under the existing Conventions.
For example, the costs of beach clean-up operations have always
been admissible as pollution damage regardless as to whether or
not actual economic loss a rose from the pollution in
question. 111
The original definition of pol lution damage is virtually all
encompassing and its interpretat ion is left to the Courts of the
lex fori. Therefore any delimitat ion brought about by the proviso
will clearly alter the substance of the definition. The proviso
i n fact restricts the not ion o f pollution damage and therefore
narrows the potential ambit o f t h i s concept. In the 1988 Annual
Report of the ropc Fund, an i mport a n t observation was made as to
the purpose and motivation f or the amended wording of the
definition of "pollution damage".
l1°Jacobsson & Trotz, op ci t, 483.
1110fficial Records, vol. 1 at 338.
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'The Diplomatic Conference based its deliberations on the
policy of the IOPC Fund and the principles developed by the
IOPC Fund Assembly and Executive Committee as regards the
admissibility of claims and the interpretation of the
definition of "pollution damage" as worded in the original
text of the Convention. The Diplomatic Conference adopted
the modified wording of this definition in order to codify
the interpretation of the definition as developed by the
IOPC Fund.' 112
This analysis of events at the 1984 Conference is confirmed by
A. H. E. Popp, who reported that ' ... there was considerable
sympathy for the view that some uniformity of interpretation
would be desirable'. In support of uniformity of damage claims
under the Fund Convention it was argued that diverse
interpretations of the notion of pollution damage in different
jurisdictions would violate the "fair shared sacrifice"
principle. Oil industries i n States maintaining a restrictive
definition of pollution damage would effectively be subsidising
clean-up and damage claims in States where more liberal
interpretation were allowed. 113 Clearly, it is not desirable
that this argument be taken too far because logically this would
require that all Contracting States to the Fund Convention should
incorporate the most restrictive definition of pollution damage.
Nonetheless, the argument would seem to have met wi th some
success in that the proviso was incorporated, however, a more
rigid definition was avoided in order to facilitate the continued
evolution of the concept of pollution damage. 1u
It has previously been observed, particularly within the context
of damage to the environment, that the courts of Contracting
States have not always conformed to the policy of the IOPC Fund.
It is also unrealistic to expect that private and state claimants
112IOPC Fund Annual Report 1988, section 13.4 (g) at 62.
113Popp , op c it, 122.
114Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit, 482; Brodecki, op cit, 383.
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will obey the policy of the IOPC Fund under the amended 1992
definition. In fact it is desirable that such claimants continue
to challenge the policy of the IOPC Fund because by doing so
preconceived legal assumptions are questioned and new legal norms
are able to develop. In the light of this statement it is
necessary to determine what effect the proviso regarding
compensation payable for environmental loss has on the ability
of claimants to recover such loss.
The proviso is designed to regulate compensation for two types
of pollution damage. Direct damage to the environment and pure
economic loss as a consequence of damage to the environment.
Although the amended definition would at first glance seem to
offer greater clarity and certainty than the definition in the
original form upon closer examination it is equally open to wide
interpretation under national law. Three areas of potential
ambiguity exist. Firstly, what constitutes loss of profit?
Secondly, what are reasonable measures? Thirdly, must measures
"to be taken" in fact be taken?
8.3.9.1 Loss of profits
The word profit as used in the definition of pollution damage is
not defined. The Oxford Dictionary provides two meanings to the
word profit. Firstly, profit can mean an advantage or benefit.
Secondly, profit can mean pecuniary gain, excess of returns over
outlay.lls
The first meaning has a more general meaning and could
conceivably include claims for lost aesthetic value caused by the
impairment of the environment sustained by a community at large.
In the same way that individuals profit from the maintenance of
their looks a coastal region profits from the maintenance of a
beautiful and diverse natural environment. A person whose
features are disfigured by an assault suffers a loss of advantage
llSThe Concise Oxford Dictionary 7th ed. (1982).
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or benefit in exactly the same way the inhabitants of a coastal
region suffer a loss of advantage or benefit due to the
contamination of their environment by oil. As a matter of
principle the IOPC Fund strongly disputes the admissibility of
such claims under the 1971 Fund Convention and would be better
able to do so under the 1992 Fund Convention according to the
wording of the proviso .116 In this respect the proviso has
furthered the objectives of the oil and ship-owning industries
in precluding claims for irreparable damage caused to the
environment and damage pending restoration and in this way has
detracted from the substantive scope of the notion of pollution
damage. Nevertheless, the degree to which the proviso will be
successful in preventing such claims can only be gauged in the
future.
The second meaning would include the more usual consequential
damage claims founded for example upon lost tourist revenues,
lost fishing-catches and lost taxes. The IOPC Fund has no
objection to such claims where a claimant has a legal right to
claim under national law and can establish that he has suffered
quantifiable economic loss. This will even be so where the
claimant can not be said to have a proprietary interest in the
damaged resource. Clearly the proviso merely describes the pre-
existing policy of the IOPC Fund and as such cannot be said to
expand or detract from the notion of pollution damage.
On the usual understanding of the meaning of the word 'profit'
both types of profits mentioned above may in principle be held
admissible by the courts of the lex fori. Because the definition
does not stipulate how lost profits are to be assessed and does
not expressly exclude the abstract quantification of such lost
profits according to theoretical models it would be possible for
claimants resorting to the abstract quantification of loss to
argue that the theoretical model used calculates actual loss of
profits. This was the argument raised by the Italian Government
116Jacobsson & Trotz, op cit 487.
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in the litigation following the Patmos incident. One may
therefore expect that the proviso will not prevent the assessment
of pollution damage in ways which contradict the policy expressed
in Resolution No.3 of the IOPC Fund Assembly.
8.3.9.2 Reasonable reinstatement measures
That this particular feature of the proviso may have been
incorporated in response to the issues raised by the SS Zoe
Colocotroni incident has not gone unnoticed by certain
commentators. 117 At the 1984 Conference, Dr F.L. Wiswall,
representing Liberia, noted that the 1969 Conference had not
intended that compensation for oil pollution damage under the
Civil Liability Convention would include awards such as those
awarded in the Zoe Colocotroni case .118 This important case is
discussed below.
At 0300 hours on 18th March, 1973, the oil tanker Zoe Colocotroni
ran aground on a reef three and a half miles off the coast of
Puerto Rico. In circumstances reminiscent of the Southport
Corpora tion case119 the captain of the Zoe Colocotroni
jettisoned approximately 5,170 tons of crude oil. The prevailing
currents carried the oil into a bay called Bahia Sucia which was
at the time a heal thy, functioning esturial ecosystem. As a
result of the spill considerable ecological damage was caused.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its principal environmental
agency, the Environmental Quality Board (EQB) sought recovery for
this loss. The owners of the Zoe Colocotroni were denied
exoneration or limitation of liability on account of the
substantial evidence of their privity. In 1978 the U.S. Court for
117Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit 237 para.10-138; Wilkinson
'Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage
Caused by Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of Two New
International Protocols' (1993) 5 Journal of Environmental Law
71 at 85.
1180fficial Records, vo1.2 at 483 para.55.
119For an analysis of this case see pg.19 of this work.
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the District of Pueto Rico delivered judgment in the case of
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al. v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni et
al. u o The Court awarded damages in favour of the plaintiff, the
nature of which caused considerable consternation to shipowners
and their P&l Clubs.
The District Court held that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had
locus standi or standing to claim for the requisite environmental
damage as it possessed a proprietary interest in the damaged
natural resources,121 and it was the trustee of the public trust
in those resources. 122 Furthermore, the Court held that the
Commonwealth of Puerto could maintain the suit in its capacity
of parens patriae because it had a quasi-sovereign interest in
the natural environment. 123 The District Court held that the EQB
had locus standi or standing to claim for the same environmental
damage under the provisions of a specific enabling statute. 124
1204 5 6 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978) hereinafter abbreviated
to Zoe Colocotroni (1978).
121Zoe Colocotroni (1978) at 1337 citing State of Maine v ,
M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1098-99 (D. Me. 1973) i State
Department of Fish & Game v. SS Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922,
926-30 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
122Zoe Colocotroni (1978) at 1337 citing Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 V.S. 519, 534 (1859) i State of Maryland,
Department of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972) i State Department of
Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.,
124 N.J. Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (1973).
123Zoe Colocotroni at 1337 citing Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208, 208, 241 (1901) i Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1
(1900) i Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447
(1945) i Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907) i Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. SuPP. 1097 (D. Me. 1973).
124Zoe Colocotroni (1978) at 1337. The enabling statute,
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(29), (1977), states that the EQB
was conferred powers:
'To bring, represented by the Secretary of Justice, by
the Board 's attorneys, or by a private attorney
contracted for such purpose, civil actions for damages in
any court of Puerto Rico or the United States of America
to recover the total value of the damages caused to the
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More germane to the present analysis was the Court's decision
regarding the assessment of harm to non-commercial living natural
resources. The Court recognized that the damage to the biological
components of the Bahia 8ucia ecosystem did not have a market
value in the sense of loss of market profits but nevertheless
determined that the quantum of damage would be assessed at the
cost of restoring the affected areas to the condition in which
they were before the incident .125 The Court awarded the
plaintiffs the market costs of replacing the damaged marine
organisms at U8$5,526,583.20 calculated according to biological
supply catalogs. The sum of U8$559,500 was awarded to replant
mangrove trees which included the cost of a five year monitoring
and fertilizing program at a cost of U8$36,OOO per annum or
U8$180,OOO for the five year period. 126 All these costs were
estimations based on what the lOPC Fund would consider 'abstract
quantification' and 'theoretical models' .
The U.8. Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision
to reject the traditional 'diminution of value' test for
assessing the quantum of environmental damage by which only the
commercial value of the damage would have been taken into
account. This decision was based, inter alia, upon the
interpretation of P .R. LAW8 ANN. tit. 12 § 1131 (29), (1977),
which provided that in a civil cause of action 'the total value
of damage caused to the environment ' may be recovered. Further,
environment and/or natural resources upon committing any
violation of this chapter and its regulations. The amount
of the judgment collected to such effect shall be covered
into the 8pecial Account of the Board on the
Environmental Quality .' (emphasis provided by the present
writer) .
The District Court also noted, at the same place, that the EQB
could not recover damages separate and apart from the
Commonwealth .
125Zoe Colocotroni (1978) at 1344-45 citing Feather River
Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1929).
126Zoe Colocotroni (1978) at 1345.
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the recovery provisions of section 311 of the Clean Water Act U 7
provided that the U.S. Federal Government and U.S. States were
authorized to recover 'costs or expenses incurred in the
restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or
destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil or a hazardous
substance ' 128 The Appeal Court, however, determined that
the decision of the District Court to award damages according to
the actual cost of removing oil-damaged mangroves and oil-
contaminated sediments and their replacement with healthy
mangroves and clean sediments was unreasonable. The Appeal Court
also rej ected the calculation of damage to marine biota according
to their replacement purchase price as if obtained from suppliers
of laboratory specimens. 129
On the question of reasonableness the Appeal Court made the
following statement:
the primary standard for determining damages in a
case like this is the cost reasonably to be incurred by the
sovereign or its designated agency to restore or
rehabilitate the environment in the affected area to its
pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is possible
without grossly disproportionate expenditures. The focus in
determining such a remedy should be on the steps a
reasonable and prudent sovereign or agency would take to
mitigate the harm done by the pollution, with attention to
such factors as technical feasibility, harmful side
effects, compatibility with or duplication of such
regeneration as is naturally to be expected, and the extent
to which efforts beyond a certain point would become
12733 U.S.C § 1321(f) (4) (Supp. I. 1977).
128Commonweal th of Puerto Rico, et al., Plaintiffs,
Appellees, v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, Her Engines,
Appurtenances, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants, U.S.
Court of Appeals, 628 F.2d 652, 673-74 (1st Cir. 1980)
hereinafter abbreviated to Zoe Colocotroni (1980).
129Zoe Colocotroni (1980) at 675-77.
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d i . t 1 ',130redundant or lsproportlona e y expenslve.
The definition of pollution damage in the 1992 Conventions
stipulates that the measures taken to reinstate the environment
shall be limited to the 'costs of reasonable measures'. No
mention is made as to the relative cost of the measures adopted
as constituting a criteria upon which unreasonableness may be
established but it would seem likely that this criteria would be
one of the factors to be considered. It would, however, be
possible for Government authorities responsible for the
rehabilitation of the environment to argue that the
reasonableness requirement should be based upon the expected
success of such operations or the choice of different restoration
techniques employed in preference to the pure cost consideration.
The Appeal Court further noted the fact that the case primarily
relied upon by the District Court to support the award of damages
for replacement value Feather River Lumber Co. v. United
Sta tes, 131
... did not contemplate a purely abstract recovery such
as that proposed here, where the theoretical "loss" was
worked out in terms of what it would cost to buy thousands
of creatures which, as a practical matter, would never be
brought in such a manner and could not be expected to
survive if returned to their damaged habitat. Rather, the
Ninth Circuit was simply willing to permit the government
to recover its actual and reasonable expected restoration
costs ... ' 132 (emphasis added by the present writer)
On these grounds the Appeal Court vacated the District Court's
130Zoe Colocotroni (1980) at 675.
U130 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1929).
132Zoe Colocotroni (1980) at 677 the wording used by the
Appeal Court closely reflects the wording chosen by the IOPC
Fund Assembly in Resolution No.3 of 11 October, 1980.
307
damage award and remanded the case to the District Court with
instructions to reopen the record for further evidence on the
issue of damages in line with the court's discussion of the
principles governing recovery in such cases. The court also
offered a number of suggestions to the parties and the District
Court on how to address the question of damage assessment on
remand. As alternatives to restoration costs, the court suggested
(1) the cost of acquiring comparable lands for public parks, (2)
the cost of reforesting a similar proximate site where the
presence of oil would not pose the same hazard to ultimate
success, and (3) the ecological value in monetary terms of non-
commercial natural resources. The court also expressed the view
that the EQB should have the opportunity on remand to show the
feasibility of carrying out a practicable plan for the actual
restoration of the environment which would not result on
excessive destruction of natural resources or disproportionate
costs. If such a plan could be developed the EQB would be able
to recover those costS.D3 This analysis could in principle be
applied to the definition of pollution damage in the 1992 Civil
Liability and Fund Protocols.
Certain important conceptual problems arise in connection with
the new definition contained in the 1992 Protocols. Firstly, it
would seem to be accepted that the cost of environmental
reinstatement must be proportionate to the value of the
ecological resource damaged. Where the adoption of a plan for the
reinstatement of the environment is grossly disproportionate to
the value of the natural resource then the measures will be
deemed unreasonable and no compensation will be made where such
measures are carried out. A fundamental problem arises, however,
when an attempt is made to determine the value of the natural
resource for the purpose of assessing relative value as opposed
to cost of reinstatement. The IOPC Fund as a matter of policy
denies that the environment has any value per se. The policy of
the IOPC Fund stipulates that no compensation shall be made for
133 Zoe Colocotroni (1980) at 678.
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damage to the environment per se unless a claimant can prove
quantifiable economic loss. The question now arises as to how the
IOPC Fund will attempt to evaluate the value of a natural
resource where no claimant has suffered quantifiable loss in
order to determine whether measures taken to reinstate that
resource are proportionate to the value of that resource? For
example I where a mangrove swamp which has no use value in
quantifiable terms is contaminated by oil one could argue in
terms of IOPC Fund policy that the relevant authority is not
justified in spending any money reinstating the swamp because any
amount spent on the renovation will be disproportionate to the
value of the swamp. Clearly I it is difficult to reasonably
justify this argument. But the conceptual problem for the IOPC
Fund is that where they admit that the swamp has a specific value
which therefore justifies reinstatement to a certain level of
expense they are conceding in principle that a mangrove swamp
does have an actual quantifiable value. Therefore certain
contradictions in the policy of the IOPC Fund may be brought to
the surface.
If the new definition of pollution damage contained in the 1992
Fund Protocol comes into force the IOPC Fund could now be placed
in the difficult position where it may be required to establish
the value of natural resources in order to show that the cost of
proposed reinstatement measures are grossly disproportionate. In
these circumstances the IOPC Fund will be faced with the same
problems of quantification that the Soviet and Italian
Governments were faced with in the Antonio Gramsci and Patmos
litigation. It remains to be seen how the IOPC Fund experts will
attempt to quantify such value without resorting to some type of
abstract quantification or theoretical model. This new proviso
if it calls for the assessment of the of non-commercial value of
natural resources may well have the beneficial result that both
parties to the dispute will be forced to consider the actual
value of such resources and finally be forced to recognise that
such resources do in fact have a value. It is preferable to
determine an actual value of a natural resource rather than
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maintain the fiction that such resources have no value and only
reasonable reinstatement costs can be compensated.
If under the 1992 definition of pollution damage it is maintained
that non-commercial natural resources have no value then no
compensation will be available where it is not possible or
practicable to restore the contaminated resources because
reinstatement under such circumstances would be unreasonable. If
this is the case then polluters who cause mild environmental
damage would be called upon to pay compensation through
reinstatement costs while polluters who cause irreparable damage
to the environment may not be held responsible. u 4 To overcome
this conceptual difficulty the Appeal Court in the Zoe
Colocotroni case suggested that equivalent alternate sites may
be renovated or the ecological value in monetary terms of non-
commercial resources could be recovered. 135
D. Wilkinson is of the opinion that the restoration of
alternative sites although being a 'sensible approach' is
unlikely to be permitted under the definition of pollution damage
in the 1992 Protocols because such reinstatement ... could
hardly be described as re-instatement' .136 However, the 1992
Protocols do not define the concept of reinstatement nor do they
specifically stipulate that reinstatement must relate to the
actual resource damaged. Therefore the exact interpretation of
the term must lie with the courts of the lex fori. The normal
understanding of the word reinstate is 'to restore to or replace
in a lost position' .137 It is significant that the definition
refers to reasonable reinstatement for compensation to the
134Wilkinson, op ci t, 88.
135Commonweal th of Puerto Rico, et al., Plaintiffs,
Appellees, v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, Her Engines,
Appurtenances, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants, U.8.
Court of Appeals, 628 F.2d 652, 677-78 (1st Cir. 1980).
136Wilkinson, op ci t, 88.
137The Concise Oxford Dictionary 7th ed. (1982).
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environment. Clearly what is reasonable depends on the
circumstances of the particular case. Where it is not possible
to reinstate the particular part of the environment contaminated
it is reasonable that the environment of the area receive
treatment which will remedy depreciation of the total ecosystem
caused by the irreparable damage to one component thereof.
A further conceptual problem arises in relation to the wording
of the definition of pollution damage contained in the 1992
Protocols. If we assume that claimants and the IOPC Fund shall
have to determine some value of non-commercial resources in order
to determine whether reinstatement costs are justified then both
parties must accept that some reduction in that value will occur
pending restoration. Once the IOPC Fund has had to concede that
some value has been lost the logical conclusion is that
compensation must be made for this loss. This brings the IOPC
Fund and claimants back to the question of the valuation of the
inherent worth of non-commercial natural resources. That this
category of loss exists cannot be denied, however, difficulties
in quantifying such loss continue to exist.
In the Zoe Colocotroni (1980) case the following sentiments were
expressed:
'To say that the law on this question is unsettled
vastly understate the situation. The parties in
lawsuit, and we ourselves, have ventured far
unchartered waters. We do not think plaintiffs
reasonably have been expected to anticipate where






This statement is almost as true today as in 1980, however, the
legal "waters" on this particular issue are considerably more
chartered than was then the case . This is especially so in the
light of legal developments i n the United States. The laws on
138Zoe Colocotroni (1980) opinion of the Court per
Campbell, Circuit Judge, at 678. '
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this issue as they pertain to oil pollution from ships is
explained in Part Four of this work which deals with the
substantive provisions of the OPA of 1990.
8.3.10 Channelling of liability to the shipowner
The delegates at the 1984 Conference hoped that the amended
channelling provisions would result in the uniform treatment of
potentially responsible part ies in the many States where the
revised Civil Liability Convention would come to apply .F" The
definition of an "owner" is not changed but the channelling (and
conversely restriction) of claims to the registered owner under
1969 Civil Liability Convention has been made more certain under
the 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention.
8.3.10.1 Existing channelling provisions
The reader will recallu o that Article 111.4 of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention stipulates:
'No claim for compensation for pollution damage may be made
against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this
Convention. No claim for pollution damage under this
Convention or otherwise may be made against the servants or
agents of the owner.'
8.3.10.2 The 1992 channelling provisions
The 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention provides for
the extension of those categories of persons against whom claims
may not be made. In this way the 1992 Protocol precludes claims
for compensation in terms of the Convention, or otherwise,
against a wider class of persons against whom liability could
U90fficial Records, vol.1 at 154 para .10.
uOFor a detailed analysis of the channelling provisions
of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, see pg.108 of this
work.
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otherwise conceivably attach. This important change is brought
about in terms of Article 4.2 of the 1992 Protocol which amends
Article 111.4 of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and which
provides that:
'No claim for compensation for pollution damage may be made
against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this
Convention. Subject to paragraph 5 of this Article,Hl no
claim for compensation for pollution damage under this
Convention or otherwise may be made against:
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or members of the
crew;
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a
member of the crew, performs services for the ship;
(c) any charterer (howsoever described, including a
bareboat charterer), manager or operator of the ship;
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the
consent of the owner or on the instructions of a competent
public authority;
(e) any person taking preventive measures;
(f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in sub-
paragraph (c), (d) and (e);
unless the damage resul ted from their personal act or
omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage,
or recklessly and wi. th knowledge tha t such damage would
probably result.' (footnote and emphasis provided to the
proviso by the present writer)
Thus, when the 1992 Civil Liability Convention applies to oil
pollution damage and the proviso emphasised above does not apply,
claimants may not proceed against the registered shipowner's
servants and/or agents. Pilots, time charterers, all other
H1Civil Liability Convention, Article 3.5 remains
unamended and preserves the shipowner's rights of recourse
against third parties.
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charterers, including bareboat charterers, ship managers and
operators, salvors and people taking preventive measures together
with their respective servants and agents are also protected.
Abecassis and Jarashow correctly observe that the protected
categories of potentially responsible parties is not exhaustive.
For example, these commentators submit that ship-builder, ship-
repairer, ship-classification societies and those associated with
ships colliding with tankers may not be protected."2
The registered owner retains all the normal rights of recourse,
according to the usual national laws of negligence, tort or
delict, against the exempted categories of people. 143 Where a
third party is sued by the registered owner in a recourse
recovery action that third party is precluded from proceeding
against any other third party encompassed within the categories
listed (a) to (f) to recover i t s losses unless it is able to
invoke the proviso.
At the 1984 Conference the Oil Companies International Marine
Forum (OCIMF) made a proposal i n terms of which the channelling
provisions would be replaced by the following provision.
'No claim for compensation for pollution damage under this
Convention or otherwise should be made against any person
other than the owner' ."4
The OCIMF was not, however, recommending that the shipowner's
right to recourse should be dispensed with."5 In the event the
OCIMF proposal received little s upport from the delegates and was
"2Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 233 para.10-126.
143
1 992 Civil Liability Convent ion, Article 111.5.
"4pOpp , op cit, 121 fn.12 c iting IMO Doe.
LEG/CONF.6/C.2/W.P.24 and contained in the Official Records,
vol.2 at 283.
"50fficial Records, vo1.2 at 434 para.27.
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rejected. 14 6 Nonetheless, it is important to consider the
rationale for the suggestion. The proposal no doubt had its roots
in the judgement of Judge McGarr of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois rendered on the 18th
April, 1978 (coincidentally some two weeks prior to the opening
of the Conference) . 147 Interpreting the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention, in the context of the Amoco Cadiz oil spill, Judge
McGarr held a number of affiliated oil companies liable for the
incident in addition to the registered owner. Oil companies were
understandably very concerned by this decision as it had the
effect of exposing them to direct liability. This concern is
alluded to in the statement which accompanied the OCIMF
channelling proposal where it was argued that the proposal would
minimize' ... the risk of ingenious attempts to circumvent the
Conventions.,148 This comment made by the OCIMF clearly referred
to the exceptional developments which occurred in the Amoco Cadiz
litigation. Due to the significance of this case it is described
in greater detail below.
On the 16th March, 1978, the supertanker Amoco Cadiz, ran aground
on the French coast after its steering gear failed in a storm.
Severe pollution damage was sustained to the French coastline.
The 1969 Civil Liability Convention applied to all claims for oil
pollution damage in France. This was because France had ratified
that Convention on the 17th March, 1975, and therefore when the
Civil Liability Convention came into force on the 19th June,
1975, the provisions of the Convention became the law applicable
in France. Unfortunately, the 1971 Fund Convention did not apply
because France only acceded to that Convention on the 11th May,
1978, and the Fund Convention came into force for France on the
16th October, 1978. Therefore, at first blush, the Amoco Cadiz
pollution damage would have had to be resolved according to the
1460fficial Records, vo1.2 at 436 para.44.
147In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978 , 1984 A.M.C. 2123 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
1480fficial Records, vol.2 at 283.
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provisions of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention alone. Clearly,
the Civil Liability Convention was the law of the place where the
wrong was committed (i.e. the lex loci delicti). The extent of
the damage caused by the spill greatly exceeded the limits of
liability under the Civil Liability Convention, French claimants
responded to this predicament by attempting to obtain
compensation from parties other than the registered owner of the
Amoco Cadiz. To this end they endeavoured, successfully, to
establish jurisdiction in the United States.
The registered owner of the Amoco Cadiz was Amoco Transport
Company ("Transport"), a Liberian corporation indirectly wholly
owned by Standard Oil of Indiana ("Standard"). In practice the
management of the Amoco Cadiz was carried out entirely by Amoco
International Oil Co. (AIOC) which like "Transport" was a wholly
owned subsidiary of "Standard". Judge McGarr held that the proper
law to be applied to determine whether AIOC and "Standard" could
be sued was that of the United States. However, he went on to
safeguard this decision by stating that even if the French law,
including the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, were applicable
to this issue, none of the provisions of the Civil Liability
Convention would bar suits against "Standard" or AIOC. This, the
learned judge held, was because the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention is not the exclusive remedy available to victims of
oil pollution damage and does not prohibit such victims from
bringing an action in tort outside the Civil Liability Convention
against anyone other than the registered owner of the vessel or
its agents or servants. The learned Judge therefore concluded
that none of the plaintiffs were precluded under French law from
suing Standard or AIDC because neither "Standard" nor AIOC, both
parent corporations of "Transport", were the registered owner of
the Amoco Cadiz or an agent or servant, of the registered
owner. 149 Therefore, even if the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
does apply it will not preclude actions against a vessel-
149In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978, 1984 A.M.C. 2123 at 2171, 2190-1
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
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operating affiliate or a corporate parent company of the
registered owner.
Judge McGarr pierced the corporate veil and held that "Standard"
and its two subsidiaries "Transport" and AIOC were liable without
limitation for the damage caused by the accident.
Firstly, AIOC as the party which exercised complete control over
the operation, maintenance and r e pai r of the Amoco Cadiz, and the
selection of her crew, had a duty to ensure that the vessel was
seaworthy and adequately maintained; this they failed to do and
they were therefore not entit led to limit their liability.150
Secondly, "Transport" as the nominal (registered) owner of the
Amoco Cadiz had failed to meet t h e burden of proving that it was
free from privity and knowledge with respect to the negligence
which proximately caused the grounding of the vessel. "Transport"
was therefore liable without limitation for the damage suffered
by the claimants as a result of the grounding of the Amoco
Cadiz .151 Thirdly, "Standard" a s a multinational corporation was
responsible for the tortious acts of its wholly owned
subsidiaries, AIOC and "Transport". Also, "Standard" was
initially involved in and controlled the design, construction,
operation and management of Amoco Cadiz and treated the vessel
as if it were its own so that "Standard" was liable for its own
negligence and that of AIOC and "Transport" and was liable to the
French claimants for damages r e s u l t i ng from the grounding. 152
Therefore, a major oil company can be held liable not only for
its own negligence but also for the negligence of its
subsidiaries based on a relationship of control and dominance
150In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978, 1984 A.M.C. 2123 at 2171, 2191-3
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
151In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978 , 1984 A. M. C. 2123 at 2193-4 (N.D .
Ill. 1984).
152 In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978, 1984 A.M.C . 2123 at 2194 (N.D. Ill.
1984) .
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over those subsidiaries. It is not necessary to establish any
abuse of that control or unfairness resulting therefrom. On
appeal to the D.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, all the
findings of law by the District Court were upheld .153
Thus, the reasoning and judgement of the District Court as
endorsed by the D.S. Court of Appeals has the result that the
major oil companies that own or operate ships through
subsidiaries, in veiled attempts to insulate the parent company
from liability, may nevertheless be exposed to unlimited
liability for oil pollution. Hence, the recommendation by the
OCIMF at the 1984 Conference to limit liability strictly to the
registered owner. Significantly, when the 1992 Protocol to the
1969 Civil Liability Convention enters into force a parent
company which is not the registered owner of the ship nor an
operator, manager, servant or agent of the registered owner is
not afforded the protection of Article 111.4 of the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention.
In a further attempt to eliminate the existence of this legal
loop-hole which exposes oil companies to potential liability the
OCIMF also proposed that the \affiliates and subsidiaries' of the
registered owner be specifically included as a category of
protected persons under Article 111.4 (a) of the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention. 154 As the delegates expressly rejected
this proposal one may infer that their intention was that such
parties should be exposed to l iability outside the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention.
It is frequently argued that the channelling provisions are
necessary to obviate the need for the whole spectrum of
potentially responsible parties associated with the operation of
1 53 In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978, 1992 A.M.C. 913.
1540fficial Records, vol. 1 at 157.
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a tanker to obtain oil pollution liability insurance.~5
However, to a large extent the owner's rights of recourse negate
this perceived benefit of channelling. Delegates at the 1984
Conference perceived this corrt r-ad i ct.Lon'r" and it is necessary
to isolate the true purpose of the channelling procedure. It is
submitted that the channelling procedure serves the primary
purpose of insulating the tanker industry and especially the oil
industry from unlimited liability for oil pollution damage. This
is because where the owner is able to limit his liability in
terms of the Civil Liability Convention, which will be the case
in most instances, then all parties protected by the channelling
provisions are protected by that limitation amount as the owner
only has recourse to the other parties up to the amount he has
paid in compensation. As such , these parties are still exposed
to potential liability but in the majority of circumstances the
risk is limited.
8.3.11 Barring the shipowner's right to limit
The criterion in terms of which the shipowner can lose his right
to limit liability under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention was
revised by the 1984 Protocol to that Convention, the revised test
has been incorporated by reference into the 1992 Protocol to the
1969 Civil Liability Convention.
8.3.11.1 The 1969 barring test
Upon proof that 'the incident occurred as a result of the actual
fault or privity of the owner ' shipowners loose their right to
limit liability under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention. 157
This test is generally applied, under the provisions of the 1957
155Ab . & J h .ecassls aras ow, op c~t, 233 para.10-126; Official
Records , vol.2 at 55; vol.2 at 125 para.6 and 7; vol.2 at 419
para.9; vol.2 at 442 para.4 .
1560fficial Records, vol.1 at 154 para.8.
157Article V. 2 of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
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Convention on Limitation of Liability, to many different types
of maritime claims and is in no way specific to claims for oil
pollution damage.
The phrase 'actual fault or privity of the owner' has on past
occasions been broadly interpreted158 and interpretations have
varied from one jurisdiction to another. 159 It is possible that
the tendency to interpret the 'fault or privity' test widely may
become even more marked in the future especially where disputes
involve large oil pollution claims. This is because judges are
sometimes placed under considerable pressure to find ways in
which compensation can be exacted, commensurate with the degree
of damage caused. One of the ways to achieve this is by breaking
the owner's right to limit, particularly where the owner is
thought to have an especially "deep pocket". This phenomenon,
whereby the traditional shipowner's right to limit has been
eroded obviously places shipowners in a tenuous position as
liability cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. In
a submission made by the International Group of P&l Associates
at the 1984 Conference the test of 'actual fault or privity' was
described as '[0] ne of the most glaring defects in the CLC'.
Their criticism was based upon the delay caused in effecting
paYments of compensation due from the shipowner, his insurer and
the IOPC Fund while a ruling as to the shipowner's right to limit
was made. 160 Clearly, the main concern of shipowners and the P&l
Clubs was that the test was not worded strongly enough to protect
them from unlimited liability for oil pollution damage.
8.3.11.2 The 1992 barring test
158Springall 'P&l Insurance and Oil Pollution' (1988) 6
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 25 at 36 suggests
that this test has generally been given an increasingly
artificial interpretation in many jurisdictions.
1590fficial Records, vol.1 at 149 para.1 and vol.1 at 159
para.1.
1600fficial Records, vol.2 at 55.
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The general consensus at the 1984 Conference was that the right
to limit liability should be linked to the limits available. The
more comprehensive the limits the more secure the rights of the
shipowner to limit liability would have to be. The revised test
under 1992 Protocol should enable shipowners to maintain the
right to limit with greater certainty. Article 6.2 of the 1992
Protocol to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention replaces Article
V.2 of that Convention, with the following test:
'The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability
under this Convention if it is proved that the pollution
damage resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with intent to cause such damage, or recklessly
and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.'
The substantive part of this test mirrors the wording of Article
4 of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims (1976 LLMC Convention) 161 and the Convention for the
unification of certain rules relating to International Carriage
by Air (the Warsaw Convention) as amended by the Hague Protocol
of 1955. 162 One of the factors which was taken into
consideration in adopting the new test was that the revised Civil
Liability Convention would be aligned with the provisions of
these Conventions. 163 As the revised test is more narrow than
the 'actual fault or privity' test it will greatly improve the
shipowner's chances of maintaining his right to limit if and when
the 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention enters into
force. This test is worded strongly in favour of the shipowner
interests which led the leading commentator on the subj ect of oil
pollution claims to the conclusion that ' ... for all practical
161DC?ne at London , on the 19th November, 1976 which
entered lnto force on the 1st December, 1986.
1620fficial Records, vol.2 at 55.
1630fficial Records, vol . 1 at 159 para .1.
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purposes, the new right to limit may be regarded as
unbreakable.,lH Obviously, the accuracy of such predictions can
only be gauged after the actual application of the test within
the context of serious oil spills.
The relationship between the enforceability of the shipowner's
insurance contract and the criteria in terms of which the owner
will be able to limit liability may at times become tenuous. The
standard of behaviour of the owner which will break his right to
limit liability under the 1992 Protocol is dangerously similar
to the English legal concept of 'wilful misconduct' which is the
standard of misconduct by the assured which invalidates the
insurance contract. Given that most policies insuring oil
pollution liability are governed by English law of marine
insurance, where the owner's r ight to limit is broken it will
also be possible that the insurer will be able to prove 'wilful
misconduct' and as such is entitled to refuse to payout on the
owner's liability insurance policy. In most cases cover will
remain intact where the shipowner successfully invokes the right
to limit, and the cover may in some circumstance fail if the
right to limit is broken. This reality may discourage victims of
oil pollution from attempting to challenge the owner's right to
limit.
8.3.12 The relationship between the 1976 LLMC Convention, and the
Civil Liability Convention
In terms of Article 3 (b) of the 1976 LLMC Convention, the
provisions of the Convention shall not apply to:
... claims for oil pollution damage within the meaning of
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution, dated 29 November 1969 ... '
164Ab • & J h . .ecaSS1S aras ow, op Clt, 244; Sprlngall op cit
36 describes limitation under the 1984 Protocol, as' 'virtually
unbreakable'. Because the same test for limitation was
in~o7Porat7d into the 1992 Protocols, by implication these
0plnlons wlll apply to the 1992 Protocol .
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Accordingly, all claims for o i l pollution damage, as defined in
Article 1.6 of the 1969 Civil Liabi l i t y Convention, do not fall
within the scope of the 1976 LLMC Convention. Article 3 (b) of
the 1976 LLMC Convention has t he effect of excluding claims for
oil pollution damage, which are within the meaning of the Article
1.6 definition of pollut ion damage, but not within the
geographical scope of the 196 9 Civil Liability Convention .165
Therefore claims for pollut ion damage outside the Article 1 .6
definition of pollution damage contained in the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention are exc luded from the application of the
1976 LLMC Convention, but claims for oil pollution outside that
definition are by implication s ubject to l i mi t a t i on in terms of
the 1976 Convention. As such o i l pollution damage caused by the
escape of non-persistent oil, o r by oil which was not carried in
bulk as cargo will be encompassed under the 1976 LLMC Convention.
As such the owners of such pol l uting ships may be able to assert
the right to limit liability according to the provisions in the
1976 LLMC Convention. This wi l l of course depend on whether or
not the State, in which such o i l pollution has been caused, has
contracted to the 1976 LLMC Conv e n t i on . Furthermore, certain
States may have promulgated nat ional legislation governing the
control of oil pollution other than the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention.
8.4 Conclusion to the 1992 Protocols
In sum, the 1984 Protocols achieved certain increased protection
for victims of oil pollution. The Protocols balanced the relative
limitation limits applicable t o small and large tankers. A
simplified amendment procedure was developed which permits the
increase of the limitation l i mi t s where appropriate. The
geographical scope of the Conven t ions are extended to the EEZ in
conformity with international l e g a l deve lopments. Pure threat
165Ar t i c l e 11 of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
stipulates that the 1969 Civil Li a b i l i t y Convention shall
~pply 7xclusively ~o p~llution d a ma g e caused on the territory
lncludl~g the terrltorlal sea o f a Contracting State and to
preventlve measures taken to prevent or minimize such damage.
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removal measures shall become admissible and the definition of
a "ship" is expanded to cater for wider pollution sources. Most
significantly, the limits of applicable damage are greatly
increased.
On the other hand the 1984 Protocols also introduce amendments
which protect polluters and which will work against the interests
of victims. The Protocols narrow the definition of "pollution
damage" and thus restricts the potential application of this
notion. This is especially relevant in the context of
environmental damage. The test for breaking the shipowner's right
to limit has become more secure. The channelling provisions have
been expanded, thus increasing the scope of potentially
responsible parties protected from liability under the Civil
Liability Convention.
The 1992 Protocols introduce revisions upon the 1984 Protocols
which increase the probability of the 1992 Protocols entering
into force through decreasing the entry into force requirements.
At the same time the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention
introduces a "capping" procedure which has the potential to
encourage the early ratification of the 1992 Fund Protocol by
Japan which is the major oil importer and contributor to the IOPC
Fund. This new procedure should help to bring the 1992 Protocols
into force at an early date. If the 1992 Protocols enter into
force it will help to settle the problem of the gold franc/SDR
conversion conundrum which has been the cause of such controversy
in the Haven case.
On the 19th January, 1993, Shell International Marine delivered
a list of proposals to the European Parliament, European
Commission, and industry bodies, outlining a course of action to
be adopted by government. The aim of this document which had been
initiated by the Braer spill and the fact that tanker-source oil
spill prevention was on the agenda at the European Parliament on
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the 21st January, 1993,166 was:
, ... to help force substandard ships out of business while
leading to increased freight rates needed to encourage
shipowners to invest in safer maintenance and manning
policies, as well as new tonnage.' 167
In this policy document Shell International Marine proposed an
eight point plan of action, urging governments to:
'[1] Improve accountability of flag state administrations
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
[2] Tighten links between tanker ownership and country of
registry and prevent owners from "shopping around" among
registries.
[3] Tighten international manning, training, and
certification rules.
[4] Increase financial resources of government agencies to
recruit and train sufficient qualified staff.
[5] Improve quality, frequency, scope and coordination of
inspections while strengthening sanctions against
substandard ships.
[6] Publicize ship inspection deficiencies and inquiries
into ship casualties.
[7] Quickly ratify the 1992 IMO Protocols for Oil Pollution
Compensation.
[8] Speed payments from the Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund. u 8 (emphasis and numbering that of the present writer)
166D. Knott 'Voice of experience joins tanker debate' Feb.
1, 1993 Oil & Gas Journal at 19.
167'Shell calls for improved tanker safety' Fed. 1, 1993
Oil & Gas Journal at 18.
168'Shell calls for improved tanker safety' Fed. 1, 1993
Oil & Gas Journal at 18 The reference to 'the Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund' refers to the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) as developed by the Fund
Convention and funded by oil companies importing oil to states
party to that convention.
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What is apparent from the position advanced by Shell
International Marine is that this organization proposes the
implementation of strong "command and control" measures. 169
Presumably, Shell's rationale for this position was that if all
maritime states were committed to prevent all sub-standard
tankers from operating this would reduce the capacity of the
tanker fleet and raise the freight rates of the high-quality
tonnage which is permitted to continue trading. This in turn
would provide the necessary capital to enable the standards of
the tanker fleet to improve. Clearly, if this plan was uniformly
implemented to a very high standard the desired result would
eventually occur. However, it is unlikely that this ideal will
be attained.
When dealing with the question of liability, in the final two
recommendations, Shell supports the maintenance of the status
quo. Shell urges the governments European coastal states to
'quickly ratify' the 1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions. It is noteworthy that these Protocols like the
original Conventions preclude claimants from suing the actual
cargo owner, who is, in most instances, the charterer. Instead,
under the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention all importers of
oil by sea to Fund Convention states mutually bear the costs of
pollution claims paid by the IOPC Fund. Furthermore, the amount
of compensation which can be paid by the Fund is limited to an
unassailable upper ceiling. In this way the losses which would
be incurred by the actual owner of oil involved in a spill are
distributed between the entire oil industry, and, because this
liability is limited it is kept to easily manageable and
acceptable limits. Obviously, this system of mutual cargo owner
liability does not provide significant incentives for the cargo
owner to be selective where he charters a tanker. In fact, the
opposite is true. Where the individual cargo owner knows he will
not be exposed to personal liability he will continue to use the
least expensive tanker. As a group all the cargo owners will tend
169Points 1-6.
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to behave in this way to maximise individual profits.
The final proposal made by Shell is that payments under the IOPC
Fund must be made as fast as possible. One would reasonably
expect a large oil importer such as Shell to be reluctant to pay
claims under the IOPC Fund as such claims are paid by oil
importers in Fund Convention States, including Shell. Why then,
it may be asked is this suggestion made, or rather, how does
Shell, and the oil industry benefit from speedy payments?
Is it possible that Shell is being benevolent? Is Shell so
concerned that victims of oil pollution are compensated that it
almost wants to give its money, and that of other oil companies,
away? It is not difficult to conclude that this is not the real
reason. Shell, and by implication the entire oil industry, is
very concerned that victims of oil pollution receive generous
compensation as soon as possible after the spill, without
claimants which are frequently government agencies who incur
clean-up expenses, being forced to resort to litigation. Where
governments do not receive such compensation they may be inclined
to revise their domestic legislation to include cargo owner
liability in order to have recourse to a defendant with greater
resources than tanker owners. Shell, and other oil companies,
would not welcome such developments. However, it is suggested in
this work that such development would be advantageous not only
in that it would provide claimants with defendants with large
resources but would also rapidly see the development of a two-
tier tanker freight market. The two tier freight market describes
a situation where oil company charterers of tankers pay a premium
for high quality tankers while avoiding lower quality tankers or
paying a reduced rate for the use of such vessels. The advent of
the two tier tanker market would result in the capitalization of
the tanker industry and the subsequent improvement in tanker
standards. This concept will be amplified upon after the analysis
of oil pollution liability under the voluntary compensation
agreements and OPA 90 and U.S. State Legislation, respectively,
in Part Three and Part Four. The question will be asked to what
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extent these liability mechanisms together with those of the
international Conventions contribute to or retard the development
of safer tanker standards. To justify a shift towards including
the cargo-owners as a party potentially liable for tanker-source
oil pollution damage involves a two stage argument. First, the
exact cause of tanker-source oil pollution will be isolated and
second it will be shown why subjecting the cargo owner to
potential pollution liability will effectively and efficiently
solve the problem. This analysis is undertaken in Chapter
Fourteen, the penultimate chapter of this work, which covers U. S.




TOVALOP and CRISTAL: An Introduction
9.1 Introductory discussion
In addition to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and 1971 Fund
Convention, there are two further agreements, which were invented
and evolved by the shipping and oil industry. Through these
agreements, compensation for certain ship-source oil pollution
damage may be recoverable. These agreements are: the Tanker
Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP), and the Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker
Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) . The format and substantive
provisions of these agreements, together with the utilization of
a two-tier compensation system, bear a close resemblance to the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. Nevertheless, despite many
similarities between TOVALOP and CRISTAL vis-a.-vis the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention and 1971 Fund Convention, numerous important
substantive and conceptual differences also exist. These
differences will be amplified in the present discussion. One of
the objectives of the present inquiry is to indicate the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the parallel systems of compensation
and to assess which, on a broad balance of criteria, would best
serve the international community.
The TOVALOP and CRISTAL agreements presently in existence will
expire on 20th February, 1997. It is not coincidental that these
agreements are renewed and expire on the same date that the P&l
Clubs employ as the start and close their policy years (i.e. 20th
February). This is done because the P&l Clubs provide the
financial backing necessary to guarantee the financial
responsibility assumed by individual members under the TOVALOP
agreement. P&l mutual insurance was explained in Part Two and the
TOVALOP agreement may be described a special kind of P&l cover,
which is regulated by its own particular terms and conditions;
(i.e. the TOVALOP agreement), which someti~es operates in
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conjunction with sources of mutual funds derived from ' oil
companies; (i.e. funds levied on oil importers in terms of the
CRISTAL contract) .
Under their respective agreements, tanker owners and oil
companies, of their own accord, accept, through TOVALOP and
CRISTAL respectively, limited 'financial responsibility' for
certain kinds of ship-source oil pollution damage. Recognizing
that compensation provided by participating members in terms of
these agreements is, in principle, voluntary, the term 'financial
responsibility' is used in preference to 'liability' which de
facto connotes responsibility determined through the operation
of law.
9.1.1 Objectives of this inquiry
This part, (i.e. Part Three), of the present work clarifies and
explains the provisions and operation of the voluntary
compensation agreements. These agreements, which have been
fundamentally revised since . 20th February, 1987, have on the
whole attracted remarkably little commentary from legal
practitioners, industry, government or academic commentators.
Current, critical and comparative analysis of this important,
innovative, complex and unique compensation arrangement is
clearly overdue.
In line with the fundamental proposition proposed in this thesis,
the present inquiry will demonstrate that the existence of the
voluntary compensation regime serves to allow the oil companies
to continue to avoid direct and full responsibility for the
standard of tankers used by that industry. This argument points
to a widely held misconception about the voluntary compensation
regimes and the role they fulfil. Thus, it is regularly
professed, that the voluntary compensation agreements demonstrate
the responsibility of the oil industry towards the problem of oil
pollution. This professed 'responsibility' certainly exists on
a prima facie examination of the agreements; however, on a more
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complicated and critical level, the 'responsibility' is revealed
as a strategy which postpones the assumption of full
responsibility and accountability of the oil industry for the
quality of the tankers they charter. It will be argued that the
oil industry, through Cristal Limited,l in effect pays oil
tanker owners to continue accepting responsibility for oil
pollution. And, by implication , pays the governments of the
international community to accept this state of affairs.
An examination of the voluntary agreements which does not
automatically accept the "fully-responsible" characterisation of
those agreements, must take into account the active competition
waged for control (over the form of liability) between the
voluntary agreements and the international conventions.
9.1.2 The enigmatic voluntary agreements
The paucity of commentary relating to this facet of oil pollution
compensation, may, in part, be attributable to the scanty
information divulged by the P&l Clubs and Cristal Limited
relating to the actual operation of TOVALOP and CRISTAL
respectively.
All settlements entered into under these agreements are subject
to strict confidentiality. Information concerning the number and
nature of claims, the criteria in terms of which damages are
assessed and the amounts paid to claimants for different types
of claims under TOVALOP and CRISTAL is never made public. 2 Other
information made available to the public is, in general, discreet
lBriefly, Cristal Limited is the organization which
manages the CRISTAL contract.
2Interviews conducted by the present writer in October,
1992, at the registered offices of International Tanker Owners
Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF) and Cristal Services
Limited; Staple Hall, 87-90 Houndsditch, London. See also
Becker 'AcronYms and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage
from Tankers' (1983) 18 Texas International Law Journal 475 at
478.
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and circumspect. This policy has been steadfastly adhered to with
a singular strength of purpose throughout the existence of the
voluntary agreements. Put plainly, the workings of these
agreements are fairly secretive.
The rationale for this veil of secrecy is easily understood from
the perspective of both the shipping and oil industries, which
must take cognizance of their respective self-interest.
Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that this guarded policy
should be endorsed by independent bodies. The international
community must also champion its own (higher) self-interest.
Clearly, the control of information by the oil and shipping
industry concerning the settlement of a large proportion of oil
pollution claims is not an ideal state of affairs. It may further
be pointed out that the general control of information by the oil
industry frequently attracts criticism. Adverse comment on the
prevalence of secrecy in the oil industry has by no means been
confined to environmental concerns, however, this is increasingly
becoming a regular cause for complaint. In short, there is a
definite need for better ' disclosure of information to the public
in the area of voluntary compensation for tanker-source oil
pollution damage.
Therefore, although it is accepted that the voluntary
compensation agreements provide important mechanisms through
which compensation for oil pollution damage can be obtained, it
is difficult to gauge the exact nature or extent of the remedies
available. Only the Management and Directors of the ITOPF i which,
among other activities, administers the TOVALOP agreement; P&l
Clubs, which pay the claims which arise under TOVALOP, and
Cristal Limited, which settles and pays CRISTAL claims, are in
a position to assess the record of TOVALOP and CRISTAL from a
truly comprehensive perspective. It is not possible for an
"outsider" to determine the precise manner in which the
agreements operate in practice. Regrettably, therefore, in
endeavouring to assess the true character of these agreements,
"outsiders" are forced to rely to a very large extent upon the
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texts of the agreements themselves. It becomes necessary to base
the analysis on whatever scant information is available and to
interpret and extrapolate from that. Nevertheless, as a general
statement, it may be surmised that the interpretation of
pollution damage adopted under TOVALOP and CRISTAL will be
similar to that adopted by the IOPC Fund. Where the voluntary
agreements have broadened the definition of pollution damage
beyond the scope permitted under the 1969 Civil Liability and
1971 Fund Conventions, however, such extension is to be taken
into account. The practice of the IOPC Fund has been explained
in considerable detail in Part Two of this work. It will be
recalled that the IOPC Fund and the P&l Clubs strive for
consistent interpretations of the notion of pollution damage
under the Fund Conventions and the Civil Liability Convention,
respectively. This is done in terms of the Memorandum of
understanding dated 5th November, 1980.
9.1.3 Previous commentaries
Considering the major role that both voluntary agreements have
secured in facilitating compensation and generally managing
liability and conflict in the controversial and politically
sensitive field of tanker-source oil pollution damage, they
require carefully considered and frequently updated analysis.
This task has previously been undertaken at different times by
commentators working within the field of oil pollution liability
and management. For example, in their work on oil pollution;
Pollution Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea, the
authors M' Gonigle and Zacher discuss the development and also the
motivation for the voluntary compensation agreements. 3 However,
although those authorities make comprehensive observations upon
the nature of and rationale for the voluntary agreements, it must
be borne in mind that they were writing in 1979. The nature and
3M'Gonigle & Zacher Pollution Politics, and International
Law: Tankers at Sea (1979) pp 154-60 TOVALOP is discussed and
pp 178-99 CRISTAL is discussed.
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form of the systems controlling oil pollution liability and' the
politics of oil pollution from tankers has evolved considerably
since that time.
Also, Abecassis and Jarashow in their work: Oil Pollution from
Ships: International, United Kingdom and United States Law and
Practice, provide lengthy and penetrating coverage of these
agreements." However, these authors deal with the nature and
form of the agreements as they stood in 1985 - since then nine
years have elapsed.
9.1.4 Significant post-1985 developments
Significant developments in the law relating to oil pollution
have taken place during these nine years, which are covered by
the present work. Together with the Exxon Valdez spill, on 24th
March, 1989, the most important developments which have occurred
are the following.
Firstly, the United States explicitly rejected the international
approach and passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) on 18th August,
1990. Repercussions from this development have been (and shall
continue to be) felt in the tanker and oil industries for some
time to come. One of the particular concerns of the present work
lies in the likely consequences of OPA, and associated state
legislation. This impact is already discernible on the
international pollution regimes covered by the international
Conventions and associated voluntary agreements. This subject is
explored further in Part Four of this work.
"Abecassis & Jarashow Oil Pollution from Ships:
International, United Kingdom and United States Law and
Practice 2nd ed (1985) Chapter 12 pp 303-325. For further
descriptions of the earlier versions of TOVALOP and CRISTAL,
see Becker 'A Short Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and
CRISTAL' (1974) 5 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 609;
Clark 'The future of TOVALOP' (1978) 2 Lloyd's Maritime and
Commercial LQ 572; Jacobsen & Yellen 'Oil Pollution: The 1984
London Protocols and the Amoco Cadiz' (1984) 15 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 467; Becker (1983), op cit, 475.
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Secondly, the ~nability of the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 civil
Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions to attract sufficient support
to bring about their entry into force and the amendment and
substitution of those instruments by the 1992 Protocols thereto,
is a notable development for the international regulation of oil
pollution liability. This development is discussed in detail in
Chapter Eight of this work.
It is arguable that both these developments were largely
precipitated by the Exxon Valdez spill. Alternatively, it could
be argued that the Exxon Valdez spill merely hastened what would
have been an inevitable evolution of the law in this area.
During this same time-span the shipping and oil industries (the
architects of TOVALOP and CRISTAL respectively) have not assumed
a passive or static role. It is remarkable that the shipping and
especially the oil industry have, so far, maintained control over
the distribution, mode of assessment and form of liability for
oil pollution from tankers. On each occasion when a "watershed"
tanker spill occurs (i.e. Torrey Canyon, 18th March, 1967; Amoco
Cadiz, 17th March, 1978 and Exxon Valdez, 24th March, 1989)5 it
seems as if the system of voluntary compensation will be replaced
by government or inter-governmental action. But, so far, this has
not been the case, instead, the two-tier voluntary scheme is
rapidly revised to better suit its changed surroundings.
The voluntary agreements were originally set up in response to
the changing environment within which the oil industry was being
called upon to operate in the wake of the Torrey Canyon spill.
Since then, they have been regularly adapted to cope with
5An analysis of the three watershed oil spills, which
prompted developments in the law governing oil spill liability
reveals a remarkable pattern of ineptitude and lack of
responsibility from oil companies as both cargo and tanker
owners. Cutting through the obfuscations of corporate
structures: the Torrey Canyon was owned by the Union Oil
Company of California (UNOCAL) and the cargo owner was BP. The
Amoco Cadiz was owned by AMOCO and the cargo owner was Shell.
The Exxon Valdez and its cargo was owned by EXXON.
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changing circumstances. Significantly, since 20th February, 1'987,
both voluntary agreements operate in an entirely different manner
than had previously been the case. As from 20th February, 1987,
parties to TOVALOP have been bound by the revised form of that
agreement which incorporates a Supplement to the original
agreement. The terms of the TOVALOP Supplement apply only to
pollution incidents in which a TOVALOP tanker is carrying a cargo
which is owned by a member of CRISTAL. In all other cases, only
the terms of the TOVALOP agreement - excluding its Supplement -
are applicable (i.e. the Standing Agreement) .6 A convenient way
to recall this dichotomy is to bear in mind that the Standing
Agreement can 'stand' on its own, whereas the Supplement and
CRISTAL are inextricably linked and co-dependant. At the same
time as TOVALOP became a two-tier agreement, the CRISTAL Contract
which came into operation on the 20th February, 1987, was
extensively revised. 7
This discussion of the voluntary agreements refers to the
relevant historical development of the voluntary agreements,
where this illuminates the legal evolution of these regimes.
However, the versions of TOVALOP and CRISTAL described herein are
the agreements that came into force on 20th February, 1994. The
6The Standing Agreement and TOVALOP Supplement originally
had a stated duration of five years from 20th February, 1987.
It was due to have expired on 20th February, 1992.
Fortunately, at an Extraordinary General Meeting in Oslo on
the 30th October, 1991, the parties to TOVALOP voted
overwhelmingly in favour of a Special Resolution calling for a
two-year extension of the Agreement to the 20th February,
1994. In October of 1993, the membership agreed to further the
TOVALOP agreement, appropriately amended to 20th February,
1997.
7The revised CRISTAL contract originally had a stated
duration of five years from 20th February, 1987. As such it
was due to have expired on 20th February, 1992. On the 28th
October, 1991, the membership of CRISTAL voted to extend their
supplementary compensation arrangements to 20th February,
1994. Accordingly, CRISTAL, like TOVALOP, was due to expire on
20th February, 1994. Fortunately, at a Special General Meeting
of CRIST~ members, held in Victoria, British Columbia,
Canada, It was resolved to amend the CRISTAL contract and
extend its application to 20th February, 1997.
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revised TOVALOP and CRISTAL agreements will remain in force until
expiry on 20th February, 1997. Accordingly, this work undertakes
retrospective and contemporary analyses of TOVALOP and CRISTAL.
Although it is possible that these agreements may be extended
beyond 20th February, 1997, it is not possible, to predict now
whether this will be the case. It is, nevertheless, possible, to
identify developments, which may, motivate either for or against
the further extension of the voluntary agreements (beyond 20th
February, 1997). Two factors which would obviously negatively
impact on the further extension of these compensation
arrangements would be the following. Firstly, if the 1992
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions come into
force, and were to receive wide support, the voluntary agreements
may be discontinued. In the view of the present writer this is
probably unlikely to occur before 1997. Secondly, if significant
states, or groups of states (i.e. the European Community), reject
the international approach and adopt unilateral or regional
action of the type already adopted by the United States, the
voluntary agreements might well be discontinued or would at least
cease to have relevance in those areas. Clearly, of these two
possible scenarios the oil and shipping industries would prefer
international uniformity as opposed to regional fragmentation.
Realistically, however, the industry probably realizes that
international uniformity will not eventuate (in the short term)
and that they will have to operate within a mixture of
international and regional control.
It may be noted, in this regard, that the Supplement to TOVALOP
and CRISTAL are presently the only truly internationally applied
oil pollution compensation mechanisms in operation. Some would
be quick to hail this state of affairs as a triumph of private
enterprise and the philosophy of laissez-faire over government
control. Certainly, as will be explained, such assertion could
be understood, at many different levels.
9.2 The nature of the Agreements
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Both TOVALOP and CRISTAL are private agreements amongst tanker
owners and oil companies, formulated and agreed to with the
specific purpose of compensating certain types of loss caused by
vessel-source oil pollution. Under these agreements certain
rights and duties arise between the members inter se. Such rights
and duties may be enforced by and against the members through the
operation of the laws governing contractual obligations. By
contrast, third party claimants may not enforce any provisions
of these agreements through recourse to the courts. Such
claimants are expressly prevented from doing so according to the
provisions of the voluntary agreements. Nevertheless, such
claimants would be free to forego possible benefits under the
agreements and to attempt to recover their losses under other
applicable law.
9.2.1 TOVALOP: Standing Agreement and Supplement
As mentioned above, the position has been that since 20th
February, 1987, the TOVALOP agreement has consisted of two
separate dispensations: the Standing Agreement and the
Supplement. Despite this bifurcation of the TOVALOP agreement,
it nevertheless still remains a single agreement and every
participating member is required to become party to both parts
thereof. Generally, according to the TOVALOP Agreement, the
participating owners and bareboat charterers of approximately 97
per cent of the world's tanker tonnage,8 voluntarily assume a
contractual obligation, between themselves, to pay compensation
according to the provisions of the agreement, for certain kinds
of pollution damage caused where persistent oil is discharged
from a participating tanker.
9.2.2 CRISTAL
CRISTAL is a close voluntary equivalent to the Fund Convention.
Under CRISTAL, a Fund provides additional compensation where that
8The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
Review (1992) at 3.
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available from the shipowner, under the TOVALOP Supplement ', is
insufficient to compensate victims of oil pollution damage. The
CRISTAL Fund is financed by CRISTAL members, which include cargo
owners, charterers, and oil traders. These participants each
finance the fund in proportion to the quantity of oil received
individually (as against the total quantity received by all
members) . Periodic calls are made when funds are required to meet
CRISTAL claims. Under TOVALOP, each participating member has
responsibility, in an individual capacity, to compensate victims
of pollution damage caused by his vessels, whereas, under the
CRISTAL Contract, no liability attaches to individual cargo
owners in their personal capacity.
9.3 Historical retrospective
Before the detailed analysis of the agreements is embarked upon,
in Chapters Ten and Eleven, it is necessary briefly to consider
how and why these agreements were devised and in what way the
original forms of those agreements have evolved, in response to
external variables, since their conception, up to the present
time.
9.3.1 Torrey Canyon: catalyst for change
In the same way that the wreck of the Torrey Canyon ultimately
resulted in the development of the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971
Fund Conventions, it was also the fons et origo of both the
voluntary compensation agreements. When the oil companies
realized that the governments of the international community of
sovereign states were meeting to devise an international
pollution compensation regime, the oil and shipping industries
resolved to take pre-emptive measures. 9 It is submitted that the
use of the adjective 'pre-emptive' is entirely justified, because
the raison d'etre for the voluntary agreements was, ideally, to
prevent, ' and, at least, significantly postpone, the evolution of
9M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 156.
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rules which would make cargo owners directly and fully
financially accountable for the damage caused by oil pollution
from tankers.
Accordingly, although the voluntary agreements were ostensibly
constructive initiatives which were intended to be seen as
indicative of the responsible philosophy prevalent within the
shipping and oil industries, the agreements were in point of fact
reactionary in nature. Through these initiatives the oil
companies endeavoured, with considerable success, to oppose a
complete change and maintain traditional liability relationships
which better suited their purposes. By voluntarily making certain
sacrifices on their own terms and within their control they hoped
to avoid attracting what they perceived as unacceptable
penalties.
9.3.2 The "Seven Sisters" make the rules
The appellation, the "seven sisters", refers to the seven largest
and most powerful multinational oil companies. In 1969 when
TOVALOP, the first of the two voluntary agreements, appeared, the
sisters were: ESSO, Standard Oil Company of California, Mobil,
Gulf, TEXACO, Shell and BP. Some changes have, however, occurred
since that time. ESSO is now called EXXON and the Standard Oil
Company of California is now Chevron. Gulf no longer exists as
it was acquired by Chevron on 5th March, 1984, for US$13. 2
billion and was fully merged into that company.10
9.3.3 Conception of TOVALOP
On 7th January, 1969, TOVALOP was signed by the tanker owning
arms of the "Seven Sisters", namely : ESSO Transport Company Inc.,
Standard Oil Company of California, Mobil Oil Corporation, Gulf
Oil Corporation, TEXACO Inc., Shell International Petroleum
lOFor a discussion of the acquisition of Gulf Oil by
Chevron, and the restructuring of the oil industry during the
mid-1980s, see Yergin The Prize (1991) pp.734-44.
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Company Ltd. 11 and BP Tanker Corporation. Nine months later~ on
6th October, 1969, TOVALOP came into operation, when fifty per
cent of the gross registered tonnage of tankers in existence
globally had become subject to the TOVALOP Agreement and its
entry into force requirements were thus fulfilled. 12 It is
significant that TOVALOP came into force in 1969, the same year
as the Civil Liability Convention was promulgated, although the
Civil Liability Convention did not enter into force until
1975. 13
9.3.4 Conception of CRISTAL
The CRISTAL Contract was adopted on 14th January, 1971, and
entered into force on 1st April, 1971, at which time thirty eight
oil companies receiving over seventy per cent of the world's
crude and fuel oil had agreed to become party. At this point
TOVALOP had already been operational for nearly eighteen months.
Significantly, CRISTAL entered into force in 1971, the same year
as the promulgation of the Fund Convention, although the Fund
Convention did not enter into force until 1978. 14
Since CRISTAL entered into force, TOVALOP and CRISTAL have, on
most occasions, been integrally linked. The two agreements
provide a double layered system of compensation for oil pollution
from participating tankers, with CRISTAL providing a supplemental
layer of compensation, where the limits under TOVALOP are
exceeded.
11Shell, which traditionally stressed the possession of a
powerful tanker service was particularly instrumental in the
initiation and development of the TOVALOP agreement, see
M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 156.
12Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 304 para.12-04.
13The 1969 Civil Liability Convention was done at
Brussels, 29th November, 1969 and entered into force on 19th
June, 1975.
14The 1971 Fund Convention was done at Brussels, 18th
December, 1971 and entered into force on 16th October, 1978.
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9.3.5 The nature of the threat and response
It must be stressed from the outset that the oil companies and
the tanker industry were adamantly opposed to the post Torrey
Canyon proposals, put forward by ~ wide grouping of governments,
to develop a liability regime for oil pollution damage. Writing
in 1979, M'Gonigle and Zacher discern that \ [t]raditional
commercial interests were ... not at all happy to see IMCO's role
expanding into the realm of "private" legal liability ... [which
those interests considered] were of private commercial and
economic significance only. ,15 When the oil companies realized
that their ability to determine the shape of new liability rules,
to be evolved under the auspices of IMCO, was largely slipping
out of their hands, they correctly began to comprehend a threat.
Usually a threat constitutes an indication of an impending
undesirable event which may restrain a person's freedom of action
or general well being. Therefore, because it was the oil
companies who set up the voluntary compensation agreements the
most logical line of inquiry is to ask what possible threats were
posed to the oil industry at that time. What did the oil industry
possibly stand to lose through the IMCO initiatives aimed at
reforming the liability rules of tanker-source oil pollution?
Conversely, what advantages did the oil industry perceive in
making voluntary concessions through TOVALOP and later CRISTAL?
Certain suggestions, which will be considered seriatim, have been
made by previous commentators in an endeavour to explain this
issue.
All analysts provide some kind of explanation as to the rationale
for the voluntary agreements. For the most part, however,
commentators provide an inadequate "statement-of-fact" type
explanation. For example: the voluntary agreements were adopted
by the oil and shipping industries in recognition of the fact
that the transportation of oil by sea was an inherently dangerous
15M' Gonigle & Zacher, op ci t, 155.
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business. By the example of the Torrey Canyon incident the ' oil
and shipping industries were galvanized into action. The
resulting agreements were designed as interim measures
established along the lines of the 1969 civil Liability and 1971
Fund Conventions, which would provide benefits comparable to
those available under the conventions, until such time as the
universal acceptance of those instruments occurred. 16
Although such explanations are not incorrect, they are
unsatisfactory, and, it is submitted, inhibit a complete
understanding of the purpose and nature of the voluntary
agreements. Predictably, members of the shipping and oil
industry, or those who work in close association with those
industries, adhere to this line of interpretation. For a more
precise understanding of the rationale for the agreements it is
necessary first to examine the exact nature of perceived or
actual threats posed by the independent workings of IMCO.
An Australian commentator, R.e. Springall, makes
observation, which more accurately describes
motivation behind the development of TOVALOP:
the following
the original
... the purpose was to persuade governments to refrain
from taking steps to protect themselves against oil
pollution, such as by the introduction of strict safety
precautions and restrictions of different kinds, with which
the [large international oil] companies were not going to
be able to live.,17 (emphasis that of the present writer)
The above observation is cited with approval by a Canadian
16These explanations basically imitate the Introduction to
the TOVALOP Standing Agreement.
17Springall 'P&l Insurance and Oil Pollution' (1988) 6
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 25 at 34.
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commentator, R.J. White-Harvey,18 who, nonetheless, concludes,
on this point, that ' ... it remains unknown whether or not
stricter requirements imposed by coastal states might have
further reduced the amount of petroleum entering the marine
environment. ,19
For the sake of clarity one may assume that where R.C. Springall
refers to large international oil companies 'not being able to
live' with those requirements which, he suggests, may otherwise
have been forthcoming from coastal states, he is not suggesting
that the oil companies would not have been able to continue to
operate in the face of such measures. A more precise inference
is that the oil companies simply preferred not to bear the
additional costs that compliance with such measures would have
entailed. It is suggested that, from the point of view of the oil
companies, forced compliance with such measures would, in the
long term, have cost the oil companies considerably more than was
the case where they preempted government interference by assuming
responsibility for oil pollution compensation on terms of their
own choice.
R. C. Springall's statement requires further interpretation. Where
the commentator refers to' . .. the introduction of strict safety
precautions and restrictions of different kinds, ... ' the exact
ambit of that description is unclear. The inference made by the
present author, which also seems to have been made by R. J. White-
Harvey, is that the commentator is referring to the development
of rules which place restrictions on action. He is not, on the
plain reading of the description, referring to liability, which
would better be described as a penalty. If this is a correct
understanding then, although there is certainly a strong element
of truth in the observation made, it is not, in the opinion of
the present author and other commentators, an exact or entire
18W~ite-Harvey 'Black Tide at the Convergence of Admiralty
and Envlronmental Law' (1991) 1 Journal of Environmental Law &
Practice 258 at 269.
19Ibid. at 270.
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explanation. It is submitted that the immediate and cr i tLcaI
concern of the oil companies related to the question of
liability, not regulation.
In this regard M'Gonigle and Zacher, correctly point out:
'The major thrust of the post-Torrey Canyon activity
clearly was in the field of liability and compensation and,
later, in the development of the 1973 Convention on the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships .... TOVALOP and CRISTAL
were clearly responses to activities undertaken by
governments in opposition to industry.'~o
Furthermore, those authors have also assessed the reasoning
behind the actions of the oil industry:
'In each case [TOVALOP and CRISTAL] the actions of the oil
industry were prompted by the hope that they would engender
goodwill and that states would, therefore, refrain from
unilateral action and follow the industry's precedent in
the ensuing conference,~l
M'Gonigle and Zacher go to some length to provide particular
examples of ways in which the voluntary agreements influenced the
conferences and benefited the oil and tanker industries. They
neglect, however, to consider a fundamental point, however.
Abecassis and Jarashow come closer to pinning down the
fundamental motivation behind the initiatives of the oil
companies. In their discussion of TOVALOP these authors make the
following observation:
'The first members were, of course, all oil companies, and
the fact that they happened to own large fleets of tankers
~OM'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 192.
21M'Gonigle & Zacher, op cit, 178.
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does not stop them behaving like oil companies. The early
TOVALOP can therefore be viewed as an attempt to influence
the international community of states to think in terms of
oil pollution liability resting solely on the tanker owner,
with liability being based on fault, with relatively modest
limits, and with compensable damage being limited to clean-
up and removal costs.' 22 (e mp ha s i s that of the present
writer)
Of the motivational criteria listed above, the factor emphasised,
appears first on the authors' list. Therefore, it may be surmised
that the authors correctly identified this factor as being a
prime objective of the oil industry. The position adopted by the
present writer is that this consideration was indeed the
overriding imperative of the oil industry and that the other
concerns, although relevant, were ancillary. The prime intention
of the oil industry was to ensure that whatever liability rules
were to be developed by IMCO, that such rules would not place
direct accountability for oil pollution damage upon the cargo
owner in his personal capacity. From the point of view of the oil
companies no expense would be spared to persuade the
international community that the tanker-owner alone should remain
personally liable for these risks and accountability should not
be extended to the cargo owner. The threat, quite correctly
perceived by the oil companies, was the possibility that the
traditional precept of maritime law, whereby liability is placed
squarely upon the shipowner, may have been expanded to encompass
unlimited and absolute liability placed upon the shipowner
together with the actual cargo-owner. If this had occurred the
oil companies would have lost a considerable commercial advantage
and would have been exposed to greater risks associated with the
tanker transport sector of their integrated operations.
Certainly,
unilateral
the oil companies did not relish
action by states in the field of
the idea of
oil pollution
22Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 305 para.12-05.
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liability regulation. Not only would unilateralism work to their
disadvantage due to the fragmentation of liability rules, but
states acting independently would, in their search for
responsible parties with "deep pockets", be more likely to focus
their attentions on cargo-owners. Hence the rationale for the
voluntary offer made to governments to cover oil pollution
damages. This concern did not, as has already been explained,
mean the oil companies were unreservedly in favour of the
international initiatives.
Oil interests as a group (i.e. cargo-owners generally), were not
opposed to making an ex gratia contribution to the cost of oil
pollution from tankers so long as they could limit or accommodate
that cost. However, they feared the imposition of a larger risk
which they would not be able to assimilate as an operational
cost. In other words, they did not want to see the development
of rules which articulated and imposed open-ended potential
liabilities and thereby required cargo-owners to accept a very
greatly expanded scale of risk in the venture of carrying oil at
sea. The way the oil companies as a group orchestrated the form
of the voluntary agreements, and also influenced the development
and form of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, saw them
in the position that, where although they would accept a limited
scale of loss, a small and manageable one at that, they would not
become exposed to open-ended danger. The danger would be borne
by the owner of the tanker spilling the oil in the form of
potentially unlimited and personal liability. In effect, it could
even be said that the tanker industry became the scapegoat for
the oil industry.
The fact that since 1969 the oil companies have largely been able
to insulate themselves from direct liability for tanker-source
oil pollution damage can be attributed to their considerable
financial resources and political influence. It would seem also,
that the oil companies achieved an even more remarkable coup
later when they succeeded in avoiding direct personal
responsibility, as cargo owners, under the measures adopted by
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the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Significantly, Abecassis and Jarashow fail to make the connection
between: (a) the success of the oil cargo owners in escaping
personal liability for pollution damage caused by their cargoes
and (b) the continued decrease in the quality of the tanker
fleet. A detailed analysis of this inter-relationship and
remedies suggested is undertaken in Chapter Fourteen which deals
with U.S. State legislation and the implications thereof.
9.3.6 possible alternative strategies
One of the alternatives available to the oil interest groups, at
the time of the development of the voluntary schemes, was to
continue to operate in the usual fashion and accept that costly
oil spills would inevitably occur from time to time. In such
cases very large claims would be brought against them by the
victims of oil pollution. Claimants would include governments as
well as private claimants. When faced with such claims the oil
companies could contest these claims by way of difficult,
expensive, protracted and unpredictable litigation, in the hope
that this would deter future claimants. Thus more claims would
be settled out of court for considerably less than would have
been the case had claimants risked litigation.
If it were not for the scale of the damage caused by large oil
spills and that governments were more often than not the major
claimants this strategy may have met with considerable success.
Government claimants, however, in contrast to private claimants,
possess considerable influence domestically and internationally,
and are also able to sustain lengthy and expensive litigation.
Therefore, an obviously uncompromising attitude adopted by oil
polluters could only contribute to the long term detriment of the
tanker and oil importer industry. Public outcry would have been
considerable and governments, as well as the judiciary, would
rapidly have adopted measures to make the whole legal process for
the recovery of oil pollution compensation more favourable to
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claimants. Such changes would have been made on terms which would
have been largely outside the control of the tanker and oil
industries.
The oil industry correctly perceived that, where co-operation
ceased, litigation and outside regulation would begin. Any
environmental controversy fought out in the courts would result
in the rapid polarisation of positions in public statements of
precedential legal authority. Hence, the general reluctance of
oil companies and shipowners to resort to litigation.
In this regard it is significant that TOVALOP in its original
form extended only to the shipowners' clean-up costs and the
costs of reasonable governmental clean-up costs. The original
agreement did not extend to claims by third parties who still
were required to pursue their claims under applicable local law.
One may reasonably surmise that the primary concern was to
placate powerful adversaries, while the less influential victims
of oil pollution would not be specially catered for.
Instead, tanker owners and oil importers adopted a more subtle
approach, which did not include any special efforts to improve
the safety of tanker operations . They offered a system through
which claimants could obtain compensation upon the terms and
conditions laid down by the tanker industry and the oil
companies. The alternative to claiming from these funds was to
attempt to recover loss caused due to oil spills through
litigation. This avenue was not an inviting prospect for any
claimant, particularly in this type of maritime matter. The
extent of the daunting task facing such claimants is aptly
illustrated in the context of the Amoco Cadiz litigation.
Essentially, claimants attempting to recoup losses sustained by
tanker-source oil pollution are faced with two choices. Firstly,
they may accept whatever compensation is judged appropriate
according to the voluntary compensation regimes or under the
Conventions. Secondly, they may attempt to break the shipowners
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right to limit his liability under the terms of the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention, or other applicable law. This would result
in protracted litigation and difficulties in recovering
substantial amounts in the case where the shipowner is not also
an oil company.
What, in essence, has been created are mechanisms through which
victims of oil spills are offered certain amounts of compensation
upon the terms and conditions of the interest groups which cause
the pollution. Those who do not accept these offerings have to
face the uncertain prospects of success in expensive lawsuits.
What has just been described is encapsulated by the "carrot and
the stick" adage. The "stick" is litigation, with the possibility
of non-recovery, and the "carrot" is carefully measured and
controlled compensation made in a manner which is suitable to the
interests of the oil and tanker industries.
The only negotiations which took place in formulating the terms
of the voluntary agreements was between oil companies and tanker
owners. When one considers that a significant proportion of the
oil tankers were, and still are, owned by oil companies, actual
negotiation was reduced to a conflict between the oil companies
and the independent oil tanker owners as to the respective
apportionment of liability. Clearly, the independent tanker
owners were in a comparatively weak position because they depend
on the oil companies to charter their tankers. Under the
principle that "he who pays the piper calls the tune", the
resulting agreements naturally favour the self-conservative
instincts of the oil companies .
9.3.7 Evolution of TOVALOP and CRISTAL
In 1978 both TOVALOP and CRISTAL were amended to reflect the
coming into force of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the
1971 Fund Convention. The next epoch in the evolution of the
voluntary agreements would occur some eight years later.
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On a broad spectrum of interests, aims and activities, . the
relationship between tanker owners and cargo importers may be
described as co-dependant and co-operative. Close co-operation
certainly exists between tanker owners and cargo importers in the
matter of compensating claims for oil pollution under TOVALOP and
CRlSTAL and also, but to a lesser extent, under the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. However, a considerable area of
conflict remains, between oil importer and oil carrier interests,
as to how liability ought to be apportioned.
Within the context of the voluntary agreements, shipowners and
cargo owners, would each, ideally, prefer the other to assume a
greater responsibility for dealing with pollution compensation.
Naturally, this would reduce their own contribution, whether by
way of P&l contributions or contributions to the CRlSTAL Fund.
This conflict is evidenced by the lack of support shown by oil
tanker owners, and especially the independent tanker-owners, for
the PLATO agreement. 23 At this time, the oil industry was not
satisfied with the distribution of liability between the tanker
owner and the cargo owner under the 1984 Protocols to the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions respectively.
The then existing TOVALOP and CRlSTAL agreements were due to
expire on 20th February, 1987. Abecassis and Jarashow suggest
that the oil industry \ ... therefore set themselves the task of
providing an alternative to the 1984 Protocol to the Fund
Convention which might ensure that it never comes into
force. ,24 The alternative was a new voluntary compensation
regime which consisted of CRlSTAL Revised 1985, which was
designed to come into effect if the PLATO agreement was accepted
by tanker owners. The tanker owners were not, however, prepared
to accept PLATO. They perceived that the oil industry was
attempting, through PLATO, to impose an unacceptably high degree
of primary financial responsibility for oil pollution liability
23Pollution Liability Agreement Among Tanker Owners, 1985.
24Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit, 316 para.12-39.
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upon the tanker industry. As a result of this negotiations
between tanker owners and oil importers became strained and the
voluntary agreements almost floundered. However, after further
negotiations, the two regimes were extended for a further five
years from 20th February, 1987. 2S
On 20th February, 1987, a Supplement to TOVALOP was implemented.
Henceforth, although TOVALOP remains a single agreement, it has
become a two-tier system of compensation in its own right. This
two-tier system consists of the original agreement, which is
referred to as the Standing Agreement, and the TOVALOP
Supplement. These supplementary revisions were largely initiated
in response to the development of the 1984 Protocols to the civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. Essentially, under the Standing
Agreement, the tanker owner assumes financial responsibility in
a similar fashion to the liability imposed under the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention.
A fundamental point to the understanding of the revised
agreements is that CRISTAL must apply to the incident before the
two-tier compensation under the TOVALOP Supplement may be brought
into being. Accordingly, the TOVALOP Supplement only applies to
incidents where a tanker participating in TOVALOP (which includes
the Standing Agreement and TOVALOP Supplement), is carrying oil
which is covered by CRISTAL. Where the tanker is entered in
TOVALOP but the cargo is not a CRISTAL cargo, compensation may
only be made under the Standing Agreement.
At the same time as the introduction of TOVALOP Supplement, a
revised CRISTAL Contract came into being which provides a higher
level of supplementary compensation over and above that received
2SBecause the PLATO agreement did not enter into force and
was replaced by an alternative voluntary compensation regime
it is not discussed in detail here. However, for a full
analysis of its provisions, see Abecassis & Jarashow, op cit
pp.316-325; Birnie 'PLATO' (1986) vo1.1 ptA International r
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 396. For a discussion of
PLAT~ after its failure to come into fruition; see Springall,
op c~t, pp.37-8.
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by victims of oil pollution under the TOVALOP Supplement. ' The
amendments to CRISTAL, like those to TOVALOP, were also initiated
in response to the development of the 1984 Protocols to the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. The word "Interim" was also
dropped from the full title of CRISTAL which reflected the
reality that it had been in force for some sixteen years and to
indicate that it would serve a more permanent function.
The revised voluntary compensation available from 20th February,
1987, brought about a substantial potential increase over and
above the previous limits. This was achieved through higher
limits of liability under the TOVALOP Supplement and the revised
CRISTAL Contract. The revised voluntary arrangements apply world-
wide, irrespective of whether the state in which an incident
occurs is a party to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention or the
1971 Fund Convention. The application of the Conventions in a
given situation will, however, have a bearing upon the manner in
which the voluntary agreements operate.
9.4 Conclusion
The fundamental characteristics of the voluntary compensation
agreements have been previewed in this introductory discussion.
The analysis to be used during the further investigation of
TOVALOP and CRISTAL involves following the application and
unfolding of the relevant agreements as they may arise in
practice. In keeping with this practical approach two broad
chapters ensue. First, Chapter Ten, which covers the possible
situation where a tanker, entered in TOVALOP, causes pollution
damage but is not carrying a CRISTAL cargo at the time. Here,
only the TOVALOP Standing Agreement applies. Second, Chapter
Eleven covers the case, more frequently encountered, where
CRISTAL oil escapes from a TOVALOP tanker causing pollution
damage. Here, both the TOVALOP Supplement and CRISTAL apply and
are discussed in turn.
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CHAPTER 10
The TOVALOP Standing Agreement
10.1 Introduction
Where oil pollution damage is caused from a tanker which is not
at the time of the incident carrying a CRISTAL cargo, only the
Standing Agreement applies. Therefore, in such cases, no
supplementary compensation will be available under the TOVALOP
Supplement or CRISTAL. The Standing Agreement is, in essence the
TOVALOP as it stood prior to 20th February, 1987.
Furthermore, the Standing Agreement will not apply where the 1969
Civil Liability Convention applies. 1 Correspondingly, where the
Standing Agreement does apply no supplementary compensation,
above the limit set by the Standing Agreement, will be available
under the 1971 Fund Convention because the Fund Convention may
only come into force in a state which has already contracted to
the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.~ Where the Standing
Agreement alone applies to an incident, and the damage caused is
considerable, claimants may be forced to pursue actions for
compensation through the traditional avenues of tort or
negligence or any applicable municipal legislation in order to
obtain full compensation where the limits of the Standing
Agreement are exhausted.
10.2 Introduction to the Standing Agreement
It is appropriate to start this description of the Standing
Agreement with an analysis of the introduction to that agreement.
The Introduction is a declaration of intent and can be equated
with the preambles to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions.
The Introduction to the Standing Agreement highlights certain
lStanding Agreement, Clause IV(B) (a) .
~Fund Convention, Article 37.4 and 40.2.
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fundamentals of the agreement.
10.2.1 Three prerequisite factors
'The Parties to this Agreement are Tanker Owners and
Bareboat Charters.,3
Within the context above, a '''Tanker'' means any sea-going vessel
and any sea-borne craft of any type whatsoever, designed and
constructed for carrying Oi14 in bulk as cargo, whether or not
it is actually so carrying Oil.' 5 '''Oil'' means any persistent
hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, fuel o i.L," heavy
diesel oil and lubricating oil whether or not carried as
cargo." Therefore, oil pollution damage caused from pollution
from laden tankers, as well as tankers in ballast, are covered
by the Standing Agreement.
An '''Owner'' means, the person or persons registered as the owner
of the Tanker or, in the absence of registration, the Person or
Persons owning the Tanker. However, in the case of a Tanker owned
by a State and operated by a company which in that State is
registered as the Tanker's operator, "Owner" shall mean such
company. ... ' 8 This proviso is necessary because TOVALOP
members include many government -owned fleets.'
3Introduction to the Standing Agreement.
4Capitals have been used in order to alert the reader that
certain concepts have been given special meanings for the
purpose of the agreements concerned.
SStanding Agreement, Clause I. (m) .
6ASTM No.4 or heavier.
'Standing Agreement, Clause I. (f) .
8Standing Agreement, Clause I. (g) .
'Guidelines for the Preparation of Shipboard Oil Spill
Contingency Plans, 1990 at 26.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the case of a Tanker
under bareboat Charter, "Owner" means the Bareboat Charterer.' 10
Therefore, bareboat charterers as well as registered owners can
contract to the Standing Agreement. A \ "Bareboat Charterer" means
the Person (s ) who has chartered a Tanker upon terms which
provide, among other things, that the Charterer shall have
exclusive possession and control of the Tanker during the life
of the charter.' 11 Once these three requisite factors are met
the tanker owner is eligible to become a "participating owner"
who is a party to the agreement .
10.2.2 Composition of participating members
The gross tanker tonnage owned or bareboat chartered by parties
to TOVALOP stood at approximately 159.8 million tons, as at 20th
February, 1992. This represents about ninety-seven per cent of
the total world tanker tonnage. Accordingly, any internationally
trading tanker not entered in TOVALOP is a rare exception. Over
half the tankers registered with TOVALOP during the 1992-93 year
were under 6,000 gross · tons but the total tonnage of these
vessels is only some three per cent of the TOVALOP total. By
comparison, there were only 161 tankers over 140,000 gross tons
entered, which represented about two percent of the total by
number but over sixteen per cent of the total tonnage. The most
significant size group of tankers in TOVALOP are those in the
20,000-59,999 range which represent over nineteen per cent by
number and almost thirty percent by tonnage of the total
membership.12 In total TOVALOP has a membership of 3,200 tanker
owner and bareboat charterer members. 13
10Standing Agreement, Clause I. (g) .
11Standing Agreement, Clause I. (a) .
12The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
Review (1992) at 3.
13Guidelines for the Preparation of Shipboard Oil Spill
Contingency Plans (1990) at 26.
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10.3 Contractual nature of the Standing Agreement
\ ... the Parties ... in consideration of their mutual
promises,
agree ...
have agreed with one another and do hereby
(to the terms of the TOVALOP Agreement) 14
Both TOVALOP and CRISTAL are universally described as voluntary
agreements. Although the decision to participate in either
agreement is voluntary once a tanker owner or an oil company
agrees to become party, a contractual obligation arises in terms
of which he must fulfil the terms and conditions of the
applicable agreement. 15
Under TOVALOP, the tanker owner voluntarily assumes a contractual
obligation to pay compensation for oil pollution according to the
provisions of the TOVALOP Agreement . In this way participating
tanker owners voluntarily assume financial responsibility where
they may not otherwise be legally required to do so. Financial
responsibility is assumed irrespective of fault. In essence, this
constitutes a voluntary assumption of liability. In exchange for
the voluntary assumption of liability, unassailable monetary
limits are imposed.
Although the decision to contract to TOVALOP and CRISTAL is in
principle voluntary, tanker owners and oil companies are placed
under considerable pressure to become party to the respective
agreements. For instance, oil companies will not charter tankers
which are not entered in TOVALOP.16
10.4 Contractual exemptions from financial responsibility
14Introduction to the Standing Agreement, the text between
brackets is provided by the present writer.
15TOVALOP and CRISTAL A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation
Produced by The ITOPF and Cristal Limited 3rd ed. (1992) at 1.
16 In tervi ews .
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Under the Standing Agreement, as is the position under the 1969
Civil Liability Convention, tanker owners are not unconditionally
responsible. Certain absolute and limited exemptions are
available to protect the members of TOVALOP.
10.4.1 Absolute exemptions
The absolute exemptions contained in Clause IV (B) of the Standing
Agreement are the same as those of Article III.2 of the 1969
Civil Liability Convention. These are of a force majeure type:
such as war, natural phenomena of exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character ,17 terrorism and varidaLd sm'" and also
governmental failure to maintain navigational aids. 19
10.4.2 Contributory negligence of the claimant
A party to the Standing Agreement will be exonerated either
wholly or partially from responsibility under the Agreement to
any person who sustained pollution damage or who took threat
removal measures if the negligence of that person wholly or
partially gave rise to the damage or threat. 2o
10.4.3 If the Civil Liability Convention applies
If an oil spill or the threat thereof from a tanker participating
in TOVALOP causes damage, any part of which is subject to the
1969 Civil Liability Convention, no responsibility for such
pollution damage or for the cost of threat removal measures shall
be assumed under the Standing Agreement. 21 As such, only where
the spill of a non-CRISTAL cargo occurs in a State which has not
17Standing Agreement, Clause IV (B) (b) .
18Standing Agreement, Clause IV (B) (c) .
19Standing Agreement, Clause IV (B) (d) .
2°Clause IV. (C) .
21Clause IV. (B) (a) .
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ratified the 1969 Civil Liability Convention shall the owner's
liability be settled in accordance with the Standing Agreement
and any applicable local law.
For example, a tanker owned by a participating member of TOVALOP,
transporting a non-CRISTAL cargo, causes pollution damage to the
neighbouring States of M09ambique and South Africa. As CRISTAL
is not applicable to the incident, the enhanced compensation
under TOVALOP Supplement does not apply. Because the tanker is
owned by a participating member of TOVALOP the Standing Agreement
will apply. In view of the fact that M09ambique has not ratified
the 1969 Civil Liability Convention that country would be able
to receive compensation from the tanker owner in terms of the
Standing Agreement. By contrast, South Africa has ratified the
1969 Civil Liability Convention but not the 1971 Fund Convention.
Accordingly, all oil pollution damage occurring in South Africa
is subject to the provisions of the Civil Liability Convention
and South African claimants will be precluded from obtaining
compensation under the Standing Agreement.
To conclude, where the Civil Liability Convention does not apply
to the incident, and none of the defences are successfully
invoked, the participating owner is under a contractual
obligation to compensate the victims of oil pollution up to the
limits contained in the Standing Agreement. The tanker owner is
strictly responsible and bears financial responsibility
regardless as to fault. The claimant merely has to show that
damage occurred and was caused by a spill or the threat thereof
from a particular vessel. The claimant is not required to prove
fault on the part of the owner or the charterer or servants or
agents of the owner.
10.5 Standing Agreement financial limits
In respect of anyone incident, the maximum compensation which
may be obtained from a participating owner, for all claims under
the Standing Agreement, is set at US$160 per limitation ton of
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the tanker involved in the incident, or US$16.8 million,
whichever is the smaller amount. 22 The sliding tonnage scale
with fixed upper ceiling is the same method which is used for the
purpose of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, although the
amounts differ and the amounts are assessed in US$ and not the
Special Drawing Right (SDR). 23
Tanker limitation tonnage is determined as the net tonnage of the
tanker plus the amount deducted from the gross tonnage on account
of the engine room space for the purpose of ascertaining the net
tonnage. 24 This is referred to as limitation tonnage and must
not be equated with gross registered tonnage (grt.) because that
measurement is a greater amount. The assessment in the Standing
Agreement of US$160 per limitation ton is roughly the equivalent
of US$147 per gross registered ton . 25
The limit of US$16.8 will be reached on a limitation tonnage
calculation for tankers of 105,000 limitation tons or roughly
114,286 grt. Where the Standing Agreement applies, all
participating tankers above 105,000 limitation tonnes will be
subject to the US$ 16.8 million limit. Furthermore, in the case
of a tanker for which this tonnage cannot be ascertained, the
tanker's tonnage shall be deemed to be forty per cent of the
weight, in tons of 2,240 lbs., which the tanker is capable of
carrying. 26
10.5.1 Where multiple members are involved
22Standing Agreement, Clause VII. (A) .
23Civil Liability Convention, Article V.l as amended by
Article 11 of the 1976 Protocol thereto.
24The same definition is used in Article V.10 of the Civil
Liability Convention for the measurement of limitation tonnage
under that Convention.
25I.C. White 'Tovalop & Cristal' (1988) vol.19 No.6 Marine
Pollution Bulletin 251 at 252.
26Standing Agreement, Clause I (p) .
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Subject to the provisions of the Agreement, where two or more
TOVALOP tankers are involved in an incident, they shall be
jointly and severally responsible for all pollution damage and
threat removal measures which is not reasonably separable. 27
Because such an event will be considered one incident, the
limitation provisions of the Standing Agreement shall apply.
Accordingly, each tanker owner will be financially responsible
up to his respective limit either on a per limitation tonnage
assessment or the absolute ceiling. However, in no event may the
amount due from both participating tanker owners exceed the
absolute ceiling of US$16.8 million.
10.5.2 All payments included for limits
If, before the owner has satisfied all claims made under the
Standing Agreement, the owner, his insurer or other person
providing him financial security pays compensation for pollution
damage and/or the cost of threat removal measures, the amount of
such payment; shall be taken into account in assessing the
aggregate of established claims under this Agreement in respect
of the incident. 28 As such, these paYments will be included in
the calculation as to the ship owner's limit of financial
responsibility. Furthermore, the owner or his insurer(s) or
person providing him financial security shall, to the extent of
that paYment, be in the same position as the person to whom that
sum was paid. 29 In other words, he may pursue any actions
against other parties which may have shared responsibility for
the spill or any other damage caused as a result of that spill.
10.5.3 Limits are unassailable
Unlike the Civil Liability Convention which provides that the
27Standing Agreement, Clause V.
28Standing Agreement, Clause VII (C) (a).
29Standing Agreement, Clause VII (C) (b) .
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tanker owner's right to limit will be broken where the incident
occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the
owner,30 the right to limit the extent of his financial
responsibility in terms of the Standing Agreement is unbreakable.
10.5.4 Where the limits are exceeded
In cases where the aggregate of the established claims under the
Standing Agreement exceed the limits of financial responsibility
the claims are reduced proportionally. 31 When a participating
owner establishes that the aggregate of claims in respect of an
incident may exceed his maximum financial responsibility under
the Standing Agreement, he or any person providing him insurance
or other financial security may in his sole discretion make
partial paYment to claimants until the full extent of all claims
is determined. 32
10.6 Financial Responsibility
It is imperative for the viability of TOVALOP that its members
are able to satisfy successful claims brought against them under
the Agreement. Accordingly, it is a general condition of TOVALOP
that each participating owner establishes and maintains his
financial capability to fulfil his obligations under this
Agreement to the satisfaction of ITOPF (The International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation Limited) .33
30Civil Liability Convention, Article V.2.
31Standing Agreement, Clause VII (B) .
32Standing Agreement, Clause VII (E) .
33Standing Agreement, Clause II(B) (3). ITOPF was
established in 1968 for the principle purpose of administering
the TOVALOP oil pollution compensation agreement. Although the
administration of TOVALOP (e.g. checking of insurance
arrangements and issue of TOVALOP Certificates) remains an
important function, the Federation now also provides technical
services in the field of practical response to marine oil
spills; damage assessment and the analysis of claims for
compensation; contingency planning and advisory work;
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The requirement of financial responsibility for tanker owners. and
bareboat charterers under TOVALOP is in most instances, obtained
though the recognised shipowner's mutual protectior: and Indemnity
Associations (P&l Clubs), or the International Tanker Indemnity
Association (ITIA) .34 All the major P&l Clubs are members of the
International Group of P&l Clubs. Whilst each individual Club
bears the first part of any claim, the concept of mutuality is
extended by the pooling of large claims amongst the members of
the International Group. The P&l Clubs and the ITIA will in turn
place excess liability insurance on the commercial markets so as
to afford greater protection to their members in the event of a
catastrophic claim. This is also the position under the 1969
Civil Liability Convention.
In order for TOVALOP to come into being it was imperative that
the P&l Clubs were prepared to extend the scope of cover
available to shipowners to include the owner's responsibilities
under the TOVALOP Agreement. Originally, the P&l Clubs required
tanker owner's participating in TOVALOP to pay an additional
premium to obtain cover for their responsibilities under TOVALOP.
These additional premiums were paid separately from those
obtaining cover for normal risks. After the Civil Liability
Convention came into force in 1975, the Clubs transferred half
of this additional premium to normal P&l rates to take into
account the partial transfer of liability from TOVALOP to the
Civil Liability Convention. As the Civil Liability Convention was
ratified by a greater number of States and it's application
became more universal, the premium was wholly transferred to
normal P&l rates and no separate premium is charged for the
training, information and publications; see, Guidelines for
the Preparation of Shipboard Oil Spill Contingency Plans, 1990
at 26.
34TOVALOP and CRISTAL A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation,
1992 at 4; for and analysis of the origins and evolution of
the lTIA see M'Gonigle & Zacher Pollution Politics and
International Law: Tankers at Sea (1979) at 158-159.
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TOVALOP risk. 35 Nowadays, separate premiums are once again being
levied by P&l Clubs for the inordinate pollution risks assumed
by tankers transporting oil to the United States.
10.6.1 Certificates of financial responsibility
Where ITOPF is satisfied that an applicant's insurance
arrangements are sufficient to meet his responsibilities under
TOVALOP, a TOVALOP Certificate is issued in respect of the
vessels entered with TOVALOP by that owner. 36 Such a certificate
is not a guarantee by ITOPF that the tanker owner will in fact
be able to provide compensation up to the amounts specified in
the certificate of financial responsibility, but merely
demonstrate that the named tanker owner or bareboat charterer and
vessel satisfied the entry requirements at the date of issue. 37
This has become a very important distinction in the light of the
provisions relating to evidence of financial responsibility under
the 1990 U.S. Oil Pollution Act .
Evidence that a tanker is currently entered in TOVALOP is
frequently demanded by charterers and port authorities around the
world. The production of a valid TOVALOP Certificate normally
meets the requirement. Failure to comply with a request for
evidence of financial responsibility normally results in delays,
whilst the necessary confirmation is provided by the tanker
owner's P&l Club and ITOPF. 38 TOVALOP certificates will almost
invariably also cover an owner's potential limited liability in
terms of the Civil Liability Convention or national oil pollution
legislation.
35The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Ltd
TOVALOP AND CRISTAL Explanatory Notes - Revised Edition
October 1987 at 12.
36TOVALOP and CRISTAL A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation,
1992 at 4.
37Standing Agreement I Clause VIII (H) .
380cean Orbit, February 1992 at 8.
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10.7 Loss recoverable
Claims under the Standing Agreement and the Supplement may go to
arbitration, however, at the time of writing none have been
reported. Regarding the settlement of claims by P&l Clubs under
the Civil Liability Convention, the policy of the P&l Clubs is
to settle claims confidentially and avoid litigation. It would
seem that the same policy is adhered to within the context of
claims settlement under the TOVALOP agreement. Consequently, it
is not possible to provide detailed commentary in this regard.
Nevertheless, · there are two categories of loss that are
recoverable under the Standing Agreement. Firstly, the
participating owner of a TOVALOP tanker assumes responsibility,
for "pollution damage" caused by oil which has escaped or which
has been discharged from his tanker. Secondly, the cost of
"threat removal measures" taken as a result of that incident are
also recoverable. 39
10.7.1 Pollution damage defined
The geographical scope of the Standing Agreement, who may claim
and the type and extent of admissible damage are factors which
must be considered. Under the Standing Agreement the notion of
"pollution damage" is defined as :
\ ... loss or damage caused outside the Tanker by
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of Oil
from the Tanker, wherever such escape or discharge may
occur, provided that the loss or damage is c~used on the
territory, including the territorial sea, of any State and
includes the costs of Preventive Measures, wherever taken,
and further loss or damage caused by Preventive Measures
but excludes any loss or damage which is remote or
speculative, or which does not result directly from such
39Standing Agreement, Clause IV (A) .
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escape or discharge.' 40
The definition of "pollution damage" facilitates the
recoverability of the following categories of damage under the
Standing Agreement .
10.7.2 Damage to property
physical loss, for example the oiling of fishing boats and
fishing gear, the contamination of cultivated stocks of sea-weed,
shell-fish or other marine products, will be included. physical
loss or damage caused by preventive measures, for example, the
destruction or depreciation of equipment will likewise be
included.
10.7.3 Economic loss
The Standing Agreement' ... excludes any loss or damage which
is remote or speculative, or which does not result directly from
such escape or discharge.' 41 The view has been expressed that
this proviso probably excludes most economic 10ss.42 What
categories of economic loss would, or should in fact, be
admissible under the Standing Agreement?
Does the proviso have the affect of rendering inadmissible all
proven economic loss actually sustained as a direct result of
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil?
Under the definition of pollution damage, recovery for economic
loss, unaccompanied by physical loss or damage, is unclear
because the word 'directly' can be either widely or narrowly
interpreted. A narrow interpretation could require a claimant to
suffer physical loss or damage in order to receive compensation.
4°Standing Agreement, Clause I (K) .
4lStanding Agreement, Clause I(K).
UBates & Benson Marine Environmental Law Lloyd's of
London Press Ltd (1993) 4-23 para.4.99.
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Despite such uncertainty, pure economic loss is reported to have
been recovered, in terms of the same definition, by claimants
upon oil pollution damage caused when the Betelgeuse exploded in
Bantry Bay, Ireland on 8th January, 1979."3
Accordingly, a more precise analysis of the ambit of economic
loss under the Standing Agreement reveals that the definition of
pollution damage extends to proven economic loss actually
sustained as a direct result of contamination even in
circumstances where such damage is unaccompanied by physical
damage ..... Therefore, the most important difficulty claimants
would be faced with would be in establishing that their claims
were not 'remote or speculative'. Clearly, viewpoints can differ
on what constitutes remote or speculative claims.
10.7.4 Damage to the marine environment
Under the Standing Agreement, claims for the recovery of damage
to the environment per se, unrelated to proven economic loss
actually sustained by "a particular claimant, are generally
regarded as inadmissible. Damage to non-commercial natural
resources or claims for environmental damage which are
theoretical or speculative"s are not admissible under the
Standing Agreement or the Supplement.
"3Cohen 'Revisions of TOVALOP and CRISTAL: Strong Ships
for Stormy Seas' (1987) 18 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
525 at 531 fn.29 .
....This proposition would seem to be borne out by the
Foreword to TOVALOP (Incorporating amendments as at February
20th, 1992) published by ITOPF at 2. The following warning is
provided at 1:
'This foreword is not part of, and is in no sense a
substitute for TOVALOP and its related documents, nor
should anything contained herein be construed as
modifying or amending them.'
"sForeword to TOVALOP (Incorporating amendments as at
February 20th, 1992) published by ITOPF at 2.
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Under the Standing Agreement, however, it is conceivable that
such damages may be allowed by arbitration, as such damage is not
specifically excluded, by the definition of pollution damage, or
elsewhere in the agreement. The arbitrator will have to determine
that such loss, which may even be assessed on a theoretical
basis, was a direct consequence of an oil spill or the threat
thereof and that such loss was not remote or speculative.
By contrast such claims are very unlikely to be held admissible
under the Supplement or CRISTAL as there is no provision for
arbitration under those agreements. The P&l Clubs and the CRISTAL
Directors, who decide the admissibility of claims under the
Supplement and CRISTAL respectively, are likely to resist this
category of damage on principle .
10.5.1.3 Preventive measures
Reasonable costs46 of reasonable measures taken by any person,
after an oil spill or the threat thereof arises,fl adopted to
prevent or minimize pollution damage shall be admissible under
the Standing Agreement as preventive measures. 48
Such costs may include, inter alia, booms, skimmers and taking
other clean-up measures. On the issue of the reasonableness of
costs the distinction between fixed and additional costs will
have to be considered. The reasonableness of the measures adopted
will also have to be assessed under the circumstances of each
case . Clearly, it is reasonable to attempt to restore and even
reinstate a contaminated natural resource, even where the
resource in question does not have a use value, because to do so
may nonetheless be described as attempting to 'prevent or
minimise' pollution damage.
46Standing Agreement, Clause I(b).
47Standing Agreement, Clause I (d) .
48Standing Agreement, Clause 1(1).
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10.7.5 Pure threat removal measures
Threat removal measures are compensable as pollution damage under
the Standing Agreement even where no oil has actually been
spilled. This class of preventive actions, which are frequently
referred to as "pure threat" removal measures, can be of crucial
importance for the prevention and minimisation of oil pollution
damage. Such measures may include salvage operations, and the
deploYment of preventive booms.
The Standing Agreement permits the recovery of "pollution damage"
and "threat removal measures". 019 "Threat removal measures" are
defined as \ ... reasonable measures taken by any Person after
an Incident has occurred for the purposes of removing the Threat
of an escape or discharge of Oil.' 50 In turn, the "Threat of an
escape or discharge of Oil" is defined as \ ... a grave and
imminent danger of the escape or discharge of Oil from a Tanker
which, if it occurred, would create a serious danger of Pollution
Damage, whether or not an escape or discharge in fact
subsequently occurs. ,51
Accordingly, expenses may be recovered from the tanker owner
under the Standing Agreement where, in the face of a grave and
imminent danger of an oil spill, costs are incurred through
reasonable measures taken to prevent a spill from actually
occurring. The recovery of loss incurred in pure threat
situations constitutes an extension of the ambit of oil pollution
compensation beyond that recoverable under the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention, which in
contrast do not facilitate the recovery of such pure threat
removal costs. The 1992 Protocols to both those Conventions do
facilitate the recovery of pure threat removal measures.
UStanding Agreement, Clause IV(A).
50Standing Agreement, Clause I (0) .
51Standing Agreement, Clause I. (n)
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10.8 Obligatory preventive and clean-up measures
Whether or not the incident was due to the fault of the tanker
owner, he is obliged to take prompt action to prevent pollution
and to undertake clean up measures. Members are also obliged to
exercise their best efforts in carrying out such preventive
measures and/or threat removal measures as are practicable and
. d h' t 52approprlate un er t e clrcums ances.
This provision articulates the voluntary adoption of a policy by
the shipping industry to initiate voluntarily proactive measures
to prevent pollution. It may be asked how this commendable policy
is translated into practice. Two immediate questions arise in
this regard.
Firstly, how does TOVALOP ensure that the member will in fact
undertake such measures? If members are able to avoid their
obligations then the policy will be defeated. Because members are
required under TOVALOP to provide proof that they possess the
financial security to fulfil these important obligations,
compliance with the policy is made more likely.53 Such security
is usually provided by a P&l Club. Therefore, when the owner
adopts measures in terms of TOVALOP, his P&l Club will indemnify
him for his costs. Where he fails to adopt such measures the P&l
Club may nevertheless be moved to intervene.
Secondly, it is unclear who shall determine whether the member
has in fact taken prompt action and is exerting best efforts as
practicable and appropriate, under the circumstances, to prevent
or combat pollution. In the first instance, it would seem that
the individual member has a discretion to determine for himself
what kind of measures are practicable and appropriate under the
circumstances. He may well be influenced by the existence of
local legislation which may empower relevant authorities to issue
52Standing Agreement, Clause VI.
53Standing Agreement, Clause VI.
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instructions in this regard. Also, the owner's P&l Club and ITOPF
will exert considerable influence over these decisions. As a last
resort it is possible for the ITOPF, as representative of all
TOVALOP members, to enforce these contractual obligations where
members are in breach.
This sound policy is founded on the principle that prevention is
better than cure. In most instances, by taking timely pro-active
measures, significant cost (to participating members, though
increased oil pollution damage made against their respective P&l
Clubs) can be avoided. It is noteworthy that the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention does not place such obligations on tanker
owners whose vessels cause oil pollution.
10.8.1 The 'TOVALOP Clause'
Many tanker charterparty agreements include a 'TOVALOP Clause'
which was initiated by the P&l Clubs to clarify the conditions
and extent to which the charterer could take clean-up measures
on behalf of the tanker owner. 54 This clause permits the oil
company charterer to clean up a spill, caused by the chartered
tanker, at the tanker owner's expense where the owner does not
take such action on his own accord. Rapid deploYment of
preventive measures are essential if the amount of pollution
damage is to be most effectively reduced. Through the
incorporation of a 'TOVALOP Clause' in the charterparty agreement
charterers can implement proactive measures with the minimum
delay because in most instances they can recover their expenses
from the owner's P&l Club. 55
10.8.2 Recovery of costs
54The Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Ltd
TOVALOP AND CRISTAL Explanatory Notes - Revised Edition
?ctober,1987 at 5. A version of this charterparty clause,
1ssued 1n May 1987 appears at 75.
55Becker 'AcronYms and Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage from Tankers' (1983) 18 Texas International Law Journal
475 at 478.
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Costs incurred by the participating owner or his insurers as a
result of the participating owner taking preventive measures
and/or threat removal measures are taken into account in
assessing the aggregate of established claims, under the Standing
Agreement, in respect of the incident. 56 The participating owner
or any person providing him insurance or other financial security
are placed in the same position as any other person with a claim
under this Agreement57 and their claims for such expenses are
treated in the same manner as claims by persons other than the
participating owner. 58 Consequently, where the limits of
financial responsibility under the Standing Agreement have been
exceeded, the amounts spent by the owner in preventive and/or
threat removal measures are effectively offset against the
limitation amounts. Therefore, where the ceilings of liability
are reached, clause VII has the effect of reducing the quantum
available for distribution to third party victims of oil
pollution damage under the Standing Agreement. In other words,
as a practical matter, the TOVALOP limits are not always as high
as presented in the Agreement.
Upon acceptance by ITOPF of an application to become party to
TOVALOP, the applicant is required to establish and maintain
proof of his financial capability to fulfil his obligations under
TOVALOp. 59 Such evidence of financial responsibility shall
include appropriate provision for the reimbursement of the cost
of preventive and threat removal measures voluntarily undertaken
by the owner in the manner described above. 60
10.9 Claims procedure
56Standing Agreement, Clause VII (0) (a) .
57Standing Agreement, Clause VII (0) (b) .
58Standing Agreement, Clause VII (0) .
59Standing Agreement, Clause II(B) (3).
6°Standing Agreement, Clause VI (A) .
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10.9.1 Contractual prescription
No responsibility shall arise under the Standing Agreement unless
written notice of claim is received by the participating tanker
owner or bareboat charterer within two years of the date of the
incident. 51 This requirement is considerably less generous and
flexible than is the case under the Civil Liability
Convention. 52
An "incident" is defined as, \ ... any occurrence, or series of
occurrences having the same origin, which causes Pollution
Damage, or which creates the Threat of an escape or discharge of
Oil. ,53 It is, therefore , conceivable that certain types of
pollution damage such as incremental oil pollution damage
occurring from sunken tankers, may become time-barred. Where a
tanker sinks with oil aboard, the original condition which led
to oil pollution or the threat of such pollution will be
considered the date of the incident and prescription will begin
to run from that time. If oil escapes from the sunken tanker
after two years has elapsed, all claims in terms of the Standing
Agreement would, consequently, be time-barred.
10.9.2 Payment of claims
Under the Standing Agreement the participating member is
responsible for damage caused by his tankers. 54 Except as
provided by Clause V, which covers the situation where two or
more TOVALOP tankers are involved in an incident, no
participating owner shall be responsible under the Standing
Agreement for the claims in respect of another participating
61Standing Agreement, Clause VIII(C).
52Civil Liability Convention, Article VIII.
63Standing Agreement, Clause I. (d) .
64Standing Agreement, Clause IV(A).
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t.anker i "
As such, the individual members and their respective insurers
settle all claims. The responsible participating owner is obliged
to dispose of all valid claims against him, arising under the
agreement, as promptly as is practicable. 66 No fund of money for
the settlement of claims is maintained by TOVALOP (which is only
an agreement) nor ITOPF, which is just the administrative organ
of the TOVALOP agreement. 67 This is an important clarificatory
point because it is frequently imagined that claims under TOVALOP
are settled from a fund controlled by ITOPF. Clearly, this is a
fundamental misconception.
In most cases it is the P&l Club of the responsible member which
ultimately bears the onus of settling claims for pollution damage
brought against him. Accordingly, although participating owners
are not financially responsible, under TOVALOP, for pollution
damage caused by spills from other participating tankers, they
will sometimes bear a proportion of the cost of such incidents
where they have entered their own tankers in a P&l Club in which
the tanker causing the oil spill is also entered. Due to the
mutual sharing of third party liability claims with P&l Clubs,
they will be required to contribute to the total loss according
to their ratable participation in their respective P&l Club.
Furthermore, because the P&l Clubs pool between each other their
liabilities above a certain level, where large claims arise, most
of the world's shipowners will have to make some contribution
where a significant oil pollution claim arises.
10.9.3 Payment is not a presumption of liability
PaYments made by, or on behalf of a participating owner in terms
65Standing Agreement, Clause VIII(G).
66Standing Agreement, Clause II(B) (4).
67Standing Agreement, Clause VIII(H).
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of the Standing Agreement, may not be taken as an admission of
liability or evidence of such liability. 58 Neither shall such
payments constitute a submission to any particular
jurisdiction. 59
10.9.4 Cession and owner's right of recourse
The owner may also require that any payment under the Standing
Agreement made by him, or by anyone providing him insurance or
other financial security, shall be conditional upon either the
claimant assigning to the owner his right of action, or
authorising him to proceed in his name. 70 Furthermore, nothing
in the Standing Agreement shall prejudice the right of recourse
of a participating owner against third parties. 71
10.9.5 Payment may preclude other remedies
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, any payment to a person by
or on behalf of a participating owner shall be in full settlement
of all said person's claims against the participating owner, the
tanker involved, its master, crew, its charterer(s), manager or
operator and their respective officers, agents, employees and
affiliates and underwriters, which arise out of the incident. 72
Therefore, where the Standing Agreement alone is applicable to
the incident and a claimant has very large claims against the
ship he may be ill advised to accept any settlement of these
claims under the Standing Agreement unless he obtains written
agreement from the owner that such settlement does not constitute
full settlement of the claim. A claimant is of course not obliged
to accept the voluntary compensation arrangements provided by
58Standing Agreement, Clause VIII (J) (i) .
69Standing Agreement, Clause VIII (J) (ii) .
7°Standing Agreement, Clause VIII (B) .
71Standing Agreement, Clause VIII(K) .
72Standing Agreement, Clause VIII(D) .
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TOVALOP and may pursue an action under local law.
10.10 Dispute resolution (arbitration)
The Standing Agreement and Supplement provide that claimants may,
in the event of an irreconcilable dispute with a participating
owner, commence International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
arbitration proceedings. 73 Such proceedings are the exclusive
and final means of enforcing the owner's liability under the
Agreement. Proceedings must commence within three years of the
date of the incident and the claimant bears the onus of proving
that he actually suffered pollution damage or took reasonable
threat removal measures to avoid such damage. Tanker owners
participating in TOVALOP assume a contractual obligation to other
members to submit to such proceedings. 74
In contrast to the arbitration clauses in TOVALOP, the 1969 Civil
Liability Convention makes no reference to the application of
arbitration to disputes arising under that instrument. Indeed for
the tanker owner to claim the benefit of limitation, he is
required to establish a limitation fund with the court of the
contracting state in which action is brought against him under
the Converit.Lon i " Although Article IX of 1969 Civil Liability
Convention facilitates the resolution of disputes through the
courts of the contracting State in which the damage was done, the
majority of cases are nevertheless settled through negotiation
73For analysis of arbitration in the context of the
TOVALOP Agreement and marine pollution generally; see Gold
'Dangerous, hazardous and noxious cargoes: A new role for
maritime arbitration' (1990) 14 Marine Policy 375; O'Donovan
'Claims for oil pollution damage - Arbitration and alternative
dispute resolution' American Petroleum Agency (EPA) 1991 Oil
Spill Conference (March 4-7, 1991 San Diego. CA) 691; for a
general discussion of marine arbitration, see Mustill
'Maritime arbitration: the call for a wider perspective'
(1992) vol.9 Journal of International Arbitration pp.5-30.
74Standing Agreement, Clause VIII(E) and (F); Supplement,
Clause 5 (A) .
75Civil Liability ~onvention, Article V.3.
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as opposed to litigation.
10.11 The proper law to be applied
The Standing Agreement and the Supplement are governed by the
laws of England. This provision is not applied without certain
exceptions. A participating owner shall not be required to incur
any obligation or take any action, in respect of any incident in
which his tanker is involved, which would violate the laws or
government regulations of the flag State of the tanker. 76 Nor
shall a participating owner be required to incur any obligation
or take any action which would, if a majority of the stock of the
participating owner is owned, directly or indirectly, by another
corporation, partnership or individual, violate any laws or
government regulations which may apply to said other corporation,
partnership or individual."
10.12 Conclusion to the Standing Agreement
The relief afforded to claimants under the Standing Agreement is
severely limited and will probably be insufficient to compensate
all claims in the event of a large oil spill. Fortunately, it
will not apply in most instances because either additional the
TOVALOP Supplement together with CRISTAL and/or the international
Conventions will apply. Furthermore, in certain States, and, in
particular, the United States, claimants would elect to recover
under local law. In the next Chapter the application of the
TOVALOP Supplement, together with the CRISTAL Fund, is discussed.
In certain circumstances these two voluntary sources of
compensation interact with the workings of relief available from
the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions. For this
reason it is important that both the international Conventions
and the voluntary agreements are considered in this work.
76Standing Agreement, Clause XI(a); Supplement, Clause
1(1) (E).




TOVALOP Supplement and CRISTAL
11.1 Introduction
Since the 20th February, 1987, the Standing Agreement has been
augmented by a Supplement which only comes into operation when
CRISTAL applies to the incident. In terms of the Supplement,
members of TOVALOP assume an obligation to provide compensation
up to an additional level of financial responsibility. 1 The
proportion of successful claims which goes uncompensated where
the limits of the Supplement are exceeded will be compensated by
CRISTAL Limited within the limits and conditions of the CRISTAL
Contract. In other words, CRISTAL provided an addition source of
compensation over and above the limits of the Supplement.
The application of the Supplement is contingent upon the
application of CRISTAL. Accordingly, it is necessary first to
discuss the conditions under which CRISTAL will operate before
considering the possible compensation which may become available
under the Supplement and CRISTAL .
11.2 Pre-conditions for the application of CRISTAL
It is a condition precedent to CRISTAL Limited's obligation to
make any payment, that, at the time of the incident, the oil
involved is "owned" by an oil company party to CRISTAL.~
"Ownership" is defined in extremely wide terms which may not be
simply equated with the traditional notions of ownership. 3
Cargoes of oil may be deemed to be CRISTAL cargoes in
1That limit of liability has been set at a level





circumstances where no CRISTAL member actually possesses legal
title to that oil.
11.3 Extended CRISTAL "ownership" rules
A wide definition of "ownership" has the result that more cargoes
are considered CRISTAL cargoes than would be the case if a strict
interpretation of the concept of "ownership" were relied upon.
In this way the designers of the CRISTAL contract endeavoured to
ensure that the supplementary compensation under CRISTAL would
be available to claimants in the greatest number of cases. This
suggests that the oil companies perceive real advantages where
they settle as many oil pollution disputes possible within their
private and confidential compensation framework, as opposed to
normal procedures.
Cristal "ownership" may arise through title to the oil or it may
be deemed to be owned.
11.3.1 Cargo legally owned
A shipment of oil is considered owned by an oil company party to
CRISTAL where, at the time of the incident, a CRISTAL member in
fact possessed title to the shipment. 4
Significantly, the term "title" to the shipment, within the
special context of CRISTAL, is carried beyond strict legal title
to include a broader range of circumstances. In certain
circumstances, for instance, where a contract or a series of
contracts of sale of a shipment of oil, which either begins with
the contract in which a CRISTAL member is seller, or, ends with
a CRISTAL member as buyer, the shipment can be construed as a
CRISTAL cargo. s In such situations, while, at the time of the
incident, legal title to the polluting oil may in fact rest with
4CRISTAL, Clause V(A) (1) .
SRules of Cristal Limited, Rule 2.5.
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a non-CRISTAL party, that cargo will still be regarded as "owned"
by the party to CRISTAL. Recognizing the artificiality of this
enhanced notion of ownership , the Rules of Cristal Limited
stipulate that the broad interpretation of title shall have no
effect on the legal rights and obligations of the parties under
any other contract or applicable law . 6
11.3.2 Cargo deemed "owned"
Under certain circumstances, although the cargo may not strictly
speaking be owned by a CRISTAL member, it may be deemed to be




A CRISTAL member may elect to be considered the owner of an oil
cargo under circumstances where he has transferred title to a
non-member.' It is a pre-condit ion for the application of this
provision that notification of an election is made in writing to
Cristal Limited prior to the occurrence of any incident. 8
When invoking this procedure the elector must state that he is
a direct or indirect transferor of the oil shipment to a non
CRISTAL member and that he unequivocally elects to be considered
as the "owner".' He must also identify the tanker carrying the
shipment, the name of transferee, the approximate quantity of oil
involved, or otherwise identify t he shipment to CRISTAL Limited's
6Rules of Cristal Limited , Rule 2.5.
'CRISTAL, Clause V. (A) (2) •
8CRISTAL, Clause V(B); Rules of CRISTAL Limited, Rule
6.1 (a) .
'Rules of CRISTAL Limited , Rule 6.1(a) (i).
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satisfaction. 10 The elector must also fulfil all the
requirements necessary for the levy of contributions to the
CRISTAL Fund regarding the oil in question. 11
11.3.2.1.2 Transportation provisions
Where a non CRISTAL cargo is carried aboard a tanker owned by a
CRISTAL member or one of its affiliates, the CRISTAL member or
his affiliate, may elect to be considered the owner. In this way
the cargo shall be deemed to be a CRISTAL cargo. 12
Due notification to Cristal Limited prior to the occurrence of
an incident is required here, also, to enable the application of
this provision. u
11.3.2.1.3 General election
As an alternative to furnishing Cristal Limited with notification
for each shipment, as described in sections 11.3.2.1.1 and
11.3.2.1.2 immediately above, a member is entitled to notify
Cristal Limited of his intention to be considered "owner" of all
such shipments of oil. Such notification is subject to approval
by CRISTAL Limited. 14
11.3.2.2 By contractual linkage
Where at the time of an incident the owner of a cargo of oil is
not a CRISTAL member but he has contracted to sell such cargo to
lORules of CRISTAL Limited, Rule 6.1 (a) (ii) .
llRules of CRISTAL Limited, Rule 6.1(a) (iii).
12CRISTAL, Clause V (A) (3) .
13CRISTAL, Clause V(B) i Rules of CRISTAL Limited, Rule
6.1 (b) .
14Rules of CRISTAL Limited, Rule 6.1(c).
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a CRISTAL member, the cargo shall be deemed a CRISTAL cargo .15
In such case the CRISTAL buyer of the cargo shall have to make
the contributions to the CRISTAL Fund in respect of that cargo.
11.3.2.3 By contractual linkage and location
Where a cargo of oil is owned by a non-member, that oil will
nevertheless be considered a CRISTAL cargo, where three
prerequisite factors are fulfilled . Firstly, where the shipment
is contracted to go to or from a terminal or other facility in
which, secondly, a CRISTAL member has ownership or other interest
and, thirdly, the incident occurs or pollution damage is caused
within 250 nautical mi Les" of such t.ermi.naL?"
In this context a ' ... terminal or other facility shall mean any
property, fixed or floating, from which Oil can be unloaded from
or discharged into a Tanker including, but not limited to, oil
terminals, tank farms, refineries, single point moorings,
floating storage or offshore discharging or loading vessels. ,18
Where all these criteria are satisfied, the cargo shall be deemed
to be a CRISTAL cargo and the CRISTAL contract will accordingly
apply even though no CRISTAL member possesses a proprietary
interest in the oil.
The President of Cristal Limited, Mr J.A. Hawkes, has expressed
the view that this provision is ' ... not entirely satisfactory. '
Clearly, certain conceptual difficulties may arise. Where, for
instance, due to an oil spill outside the 250 nautical mile
limit, oil pollution is subsequently caused within the 250 mile
zone, the delay between the incident and the subsequent pollution
l5CRISTAL, Clause V(A) (4) .
161 Nautical mile = 1.852 m ergo 250 nautical miles = 463
km (277.8 land miles).
17CRISTAL, Clause V(A) (5) .
18CRISTAL, Clause V(A) (C) .
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can lead to uncertainty.19 This is significant not only to · the
issue of compensation but uncertainty could result in hesitation
o on the part of responders who may not be sure whether they will
be able to recover their costs under the enhanced limits of the
Supplement and CRISTAL.
Notwithstanding certain difficulties, the endeavours of the
developers of CRISTAL have, in this regard as in other aspects
of the contract, clearly indicated that the oil industry intended
to provide a reliable source of compensation for oil pollution
above that paid by tanker owners . It has, however, been suggested
that the oil industry created CRISTAL merely to convince the
public of the industry's large monetary willingness to help in
the fight against pollution. 20 To a large extent this is an
unsophisticated analysis which fails to take into account the
full subtleties of international oil pollution compensation.
11.4 Parties eligible for CRISTAL membership
Any person who falls within the CRISTAL definition of an oil
company may become a party to CRISTAL upon acceptance by Cristal
Limited. 21 Cristal Limited is a Bermuda-registered company which
administers the Contract while the actual working of the Contract
is handled by its subsidiary, Cristal Services Ltd in London.
For the purpose of CRISTAL, an oil company may include any
individual or partnership or any public or private body, whether
corporate or not, including a State or any of its constituent
19J.A. Hawkes 'The Voluntary Compensation Schemes CRISTAL'
at 8 contained in Oil Pollution Claims, Liability &
Environmental Concerns International Business Communications
Ltd. Conference Documentation 3-4 November, 1992 London.
2°Buglass 'The Big Oil Spill: Potential Labilities v.
Available Insurance' (1978) Dynamic Aspects of Marine and
Offshore Liabilities at 111-4 cited by McKaig 'Liability For
Oil Tanker Spills' (1991) vol.44 Southwestern Law Journal 1599
fn.157 at 1608.
21CRISTAL, Clause I I (A) .
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subdivisions engaged in the production, refining, marketing,
storing, trading or terminaling of oil, or that receives oil in
bulk for its own consumption or use. 22 As a result of this broad
definition, major consumers of crude oil such as power stations
also become members of CRISTAL together with oil companies and
traders in oil.
11.4.1 Oil traders included
Originally, the categories of eligible CRISTAL members did not
include companies trading in oil. The term "trading" was
incorporated in 1987 to ensure that oil traders could become
CRISTAL members. 23 This amendment was brought about to reflect
a profound change that had occurred in the oil industry in the
late 1970s. Yergin outlines the development of oil trading as
follows.
'Until the end of the 1970s, no more than 10 percent of
internationally traded oil was to be found in the spot
markets, . By the end of 1982, more than half of
internationally traded crude oil was either in the spot
market or sold at prices keyed to the spot market.'24
The ability of the parties to both voluntary agreements, and in
this instance CRISTAL, easily to amend their agreements is
conducive to the continued success of the voluntary regimes.
11.4.2 Composition of CRISTAL membership
22CRISTAL, Clause I(H) read with Clause I(K).
23Cohen 'Revisions of TOVALOP and CRISTAL: Strong Ships
for Stormy Seas' (1987) 18 Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce 525 at 536.
24Yergin The Prize (1991) at 722 for an analysis of the
reasons for this development (essentially due to a glut of
cheap oil on the international market, together with the loss
of secured oil sources by the majors) see Yergin pp.715-24.
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ed.
As the ambit of potential membership is construed widely and
CRISTAL facilitated an enhanced definition of "ownership", a high
proportion of the total volume of oil transported by sea is
subject to the terms of the Contract.
In general, CRISTAL membership remains fairly constant in number
and make-up. As at 31st December, 1991, 732 Companies were
parties to CRISTAL. This represented a reduction of thirty-six
compared with the membership at the end of the 1990 year. This
reduction was mainly due to the withdrawal by one Group member
of twenty-three of its Compani.es P! As at 1st June, 1992,
Cristal Limited had 726 members, comprising oil companies, oil
refinery and terminal operators and oil traders, as well as a
number of other companies consuming or using oil in bulk. 26
These members are located in over ninety countries many of which
are party to the 1971 Fund Convention.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. Groups of certain multinational
oil companies, which are otherwise CRISTAL members, sometimes
choose not to become members. This, for instance, is so in the
case of BP America Inc. 27
11.5 CRISTAL "ownership" per.mits Supplement's application
Compensation under the Supplement shall be permitted only if the
claim arises from an "applicable incident". 28 An occurrence or
series of occurrences with the same origin which causes pollution
damage or creates the threat of an oil spill from a tanker
carrying oil "owned" by an oil company party to CRISTAL
25Cristal Limited Annual Report and Consolidated Financial
Statements Year ended December 31, 1991 at 4.
26TOVALOP & CRISTAL A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation 3rd
(1992) at 14.
27CRISTAL 1991 List of Members at 7.
28Introduction to the Supplement.
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constitutes an "applicable incident H • 29 The seminal idea behind
the Supplement's definition of an "applicable incident H is that
the Supplement only operates where the oil involved in the spill
is actually owned or deemed to be "ownedH by a party to CRISTAL.
11.6 CRISTAL applies if Supplement limit is met
Supplementary compensation under CRISTAL will not become
available until the tanker owner has first paid compensation up
to the applicable limit calculated in accordance with the
Supplement. Such payment; may result from claims for oil pollution
damage or costs of preventive measures or threat removal measures
and paYments or costs incurred by the tanker-owner as a result
of the application of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention,
applicable domestic laws or otherwise. 3D
It is not necessary that the tanker owner directly pays these
amounts. Such paYments may be made on his behalf through, for
instance, his P&l Club or other insurer . Furthermore, tanker
owners who are not party to the TOVALOP Agreement at the time of
the "applicable Lnc i.dent;" may nevertheless bring about the
application of CRISTAL by paying compensation according to the
terms of the TOVALOP Agreement and up to the limits encapsulated
in the Supplement.
This procedure is a further illustration of how the oil industry
has seen fit to enable the application of the voluntary
compensation regimes in as many instances as possible. However,
before tanker owners can invoke the very substantial benefits
afforded to them by this provision, the oil causing the spill
must have been owned, or deemed to be owned, by a party to
CRISTAL.
29Supplement, Clause 1 (1) (A) .
3DCRISTAL, Clause IV(D) (4) the limits mentioned in this
clause are equivalent to the limits of financial
responsibility specified by Clause 3(C) (3) of the Supplememt.
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11.7 Scope of the Supplement and CRISTAL
Because the Supplement and CRISTAL are required to provide
compensation arising out of the same incidents they have a
similar scope of application.
11.6.1 Tanker defined
The Supplement does not define the term "tanker" but Clause
1(2) (A) of the agreement stipulates that insofar as words and
phrases are not varied by Clause 1(1) of the Supplement they
shall have the same meanings as defined in Clause I of the
Standing Agreement. In keeping with this provision, the term
"tanker" does not have the same meaning in the Standing Agreement
as in the Supplement. This because the definition of an
applicable incident for the purpose of the Supplement confirms
that the Supplement only applies where CRISTAL applies to the
incident. Therefore, the incident in question must occur from a
tanker as defined in CRISTAL and the other requirements for the
application of CR1STAL must also be met.
For the purpose of CR1STAL and for the purpose of the Supplement,
a tanker includes any seagoing vessel and any seaborne craft of
any type whatsoever, designed and constructed for carrying oil
in bulk as cargo, where actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo
at the time of the incident. 31
Accordingly, the definition of a tanker in CRISTAL and the
Supplement is narrower than that of the Standing Agreement as it
only covers tankers actually carrying oil, in bulk as cargo at
the time of the incident. Furthermore, the oil in question must
be owned or deemed to be owned by a CR1STAL member. By contrast,
the Standing Agreement applies whether or not the tanker is
actually laden at the time of the incident. 32
31CR1STAL, Clause I(N).
32Standing Agreement, Clause I (m) .
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Under CRISTAL, as is the case with the Standing Agreement, . the
tanker need not be at sea at the time of the incident, but must
be capable of sea-going or being seaborne. The Great Lakes shall
be regarded as seas for this purpose and sea-going or seaborne
capability shall normally be determined in the light of the
tankers certification. 33
11.6.2 Oil defined
"Oil" means any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil including, but
not limited to, crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and
lubricating oil whether carried on board a tanker as cargo or in
the bunkers of such tanker. 34 The Supplement does not expressly
define "oil" but, because the definition of an applicable
incident refers to oil as defined in CRISTAL, the Supplement
incorporates the CRISTAL definition by reference.
Therefore, provided that the incident occurs while a tanker is
transporting "oil" which is owned, or deemed to be owned, by a
party to CRISTAL, compensation shall be made in terms of the
Supplement and CRISTAL, even in circumstances where the oil
pollution damage was not due to a spill of cargo oil, but was due
to a spillage of persistent bunker oil from that vessel.
As has been the experience of the IOPC Fund, CRISTAL has also
encountered problems with regard to the categorization of
persistent oil as opposed to non-persistent oil. For example it
has been noted that at least two crude oils are not categorized
as being persistent oil by both the IOPC Fund and CRISTAL. The
IOPC Fund, like CRISTAL, accepts that the product called
Orimulsion is a persistent oil. 3s
33CRISTAL, Rule 2.1.
34CRISTAL, Clause I (G) .
3SJ.A. Hawkes 'The Voluntary Compensation Schemes CRISTAL'
at ~ contained in Oil Pollution Claims, Liability &
Env~ronmental Concerns International Business Communications
Ltd. Conference Documentation 3-4 November, 1992 London.
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11.6.3 Ballast voyages excluded
From the standpoint of the oil shipper, as opposed to that of the
oil haulier, the justification for the definitions of "tanker"
and "oil" is understandable. Unladen tankers do not transport
cargoes of oil and therefore why should owners of oil cargoes
contribute to damages arising from incidents where no oil is
actually being transported in bulk as cargo?
In rebuttal, the tanker owner camp have argued that the oil
industry should assume a significant proportion of the financial
responsibility for spills of bunker oil from unladen tankers when
tankers are on ballast voyages to receive an oil shipment. The
foundation for this assertion is that the oil cargo owners are
integrally linked, through association, with the ballast voyage,
and as such should shoulder a large degree of responsibility for
incidents and resulting pollution damages which occur during
ballast voyages.
11.7 Loss recoverable - Supplement and CRISTAL
The Supplement and CRISTAL were designed as a dual system of
compensation. Of necessity, therefore, they share the same
definitions of oil "pollution damage", "preventive measures" and
"threat removal measures". Consistency between the types of
damage admissible under the Supplement and CRISTAL echoes the
endeavours of the P&l Clubs and the IOPC Fund to achieve
conformity as to the admissibility of claims under the 1969 civil
Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions respectively.
11.7.1 Pollution damage defined
For the purpose of the Supplement and CRISTAL, (but not the
Standing agreement), the definition of pollution damage was
amended to clarify the position relating to environmental damage .
For the purpose of CRISTAL this important amendment became
effective from 23rd October, 1989, and for the Supplement on 20th
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February, 1990. At the time of writing the definition is as it
appears below.
\ "Pollution Damage" means (i) physical loss or damage
caused outside the Tanker by contamination resulting from
the escape or discharge of Oil from the Tanker, wherever
such escape or discharge may occur, including such loss or
damage caused by Preventive measures, and/or (ii) proven
economic loss actually sustained, irrespective as to
accompanying physical damage, as a direct result of
contamination as set out in (i) above, } n c l ud i ng the Costs
of Preventive Measures, and/or (iii) Costs actually
incurred in taking reasonable and necessary measures to
restore or replace natural resources damaged as a direct
result of an Applicable Incident, but excluding any other
damage to the environment.' 36
The type of damages recoverable under the Supplement and CRISTAL
are considerably clearer and broader than is the case under the
Standing Agreement. However, as is the case under TOVALOP, it is
difficult to assess the approach adopted by the Directors of
Cristal Limited in the resolution of claims arising under the
CRISTAL contract because of the confidentiality involved. The
Rules of Cristal Limited do, however, provide certain insights
into the policy, practice and principles applicable to the
CRISTAL contract.
In accordance with provisions of the CRISTAL Contract and the
Rules of Cristal Limited, any person, including a CRISTAL member,
may make a claim and receive compensation for pollution damage
occurring as the result of an escape or discharge of oil or the
cost of preventive or threat removal measures. 37
11.7.2 Economic loss
36Supplement, Clause l(G); CRISTAL, Clause I(M).
37Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 3.2.
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Although it seems the Standing Agreement also permitted the
recovery of proven economic loss actually sustained, irrespective
of accompanying physical damage, the exact position under that
agreement was not clear. Any uncertainty concerning the recovery
of pure economic loss under the Supplement and CRISTAL has now
been clarified.
The Rules of Cristal Limited have elaborated on the CRISTAL
definition of pollution damage. The term 'proven economic loss
actually sustained', as used in Clause I(M) of CRISTAL, excludes
any remote or speculative economic loss or economic loss based
upon theoretical calculations in any form.
The term includes loss or damage (and reasonable measures to
prevent further loss or damage) directly caused by airborne
particles of oil emanating from a tanker. 38 Such particles may
be carried by wind or in the form of soot from a tanker fire.
Of course, under the Supplement, the exact meaning of the term,
'proven economic loss actually sustained', may be determined by
ICC arbitration. Also, such recovery shall be permitted only
where the loss incurred is directly linked to the contamination.
An example, provided by Cristal Limited, depicting how definition
of pollution damage may operate in practice is given as follows.
'A hotel owner who spent money to clean up a beach which
fronts the hotel and which is contaminated by oil spilled
from a tanker has certainly sustained pollution damage.
Again, loss of income which the hotel owner is able to
prove is the result of the contamination will constitute
pollution damage.' 39
38Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 2.4.
39CRISTALi Memorandum of Explanation, Cristal Contract and
Rules of Cristal Limited, Revised February 20, 1992 at 7.
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This very simple example depicts a hotel owner suffering damage
by way of clean up costs and economic loss reasonably
attributable to contamination. It envisages a hotel situated in
front of a contaminated beach, suggesting a very close proximity
to the site of contamination. The example, could seem indicative
of a particularly narrow interpretation of economic loss.
Certainly, resorts that depend upon water-related activities may
suffer a severe decline in custom even where such resorts are not
situated in close proximity to the pollution site. 40
There are numerous types of reliably attributable economic loss
which are removed from the site of contamination. For instance
would lost taxes be claimable from the voluntary compensation
regimes? According to the interpretation of the definition of
pollution damage, as articulated by Rule 2.4 of Cristal limited,
such claims are in principle recognizable under the definition
of pollution damage where the Directors of Cristal Limited
determine that they satisfy the criteria of directness.
11.7.3 Loss of natural resources
The Standing Agreement makes no direct reference to the
admissibility of claims for the recovery of damage to the
environment caused by oil pollution. As loss or damage which is
remote or speculative is not covered by the definition of
pollution damage in the Standing Agreement, it is probable that
claims for damage to the environment are inadmissible under that
agreement. The position under the Standing Agreement on this
issue is analogous to the policy expressed by the IOPC Fund in
relation to its interpretation of the definition of pollution
damage under the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971
Fund Convention, in that compensation would be granted only where
a claimant had suffered quantifiable economic loss. Compensation
4°For a discussion of the question of economic loss see
Mulhern 'Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the
Land: A Tort Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses'
(1990) 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. at 85.
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for damage to the marine and coastal environment on the basis of
an abstract quantification of damage, calculated in accordance
with theoretical models, will presumably be precluded under the
Standing Agreement. However, as pointed out previously, it would
be possible for an ICC arbitration tribunal to determine
otherwise.
The 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund
Conventions introduced a revised definition of pollution damage
which was incorporated into the 1992 Protocols to those
Conventions. This revised definition of pollution damage
includes, inter alia, compensation for damage to natural
resources, provided that compensation for impairment of the
environment (other than the loss of profit from such impairment)
shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement
actually undertaken or to be undertaken. 41
The industries behind the two-tier voluntary compensation regimes
responded to the 1984 amendment to the definition of pollution
damage by implementing amendments to the definitions of pollution
damage contained in the Supplement and CRISTAL. These amendments
facilitate the recovery of damage to natural resources prior to
the coming into force of the 1992 Protocols.
The relevant portion of the Supplement and CRISTAL definition
provides that pollution damage includes costs actually incurred
in taking reasonable and necessary measures to restore or replace
natural resources damaged as a direct result of an applicable
incident, but excluding any other damage to the environment.
Consequently, damage to the environment per se is inadmissible,
under the Supplement and CRISTAL.
Mr J .A. Nichols and Dr 1. C White, respectively, Technical Manager
and Managing Director of ITOPF, have expressed the following
41Article 2.3 of the 1992 Civil Liability Protocol which
is incorporated by reference into the 1992 Fund Protocol by
Article 2.3 of that Protocol.
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industry concerns over the admissibility of claims for
environmental loss.
'The fundamental problem with such claims is the fact that
such resources do not usually have an easily definable
economic value. As a result natural resource damage ·
assessment procedures and the resulting claims are usually
based on formulae and on questionable scientific premises
and unrelated economic indicators. This is a highly complex
area involving scientific, legal, economic and political
considerations ... ,42 (emphasis by the present writer)
It would seem that these commentators even agree that such
resources have an economic value per se but their concern is that
such value is difficult to determine (refer to emphasis in quote
above). However, an obvious point is that just because the
economic value of a thing damaged is not easily discernible it
does not mean that such damage must go uncompensated. Clearly,
courts are often called upon to make such decisions and may also
make use of abstract or theoretical models when reaching a
decision as to the quantum of damage.
11.7.3.1 Recovery of damage assessment costs
In the sole discretion "o f the Directors, CRISTAL may compensate
claimants for the cost of studies undertaken to assist in
quantifying or verifying pollution damage and for any additional
costs which CRISTAL determines as having assisted in resolving
claims. It could well be the case that legal expenses could be
recoverable under the heading of additional costs. Such costs may
be included within the limits payable by CRISTAL.
CRISTAL will not, however, compensate for any environmental
studies, even if required by local law, unless such studies were
authorised by CRISTAL or the Directors determine they were
42Nichols & I.C. White 'The Role of ITOPF and P&l Clubs in
Oil Spill Response' (undated paper) at 9.
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designed to assist in quantifying or verifying pollution
damage. 43 It seems that as a matter of policy, at this stage all
claims for wider environmental damage per se will be resisted by
the P&l Clubs and the Directors of Cristal Limited.
11.7.3.2 The importance of ecological damage
It has been suggested that despite great differences between
legislation, case law and scholarly writing in different legal
systems, there are common characteristics in the definition of
ecological damage, which can be identified as ' . . . the
detrimental physical change of the environment, that do not only
affect personal property, health or economic interests, but
injures the public interest in the conservation and use of the
environment. ,44 This definition articulates a broader category
of damage than the restricted parameters within which the
voluntary regimes and the international Conventions allow for the
recovery of damage to the environment.
Clean-up operations and "a t t e mp t s to restore damaged ecosystems
are in most instances only partly successful. Therefore, by
merely paying for clean up and attempted rehabilitation expenses,
the polluter can never provide full compensation for damage to
the environment. At best, even if reinstatement measures were
entirely effective, damage to natural resources would still have
occurred because the environment will have been impaired during
the interim period from the time of the spill up to the time when
full reinstatement occurs. This is generally referred to as
'depreciation of resources pending restoration.' Also, in certain
circumstances, remedial measures are counter-productive,
unfeasible or impossible. This would be so, for example, where
the technology does not exist to restore the damage to an
ecosystem or where remedial action would cause greater damage
43Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.4.
44Marticke 'Liability for Ecological Damage: a Report'
(1992) 22 Envtl. Pol. & Law 28 at 28.
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than would be the case if no remedial action were taken.
For these reasons it is unsatisfactory to maintain that claimants
should only be permitted to recover 'the cost of reasonable
measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be
undertaken' 45 or 'costs actually incurred in taking reasonable
and necessary measures to restore or replace natural resources
damaged as a direct result of an applicable incident, but
excluding any other damage to the environment.,46
The extant position fails to accommodate the loss sustained by
a community when their shoreline is polluted by an oil spill and
attempted reinstatement measures have proved unsatisfactory or
ineffective. If one concedes that a community whose environment
is thus heavily polluted with oil suffers damage, and it would
seem difficult to argue otherwise, then on grounds of equity the
present position adopted by industry regarding the compensation
of such damage is untenable. The position of industry can only
be justified on the traditional policy grounds that shipowners,
and by implication the oil industry, must be allowed to limit
their liability to manageable levels . The policy of limitation
as it applies to maritime law has been steadily eroded. In
keeping with this trend, provision should now be made for full
compensation for environmental damage, including monetary
compensation and compensation in kind where reinstatement is not
feasible.
As the definitions of environmental damage contained in the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions, the 1992 Protocols thereto and
the Standing Agreement, Supplement and CRISTAL do not
realistically reflect the requirement that compensation must be
made beyond the artificial constraints of reinstatement costs,
it can be predicted that such definitions will not enjoy
45As in the position under the 1992 Protocols to the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions.
46As is the position under the Supplement and CRISTAL.
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longevity or legitimacy. Where law attempt to regulate conflict
between groups but fails to reflect the legitimate demands of the
more powerful group, those laws will inevitably be superseded by
laws more favourable to the most influential group.
During periods of rapid industrialisation: for example in England
during the industrial revolution, environmental considerations
were sacrificed in the interest of rapid industrial growth. This
trend is still evident in developing countries where governments
sacrifice the demands of conservationists to satisfy the dictates
of rapid development. When frenetic industrialisation reaches
more stable levels and the dictates of industrialists are
replaced by more humanist considerations, the law is forced to
reflect this change if it is to retain legitimacy. This general
observation is also true within the context of marine oil
pollution from tankers.
It has already been seen how in the United States the public
outcry following the Exxon Valdez spill has resulted in OPA,
which, inter alia, provides that environmental damage will be
recoverable to a far wider extent than is the case under the
relevant provisions of the international Conventions and the
voluntary compensation regimes. This reflects a swing in the
balance of power from industry to the public at large which is
beginning to demand that the cost of pollution be realistically
and truthfully assessed.
What the oil industry, and to a lesser extent the independent
tanker owners, fear more than higher liability is external
control and unpredictability. External control will be forced
upon the tanker process if the oil industry fails to meet the
standards of responsibility expected of them. Such standards
naturally fluctuate over time, and differ in different
geographical locations around the world where different
conditions prevail. But, as a general statement, it is very
likely that environmental standards will increase significantly
as the general public becomes more conscious - of the need to
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preserve the environment. It is also significant that the groups
of people who use the most oil, which is in most cases imported
by tankers, are the most articulate, educated, influential and
litigious in the world (i.e. North American and European
citizens) .
It is not sufficient or satisfactory that the oil industry merely
compensate victims of narrowly defined oil pollution without
paying the full cost of the destruction of natural resources
caused by their less than adequate levels of performance. The
parties ultimately responsible for the pollution must be forced
to provide full compensation, including the full costs of damage
to the environment. Punitive damages and fines should also be
levied in appropriate circumstances. To avoid external control
the industry must provide such compensation until they manage to
make the tanker transport process safe.
Unless the international Conventions and the voluntary
compensation regimes adequately reflect the legitimate demands
and expectations of the public, they will lose legitimacy and
fail. The consequence of such failure will be a fragmentation of
oil pollution compensation systems to the point where a different
system applies in each State. This is effectively what has
already occurred in the United States with the passing of OPA.
In this regard one commentator has expressed the following view.
'The fate of international law regarding oil spill
pollution is most likely settled. The interest in resolving
the oil spill pollution problem through an international
treaty will slowly fade as more and more nations follow the
United States lead, moving further away from an
international solution to the oil spill liability
problem. ,47
47Smith 'An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and
the 1984 Protocols on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage' (1991) 14 Houston J. of Int'] Law 115 at 150.
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In essence the above prediction is probably correct, however, it
is not desirable that the form of the various fragmented
compensation regimes emulate the system of control implemented
by OPA. Unfortunately, OPA channels liability to the tanker
owner, when in the view of the present writer, it is more
effective to place responsibility on the owners of the cargo
which, as noted previously, is the case in certain U.S. State
Legislation. Furthermore, international control over oil
pollution and the compensation thereof is desirable because it
creates uniformity and therefore predictability.
The U. S. is the world's largest oil importer and possesses
sufficient political and economic influence to adopt unilateral
action. No single state other than the U. S. is in the same
position to dictate terms to the shipping and oil industry and
avoid isolation or considerable additional costs. Therefore,
although the proponents of internationalism have come under
pressure from the United States since 1990, a more united
European community and Japan are likely to adopt an amended
international system of control with greater liability and an
effective channelling of liability to the oil cargo owner. Such
development would be in keeping with the thrust of this thesis
and would serve the central purpose of increasing tanker safety.
This argument is developed in more detail in Chapter 14 of this
work.
11.7.4 Preventive measures
The CRISTAL Contract defines preventive measures as any
reasonable measures taken by any person, after an incident has
occurred, to prevent or minimise pollution damage. 4 8 The
Standing Agreement also contains this definition. u The
Supplement defines preventive measures in the same way, except
in that it refers to an applicable incident to emphasise that the
48CRISTAL, Clause I (L) .
UStanding Agreement, Clause 1(1).
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Supplement shall only apply in those cases where CRISTAL applies
to the incident . 50
For the purpose of CRISTAL the term "preventive measures" shall
be interpreted to mean any reasonable measures taken after an
escape or discharge of oil from a tanker to prevent pollution
damage from being caused or to contain, remove, disperse or
eliminate any oil that has escaped, or to reduce or prevent the
further escape of oil from the tanker but shall not include
measures the primary purpose of which is not directed towards the
prevention of further pollution damage or the elimination of the
further escape or discharge of oi l . 51
Examples of preventive measures are the booming of an estuary to
prevent oil entering the estuary, or putting a boom around oil
which has been spilt and picking it up from the surface of the
water by means of a skimmer in order to ensure that it does not
cause extended pollution damage . 52
In principle, Cristal Limited considers the type of measures
mentioned above, and any other reasonable clean up measures, to
be included within the ambit of preventive measures. By
implication these heads of damage would also receive compensation
under the Supplement. Therefore the two-tiered system of
compensation under the Supplement and CRISTAL will reimburse
governments and other claimants who incur reasonable costs in
undertaking preventive measures .
11.7.5 Threat removal measures
The wording of the definition of threat removal measures is
almost identical across the Standing Agreement, the Supplement
50Supplement, Clause 1 (1) (H) .
51CRISTAL, Rule 2.2.
52CRISTAL; Memorandum of Explanation, Cristal Contract and
Rules of Cristal Limited, Revised February 20, 1992 at 7.
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and CRISTAL. The CRISTAL Contract defines threat removal measures
as reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident has
occurred for the purposes of removing the threat of an escape or
discharge of oil. 53 The TOVALOP Supplement defines threat
removal measures in the same way except that it refers to an
applicable incident to emphasise that the supplement shall only
apply in those cases where CRISTAL applies to the incident. 54
The Standing Agreement also contains this definition. 55
The CRISTAL Contract defines a "threat of an escape or discharge
of oil" in the same way in which that phrase is defined in the
Standing Agreement. The threat of an escape or discharge of oil
means a grave and imminent danger of the escape or discharge of
oil from a tanker, which if it occurred, would create a serious
danger of pollution damage, whether or not an escape or discharge
in fact subsequently occurs. 56 This term is not directly defined
in the Supplement but for the purpose of the Supplement the
phrase "threat of an escape or discharge of oil" shall have the
same meaning as that of the Standing Agreement, provided that the
Supplement in fact applies to the incident. In effect, because
the Supplement only applies where CRISTAL applies, the ability
of the Supplement to compensate threat removal measures is not
as wide in the Supplement as under the Standing Agreement. On the
other hand, greater compensation is potentially available under
the Supplement and CRISTAL where those agreements apply.
In terms of the Supplement and CRISTAL, compensation is available
for measures taken to remove a grave and imminent danger of an
oil spill . This might include, for instance, the removal of oil
from a damaged cargo tank on a tanker in order to prevent the
53CRISTAL, Clause I (P).
54Supplement, Clause 1 (1) (K) .
55Standing Agreement, Clause 1(0).
56CRISTAL r Clause 1(0); Standing Agreement, Clause I(n).
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risk of that oil escaping into the sea. 57 "Threat removal
measures" are interpreted to include reasonable measures taken
directly to prevent an escape or discharge of oil from a tanker.
It does not, however, include measures the primary purpose of
which is not directed towards the prevention of an escape or
discharge of oil, nor shall it include measures which,
irrespective of pollution considerations, any reasonable or
prudent owner would have taken in the circumstances to ensure the
safety of the tanker, its personnel and/or its cargo. 58 In other
words, the policy of Cristal Limited is analogous to that of the
IOPC Fund, in that a distinction is drawn between pollution
prevention operations and operations in the nature of salvage.
Significantly, pure threat removal measures are recoverable under
the Supplement and CRISTAL (and the Standing Agreement) while
such measures are inadmissible under the 1969 Civil Liability and
1971 Fund Conventions. The recovery of reasonable threat removal
measures had been permitted in terms of CRISTAL since the
contract was first initiated but such claims were only recognized
by Cristal and TOVOLOP where an oil spill had actually occurred.
TOVALOP was amended as from 20th February, 1973, to provide for
the recovery of costs for pure threat removal measures and since
25th May, 1973 the CRISTAL Contract likewise permitted the
recovery of claims for reasonable pure threat removal
measures. 59 These changes were incorporated in the Supplement to
TOVALOP. In this way claimants who incur costs reacting to the
threat of an oil spill are able to recover such loss regardless
as to whether or not an actual spill eventuates.
It is not necessary that the actual owner of the polluting tanker
claim for the costs of preventive measures or the cost of threat
57CRISTALi Memorandum of Explanation, Cristal Contract and
Rules of Cristal Limited, Revised February 20, 1992 at 7.
58The Rules of CRISTAL Limited, Rule 2.3 .
59Abecassis & Jarashow Oil Pollution from Ships:
International, United Kingdom and United States Law and
Practice 2nd ed. (1985) 311 para.12-23.
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removal measures taken by an owner. Such claims may be made by
a person other than the owner, provided that such person
establishes to CRlSTAL's satisfaction that he is expressly or
implicitly authorized by the owner to receive such
compensation. 60 Accordingly , the owners P&l insurer or other
insurer may claim compensation from CRlSTAL.
11.7.6 Fixed and additional costs
As a matter of principle, CRlSTAL will not compensate
Governments, for any fixed costs incurred by that Government to
establish and maintain a public service mobilised in response to
a pollution incident. Where such costs are recoverable under
local law, the tanker owner may be required to provide
compensation for these fixed costs . Further, a person who
compensates governments for this category of loss shall not be
reimbursed by CRlSTAL. However, CRlSTAL will provide compensation
to Governments, and any person who compensates Governments, for
reasonable incremental (additional) costs incurred by a public
oil pollution response service, over and above fixed costs, when
it actually responds to an oil pollution incident. 61
11.8 Limitation - Supplement and CRISTAL
The limits available under the Supplement and CRlSTAL are greater
than that under the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund
Conventions. Consequently, as the Supplement may apply in states
which are party to the Civil Liability Convention, tanker owners
may voluntarily assume greater " l i a b i l i t y " under the Supplement
than they may legally be required to assume.
However, the limits available under the Supplement and CRlSTAL
are not as great as those available under the 1992 Protocols to
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions which, it should not be
6°Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 3.1.
61Rules of Cristal Limited , Rule 3.2.
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forgotten, are not in force. Indeed, it is moot whether or 'not
the 1992 Protocols will ever enter into force.
Significantly, again, the limits available under the Supplement
and CRISTAL are not as great as those available under OPA.
The revised version of the Supplement and CRISTAL which came into
operation on 20th February, 1994, contain new limits. The limits
have been increased and are no longer denominated in U.S. Dollars
but linked to the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the
International Monetary Fund. There are two main reasons for these
changes. Firstly, the limits of the Supplement and CRISTAL had
been eroded due to weakening (devaluation) of the US$ on the
international currency market. Secondly, the members of TOVALOP
and CRISTAL considered that the voluntary agreements should be
brought into conformity with the international Conventions. 62
Notwithstanding such amendments, the Standing Agreement limits
have remained at the previous limits and remain denominated in
the U.S. Dollar.
11.8.1 Supplement (20/2/94) limits
In terms of Clause 3 (C) (3) of the Supplement the maximum
compensation available under that agreement for all claims
arising out of a single incident is as follows. All tankers
measuring under 5,000 gross tons (gt.) are assessed a fixed
amount of 3 million SDR. Tankers measuring above 5,000 gt. are
charged the fixed amount of 3 million SDR plus an additional
amount of 420 SDR for each gross ton above 5,000 gt. up to a
maximum of 59,7 million SDR. These are exactly the same limits
as will become applicable in contracting states if the 1992
Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention enters into force.
However, the 1992 Civil Liability Convention limits will become
available even where the 1992 Fund Convention does not apply to
the incident. By contrast the Supplement only applies if the
62Interviews.
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tanker causing the spill is carrying a CRISTAL cargo.
11.8.2 CRISTAL (20/2/94) limits
In terms of Clause IV(D) (5) (a) of CRISTAL, the following maximum
limits of responsibility, determined according to a measurement
of the gross tonnage of the tanker, may apply. In all cases the
stated amounts include compensation that would be payable
according to the limits of f inancial responsibility in the
Supplement.
Tankers measuring under 5,000 gt . are rated a fixed amount of 32
million SDR. Tankers over 5,000 gt. are charged the fixed amount
of 32 million SDR and an additional amount of 652 SDR for each
gross ton above the 5,000 gross ton measurement subject to a
maximum of 120 million SDR. While the Supplement's limitation
provisions conform to the 1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability
Convention, CRISTAL's limitation amounts are linked to the
tonnage of the polluting tanker and, as such, do not reflect the
1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention . It is significant that the
upper limit of CRISTAL is substantially lower than that provided
for in the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention. This is designed
to provide states with an incentive to ratify the Fund
Protocol. 63
11.8.3 Tonnage measurement
As is to be expected, the Supplement and CRISTAL measure tonnage
for the purpose of limitation in the same way. This ensures that
compensation under both tiers of the voluntary regime are
synchronised. And the apportionment of financial responsibility,
as between the tanker and oil industries under the Supplement and
CRISTAL, respectively, remains uniform. A "ton" means a ton of
a tanker's gross tonnage as determined in accordance with the
provisions of the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement
63Notice of Special General Meeting of CRISTAL Members
Resolution 1 Para.4. '
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of Ships, 1969, as amended, and in force at the effective date
of this contract. H This is the unit of measurement under the
1992 Protocols, but not under the 1969 Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions.
11.8.4 contractual exemptions to financial responsibility
A tanker-owner participating in the TOVALOP Supplement is not
obliged to take preventive measures or threat removal measures
or pay any costs or make any compensation to a person and neither
shall compensation be paid under CRISTAL where the incident
results from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection
or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character, 55 was wholly caused by an act or
omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party, 55 or
if the incident was wholly caused by the negligence or other
wrongful act of any Government or other authority responsible for
the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the
exercise of that function. n
Certain qualifications are relevant to these absolute rules as
between the TOVALOP party and Cristal Limited, and Cristal
Limited and its members, regarding the balancing of financial
responsibility assessed under the international Conventions as
opposed to the voluntary schemes. Significantly, under the terms
of the Fund Convention, the IOPC Fund will pay claims arising out
of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible natural phenomena.
In terms of the Civil Liability Convention, however, the tanker
owner will be exonerated from all liability caused by such
54TOVALOP Supplement, Clause 1 (1) (L)i CRISTAL, Clause I
(Q) .
55Supplement, Clause 3(C) (1) (i) i CRISTAL, Clause
IV (D) (2) (i) .
66Supplement, Clause 3(C) (1) (ii) i CRISTAL, Clause
IV (D) (2) (i i) .
57Supplement, Clause 3 (C) (1) (iii)i CRISTAL, Clause IV
(D) (2) (iii) .
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phenomena.
It may also be noted that in the case of the Supplement an ICC
arbitration tribunal may have the discretion to decide the
application or non-application of these defences. By contrast,
under the Cristal Contract, there is no provision for external
influences and the Directors of CRISTAL, alone, will determine
the application of these defences in the event of a dispute.
11.9 Financial responsibility - Supplement and CRlSTAL
Certain important differences exist as to the sources of paYment
applicable under the Supplement and CRISTAL. However, both
schemes rely on the concept of mutual protection.
11.9.1 Supplement (P&l cover or other insurance)
Paymerrt s from the tanker owner under the Supplement are made from
the same sources as under the Civil Liability Convention and the
Standing Agreement. The P&l insurer indemnifies the tanker owner
for the amounts that he is required to pay under the Supplement.
Furthermore, the tanker owner may also have obtained cover
pertaining to pollution liability insurance from commercial
insurers. In such cases claimants may attempt to recover directly
from insurers.
11.9.2 CRlSTAL (CRlSTAL Fund)
In order to assure its financial capability to pay successful
claims established under the CRISTAL contract Cristal Limited,
maintains and administers an account which is known as the
CRISTAL Fund. The CRISTAL Fund is funded in roughly the same way
as the IOPC Fund through the mutual pooling of money by members.
Cristal Limited is empowered to make Periodic Calls on its
members as required to pay claims, meet the administrative
expenses of Cristal Limited and any other expenses incurred by
407
h . 68contract, or ot erWlse.
The motivation for incorporation of Cristal Limited under the
laws of Bermuda is to be found in the tax relief available in
that island State. Under the current laws of Bermuda, Cristal
Limited is not required to pay any taxes in Bermuda on either
income or capital gains. The Company has received an undertaking
from the Minister of Finance in Bermuda, under the Exempted
Undertakings Tax Protection Act, 1966, which exempts the company
from any such tax at least until the year 2010. 69 It may also be
observed that many of the P&l Clubs are also incorporated under
the laws of Bermuda.
11.9.2.1 Contributions assessed on oil receipts
Each member's contributions to the CRISTAL Fund are worked out
upon a proportional assessment of crude/fuel oil receipts
(hereinafter referred to as oil receipts) submitted to Cristal
Limited by its members. Prior to the 1st April of each calender
year, each member is required to notify Cristal Limited as to his
oil receipts measured in barrels received during the immediately
preceding calendar year. 70
The method used to assess each member's contribution is
relatively simple. The amount of the periodic call in SDR is
divided by the total barrel amount of oil receipts received from
all CRISTAL members during the calendar year preceding the date
of the call. This calculation yields an overall assessment of
financial responsibility per barrel of all oil received by all
CRISTAL members over that year. This amount per barrel is
multiplied by the barrel amount contained in each of the oil
receipts of each particular member during the same period and the
68CRISTAL, Clause VII (A) (1).
69Cristal Limited Annual Report and Consolidated Financial
Statements Year ended December 31, 1991 at 12.
7°Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.1(a).
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individual members ratable contribution per barrel is derived.
71
The volume of crude and fuel oil received by CRISTAL members from
1986-1990 are given below in barrels . 7 2 The fluctuations
recorded here are quite considerable from year to year. It is
also noteworthy that the amount of oil received by CRISTAL
















Note: One barrel is equivalent to 159 litres or
and approximately 7.4 barrels is the equivalent
crude oil.
11.9.2.1.1 After carriage of oil by sea
The submission of oil receipts to Cristal Limited by its members
is closely linked to the expanded notion of "ownership" used by
CRISTAL.
Receipts are required when oil is received at an installation or
terminal by a CRISTAL member which has been transported all or
part of the way to such installation or terminal by a tanker and
at the time of receipt is "owned" by a CRISTAL member. If the oil
is not received and owned by a CRISTAL member such oil must
nevertheless be included in an oil receipt if a CRISTAL member
elects to be considered the owner. Any oil which is received at
71CRISTAL, Clause VII (B) (2) •
72Cristal Limited Annual Report and Consolidated Financial
Statements Year ended December 31, 1991 at 4.
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an installation or terminal solely for trans-shipment to another
installation or terminal where it is to be received by a CRISTAL
member need not be included in such oil receipt. 73 Where oil
owned by a CRISTAL member, but having title transferred at
destination to a non-member, a receipt must be furnished by the
membe r i ?"
Where a CRISTAL member has title to oil at some point after
loading and prior to discharge from a tanker, that member will
be required to submit an oil receipt in respect of that oil
unless that oil is included in the receipts of that oil company
party or any other related or affiliated oil company party by
reason of any other provision. 75 Furthermore, where that oil has
been sold to another oil company party to CRISTAL, the later
member may furnish the receipt. 76
Oil receipts shall be required for any portion of oil received
at a terminal or other facility which is partly owned by a
CRISTAL member. Such receipts shall reflect the quantity of oil
in proportion to that member's relative equity interest compared
to the equity interest(s) of all other CRISTAL members in that
terminal or other facility. Notwithstanding this rule, the
member's proportional assessment will not be necessary where the
oil in question has been reported (or is to be reported) in the
other receipts of the member in question or any other related or
73CRISTAL, Clause VII (A) (2) (i) and (ii).
74CRISTAL, Clause VII (A) (2) (iii) .
75The question of affiliated companies is important. For
example, in 1992, Shell International Petroleum Company Ltd.
had 81 different subsidiaries listed as members of CRISTAL. 'seej CRISTAL 1991 L~st of Members at pp 39-41. Members may,
whe~ ~ransmitting its oil receipts include the receipts of an
afflllated member. However, where this is done, any
assessments due from the affiliate will be forwarded by
CRISTAL to the Member submitting the receipt.
76CRISTAL, Clause VII (A) (2) (vi) .
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affiliated member. 77
11.9.2.1.2 For oil in storage tankers
Oil receipts must also be made by CRISTAL members who maintain
stocks of oil in storage tankers. Although the amount of oil and
tanker tonnage engaged in floating storage fluctuates over time,
according to variations of supply and demand, the quantities of
oil involved are usually considerable.
By way of illustration, the demand for floating storage increased
sharply in the first half of 1991. In March 1991 it was estimated
that a total of 26 million deadweight tons (mdwt.) of tanker
capacity was engaged in storage operations. As much as 17 mdwt.
of this was in floating storage in the Gulf of Arabia,
representing about 125 million barrels of mainly Saudi Arabian
and Iranian crude oil and petroleum products. However, in the
first week of July 1991, Samarec, the Saudi Arabian oil refining
and marketing company, issued tender calls for the sale of nearly
1.5 million barrels of petroleum products from their stocks in
floating storage. It was reported that by mid-July of 1991, Saudi
Arabian and Iranian floating stocks of crude and petroleum
products were probably down to 40 million barrels. 7 8
Under CRISTAL, after oil has been stored on board a tanker for
six months and at which time is owned by a CRISTAL member, the
member must submit an oil receipt. Thereafter, if oil is retained
on board such storage tanker which is on the last day of each
ensuing calendar year owned by a CRISTAL member an oil receipt
is required. 79 In other words, oil in tanker storage is rated
after six months of storage and then again on the last day of
each calender year thereafter. When oil is received on board a
tanker for the sole purpose of being discharged from such tanker
77CRISTAL, Clause VII (A) (2) (v) .
78Petroleum Economist August 1991 at 15.
79CRISTAL, Clause VII (A) (2) (iv) .
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into another tanker for onward transportation, the tanker shall
not be deemed an "installation" or "terminal" in relation to the
obligation of a member to report oil receipts so long as such
discharge shall take place within six months from time of receipt
on board the receiving tanker. 80
This is an improvement upon the position pertaining to storage
tankers under the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions
where there is uncertainty as to whether or not oil in storage
is covered by that regime.
11.9.2.2 Minimum contributions to the Fund
Each CRISTAL member pays a minimum charge which is determined by
Cristal Limited to be reasonable under the circumstances. The
minimum charge is assessed regardless of the quantity of oil
received by the member. Even if the member has not had any oil
receipts during the preceding calendar year, the minimum charge
will be made. 81 When determining the amount to be paid by
members in respect of a periodic call, Cristal Limited shall
determine the minimum charge to be paid. 82 If the amount of oil
receipts notified by a member is either nil or is of an amount
that would give rise to a contribution less than the minimum
charge determined by CRISTAL the member shall be required to pay
the minimum charge. 83
Under the 1971 Fund Convention and the 1992 Protocol thereto
there is no minimum contribution made to the IOPC Fund.
Contributions are only required from oil receivers in states
contracting to the Fund Convention who receive over 150,000
tonnes of oil per annum. This procedure has been criticised upon
8°Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.1(e) .
81CRISTAL, Clause VII(B) (3) (i).
82Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.4 (a) .
83Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.4(b).
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the basis that certain small oil importer states were being
subsidised by the maj or oil importers. 84
11.9.2.3 Notification by a new member
When an oil company becomes a member, it shall forthwith advise
CRISTAL in writing of its crude and fuel oil receipts for the
immediately preceding calendar year. 8S
11.9.2.4 Rules of notification and contribution
As soon as practicable after a periodic call has been made,
Cristal Limited will mail notice to its members advising them of
the total amount of the call and the date on which it is payable.
Where the call is to be paid in installments, the member will be
notified as to the date on which each instalment is payable. The
notice will also state the minimum charge payable.
After forty-five days from the date of mailing notice Cristal
Limited will not accept any changes in a member's advice of his
oil receipts for the calendar year upon which that call is to be
caLcuLat.ed i '" By implication it would seem that members are
permitted to change their oil receipts if they do so before the
specified date. This is a pragmatic and equitable practice
because given the complexity of the provisions governing
"ownership" and submission of oil receipts and the number of
affiliated members listed in the membership of multinational oil
companies it is conceivable that the same oil could mistakenly
be counted more than once.
Following the expiry of the stipulated forty-five day period from
posting, but not later than sixty days prior to the date on which
the contributions shall become payable, Cristal Limited notifies
84Wilkinson, op cit, 78 fn.39.
8SRules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.2.
86Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.3 (b) .
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each member as to the amount of his contribution, as well as the
contribution for any other member, whose oil receipts have been
included in the advices submitted by that member. 87 This
notification will also stipulate the date upon which paYments or
installments are due,88 the place or places where paYment is to
be made 89 and the consequences of a failure of a member to pay
said contribution. 90
11.9.2.5 Contribution enforcement
Cristal Limited reserves the right to take such steps as it shall
think fit, to confirm the accuracy of any members' oil receipts
and members are obliged to provide such information as may
reasonably be requested by CRISTAL.91 Where a member still fails
to report, or inaccurately reports, his oil receipts, then, for
the purpose of calculating the contribution of such member,
CRISTAL may determine, in its absolute discretion, what shall be
deemed to be the member's oil receipts for the relevant calendar
year. 92
11.9.2.6 Interest on overdue payments
If a member fails to pay his contribution to any call on the date
on which such paYment is due then such member shall pay to the
CRISTAL Fund interest on the amount not paid at a rate per annum,
which is four per cent above the Bank of Bermuda lending rate
applicable on the due date, from the due date to the date on
which paYment is made to CRISTAL. The liability of a member to
87Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.3(c)(i).
88Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.3(c)(ii).
89Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.3(c)(iii).
90Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.3(c)(iv).
91Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.1(h).
92Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.3(a).
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pay interest is not extinguished by the cessation ' of
membership. 93
11.9.2.7 Default
A member shall be in default in paYment of his contributions to
any periodic call where paYment is not made within forty-five
days from the date upon which it was due. However, where the
delay was due to causes beyond the reasonable control of such
member he shall not be in default. The President of CRISTAL may
decide that the circumstances of that delay shall be referred to
the Directors to determine what action should be taken in
relation to the member. 94 If a Member is in default, any deficit
shall be made good, at the discretion of the Directors, upon
written demand from CRISTAL, by the other members rateably in
proportion to the contributions last due from them in respect of
the calendar year in question. Such paYment shall be made by such
members without prejudice to any right CRISTAL or any other
member may have against the member then in default. 95 Where a
member claiming compensation or reimbursement from CRISTAL is in
default, CRISTAL will not respond to that claim to the extent
that the member is in default. 96
11.9.2.8 Confidentiality of oil receipt data
All data, including oil receipts, submitted by a CRISTAL member
shall be treated as confidential and for the use of CRISTAL only,
and shall not be disclosed by CRISTAL or by any representative
of CRISTAL to any other member, or to any other party, without
the express, prior, written consent of the member involved, or
unless a question arises as to such member's contribution and its
93Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.5.
94Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.6 (a) .
95Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.6 (b) .
96Rules of Cristal Limited, Rules 3.1 and 3.2.
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calculation, and the Directors authorise the disclosure of' the
data but then only to the extent and in the manner so authorised
by the Directors. 97 The reason for this confidential
relationship is understandable from political and economic
concerns. It is interesting to note by way of example that, while
South Africa was technically not permitted to import oil during
the existence of the United Nations oil embargo, South Africa's
major oil importers were members of CRISTAL.
11.10 Har.monizing conflicting sources of liability
The voluntary arrangements operate independently of the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions, but the application of the
Conventions does not preclude claimants from seeking additional
compensation in terms of the Supplement and CRISTAL. Both the
Supplement and CRISTAL incorporate rules which serve to reconcile
the different liabilities which may arise in terms of the
Conventions and the voluntary compensation regimes.
11.10.1 Where the Civil Liability Convention applies but the Fund
Convention does not
In terms of the Supplement, the participating tanker owner is
required to satisfy his legal liabilities under any domestic
legislation giving effect to the Civil Liability Convention or
any other local laws before compensating any person under the
Supplement. 98 Where CRISTAL applies to an incident which results
in pollution damage in a jurisdiction where the Fund Convention
is not in force, Cristal Limited will reimburse the tanker owner,
up to the maximum CRISTAL limits, where any settlement under the
Civil Liability Convention or local law exceeds limits of the
supp.Lement i "
"Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 7.1(i).
98Supplement, Clause 3 (A) (1) .
99CRISTAL, Clause IV (A) .
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Accordingly, where claims for oil pollution, brought against the
tanker owner under the Civil Liability Convention, or other local
laws, exceed the limits of the Supplement, tanker owners and
bareboat charterers who become liable for such damage will in
most instances be able to recover all or a proportion of that
excess liability from Cristal Limited. This will be so where a
CRISTAL cargo is involved in an incident and all other conditions
laid down by the CRISTAL Contract are satisfied. Where the
pollution damage sustained by the tanker owner occurs as a result
of the wilful misconduct of the owner or is due to
unseaworthiness of the tanker attributable to the privity of the
owner, that owner will not be reimbursed, or reimbursement will
be proportionately reduced. loo As a result of this rule, owners
and bareboat charterers may, for instance, be able to obtain a
measure of relief where they are subjected to high potential
liability under OPA 90 and/or individual U.S. state laws. This
is basically a procedure for distributing financial
responsibility between tanker-owners and oil importers.
In this way tanker owners are able to operate under the
expectation that in most cases their liability will be contained
within the liability limits stipulated in Clause 3(C) (3) of the
Supplement. In very serious cases, however, where very high
claims succeed against the shipowner, or in those instances where
large claims arise, and the CRISTAL Contract does not apply, or
where the shipowner's standard of misconduct exempts CRISTAL from
providing reimbursement, then the shipowner will still have to
bear additional liability.
11.10.2 Where the Civil Liability and the Fund Conventions apply
The first point to note is that if the spill occurs in a state
where the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions are in force, but
the shipowner is not entitled to limit his liability, CRISTAL may
still provide supplementary compensation to third parties up to
lOOCRISTAL, Clause IV(D) (3) .
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the CRISTAL limits. This relieves the shipowner of that
proportion of liability to third parties which exceeds the
maximum compensation payable under the Supplement. However,
CRISTAL will not provide such relief where the incident 'results
from the wilful misconduct of the owner or from the
unseaworthiness of the tanker when this occurs with the privity
of the owner' .101 The terms 'wilful misconduct', 'privity' and
'unseaworthiness' shall have the same meaning as they have under
the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 as interpreted by the English
Courts under English Law. 102 In terms of Article V. 2 of the 1969
Civil Liability Convention, the tanker owner will lose his right
to limit his liability where the incident occurred as a result
of the actual fault or privity of the owner. Significantly, the
test upon which claimants may break the owners right to limit
liability under the Civil Liability is wider and therefore more
easily satisfied than is the test on the basis of which Cristal
Limited can refuse to provide supplementary compensation.
As explained in Part Two of this work, where a tanker owner is
able to maintain his right to limit liability under the Civil
Liability Convention, and the sum total of successful pollution
claims exceeds those limits, then the IOPC Fund provides second
tier compensation. Where this occurs, Cristal Limited will
reimburse CRISTAL members for the contributions they have been
required to make under the Fund Convention. 103 In turn, within
the applicable limits of the Supplement, the tanker owner is
obliged to compensate Cristal Limited for this amount. 104 The
amount available from the Supplement is, however, limited.
Accordingly, where the amounts due from the tanker owner to
Cristal Limited to reimburse contributions of CRISTAL members to
the IOPC Fund, are insufficient, Cristal Limited compensates such
101CRISTAL, Clause IV(D) (3) .
102CRISTAL, Clause IV(D) (10) .
103CRISTAL, IV(B) (1) .
104TOVALOP, Clause 3 (B) (2) .
418
members for the outstanding portion of their contributions. 10s
A TOVALOP member is required to fulfil this obligation in all
applicable circumstances except where the incident resulted from
an act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or was
wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage by a third party. 106 Significantly, he must even
reimburse Cristal Limited where the incident was a result of an
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible natural phenomenon. This
obligation exists whether or not the owner bears any liability
under the Civil Liability Convention. However, where the owner
is exempt from liability under Article III.2(a) and (b) of the
Civil Liability Convention, which also cover the exceptions in
Clause 3(C) (1) of the Supplement, then the owner will be exempt
from having to make paYments to Cristal Limited and liability
under the Civil Liability Convention. But where the owner is
exonerated from liability under the Article III.2(a) of the Civil
Liability Convention on the grounds that the incident resulted
from an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible natural
phenomenon, he will nevertheless be required to reimburse Cristal
Limited for the contributions that CRISTAL members in Fund
Convention States were required to make in respect of that
incident. It will be recalled that under the terms of the Fund
Convention the IOPC Fund will pay claims arising out of
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible natural phenomena.
Equally, no reimbursement shall be made by Cristal Limited where
the incident leading to the pollution damage or threat removal
measures resulted from an act of war, hostilities, insurrection,
or was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to
cause damage by a third party. 107
The procedure described above ensures that CRISTAL members in
10SCRISTAL, Clause IV(B) (1) .
106Supplement, Clause 3 (C) (1) .
107CRISTAL, Clause IV (D) (2) .
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Fund States do not bear a disproportionate share of the cost's of
oil pollution settlements through having to contribute to
settlements made under both CRISTAL and the Fund Convention. lOB
Cohen provides an explanation as to the reasons for the
incorporation of the reimbursement provisions in the Supplement
and CRISTAL.
'The inclusion of this provision addresses concerns of oil
companies in CRISTAL located in FC (Fund Convention) States
who, heretofore, were not only required to contribute to FC
by law but were also required to contribute to CRISTAL
claims occurring outside FC States. With the substantial
increase in compensation to claimants afforded by CRISTAL
on a worldwide basis (since 20th February, 1987) it was
considered equitable to permit companies incurring
assessments in cases involving oil owned by a CRISTAL
member to reduce their paYments by mutualizing them over
the much larger CRISTAL membership. Therefore, members of
CRISTAL located in FC States will not be penalized by being
members of CRISTAL.-, 109
Essentially, the oil company members of CRISTAL wanted to
establish and maintain a true mutual. This is indicative of the
oil companies ability to co-operate on an international scale to
protect each other and by so doing protect themselves against
externally imposed penalties. It may also be noted that CRISTAL
members in Fund Convention States are often of the same corporate
group as those which operate in non-Fund states.
In the event that the maximum amount of compensation available
under CRISTAL is insufficient to meet all claims and claims for
reimbursement by CRISTAL members in Fund Convention States, all
10BTOVALOP and CRISTAL A Guide to Oil Spill Compensation
3rd ed. 1992 at 7.
109Cohen, op ci t, 536.
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claims are reduced proportionally. 110 In this way CRISTAL
members do not receive any priority over other claimants.
Statistics indicate that the overlap between the compensation
mechanism under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and
TOVALOP Supplement and the CRISTAL Contract is considerable. In
1990, CRISTAL receipts reported by Companies located in States
which are parties to the Fund Convention totalled approximately
6.25 billion barrels, total reported CRISTAL crude/fuel oil
receipts for 1990 amounted to 11.87 billion barrels. 11 1
11.10.3 CRISTAL and other oil-sourced compensation funds
Where the requirements of the CRISTAL Contract are satisfied,
Cristal Limited will provide compensation to a person who has
compensated another person for pollution damage and/or costs of
threat removal measures. For instance, where a government
provides compensation for claimants (i.e. victims of oil
pollution) the government may claim reimbursement from Cristal
Limited. However, CRISTAL does not permit claims made against
Cristal Limited for compensation earlier paid out from funds
established and/or maintained by means of assessments against oil
companies .112 With the exception of claims brought under the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, if a claimant accepts
compensation from such funds he forfeits any rights to paYment
from Cristal Limited .113 This rule discourages the development
of numerous oil industry based funds in nation states or regions.
11.11 CRISTAL claims and payment procedure
11.11.1 Notice of claim and prescription
l1°CRI STAL, Clause IV (D) (6) •
111Cristal Limited Annual Report and Consolidated
Financial Statements Year ended December 31, 1991 at 4.
112CRISTAL, Clause IV (C) .
113CRISTAL, Clause IV(D) (7) .
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Written notice of claims should be made to CRISTAL as promptly
as possible after the incident, allegedly giving rise to the
claim, occurred. 114 Notice must be given within two years from
the date of the incident. Once notice has been given, CRISTAL
permits the claimant to amend, or make additions to, his claim
at any time prior to final determination. 11s
11.11.2 Information to be contained in a claim
The Rules of Cristal Limited advise that, wherever possible,
claims should provide the name and address of the claimant or his
representative and identify and describe the tanker allegedly
involved. The following information should be given: the name of
the vessel, its flag, tonnage, owner or bareboat, time or voyage
charterer and P&l Insurer. For the purpose of Cristal Limited,
determining the status of the cargo involved in the incident is
essential. Claimants are asked to identify the owner, shipper,
consignee, quantity and type of oil involved in the alleged
incident.
The claim should stipulate when and where the alleged incident
occurred and outline the nature of the incident, the type of
pollution damage incurred and where it was sustained. It should
describe the nature of preventive and threat removal measures
taken, or to be taken, and the location of such operations;
identify the responders and include their addresses. Obviously,
the claimant must also stipulate the approximate amount of the
claim, expressed in the currency (ies) in which it is
incurred. llli
Cristal Limited may require information relating to legal
opinions obtained and details as to proceedings held before
Courts, Arbitrators or Administrative Agencies. This is to enable
114Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.1 (a) .
llSRules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.1(c) .
116Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.1 (b) .
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Cristal Limited to determine the validity of the claim and ' the
amount, if any, payable. 117
At its discretion, Cristal Limited may elect to conduct private
investigations into the particulars of a claim. This may be done
so that CRlSTAL can obtain an independent assessment as to the
validity, and quantum, of the claim. Once Cristal Limited has
reached a final determination as to the merits of the claim, it
shall promptly advise the claimant as to the amount, if any, that
will be paid and the release or releases that will be required
as a condition precedent to any paYment of compensation. 118
11.11.3 Filing for payment
Where a CRlSTAL member makes a contribution to the lOPC Fund, and
he believes that CRlSTAL is required to reimburse him for all or
any portion of that contribution, he must notify CRlSTAL and
provide certain relevant information .119 To the extent that it
is known or available to the claimant, such notice should inter
alia disclose: the amount of the contribution made or to be made
to the lOPC Fund and provide relevant supporting
documentation,120 the details of the member and, where relevant,
his affiliated companies ,121 information pertaining to the
incident or incidents to which the contributions relate, and
designation of the tanker involved, its owner or, in the event
that the tanker is under bareboat charter, the bareboat
charterer, time or voyage charter and P&l insurer. 122
Such notice may be amended or added to by a member at any time
117Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.2.
r
118Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.3(c).
119Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.5 (a) .
12°Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.5(b)(i).
121Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.5(b)(ii).
122Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.5(b) (iii).
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prior to the final determination of a payment by CRISTAL,
provided that initial written notice was made within one year
from the date on which the contribution is to be made to the IOPC
Fund. Where notice involves related or affiliated companies of
the member seeking reimbursement, such notice must be made within
one year from the date on which the last contribution is to be
made, by all those companies.
As in the case of any claim made under the CRISTAL Contract, the
Directors may request additional information1 :l3 and may also
initiate investigations into the validity of reimbursement
claims. In the course of such investigations CRISTAL may make
\ ... any contacts as may be deemed appropriate with the
[IOPC] Fund ... ,l:l4
11.12 Final Deter.mination of payment
The Directors of Cristal Limited determine the compensation to
be paid to claimants and members in accordance with the terms and
conditions of CRISTAL and the Rules. To this end the Directors
meet as often as they may consider necessary for the prompt and
expeditious determination of claims.
No Director is permitted to participate in the determination of
compensation where he represents or is employed by an interest
which owns a tanker or cargo involved in an incident. However,
even where such a link exists, a Director may participate in the
,
determination of reimbursement claims for oil company members
required to contribute to the IOPC Fund. u 5
The Directors are the sole and final judges as to whether, and
to what extent, compensation or payment shall be paid. However,
subject to certain limits and conditions that the Directors may
U3Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.6.
u4Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.7.
u5Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.8.
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deem appropriate, they may delegate this authority to · the
President of Cristal Limited or any other person. 126
11.13 Interest
Where the payment; of compensation is delayed interest shall
accumulate for such a period and at such a rate as CRISTAL, in
its sole discretion, believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances. Generally, interest shall be counted towards the
overall limits of liability available from CRISTAL. 127
11.14 Conclusion
It is incontestable that the voluntary regimes have provided an
important service to coastal states throughout the world and in
the foreseeable future, they will probably continue to do so. At
the same time this arrangement does present certain problems of
principle. That the voluntary compensation regimes provide
compensation for pollution damage on terms that are largely
determined, and controlled, by the selfsame agents of that
pollution is contrary to the fundamental precept of the western
legal tradition; that no party should be a judge in his own
cause.
Writing in 1985, Abecassis and Jarashow et al expressed the fear
that by means of the voluntary compensation agreements the oil
industry had mounted \ ... a threat to the 1984 Protocols to the
Fund Convention which, if successful, may ensure that it does not
enter into force'. 128 Even if this hypothesis were correct, the
failure of the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention to enter into
force in that form was due to different reasons. It was not the
alleged manoeuvring of the oil industry, aimed at retaining
effective control over tanker source oil pollution compensation
126Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.10.
127Rules of Cristal Limited, Rule 4.9.
128Abecassis & Jarashow, op ci t, 304 para .12 - 03.
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that caused the failure of the 1984 Fund Convention. It was in
fact quite the opposite; it was the desire of the U.S. Government
to increase potential liability for oil pollution damage in the
U.S. though domestic legislation, and their pivotal refusal to
support that Convention, which resulted in the failure of the
entry into force requirements of that Protocol being fulfilled.
The oil industry has traditionally been wary and resentful of
external control. This has been evident since the dissolution of
the Rockerfeller oil monopoly, Standard Oil Company, under the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 . In May 1911 Chief Justice Edward
White ordered that Standard Oil Company was to dissolve itself
within six months in order to break the monopoly over the
American oil industry. 129 Another, more crucial, struggle waged
by the oil companies was that against the threat of
nationalization of oil wells in the oil producing areas of the
Soviet Union, the Middle East and South and Central America.
It may be predicted that the issues posed by environmentalism may
well become the next maj or force that the oil companies and other
industries are going to have to confront and eventually
accommodate. The lessons that have been learned from previous
confrontations between the oil industry and governments is that
the oil companies are not always able to operate with the degree
of independence they might ideally wish. It has been shown that
governments are capable of curtailing the operations of the oil
companies when it is politically expedient or necessary.
A fundamental part of managing a multinational oil company is
that the corporation must be seen to be responsive to a number
of demands and expectations that are made upon them by diverse
interest groups. The response must be sufficient to preempt the
assumption of control by outsiders. Such a response will, in most
instances, prove most effective in postponing or avoiding
external control if it is undertaken before any given potential
129Yergin, op ci t 110.
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conflict situation reaches a crisis point.
It is one of the main submissions of this thesis that the most
effective way in which to improve the standards of tanker
operation (and thereby decrease the incidence of tanker source
oil pollution) is by placing a high degree of liability at the
door of the actual cargo owner . This is because the cargo owners,
which are very often multinational oil companies, have far
greater resources than tanker owners. Accordingly, these
corporate bodies are in a better position to substantially raise
the safety standards of tanker operations. In contrast, tanker
owners are able to increase the quality of their operation only
in so far as the prices paid by the oil shippers for the use of
their tankers allow them to do so. Therefore, where freight rates
are depressed the tanker owners do not have access to the capital
required to improve, or even maintain the safety of their
operations. As capital runs short, tankers continue to operate
beyond the reasonable lifespan of such vessels. Corrosion sets
in and goes unchecked, crew standards decline and oil spills
inevitably occur.
There are various options that can be utilized to remedy the
problems associated with a dangerously undercapitalized tanker
industry. Firstly, one can utilize the government controlled
regulatory approach, in terms of which, no vessel with a
hazardous cargo on board will be granted permission to approach
a port in a specific State unless it in fact satisfies certain
standards of operation. What is required here is classification
societies of a reputable standard.
In terms of this approach, the rationale is that tanker owners
will have to achieve and maintain certain standards of operation
before they can deliver or receive a cargo. To meet such
standards they will be required to undertake vast capital
expenditure; building new tankers or up-grading older tankers,
improving crew standards and adhering to safer operating
procedures. Because, in theory, the tankers which do not meet
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these standards are prevented, through legislation and control
from competing with the better more expensive vessels, these
vessels can consequently demand higher freight rates. In turn,
the higher freight rates will enable the tanker operators to keep
the quality of tanker operations at an acceptable level.
This methodology could well work; however, it entails the uniform
adoption, and enforcement of such safety regulations in all of
the large oil importer states throughout the world. Also, states
are loath to turn tankers away from their shores when the cargoes
play such strategic roles in their economies. Despite these
difficulties, and the fact that this methodology has been
patently unsuccessful up until now, it is the opinion of this
writer that the safety of oil tankers will eventually be brought
up to appropriate standards through a synthesis of such
government regulation and self -regulation undertaken by the large
oil importers. This process has already started to take place.
As the liability for oil pollution increases, and is shifted to
the owners of the polluting oil cargo, two changes can be
expected to occur. Firstly, the major oil companies will once
again begin to acquire their own tankers, which will be built and
operated to very stringent standards. The oil companies will
begin to invest considerably more capital in tanker safety than
has been necessary in the past. Secondly, where the oil companies
have to charter tankers they will only charter tankers of a high
standard. When doing so, they will be required to pay
considerably higher freight rates than those currently demanded
by ship owners. The extra costs involved in achieving a safer
tanker process will inevitably be transferred to the consumers
of oil products.
The present writer agrees with D.W. Abecassis where that
commentator is opposed, in principle, to the continued
maintenance of control over the process and terms of compensation
for tanker-source oil pollution by oil companies through the
voluntary agreements. However , this writ~r's objections are not
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for the same reasons as those expounded by that author. ' The
objection stated here is not only that the shipowner and oil
companies retain substantial control over the degree and nature
of the amount of compensation available. In addition, because
they have been permitted to do so, they have effectively held
down the actual and potential penalties of pollution to a point
were it is cost-effective (a) to pay controlled compensation, and
(b) to continue to operate in a fashion which causes pollution.
In this way they have successfully negated real incentives for
changing the manner in which polluting tankers are operated.
In the context above the sentiments expressed by P.J. Goulandris
the Chairman of the International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation must be critically appraised:
'It is our view that, far from an adversarial interest, the
tanker and oil industries share with governments and with
the potential victims of oil spills the greatest community
of interest, in an efficient and effective approach to
clean-up and compensation. We shall continue to direct our
energies in that spirit.'uo
If the CRISTAL contract had been a mere exercise in public
relations its founders would have been content to undertake
responsibility solely in those circumstances where title to the
oil cargo was held by CRISTAL members in the strict sense of the
word. However, the object of the developers of CRISTAL was to
bring into existence a regime which would satisfy the legitimate
expectations of victims of oil pollution worldwide. To do so
e~fectively it was imperative that the voluntary regimes avoid
the impression of paying only lip service to claims for oil
pollution damage. If these regimes lost legitimacy in the eyes
of actual and potential claimants, which would include the
governments of the world, the oil companies correctly perceived
that they would rapidly loose any real ability to determine the
13°The Chairman's Statement The International Tanker
Owners Pollution Federation Review 1992 at 2.
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terms and conditions under which hazardous cargoes of crude' oil
are transported around the coastlines of the globe.
Therefore, because of this threat the voluntary regimes have
evolved in a serious manner that can not accurately be explained
as a mere public relations exercise. These regimes evolved in
response to the increased transfer of control over the oil
industry by governments and the ever present threat that the
measure of government control would be increased wherever the
industry failed to meet acceptable standards of responsibility.
In no other type of industrial enterprise have governments
permitted such a degree of self regulation as has been the case
in relation to the activities of multinational oil companies.
Nevertheless, where the oil industry behaves in a way which
offends the political sensitivities of influential governments,
these governments have on numerous occasions interfered in that
realm of self regulation by transferring a greater portion of
permitted self control to government control.
Within the context of oil pollution this phenomenon has been well
illustrated on three occasions. The Torrey Canyon brought about
the 1969 Civil Liability and 1971 Fund Conventions. The Amoco
Cadiz brought about the 1984 Protocols to those Conventions. Most
recently, the Exxon Valdez spill brought about the most dire
consequences for the oil industries ability to influence control
over the international control of oil pollution. Here the oil
industry failed to meet the terms of the tacit understanding
between the oil industry and the victims of pollution. What
resulted was overwhelming pressure brought to bear on the United
States Government, which, acting as referee to the conflicts
which sometimes arise between oil companies and the public,
responded by exerting a greater measure of control over the oil
industry in the form of OPA. This important subject is considered
in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 12
An Introduction to U.8. Oil Pollution Liability Law
12.1 Introduction
This work is intentionally broad , so as to effectively illustrate
and explain certain underlying principles of maritime law and
practice regarding liability for oi l pollution damage. The civil
Liability and Fund Conventions a nd TOVALOP and CRISTAL agreements
have already been discussed. While this work has, up till now,
avoided undertaking an anal y s is of the liability laws of
individual states, the oil pol l u t ion liability laws of the United
States are considered due to the special circumstances prevailing
in that State.
It is submitted that the analys is of the oil pollution liability
laws applicable in the U.S . is imperative to an adequate
understanding of the regulation of oil pollution liability. The
U.S. encompasses a considerable p or t i on of the world's coastline
and very large quantities of oi l are carried to the U. S. by
tankers . The potential for o i l pollution damage in that
jurisdiction is, therefore , cons iderable. For the purpose of this
thesis, however, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and U.S. State
legislation is discussed because the laws covering oil pollution
liability under those jurisdictions exert considerable influence
on the legal approaches followed by other nations. Clearly, legal
developments in the United States may well depict or even
precipitate the emergence of new l e g a l trends or policy within
the context of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and the
voluntary agreements. In part icular, a well-developed trend
towards the inclusion of cargo-owner liability at the level of
U.S. state legislation is ident ifiable.
The U.S. has a highly educated , environmentally aware and
politically active populat ion . According to one survey,
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approximately 2,5 million Americans are "active members" 1 of
either the National Republican or Democratic Parties2 and
together contribute approximately US$ 90 million to those
parties. In contrast, during the same period, roughly thirteen
million Americans were "active members" of the twelve foremost
U.S. environmental organizations and together contributed
approximately US$ 340 million to those organisations. 3 By the
same token the U. S. has the most powerful and largest oil
companies. 4 Thus, within the context of tanker-source oil
pollution the U.S. represents an interesting study because it
depicts the conflict between environmental considerations and oil
company concerns (i. e. conservation versus development) at a
critical level.
It is therefore necessary to consider the policy choices made by
the U.S. Federal and State governments in attempting to deal with
the problem of tanker-source oil pollution damage. An attempt is
also made to illustrate how the U.S. approach differs from that
adopted under the international Conventions and the voluntary
agreements and to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the different regimes. The impact that legal developments in
the U.S. may have on the viability of the international
Conventions and the voluntary agreements is also considered. The
most far-reaching and recent U.S. developments in this field of
law will now be considered in Chapters 12 and 13 and 14 which
together make up Part Four of this work.
Chapter 12, the introductory chapter, depicts the development of
l"Active members" are defined as members who make
financial contributions to their respective organizations.
2These are the two largest political parties in the United
States.
3G. Pokorny 'The Greening of America: A New Climate of
Opinion and its Implications for Utilities' (1990) Strategic
Publications Series No.226 1 at 6.
4Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Amoco, Conoco and Arco being some
of the largest.
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OPA, its comprehensive scope, aims and objectives. It is also
explained how OPA inter-relates with other important Federal and
state U. S. legislation. Chapter 13 deals with the liability
provisions of OPA while Chapter 14 illustrates how certain state
laws contradict the liability provisions of OPA in important
ways. Through explaining how the policy of certain U. S. State oil
pollution liability laws fundamentally differ that of the
international Conventions, the voluntary agreements and OPA it
is then possible to suggest the development of a new policy for
tanker-source oil pollution liability. In Chapter 13 it will also
be argued that the further development and acceptance of this
embryonic legal norm may have the effect of greatly improving the
standard of tanker operations .
12.2 The development of OPA
In what constituted a major defeat for the Bush administration
and other protocol proponents the government of the United States
made a decision not to accede to the 1984 Protocols to the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions. This is a key event in the
history of the subject of oil pollution liability management and
an important part of this thesis is an analysis of the effect of
this event on the international approach to oil pollution
compensation. In early 1990, prior to the enactment of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990,s Congress announced that the 1984
Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions would not
be ratified by the United States because to do so would
effectively preempt the rights of U. S. states to enact provisions
pertaining to oil pollution more stringent, if necessary, than
those contained in the conventions. 6 On the 18th August, 1990,
spub. L. No.101-380, 104 Stat. (Statute at Large) 484
(18th August 1990) (codified at 33 USC §§ 2701-2761)
hereinafter referred to as OPA. Where provisions of OPA are
referred to in this work they are cited first as they appear
in the Statute at Large and second by reference to the United
States Code Service (USC).
6Ad hoc group of legal experts on dumping LDC/LG 5/10 7th
August, 1991 Annex 3 para 2.2.3 at 2.
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the OPA was signed into law by former President Bush (once also
a Texas "oilman") after it had been unanimously approved by the
House of Representatives and the Senate.' This major development
constituted a clear rejection of the international approach in
favour of domestic U.S. legislative control.
A pertinent articulation of the standpoint taken by Congress
regarding the non-participation of the United States in the
system of compensation provided by the 1984 Protocols to the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions is contained in the "sense
of Congress" provision incorporated in OPA:
'It is the sense of Congress that it is in the best
interests of the United States to participate in an
international oil pollution liability and compensation
regime that is at least as effective as Federal and State
laws in preventing incidents and in guaranteeing full and
prompt compensation for damages resulting from incidents.'s
This statement represents the culmination of a concession made
to the Senate by the House of Representatives on the 28th June,
1990, whereby the House Conferees agreed to delete the provisions
contained in House Report 1465 in terms of which the House had
intended to implement the international protocols. 9
The "sense of Congress" may be interpreted as a challenge and an
invitation to the proponents of internationalism. Clearly the
International Maritime Organisation, the tanker and oil-importing
'The bill was approved by the Senate 99 votes to 0 on
August 2, 1990, 136 Congo Rec. Sll,547 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1990), and by the House 360 votes to 0 on August 3, 1990. 136
Congo Rec. H6,949 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) cited by Rodriguez
& Jaffe 'The Oil Pollution Act of 1990' (1990) 15 Tulane
Maritime L.J. 1 at 11 fn.68.
SOPA § 3001.
9Grumbles 'Major Provisions, Themes of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990' (1990) 21 Environment Reporter 1264 at
1266.
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industries and their insurers will be required to revise their
respective roles to meet this challenge by the United States.
Detailed commentary on the U.S. position, therefore, is a
prerequisite to the development of anew, more broadly acceptable
international oil pollution compensation programme to take the
place of the Civil Liability and Fund Protocols of 1992.
President Bush clearly held reservations about the omission of
the Conventions from the system of oil pollution control
implemented by the OPA. In a formal statement accompanying the
signing of the Act President Bush emphasised inter alia the
policy arguments in favour of the adoption of the 1984 Protocols
by the United States.
Firstly, he cited the advantages which would accrue to U. S.
claimants from the enhanced level of compensation which would
have been available from the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund . Secondly, he expressed the desirability of an
international approach to the problem of tanker-source oil
pollution and stressed - that the U.S. had to reaffirm its
credibility in the development of such solutions. Thirdly, he
issued the following warning :
'I am concerned about another consequence of the failure to
ratify the Protocols. We must work to ensure that, in
response to the provisions of this Act, a situation is not
created in which larger oil shippers seeking to avoid risk
are replaced by smaller c omp a n i e s with limited assets and
a reduced ability to pay for the clearing up of oil spills.
We will need to monitor developments in order to protect
against such undesirable consequences.,lO
President Bush then urged Congress to continue working to ratify
and implement the protocols.
lOStatement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 26
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. (Aug. 1 8 , 1 990 ) .
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The adoption of this Act by the U.S . scuttled any chance of 'the
1984 Protocols entering into force in that form. Given this
existing situation, the IOPC Fund and its member States, in
consultation with IMO, considered various options for the
amendment and revision of the coming into force provisions of the
1984 Protocols so as to attract sufficient support to enable the
Protocols to enter into force. 1 1 These efforts saw the adoption
of the 1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions.
The existence of individual U.S. state liability legislation and
a diminished prospect of tanker owners and operators being able
legitimately to limit liability in the event of oil spills in
U.S. jurisdictions is a continuing cause for great concern to the
wide array of interest groups connected to the tanker industry.
12.3 Aims and Objectives the U.8. Oil Pollution Act
The OPA is a comprehensive response to the diverse problems
associated with oil pollution . Broadly, the Act provides a
statutory framework for oil spill liability, compensation,
prevention, and removal. In addition it contains provisions
relating to particular problems encountered, in the Alaska
region, associated with the Exxon Valdez spill. The extent and
form of this comprehensive system of control is most effectively
illustrated through an overview of the nine titles making up the
Act. The provisions relevant to the question of tanker-source oil
pollution liability will be discussed in greater detail later.
12.3.1 Title I - Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation
This title contains the definitions used in the Act, establishes
the liability scheme for oil spills, provides the mechanisms for
recovery from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and from
responsible parties, and establishes financial responsibility
llAd hoc group of legal experts on dumping -LDC/LG SIlO 7th
August, 1991 Annex 3 para 2.2.4 at 3.
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requirements. In essence, Title I sets forth comprehensive
liability and compensation provisions detailing who is liable to
whom, when, and for how much. 12 Accordingly, analysis of the OPA
contained in this thesis will largely focus on this title of the
OPA as it applies specifically to tank-vessels.
12.3.2 Title II - Confor.ming Amendments
This title contains amendments necessary to conform certain other
federal statutes to the OPA provisions and to clarify their
application. Conforming Amendments are made to the Intervention
on the High Seas Act,13 the Clean Water Act (CWA)14 [also known
as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)], the
Deepwater Port Act,15 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1976. 16 The substance of the amendments will be
discussed in connection with the amending sections, where they
affect the question of liability. A patch-work of provisions,
contained in diverse Federal instruments previously controlling
oil pollution liability, are consolidated under OPA. 17
UOPA §§ 1001-1020, 33 USC §§ 2701-2719.
133 3 USC § 1486.
143 3 USC § 1321.
153 3 USC s 1502.
164 3 USC s 1811.
170PA § 2002 provides that functions concerning oil
pollution liability under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (33 usc 1321), the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 (33 USC
1502) are transferred to OPA, Title III of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (43 USC 1811-
1824) is repealed. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
remains applicable to liability for oil pollution and is
extensively amended by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Reform
Act of 1990 contained in Title VIII of OPA. Furthermore any
funds held by these instruments were transferred to the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund established under § 9509 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 USC 9509), which in terms of
§ 1012 the OPA is to be used to cover the costs incurred by
the National Contingency Plan.
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It must be stressed that the FWPCA remains in existence, however,
OPA now governs liability for oil pollution while the FWPCA
continues to govern the discharge of other hazardous
substances. 18
12.3.3 Title III - International Oil Pollution Prevention and
Removal
This title relates to the United State's participation in
international efforts to prevent and clean up oil spills. It
directs the Secretary of State to review international agreements
and treaties and to negotiate agreements with Canada regarding
oil spills on the Great Lakes, Lake Champlain, and Puget
Sound. 19 The president of the United States is directed to work
with international organizations to establish an international
store of response equipment and per'sonneLv'" In his formal
statement accompanying the signing of the OPA President Bush
reported that he would construe this provision as only
"advisory". This construction is not only contrary to the
language of § 3004 but also seemed to contradict his earlier
statement expressing a preference for an international solution
to the problem of tanker-source oil pollution.
12.3.4 Title IV - Prevention and Removal
Three subtitles aimed at preventing and cleaning up of oil spills
are included in this title.
12.3.4.1 Subtitle (A) - Prevention
Subtitle (A) provides for the review of information contained in
the National Drivers Register for issuing licences, certificates
of registry and merchant mariners' documents; provides for the




suspension and revocation of those documents for alcohol and drug
abuse incidents i and establishes prevention measures, which
include manning standards for foreign and domestic tank vessels,
the requirement for a study on tanker navigation safety
standards, and the establishment of double hull requirements for
tank vessels. 21
12.3.4.2 Subtitle (B) - Removal
Subtitle (B), provides authority for federal removal of oil
spills and requirements for the national oil spill planning and
response system. 22
12.3.4.3 Subtitle (C) - Penalties and Miscellaneous
Subtitle (C), strengthens and increases the civil and criminal
penalties available to the government under the Act. 23
12.3.5 Title V - Prince William Sound Provisions
This title contains provisions specifically designed to avoid
future oil spills in the Prince William Sound in Alaska. 24
12.3.6 Title VI - Miscellaneous
This title includes the OPA's savings clause which states that
rules and regulations, effective under laws predating OPA,
continue in effect unless and until repealed, amended or
superseded. It also states that nothing in the Act applies to
rights and duties that matured, penalties incurred, or
proceedings that were begun prior to the date of the Act unless
UOPA §§ 4101-4118.
220PA §§ 4201 -4205.
230PA §§ 4301-4306.
240PA §§ 5001-5007, 33 USC §§ 2731-2737.
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specifically provided in the Act. Furthermore, unless
specifically provided otherwise in the statute, OPA does not
affect the admiralty and maritime law or the jurisdiction of the
courts. This title also governs annual appropriations to the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund. It restricts drilling on the Outer
Banks of North Carolina, 25 and encourages the cooperative
development of certain hydrocarbon-bearing, underwater lands so
as to prevent unrestrained competitive production of hydrocarbons
from these areas. 26
12.3.8 Title VII - Oil pollution research and development program
This title is intended to establish a vehicle for the
coordination and development of a comprehensive program of oil
pollution research, technological development and technological
demonstration. An Inter Agency Coordination Committee on Oil
Pollution Research is established which will be chaired by the
Coast Guard. Among other projects, this committee will provide
for research, development and demonstration of new and improved
technologies effective in preventing or mitigating pollution
incidents, and which protect the environment. It is also
envisaged that the program will include an evaluation of oil
pollution prevention and mitigation technology, including a
program for field tests and the development of standards and
testing protocols. Improved modelling and oil spill behaviour
prediction techniques are to be developed and damage assessment
technology is also to be improved. 27
12.3.9 Title VIII - Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
This title is called the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Reform Act
25In his formal statement accompanying the signing of the
OPA President Bush opposed this provision (§ 6003) and pledged
to work towards its repeal.
260PA §§ 6001-6004, 33 USC §§ 2751-2753.
270PA § 7001, 33 USC § 2761.
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of 1990. This Act amends the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System,
through increasing certain penalties, providing for additional
liability provisions, merging the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability
Fund into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and requiring an
inspection of and report on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. 38
12.3.10 Title IX - Amendments to the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund (OSLTF)
This title contains provisions relating to the funding of and
expenditures by the OSLTF. 39 This important feature of the OPA
will be dealt with in greater detail below and comparisons with
the IOPC Fund and the CRISTAL Fund will be made.
12.4 Circumstances leading up to the Oil Pollution Act
It was not only the oil spill from the Exxon Valdez on the 24th
March, 1989, which served as a catalyst for Congress and Senate
to pass legislation concerning oil pollution. The cumulative
effect of a spate of smaller oil spills preceding the Exxon
Valdez spill added impetus to calls for the implementation of
comprehensive oil pollution legislation.
Within twenty-four hours on June 23rd and 24th, 1989, the Greek-
registered tanker World Prodigy struck a rock and spilled over
290,000 gallons30 of heating oil into Naragansett Bay in
Newport, Rhode Island; the oil tanker Rachel B. collided with
another oil tanker in the Houston Ship Channel, spilling over
250,000 gallons of heavy crude oil; and over 300,000 gallons of
heating oil was spilled into the Delaware River when the
380PA ss 8001-8302.
390PA ss 9001-9002.
30 4 2 US gallons is equal to one barrel and 7.4 barrels of
crude oil is the equivalent of one tonne of crude oil.
441
uruguayan-registered tanker President Rivera ran aground. 31 .
On 7th February, 1990, the tanker American Trader went aground
on her starboard anchor while in the process of manoeuvring into
the sea berth off Huntington Beach, California, causing a spill
of nearly 400,000 gallons of Alaskan crude oil. 32 From the
standpoint of the oil and tanker industries the political
consequences of the American Trader spill were significant in
that the influential House Public Works and Transportation
Chairman Glen M. Anderson (California) who had, until then been
a strong supporter of the oil and shipping industries, shifted
his support towards the adoption of mandatory, more costly,
double hull requirements. 33
In June 1990, the supertanker, Mega Borg exploded and burned in
the Gulf of Mexico while transferring some of its 41 million
gallon cargo of oil to a smaller vessel. Oil leakage created a
slick thirty miles long and eight miles wide off the shores of
Galveston, Texas. In total, it is estimated that the Mega Borg
lost over four million gallons of oil, although fortunately a
large proportion of this oil was burned off in the fire that
ensued. 34
The above incidents are examples and do not constitute a complete
31These three spills were considered by the House of
Representatives in H.R. Rep. No.242, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt.3 at 9-10 (1989) cited by Ruhl & Jewell 'Oil Pollution Act
of 1990: Opening a New Era in Federal and Texas Regulation of
Oil Spill Prevention, Containment and Cleanup, and Liability'
(1991) 32 S. Tex. L. Rev. 475 at 478.
3~Fisher & Martinet 'Response to the American Trader Oil
Spill' (1993) 19 Ocean & Coastal Management 59.
33Kuntz 'Recent Oil Spill Adds Force to Calls for Double
Hulls' (1990) 48 Congo Q. 655 at 655 cited by T.M. Alcock
'''Ecology Tankers" and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A
History of Efforts to Require Double Hulls on Oil Tankers'
(1992) 19 Ecology Law Quarterly 97 at 138.
34Edelman 'The oil Pollution Act of 1990' (1990) 8 Pace
Environmental Law Review 1 at 2-3.
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list of oil spills from tankers occurring in the U.S. during that
period.
12.5 The Oil Pollution Act does not pre-empt State Law
The Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution states that ' [t] his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby ... ,.35 Despite this constitutional rule the most
recent approach adopted by the courts of the United States has
been to preserve state law unless Congress has expressed an
unequivocal intent to preempt such law. 3' Preemptive
Congressional intent would be manifest where the language of
federal law expressly preempts state law. Moreover, where
Congress has enacted legislation which does not expressly preempt
state law preemption has been implied in circumstances where
Congress evidences an unm.i atakabLe?" intent to occupy a given
field. 38 Preemption has also been inferred by the courts where
state law obstructs or even conflicts with federal law. 39
However, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of the United
States has adopted the position that state laws are particularly
well suited to the regulation of the environment and as such are
35US Constitution, Article VI, § 2, clause 2.
36Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 US 261, 275
(1943); see Bowers 'Oil Pollution Regulation: The Continuing
Trend of Uncertainty' (1990) vol.9 No.1 Temple Environmental
Law & Technology Journal 59 at 63.
37Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 US 132
(1963) .
38pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 US 491 (1956).
39California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Company 480
US ~72 (1987); Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass's, Inc~ v.
Agr~cultural Mktg and Bargaining Bd, 467 US 461 (1987)· Bill
M~ ~ilkwood v. Kerr-McG~e Corp., 464 US 238 (1984); ca~ital
C~t~es Cable, Inc. v. R~chard A. Crisp, 467 US 691 (1981).
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to be protected from federal encroachment. 4o
In each of the fourteen years between 1975 and 1990, the House
of Representatives consistently had passed one or other form of
oil pollution bill. During the same period the Senate, on two
occasions, passed their own version of oil spill compensation
bills. Despite these efforts, no agreement could be reached
between the House and Senate and consequently no new oil spill
legislation was passed. The inability to reach agreement was due
mainly to a fundamental difference of opinion on whether or not
the preemption of state oil spill clean-up funds and state
liability laws should be allowed by a revised Federal regime. 41
The pre-emption debate was also linked to the question of whether
or not the United States should implement the Civil Liability and
Fund Conventions (as amended by the 1984 Protocols thereto). As
international agreements, if the conventions had been adopted by
the United States, the provisions contained therein would have
become binding on the entire nation without reserve. Accordingly,
individual state law would have been superseded. In 1986, the
U.S. Congress gave serious consideration to the implementing of
the 1984 Protocols. The House of Representatives approved such
a step, subject to the Senate's advice and consent, and eventual
ratification. 4 2 The Senate, however, did not accept the House
bill. 43
Proponents of pre-emption submitted that uniform federal and
40Chevron , U.S.A., v. Harnmond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub. nom., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Sheffield,
471 US 1140 (1985).
41Jones 'Oil Spill Compensation and Liability Legislation:
When Good Things Don't Happen to Good Bills' (1989) 19 Envtl.
L. Rep. 10333 at 10333.
42H.R. 1232. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1986).
43Noyes 'The US Oil Pollution Act of 1990' (1992) vol.7
No.1 International Journal Of Estuarine and Coastal Law 43 at
44.
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international liability requirements allow for quick and complete
paYment of reasonable claims without resort to cumbersome
litigation. On the other hand, opponents of pre-emption argued
that oil pollution legislation, like other federal environmental
laws, should set minimum standards but should allow states to
provide greater protection (if desired) for their own natural
resources and citizens. 44 Generally speaking, the House of
Representatives supported the case for a comprehensive oil spill
bill that would provide a uniform system of liability and
compensation which would also pre-empt state laws. The Senate
believed that ratifying the 1984 Protocols would leave the states
powerless to recover compensation for oil spills in which damage
claims exceeded the limits provided by the 1984 Protocols. 45
The Exxon Valdez spill strengthened the view that federal oil
pollution legislation should not preempt state legislation. The
mindset which had previously advocated the consolidation of U.S.
oil pollution law under a federal dispensation began to shift
towards a more generally agreed approach whereby existing and
evolving state legislation would co-exist with the federal
laws. 46 The federal dispensation would be a minimum standard
which could be supplemented by state legislation where necessary.
Also during the period immediately preceding the development of
the OPA, many states had adopted (or were in the process of
developing) state laws pertaining to the control of and
compensation for oil pollution and oil pollution damage. This
state of affairs ensured that the issue of pre-emption was
accepted as being of particular importance as the congressional
44G.J. Mitchell 'Preservation of State and Federal
Authority Under the Oil Pollution Act 1990' (1991) 21
Environmental Law 237 at 239 .
45Smith 'An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and
the 1984 Protocols on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage' (1990) 14 Houston J. Int'l Law 115 at 135.
46Grumbles, op ci t, 1268.
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debate on the OPA got underway. 47
The agreement to the adoption of the OPA represents a compromise
between Senate Bill 686 48 and House of Representatives Bill
1465. 49 On the issue of pre-emption the Senate prevailed over
the House and, accordingly, the OPA encapsulates the principle
that states may retain and enact law relating to oil pollution,
even where these laws conflict with, or exceed the provisions of
the OPA. Section 1018 (a) of the ActSO states:
'Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as
preempting, the authority of any State or political
subdivision thereof from imposing any additional
liability or requirements with respect to -
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within
such State; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such
discharge.
(2) affect, or be construed or interpreted to affect
or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of
any person under the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 USC
6901 et seq.) or State law, including common law.'
Likewise, the state pollution funds are unaffected by the
implementation of the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. s1
Some states have deemed it appropriate to enact legislation which
47Ruhl & Jewell, op ci t, 489 .
48S. 686, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
49H .R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
sOcodified at 33 USC § 2718 (a).
s10PA § 1018 (b); 33 USC § 2718 (b) .
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imposes liability for oil pollution damage on cargo owners as
distinct from the carrier or haulier. In total, some ten states
hold shippers of oil liable for oil pollution damage. 52 This is
a significant departure from the provisions of the OPA which does
not include oil cargo owners within the definition of a
"responsible party". 53 The direct inclusion of oil-importers
into the liability regime would have provided
significant relief to ship owners and operators but would have
encountered strong opposition from oil-importer interests. 54
12.6 The Demise of the Limitation of Liability Act
The Oil Pollution Act stipulates that the Limitation of Liability
Act of March 3, 185155 shall no longer apply to claims for oil
pollution damage founded upon state or common law. 56 However the
Limitation Act will continue to apply to damage claims of a non-
oil pollution nature even where such damages arise out of an
incident where oil pollution damage also occurred.
The Limitation Act provides that where damage is caused by a
ship, without the privity or knowledge of the shipowner(s), the
shipowner(s) will not be held liable in excess of the amount or
value of the interest of such owner in the vessel and her freight
then pending. 57 The protection afforded to the shipowner under
the Limitation Act also extends to demise charterers. 58
52Edelman, op cit, 16 at fn.114.
53The OPA definition of a "responsible party" is described
and discussed in detail in Chapter 13.
54Which would have included the major and minor US and
non-US oil companies.
55Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 State 635 (codified at 46
USC app. §§ 181-196 (1988)) (the Limitation Act).
560PA § 1018 (a), 33 USC § 2718 (a) .
~The 1851 Limitation Act, § 183(a).
58The Limitation Act, § 186.
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By judicial interpretation it has been held that the value of the
vessel should be calculated at the completion of the voyage
during which the damage occurred. 59 It is not difficult to see
how this rule can easily result in an outcome which is
particularly prejudicial to claimants. It is not uncommon for
vessels involved in maritime accidents, which result in great
damage or loss, to be of little or no value at the close of the
voyage during which the accident took place. An obvious situation
where this would be so is where the vessel causing the damage
sinks and there is no freight pending. This was the position in
the litigation surrounding damage claims resulting from the oil
pollution damage caused by the Torrey Canyon incident. 5 0
The position, prior to the OPA, was that claims brought by the
federal government under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA) were not subject to the Limitation Act and the FWPCA
preempted other remedies previously available to the U.S.
Government to recover cleanup costS. 51 Under the FWPCA the U.S.
Government was permitted to recover its cleanup costs according
to the liability limits contained in the Act. 52 Where the V.S.
Government was able to show that the discharge 'was the result
of wilful misconduct within the privity or knowledge of the
owner' the liability limits would be broken and the owner or
59Norwich Co. v. Wright., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871);
Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp., 118 U.S. 468, 492 (1886).
50In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228, 230-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 409 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1969).
51U.8. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.
1980), Here the court rejected an attempt by the U.S.
Government to recover under the Refuse Act, common law
theories of public nuisance, and maritime tort negligence. See
also, In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981),
regh. denied 673 F.2d 47, in which the court held that § 1321
(f) preempts other means of recovery by the U.S. government.
Sed contra see U.8. v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963 (9th
Cir. 1981).
52 33 USC § 1321.
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operator would become liable for the full removal costS. 63
The FWPCA does not appear to preempt states, individuals, or
foreign governments from recovering actual cleanup costs under
state law, even where these costs exceed the limits of the FWPCA.
However, claims based on state and common law would be subject
to the 1851 Limitation Act. 64
Courts have construed the Liability Act narrowly in recent
decades and in most instances decisions have been adverse to ship
owners seeking limitation. 65 Therefore, although this statute is
not enforced in every instance, it has not been abandoned
entirely by the courts. In In re Harbour Towing Coxpoxe t i on"
the Liability Act operated to preempt a Maryland statute which
required liability in excess of the value of the ship. This
principle was upheld in In re Oswego Barge Corp, 67 where the
court held that oil pollution claims founded on state laws are
subject to the Limitation Act.
633 3 USC § 1321 (f). See, Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. U.S.,
584 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 959 (1979)
Here a tug owner was denied the right to limitation of
liability under 33 USC § 1321 (g), the term "wilful
misconduct" was applied.
64Complaint of Steuart Transp. Co., 435 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.
Va. 1977), aff'd, 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979). Here the court
held that the State of Virginia's recovery of cleanup costs
under Virginia legislation was not preempted by the FWPCA. See
also, Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F. Supp.
631 (D. Ak. 1981), cited by Vickers 'Deterrence or Prevention
- Two Means of Environmental Protection: An Analysis of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Oregon Senate Bill 242' (1992)
28 Willamette L. Rev. 405 at 411.
65Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty § 10-4(a), at 822
(2nd ed. 1975) cited by King 'In Re Complaint of Armatur,
S.A.: The Limitation of Liability Act and Environmental
Disasters' (1991) 21 Environmental Law 357 at 408 fn.23.
66335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
674 3 9 F. Supp. 312, 320 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Considering the protection afforded to the shipowner and certain
kinds of charterers under the provisions of the Limitation Act,
Congress had good reason to exclude the Act from application to
oil pollution claims where the OPA would apply. The Limitation
Act could have subverted one of the main purposes behind the OPA,
which is to permit states to impose supplementary liability over
and above that provided by the OPA. For oil pollution claims
arising after the 18th August, 1990, it seems that Congress has,
in effect, abandoned the Liability Act although it still applies
to non-oil pollution claims. Consequently claimants are no longer
limited to recovery under federal law where they were previously
hindered at state and the common law by the protectionist
provisions of the Liability Act. It has been observed that the
Limitation Act will in principle continue to apply to claims for
oil pollution damage brought in the U.S. to recover damage caused
in international waters or in foreign jurisdictions. 58
12.7 Geographical Scope of the Oil Pollution Act
The Oil Pollution Act contains a pervasive system of control over
the discharge of oil, and makes considerable changes to the
liability which may be incurred for clean-up operations and
damages where oil is spilled, or a substantial threat of an oil
spill is posed within the navigable waters, adjoining shorelines
and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the United States. 59 For
the purpose of this discussion it is necessary to define the area
encompassed by the terms navigable waters and EEZ.
12.7.1 Navigable Waters
As was the position under the Clean Water Act,70 OPA defines
"navigable waters" as meaning 'the waters of the United States
58Thadd~us Miller & Braunreuther 3 Benedict on Admiralty
7th ed. rev1sed 1992 Chapter IX 'Marine Oil Pollution' 9-27.
690PA § 1002 (a), 33 USC § 2702 (a) .
7°Clean Water Act § 502 (7), 33 USC s 1362 (7) (1989).
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including the territorial sea . ,71 It is convenient to begin by
describing what is meant by the words 'waters of the United
States'. This concept is not defined in the OPA; however it is
significant that for the purpose of § 311 of the Clean Water Act
(the forerunner of OPA) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
defined the "waters of the United States" to encompass very broad
categories of water resources i n the following terms.
(a) All waters that are currently used, were used in the
past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce, including all waters that are subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide;
(b) Interstate waters, including interstate wetlands;
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams) , mudflats,
sandflats, and wetlands , the use, degradation, or
destruction of which would affect or could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(1) That are or could be used for interstate or foreign
travellers for recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and
sold in interstate or foreign commerce;
(3) That are used or could be used for industrial purposes
by industries in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as
navigable waters under this section;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)
through (d) of this section, including adjacent
wetlands;
(f) Wetlands adjacent t o waters identified in
paragraphs (a) through (e ) of this section: Provided,
that waste treatment systems (other than cooling ponds
meeting the criteria of t hi s paragraph) are not waters
of the United States; .. . , 72
7lOPA § 1001(21), 33 USC § 2701(21).
724 0 C.F.R. § 110.1(a) to (f) (1990).
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Within the context of claims for water pollution the U.S. Courts
have taken the view that despite the use of the adjective
"navigable" it is not necessary that the water source be capable
of supporting water traffic. 73 However the courts do require
that the polluted water source bears some connection to
interstate commerce. 74 Pierce raises the question as to whether
or not damages incurred by way of a discharge of oil, or the
threat thereof, into groundwater could be admissible under the
OPA. The learned writer seem to suggest that such damage would
be admissible under OPA as he points out that groundwater 'is
used in interstate commerce for agriculture, other industries,
and for municipal water supply.' 75
12.7.1.2 Territorial Seas
The territorial seas are defined as 'the belt of the seas
measured from the line of the ordinary low water along that
portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea
and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and
extending seaward a distance of three miles.,76
12.7.2 The Exclusive Economic Zone
The "exclusive economic zone" means the zone established by
Presidential Proclamation No .5030, dated March 10, 1983,
including the areas referred to as the "eastern special areas"
in Article 3(1) of the Agreement between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
73See, United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345,
346-47 (lOth Cir. 1979).
74Ibid. and see also, United States v. Ashland Oil &
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1974).
75Pierce 'The Emerging Role of "Liability-Forcing" in
Environmental Protection' (1991) 30 Washburn Law Journal 381
at 415.
760PA s 1001 (35), 33 USC § 2701 (35) .
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Maritime Boundary, signed June I, 1990. 77
Presidential proclamation No.5030 defines the exclusive economic
zone as follows:
'The Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States is a zone
continuous to the territorial sea, of the United States,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands and the United States Overseas
territories and possessions. The Exclusive Economic Zone
extends to a distance 200 nautical miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured .
... within the Exclusive Economic Zone, the United States
has, to the extent permitted by international law,
jurisdiction with regard to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment.'78
The OPA, therefore, covers any oil spill in U.S. navigable waters
within the territorial waters and 200 nautical mile limit of the
EEZ. Also, oil spilled in this area which contaminates the
adjoining shoreline is encompassed within OPA. However,
uncertainty exists as to whether or not discharges of oil on the
high sea which drift into the EEZ, navigable waters or adjoining
shoreline are subject to the OPA. It would seem that the
preferable approach is that the provisions of the act would apply
to such spills. 79
12.8 The Oil Pollution Act only applies to oil Pollution
Incidents
For the purpose of the OPA, "oil" means oil of any kind or in any
form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge,
770PA § 1001 (8); 33 USC § 2701 (8).
in
78Proclamation No.5030, 3 CFR §§ 22-23 (1983), reprinted
16 use § 1453 (1988).
79Thaddeus Miller & Braunreather, op cit, 9, 15-16.
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oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil.
However, the definition excludes petrol, and crude oil or any
faction thereof, which is specifically listed or designated as
a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
section 101 (14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (42 usc 9601) (hereinafter
CERCLA) and which is subject to the provisions of that Act. 80
up to the word "spoil" the definition is the same as that
contained in the FWPCA. The remainder of the definition was added
in order to clarify that OPA and CERCLA are intended to cover
discrete matters rather than overlap. One possible problem is
that a hydrocarbon which would fall within the definition of
"oil" contained in the OPA can be transformed into a substance
listed or designated as a hazardous substance under CERCLA after
a manufacturing process. 81 Accordingly, where the hydrocarbon
material contains a listed or designated substance, a discharge
of the hydrocarbon will be covered by CERCLA rather than OPA. The
new OPA definition settles a previous point of uncertainty which
had been created, whereby CERCLA had overlapped with other
federal oil pollution laws. The potential application of CERCLA
to incidents involving product carriers in United States Waters
remains a distinct possibility.
12.9 The Prospective Application of the Oil Pollution Act
OPA stipulates that claims founded upon incidents occurring prior
to enactment shall be decided in terms of the law which was then
8°OPA § 1001 (23), 33 usc § 2701 (23) .
81When crude oil is refined the fuel oils are distilled
off at varying boiling points. The lower-number fuel oils are
distilled off first and contain a higher proportion of
compounds with shorter chains. These are either chains of
carbon atoms (aliphatic) or benzene rings or carbon atoms
(aroma~ics). Number 2 fuel oil contains about 38 per cent
aromatlc compounds. See, New Scientist, Aromatics poison ocean
in new oil spills, July (1993) 36.
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in force. 82 The Act goes on to provide that the provisions of
OPA may be applied only to those matters arising from incidents
subsequent to the date of enactment. 83 Therefore, the Act
applies only to incidents occurring after the 18th August, 1990,
the date of its enactment.
12.10 Conclusions
In this chapter the development of OPA and its relationship to
the international Conventions and other U.S. Federal and State
law has been dealt with. Significantly, it was seen how OPA did
not pre-empt State law and how the 1851 Limitation of Liability
Act no longer applies to oil pollution claims in the United
States. Also, certain general but important features of OPA which
are fundamental to understanding the liability provisions of that
instrument were identified and explained.






In this Chapter the central liability provisions of OPA will be
explained and compared to the equivalent provisions contained in
the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions and the 1992 Protocols
thereto and in the voluntary agreements. Because OPA does not
pre-empt U.S. state law, the analysis contained in Chapters 12
and 13 also provides the preparatory framework which leads to the
penultimate chapter. In Chapter 14, U.S. state legislation is
discussed and the development of a new policy governing tanker-
source oil pollution liability is identified. The possible
ramifications of the broader acceptance of this policy at the
U.S. Federal level and in the international Conventions will be
explored.
13.2 General Elements of Liability
With certain exceptions OPA governs liability for discharges of
oil from vessels or facilities. 1 For the purpose of the OPA
"liable" or "liability" shall be construed to be the same
standard of liability which obtains under section 311 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA 33 usc 1321).2 The
courts have repeatedly determined that the standard provides
strict, joint, and several liability.' In the Joint Explanatory
10PA § 1002(a), 33 USC § 2702(a).
20PA § 1001(17), 33 usc § 2701(17).
3Total Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 178,
180, 17 ELR 21001 (1987); United States v. M/V Big Sarn, 681
F.2d 4~2, 12 ELR 20994 (5th Cir.), re'g denied, 693 F,2d 451
(5th Clr. 1982) cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132, 13 ELR 20226
(1983); Burgess v. M/V Tarnano, 564 F.2d 164 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1977). cited by Randle 'The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and
Effects' (1991) 21 ELR 10121 at 10121.
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Statement of the Committee of Conference Considering the OPA, the
Conference Committee is unequivocal in this regard. 4 It is
therefore likely that each person or corporation defined as a
"responsible party" under the OPA (an "owner" or "operator"), is
strictly and jointly liable for removal costs and damages caused
by such spills or threatened spills, subj ect to certain statutory
exceptions.
Because liability is strict the responsible party will be liable
without regard to fault and the claimant shall only be required
to establish that a discharge of oil from a vessel or facility
occurred and that the defendant is a responsible party.
The impact of joint and several liability under OPA is
demonstrated by the following example. Suppose three corporations
(A,B,C) are held responsible for an oil pollution incident under
OPA which is judged to have caused US$150 million in pollution
damage. Where the responsible parties cannot prove their
respective contributions to the harm done they are all jointly
liable for the damage i.e. A,B and C will each pay US$50 million.
Also each party is individually liable for the total cost of the
incident. Where, for example, claimants proceed against A only,
that defendant will be required to pay the entire US$150 million
judgment and attempt to seek contribution from Band C. To the
extent that Band C do not have the resources to reimburse A for
their share of the harm, A, instead of the claimants, must bear
the loss. In O'Neil v. Picilla5 the court, commenting on the
joint and several liability rules created under CERCLA, stated:
'It has not gone unnoticed that holding defendants jointly
and severally liable in such situations may often result in
defendants paying for more than their share of the harm.
Nevertheless, courts have continued to impose joint and
4H.R. Conf. Rep. No.101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103
(1990) .
5883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1115 (1990).
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several liability on a regular basis, reasoning that where
all of the contributing causes cannot fairly be traced,
Congress intended for those proven at least partially
culpable to bear the cost of the uncertainty.,6
It seems to be the case that the strict, joint and several
liability provisions of the OPA are designed to safe guard the
interests of claimants which in most instances shall include the
Government of the United States or other governmental bodies
which undertake costly clean-up measures.
13.2.1 Discharges excluded from the provisions of the oil
Pollution Act
The OPA excludes from its broad assertions of liability
discharges permitted by a permit issued under Federal, State, or
local law.' Where the responsible party intentionally or
accidentally exceeds the conditions of the permit, the OPA would
become applicable to such discharge. The responsible party for
such violation would be held liable for removal costs and damages
under the OPA. 8
Discharges emanating from public vessels are also excluded. 9 A
"public vessel" is defined as 'vessel owned or bareboat chartered
and operated by the United States, or a by a State or political
subdivision thereof, or by a foreign nation, except when the
vessel is engaged in commerce .,lO The OPA's liability provisions
will not apply to any discharge from an onshore facility which
is subject to the Trans Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (43 USC
60'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d at 178-79.
'OPA s 1002 (c) (1), 33 usc § 2702 (c) (1) .
8Randle, op cit, 10122.
90PA s 1002 (c) (2), 33 use s 2702 (c) (2) .
lOOPA § 1001 (29), 33 usc s 2701 (29) .
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1651 et seq).l1
13.3 Responsible Parties under the Oil Pollution Act
Section 1002(a) of OPA1~ is a broad statement of how liability
accrues under the Act, and provides the following:
each responsible party for a vessel or a facility
from which oil is discharged, or which poses the
substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the
navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages
... that result from such incident.'
The OPA does not preclude the existence of more than one
responsible party.13 This observation would be supported by the
use of the word "each".
The Act defines the responsible party according to the type of
structure giving rise to the discharge. 14 Where the source of an
oil spill or the substantial threat thereof is a vessel, the
responsible party is any person owning, operating, or demise
chartering15 the vessel. 16 Where an actual or threatened oil
llOPA § 1002 (c) (3), 33 usc § 2703 (c) (3) .
1~33 USC § 2702 (a) .
13H.R. Rep. No.242, 101st Congo 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 55
(1989), cited by Ruhl & Jewell 'Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
Opening a New Era in Federal and Texas Regulation of Oil Spill
Prevention, Containment and Cleanup, and Liability' (1991) 32
S. Tex. L. Rev. 475 at 494 fn.133.
14See, OPA § 1001 (32) (A) to (F), 33 usc § 2701 (32) (A) to
(F); this provision lists six categories of structures:
vessels, onshore facilities, offshore facilities, deepwater
ports, pipelines and abandoned structures.
15A bareboat or demise charterer leases and operates the
vessel and employs its own crew; See, International Marine
Towing, Inc. V. Southern Leasing Partners, Ltd., 722 F.2d 126
(5th Cir. 1983).
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emission occurs from an abandoned vessel, the persons who wbuld
have been responsible immediately prior to the abandonment of the
vessel shall be the responsible party.17 The above definition of
a responsible party could support either wide or narrow
interpretations. As such, the legal definition of potential
defendants who may be included within the meaning of a
responsible party has yet to be determined. This will be
considered in the next two sections.
13.3.1 The meaning of a "person"
Due to the fundamental importance of the notion of a responsible
party it is necessary to amplify the constituent parts of the
definition. The OPA defines a "person" as 'an individual,
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality,
commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any
interstate body. ,18 Although this definition is broad it is
noteworthy that it excludes the United States Government from the
category of persons or entities who may be considered responsible
parties. This is in contrast with the CERCLA definition of a
"person" which expressly includes the United States Government
as a potentially responsible party.u
13.3.2 The meaning of an "owner"/"operator"
Fortunately the legislative history of the OPA provides some
insight into the meaning of the phrase "owner or operator".
160PA § 1002(a), 33 USC § 2702(a) read with the definition
of "owner and operator" in § 1001(26) (A), 33 usc § 2701(26) (A)
and the definition of a "responsible party", contained in §
1001 (32) (A), 33 usc § 2701 (32) (A) .
170PA § 1002(a), 33 USC § 2702(a) read with the definition
of "owner and operator" in § 1001(26) (C), 33 usc § 2701(26) (C)
and the definition of "responsible party", contained in §
1001 (32) (F), 33 USC 2701 (32) (F) .
l80PA § 1001(27), 33 usc § 2701(27).
uCERCLA s 101 (21), 42 usc s 9601 (21) (1988).
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According to the Conference Committee, the OPA definition of
"owner and operator" was adopted from section 311 (a) of the FWPCA
and is intended to have the same meaning. 20 In accordance with
this Congressional intent two avenues of enquiry exist which
offer guidance as to the meaning attributable to the concepts of
an "owner" and "operator". In this regard applicable regulations
promulgated under the FWPCA and decisions interpreting the
relevant provisions of FWPCA will be discussed.




promulgated under the financial responsibility
of the FWPCA21 by the U. S . Coast Guard provide
'''Operator'' or "Vessel operator" means any person,
including, but not limited to, an owner, demise charterer
or other contractor who conducts or who is responsible for
the operation of a vessel . Persons who are responsible for
vessels in the capacity of a builder, repairer, scrapper,
or seller are included in this definition of operator.
"Owner" or Vessel "owner" means any person holding legal
or equitable title to a vessel. In a case where a
Certificate of Registry or equivalent document has been
issued, the owner is the person or persons whose name or
names appear thereon as owner: Provided, however, that
where a Certificate of Registry has been issued in the name
of the president or secretary of an incorporated company
2°H.R. Conf. Rep. No.101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 102
(1990), cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 495 fn.137 - see also
Thaddeus Miller & Braunreuther 3 Benedict on Admiralty 7th ed
revised 1992 Chapter IX 'Marine Oil Pollution' 9-19. This
would also conform with the definition of "liable" and
"liability" which terms are intended to have the same meaning
as in the FWPCA.
21The law requiring Certificates of Financial
Responsibility (COFR) prior to OPA was contained in FWPCA, 33
USC § 1321.
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under 46 U. S . C. 15, such incorporated company is the
owner. ,22
The definition of an "owner" does not seem to be problematic as
it designates the registered owner as the owner for liability
purposes. However, the definition of an "operator" presents
considerable difficulty as it can be interpreted to encapsulate
a broad range of potentially responsible parties. The difficulty
lies in that the definition of an operator includes anyone who
conducts the operation of a vessel. Therefore anyone who directs
or manages a vessel, which in the case of a tanker involves a
wide array of entities, could risk being construed as a
potentially responsible party . It could be argued, for example,
that where a large oil company directs an independent tanker
owner to carry a cargo of crude oil from Saudi Arabia to a
specific port in the United States that oil company is to some
extent conducting (directing) the operation of that tanker.
Because FWPCA clearly contemplated the possibility of more than
one operator being implicated in an incident it would be
difficult for a potentially responsible party who did exercise
some control over the vessel to successfully avoid liability on
the basis that the proper enquiry should be the comparative
degree of control exercised. All such "operators" together with
"owners" could possibly be held jointly and severally liable
under OPA.
13.3.2.2 Previous decisions under FWPCA
In U.8. v. Mobile Oil Corp.23 the court attributed the following
interpretation to the phrase "owner-operator":
'The owner-operator of a vessel or a facility has the
capacity to make timely discovery of oil discharges. The
2233 C. F. R. 130.2.
234 64 F.d 1124, (5th Cir. 1972).
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owner-operator has power to direct the activities' of
persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution.
The owner-operator has the capacity to prevent and abate
the damage.' 24
This "definition" by description of power or capacity was used
by the court in CPC In t ' 1, Inc . v , Aerojet-General Corp. 25 as
guidance to interpret the definition of "owned or operated" in
§ 107 (a) (2) of CERCLA.26 In this case, the court also noted that
where 'a party assumes control of an activity and then fails to
perform ... [that party] should bear the responsibility for any
pollution which results. ,27 Generally, OPA equates legal
responsibility for the consequences of the incident with
ownership, and/or the right to control the source of a spill. 28
Contemporary courts have displayed a tendency to impute
responsibility to parties connected to pollution where previously
the causal connection between that party and the damage would
have been considered too remote for liability to attach. This
trend is particularly evident in environmental law as practised
in the United States. 29 For example, in U.S. v. Fleet treccoxe"
the court made the following statement:
in order to achieve the "over-whelming remedial" goal
of the CERCLA statutory scheme, ambiguous statutory terms
should be construed to favour liability for the costs
24Id at 1127.
25731 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
264 2 usc § 9607 (a) (2) (1988).
27CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 731 F. Supp.
783, 788 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
28Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 495.
29Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 480.
30901 F.2d 1550, 1557, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991)
cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 528 fn.436.
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incurred by the government in responding to hazards at such
facilities.'
When the definition of a responsible party is considered in the
light of such developments, it is reasonable to anticipate that
ship-marketers, managers, builders, lenders, insurers,
classification societies and shippers (cargo owners) may well be
included within the expanded spectrum of potentially responsible
parties (PRPs).
13.3.3 Concerns facing particular PRPs
The following concerns have been voiced in relation to the
possible width of the OPA definition of a "responsible party".
13.3.3.1 Ship management concerns
Although the OPA does not strictly define an operator, it seems
clear from the way in which the courts of the United States have
chosen to interpret similar provisions in legislation parallel
to the OPA, that the party which arranged for the execution of
the voyage, including the manning and navigating of the vessel
and therefore the vessel manager or managing agent, will be
included. Of particular concern to the managers is that liability
under the OPA refers to owners and operators; therefore the
operator's liability will be joint and several with that of the
owner. 31
13.3.3.2 Directors and Officers
It is uncertain whether the OPA's reference to the liability of
persons who are operators would extend to directors and officers
of a tanker company. 33
31Spruyt Ship Management 1st ed 134 (1990).
J:zSee, 'D&O Liability from Oil Pollution Act' World
Insurance Report (19 Mar. 1991) ; cf. United States v.
Northwestern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
464
13.3.3.3 Lending Transactions
Banks traditionally provide the capital necessary to acquire
tankers. They will usually lend sixty to eighty per cent of the
acquisition cost in exchange for the security of a mortgage over
the vessel together with the assignment of its earnings and
Lnsuxances i " What typically transpires is that the financier
remains the registered owner of the vessel while actual
responsibility for the control and operation of the vessel is
relinquished to the borrower in his capacity as a bareboat or
demise charterer. 34 Through this tanker-leasing arrangement the
financier retains legal ownership of the ship until the amount
due under the lending agreement has been repaid. This practice
is primarily to protect the lender's security interest in the
vessel.
The question which arises is whether financiers who maintain
legal or titular ownership over vessels run the risk of facing
liability under the OPA if such vessels cause oil pollution in
the United States. 35 Under general maritime law the position
prevailed that the bareboat or demise charterer had insulated the
registered owner from liability incurred by the vessel. 36
(W.D. Mo. 1984); where the court upheld the liability under
CERCLA of a vice president actively participating in polluting
practices - cited by Noyes 'The US Oil Pollution Act of 1990'
(1992) vol.7 NO.1 International Journal Of Estuarine and
Coastal Law 43 at 47 fn.24.
33K. Cottrill 'Owners Count The Cost Of Oil Spills' August
1992 Petroleum Economist 14 at 15.
34Thaddeus Miller & Braunreuther, op cit, 9-21.
35This question is posed by A.F Bessemer C~ark 'The U.S.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990' (1991) Lloyd's Maritime and
Commercial LQ 247 at 247.
36Dant & Russell Inc. v , Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp.,
Inc., 895 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1989), as amended (1990); Deakle
v. John E. Graham & Sons, Inc ., 756 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1985)'
Nutt v. Loomis Hydraulic Testing Co., Inc., 552 F.2d 1126 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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This issue was considered during the process leading up to' the
development of the OPA. In the original House-approved version
of the OPA, such lenders were expressly exempted from the
definition of an "owner". 37 However, in the compromise between
the House and the Senate, the conferees decided not to
incorporate the House definition of "owner" in the OPA and
instead adopted the definition of "owner or operator" contained
in § 311(a) of the FWPCA which does not expressly exclude such
lenders from liability. However, if the term "owner or operator"
is, for the purpose of the OPA, interpreted in the same way as
has been the case under the FWPCA, financiers who hold titular
ownership over a vessel primarily to protect a security interest
in that vessel shall not be deemed to be a responsible party
under the OPA.
Where the terms of the security document contain conditions which
permit the lender to retain control over the manner in which the
borrower operates the vessel, the lender could be construed as
an "operator" under the provisions of the OPA because it would
be open to the court to hold that such lender has the 'power to
direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms
causing the pollution' .38
Where a lender holds titular ownership of a vessel and
participates in the management of that vessel, he would run a
very high risk of being considered a responsible party under the
provisions of the OPA. In conclusion, lenders may face real risks
where they adopt certain types of ship-financing procedures and
those vessels operate within the U.S. jurisdiction. Insurance
cover has been drafted to protect mortgagees from the prejudicing
378ee H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) § 1001
(23), cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 527 fn.429.
38Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 526 citing U.8. v. Mobile Oil
Carp 464 F.d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972)
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of their security as a result of potential OPA liability.39 ·
13.3.3.4 Ship Manufacturers
The OPA does not specifically address the liability of those who
design or manufacture vessels or components used on board such
ships. Normally such parties would not be included within the
meaning of "owners or operators of vessels", nor is it likely
that such parties could be construed as having the "power to
direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms
causing the pollution."40 It would seem, then, that the proper
way which claimants would proceed against this category of
responsible party would be as a claim against third parties. For
example, it is possible that ship builders and designers could
be faced with claims brought against them by vessel owners and
operators arising out of the failure of vessels to comply with
the OPA's construction standards. 41
13.3.3.5 Classification Societies
Can it be said that a classification society which surveys a
vessel may be construed as an "owner or operator" of that vessel?
Or, put differently, does the a classification society have the
"power to direct the activities of persons who control the
mechanisms causing the pollution".42 If this is so, then, where
such vessel sinks or is damaged in the jurisdiction of the United
States and a subsequent discharge of oil occurs, that
classification society may be held jointly and severally liable
with the actual owner or operator in terms of OPA. A central
39George & de la Rue Liability for Oil Pollution from
Ships and the Effect of the United States Oil Pollution Act,
38.
4°Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 526 citingp.S. v. Mobile Oil
Corp 464 F.d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972)
41See further at pg.479 of this work.
42 Ibid.
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feature of commercial maritime ventures is that it is nearly
impossible for an owner or operator to trade a vessel without
having satisfactory insurance. This is particularly true of
tankers, which are required to be in possession of adequate
liability insurance to meet the requirements of the Civil
Liability Convention and TOVALOP and U. S. Coast Guard
Requirements. It is a prerequisite that, in order to obtain such
cover from either a P&l Club or a commercial insurer, the vessel
must have been certified as being within the standards of a
particular class of ship classification. Furthermore the
continuation of cover will in most circumstances depend on the
vessel remaining within that classified class of quality.
Although the classification society does not have actual direct
physical control over the vessel in the sense that it could bar
the vessel from trading, it does in fact have the "power to
direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms
causing the pollution" ...3 This is so because where the
classification society declines to certify a vessel in class it
will lose insurance cover and effectively be precluded from
operating ..... On the other hand it could reasonably be argued
that there is a difference between "directing" activities and
having the ability to abort such activities ab initio.
13.3.3.6 Insurers
Insurers who take efforts to monitor and control their insured's
activities to protect themselves against pollution claims may
face the same concerns as lenders and classification societies
of being construed as an owner within the meaning of the OPA." s
13.3.3.7 Cargo Owners
.. 3 Ibid .
....See generally, Russell Harding 'The Liability of
Classification Societies to Cargo Owners' (1993) 1 Lloyd's
Maritime and Commercial LQ 1.
"sRuhl & Jewell, op cit, 530.
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In a significant departure from previous federal oil pollution
legislation and general maritime law the House of Representatives
included in their version of the OPA bill an innovative provision
which would have made the actual cargo owner involved in the
spill secondarily liable for removal costs incurred as a result
of the spill. The proposed liability of the cargo owner was set
at fifty per cent of removal costs which would only become due
once the other responsible parties had paid their allocated
proportion of liability. However, towards the final phase of the
Conference the House of Representatives agreed to the Senate's
request to delete this shared liability arrangement. 46
Cargo owners are increasingly aware of the quality of the vessels
they charter to carry their oil cargoes. Cargo owners take
efforts to monitor and control the vessels they use so as to
provide a degree of protection against becoming embroiled in
pollution claims. By doing so they may face the same concerns as
lenders, classification societies and insurers in that they
possibly could be construed as an "owner and operator" within the
meaning of the OPA. Of course, where the cargo owner is the owner
of the tanker or the demise charter he will be liable unless he
is able to prove that he exercised due care, that the pollution
was caused by a third party other than his servant, agent or
independent contractor. It will also be recalled that the OPA
does not preempt individual states retaining or enacting
legislation over and above that of the OPA. The OPA liability
regime makes no provision for primary responsibility for clean-up
costs or damages on cargo interests such as voyage or time
charterers. On this very important issue individual states have
adopted a different approach.
Furthermore, even though a cargo owner may not bear any legal
responsibility for a spill they are often placed under
considerable public pressure to participate in removal efforts.
46Grumbles 'Major Provisions, Themes of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990' (1990) 21 Environment Reporter 1264 at 1266 and
Randle, op cit, 10121.
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13.4 Limited Liability under the Oil Pollution Act
The OPA has attracted widespread, strong criticism especially
from tanker industry representatives. One such criticism is that
the provisions of the Act significantly narrow the opportunities
for responsible parties to limit liability. An examination of the
provisions of the OPA shows that the fears of the tanker industry
are well founded. Furthermore, whatever benefits are afforded to
the responsible party (who under the OPA will be in most
instances a tanker owner or operator) may be of minimal use
because the OPA does not preempt state law remedies which may
therefore exceed the provisions of the OPA. This move away from
the concept of limitation reflects a general trend in
environmental law which is becoming increasingly evident within
the context of maritime law . 47 The traditional protection
afforded to the industrial sector through the right to limit
liability (at the expense of the public and the environment) is
diminishing. This observation is seen in the process leading up
to the development of the OPA. Both Houses narrowly defeated
efforts to delete liability limitations from the bill. 48 As such
OPA does provide limits to liability although the circumstances
under which the responsible party may avail himself of this
protection are narrowly defined. Strictly speaking, therefore,
OPA is an instrument which maintains, at least in principle, the
philosophy of limited liability .
13.4.1 Limits under the Oil Pollution Act
Different rules for determining liability limits apply for
different types of discharging sources. 49 These differences are
47White-Harvey 259.
48Randle, op ci t, 10123 fn. 40.
49The different types of activities which may cause a
discharge of oil or the threat thereof are (a) tank vessels
(b) all other vessels (c) Offshore facilities (d) Onshore
fa~ilities and deepwater ports (e) Mobile Offshore Drilling
Unlts (MODU) and (f) Outer Continental Shelf Facilities (OCS
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designed to reflect the different risks of oil pollution
associated with different sources . 50 The focus of this work is
on the liability of discharges from tank vessels.
It is understandable that tank vessels (tankers, manned and dumb
barges)51 have been allocated higher limits than other vessels
because tank vessels have a greater potential than other vessels
for causing damage of the kind contemplated by the OPA. Also,
larger tank vessels attract h i ghe r liability limits, on the
rationale that the larger the tanker the greater harm it may be
expected to cause. Consequently, different rules for the
calculation of liability limits apply to tankers exceeding 3,000
gross tons (gt.) as opposed to tankers of 3,000 gt. or less.
Under the United States' rules , a "gross ton" is equivalent to
100 cubic feet. The vessel's tonnage is intended to reflect the
vessel's approximate volume, and represents the total volume of
all enclosed spaces less certain spaces permitted to be
exempted. 52
Where a discharge of oil occurs from a tank vessel and the
responsible party is able to maintain his right to limit
liability under the provisions of the OPA, the amount of his
limitation fund is calculated in the following way.
Facilities) .
50Randle, op ci t, 10123.
510PA § 1001 (34), 33 USC § 2701 (34) defines a "tank
vessel" as a vessel that is constructed or adapted to carry,
or that carries, oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo or
cargo residue, and that -
(A) is a vessel of the United States;
(B) operates on the navigable waters; or
(C) transfers oil or hazardous material in a place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;
Therefore a tank vessel is a tanker operating in US
jurisdiction .
. 520PA, § 1001(12), 33 USC § 2701(12) "gross ton" has the
meanlng glven to that term by the Secretary under part J of
title 46 - United States Code (46 USC §§ 14101 et seq.).
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13.4.1.1 Tank vessels over 3000 gt.
If the tank vessel from which the discharge occurred is over
3,000 gt. the responsible party may not be held liable for
removal costs, including pure threat removal costs and damages
exceeding the greater of $1,200 per gt. or $10 million. 53
13.4.1.2 Tank vessels under 3000 gt.
If the tank vessel from which the discharge occurred is 3,000 gt.
or less, the responsible party may not be held liable for removal
costs and damages exceeding the greater of $1,200 per gt. or $2
million. 54
The effect of the above prov1s1ons is that all tank vessels over
3,000 gt. are subject to a minimum liability limit of $10
million. Arithmetically, a tank vessel of 8,333 gt. will equal
the $10 million minimum upon a calculation based on the $1,200
per gross tonnage calculation. Therefore, all tank vessels
between 3,000 gt. and 8,333 gt. will be liable for the $10
million minimum limit because according to the per gross ton
calculation they would fall below the $10 million minimum for
that class of tanker. All tank vessels exceeding 8,333 gt. assess
their liability fund according to the $1,200 per gross ton
calculation.
Tankers of 3,000 gt. or less are subject to a minimum liability
limit of $2 million. Arithmetically, parties responsible for a
discharge from a tank vessel of 1,667 gt. will equal the $2
million minimum upon the $1,200 per gross ton calculation.
Therefore, tank vessels below 1,667 gt. will be liable for the
530PA § 1004 (a) (1) (A), 33 use § 2704 (a) (1) (A) read in
conjunction with § 1004(a) (1) (B) (i), 33 use §
2704 (a) (1) (B) (i) .
540PA § 1004 (a) (1) (A), 33 use § 2704 (a) (1) (A) read in
conjunction with § 1004(a) (1) (B) (ii), 33 use §
2704 (a) (1) (B) (ii) .
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$2 million minimum limit because on the $1,200 per gross ton
calculation such vessels would fall below the $2,000,000 minimum.
Tank vessels between 1,667 gt. and 3,000 gt. limit will assess
liability fund according to the $1,200 per gross ton calculation.
A schematic representation of maximum possible compensation
available from the "responsible party" under OPA on the gross ton









$1,200 per ton over 1,667
$10,000,000
$10,000,000 plus
$1,200 per ton over 8,333
For other vessels the limit is set at the greater of $600 per
gross ton or $500,000. ss
An interesting theoretical question in connection with the
established per gross ton method of assessing the liability limit
of the responsible party is the following. Is it equitable to
assess a responsible party for the total potential capacity of
the tank vessel where that vessel only discharges a small
proportion of her cargo or where the vessel loses her cargo but
was only partially laden? Furthermore, is it equitable to assess
larger tank vessels for higher limitation amounts in the light
of the possibility for a relatively small tank vessel to inflict
as significant damage as larger vessels under given
circumstances? In counter to these questions, it is probably true
that so long as the concept of limited liability remains in use
in maritime claims, the per tonnage assessment is probably the
most workable. Alternatives would probably result in significant
ssOPA s 1004 (a) (2), 33 USC s 2704 (a) (2) .
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insurance and evidentiary problems and prove too unwieldy.
Nonetheless, the above observation does illustrate that the true
nature of limitation of liability in maritime law is not a legal
principle founded on equitable ground~, but rather a compromise
based on policy considerations. It is, however, submitted that
in the not too distant future the concept of limited liability
will disappear altogether within the context of oil pollution.
13.4.2 OWners Removal Costs Creditable to the Limitation Fund
The provisions of the OPA allow any removal costs incurred by,
or on behalf of, the responsible party, with respect to each
incident, to be credited against his overall limit. 56 This
concession to the shipowner removes the anomaly which existed
under the FWPCA whereby an owner who undertook cleanup operations
could not credit those sums against his overall limit. This
provision will go some way towards encouraging the responsible
party to become involved in the cleanup process. However, where
the responsible party is able to limit his liability, other
damage claims may go unrecovered where the limitation fund has
been exhausted. In such cases such claimants may have recourse
to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund the provisions of which are
dealt with in due course.
13.4.3 Adjustment of Limitation Amounts
The President of the United States has the discretion to pass
regulations which adjust the liability limits for all potential
sources of oil pollution as he deems necessary. The President
must carry out this duty at least every three years. These
adjustments are to reflect significant increases in inflation as
measured by the consumer price index . 57
13.4.4 Interest not subject to Limitation
560PA § 1004 (a), 33 USC § 2704 (a) .
570PA § 1004 (d) (4), 33 usc § 2704 (d) (4) .
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The OPA specifically provides that, except under certain
particular circumstances, the responsible party shall be liable
to claimants for interest beginning thirty days after the claim
is presented until the claim is paid. 58 The amount due in
interest is not subject to the limitation provisions of the
Act. 59 However, where interest is paid by a guarantor of
financial responsibility, the guarantor is never obliged to pay
more than the extent of the guarantee. 50
If, within sixty days of the presentation of a claim to a
guarantor of financial responsibility the claimant is offered an
amount equal to or greater than the amount finally paid in
satisfaction of the claim no interest shall accrue to the
claimant. 51 Where an offer is made to the claimant sixty days or
more from the presentation of the claim (by the claimant to the
guarantor) and the claimant is offered an amount equal to or
greater than the amount finally paid in satisfaction of the
claim, interest shall only accrue for that period running from
thirty days after the claim was presented up until the date on
which the offer was made.
This is an interesting aspect of the OPA which would seem to be
an attempt to expedite the settlement of claims. Responsible
parties and their guarantor[s] are hereby encouraged to address
claims-handling issues promptly so that the accrual of interest
can be kept to a minimum. Responsible parties and their
guarantor[s] are also encouraged to offer settlements to
claimants based upon a realistic estimation of settlements which
a court could assess in the settlement of that claim. If the
offer is not at least equal to the final settlement the
responsible party and the guarantor[s] will have to pay full
580PA § 1005 (b) (1), 33 use § 2705 (b) (1) .
590PA § 1005 (b) (5) (A), 33 use § 2705 (b) (5) (A) .
500PA § 1005 (b) (5) (B), 33 use § 2705 (b) (5) (B) read in
conjunction with § 1016(g), 33 use § 2716(g).
6l0PA § 1005 (b) (2), 33 use § 2705 (b) (2) .
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interest. Further, claimants are encouraged to accept reasonable
offers made by responsible parties and their guarantor [s] or they
may find that after protracted litigation the eventual settlement
will have been significantly diminished by inflation. This would
be the situation where the original offer was equal to or greater
than the amount finally paid in satisfaction of the claim and
accordingly no interest, or at best a small amount of interest,
accrued to the claimant.
The applicable interest rate is calculated at a rate published
by the Federal Reserve, which is the average of the highest rate
for short term, 180 days or less, commercial and finance company
paper. Interest is computed on each day included within the
interest period. 62
13.5 Comparison between OPA Limits and Previous Limits
The way in which the OPA formulates limitation is essentially
similar to the previous limitation provisions contained in the
FWPCA. However, the tonnage liability limits for tank vessels
under § 1004 (a) (1) of the OPA63 is eight times higher than was
the case under § 311 (f) of the FWPCA. Previous federal law
permitted the owners and operators of tank vessels Without
'wilful negligence or wilful misconduct within the privity and
knowledge of the owner', to limit their liability for federal
cleanup costs to the greater of $150 per gross ton or
$250,OOO.~ These limits were criticised for being
unrealistically low.
The very great increase in a shipowner's potential liability can
be illustrated by using a 100,000 gross ton oil tanker as an
example. Under the FWPCA, a vessel of this size would have been
liable for a maximum of $15 million in cleanup and removal costs
620PA § 1004 (b) (4), 33 usc § 2705 (b) (4) .
63 33 USC s 2704 (a) (1) .
~33 USC § 1321 (f).
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(100,000 gt. x $150), assuming that the responsible party had not
been guilty of wilful negligence or wilful misconduct, and that
no statutory defences applied. Under the provisions of the OPA,
the same vessel would now be liable for federal cleanup costs up
to a maximum of $120 million (100,000 gt. x $1,200).
13.6 Unlimited Liability under the Oil Pollution Act
13.6.1 Introduction
To shipowners, operators and other potentially responsible
parties of greater significance than the increases in liability
limits is that it is more difficult to invoke limitation under
the OPA. This is because the circumstances through which a party
may lose the right to limit have been made far more inclusive
than was formerly the position under the FWPCA. The OPA requires
a broad standard of pre-spill and post-spill conduct, which the
responsible party may not transgress if he is to successfully
limit liability.
This is an important development because it would seem that
shipowners and other responsible parties are unable to rely with
any degree of certainty on an ability to invoke limitation. As
liability insurance cannot be obtained for potentially unlimited
liability they are forced to conduct their operations under the
threat of full liability . Accordingly, whenever a tanker with a
cargo of oil enters the jurisdiction of the United States, the
company operating that vessel runs the risk of incurring
liability which conceivably could force that company into
liquidation.
13.6.2 Losing the Right to Limit Liability under the Oil
Pollution Act
The right to limit liability may be lost under the same
circumstances which cause the loss of the absolute defences.
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13.6.2.1 Gross Negligence or Wilful Misconduct
The OPA will deny limitation where the incident was proximately
caused by the gross negligence65 or wilful mi sconduct" of the
responsible party or an agent67 or employee of the responsible
party, or person acting within a contractual relationship with
the responsible party .68 Although this test is widely stated, it
requires the presence of a close causal connection or proximate
cause between the standard of negligence and the occurrence of
the incident.
Under the FWPCA, limitation was permitted where the discharge
occurred without evidence of 'wilful negligence69 or wilful
65As opposed to ordinary negligence.
66The difficulties facing an owner who seeks to avoid
charges of wilful misconduct and hence hold his right to limit
are well illustrated in Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United
States, 584 F.2d 1151 at 1163 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 959 (1979). Here the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
defined wilful misconduct as: 'an act, intentionally done,
with knowledge that the performance will probably result in
injury, or done in such a way as to allow an inference of a
reckless disregard of the probable consequences'. In this
instance a tug caused a barge, which it was pushing, to ground
and spill oil in the Hudson River. The court held that the tug
owner's failure to appoint a captain, failure to post a
lookout and failure to inform one pilot of the other pilot's
unfamiliarity with the river constituted wilful misconduct.
Accordingly tug owners were denied the right to limit and the
United States was allowed to recover its full cleanup costs
under the FWPCA. This interpretation of the meaning of wilful
misconduct will be applicable to the OPA.
67The OPA does not define the term "agent". Thus, it is
unclear what type of agent[s] can possibly subject a
responsible party to unlimited liability under the Act.
UOPA § 1004(c) (1), 33 USC § 2704(c) (1) this provision
does not apply where the sole contractual arrangement arises
in connection with the carriage by a common carrier by rail.
69The fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an owner's
reckless disregard for seaworthiness was capable of
constituting wilful negligence, which would subject the owner
to unlimited liability - Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied
Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 619 (4th Cir. 1979).
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misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner'. Under
the OPA, proof of privi ty and knowledge on the part of the
shipowner is no longer required in order for the responsible
party to lose limitation and the concept of "wilful negligence"
is replaced by "gross negligence". Thus, whereas under the FWPCA,
limitation could have been granted if the discharge of oil was
caused by an isolated act of gross negligence by one member of
an otherwise competent crew, the OPA will deny limitation under
similar circumstances. 70
A finding of unlimited liability depends on the accumulative
nature of the mistakes involved and the degree of foreseeability
that the harm might occur. 71 Where the owner makes several
errors and could easily have foreseen the disaster, full
liability exists. 72 Where the errors are few or unimportant and
the harm could not reasonably have been anticipated, liability
will be limited to the applicable U.S. dollar amounts. 73
13.6.2.2 Violation of Federal Rules










70Burlingham Underwood and Lord Report on the United
States Oil Pollution Laws (1990) 28.
71Schoenbaum 'Liability for Spills and Discharges of Oil
and Hazardous Substances From Vessels' (1984) XX Forum 152 at
155 cited by McKaig 'Liability for Oil Tanker Spills' (1991)
44 Southwestern Law Journal 1599 at 1603 fn.65.
72Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151,
1162 (2d Cir. 1978) here limitation was denied when the
grounding resulted from a series of negligent acts.
73Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d
609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
74U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, 33 USC
§ 1321, et seq; U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub.
L. 95-217, 33 USC § 1251, et seq; U.S. Port and Tanker Safety
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-474, 33 USC § 1221, et seq· MARPOL
1973-1978; Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974/1978/1983;
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applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating regulation
by the responsible party or an agent or employee of the
responsible party, or person acting within a contractual
relationship with the responsible party, which proximately causes
an incident, will result in unlimited liability.7s
A breach of a federal safety, construction or operating
requirement will result in unlimited liability for the
responsible party only if the breach is shown to have contributed
to the occurrence of the incident. It is not tenable to argue
that the breach of any federal requirement, especially one
without a causal link with the incident, will result in unlimited
Li.ab.iLi.t.y c " Such an interpretation would effectively preclude
any real opportunity to limit liability; as it would usually be
possible in most cases to prove some, albeit minor, violation of
federal rules.
It remains to be seen how this new exception will be interpreted.
Suffice it to say that many operating regulations, such as those
Applicable Flag State Law; Vessel Classification Society Rules
and Industry recognized guidelines and standards, as developed
by the; (a) International Maritime Organization (IMO) , (b)
International Chamber of Shipping, (c) Oil Companies
International Marine Forum.
7SOPA § 1004 "(c) (1) (B), 33 USC § 2704 (c) (1) (B). This
provision will not work to the detriment of the responsible
party where a person acting within a contractual relationship
with the responsible party, in connection with carriage by a
common carrier by rail, violates an applicable federal rule -
see supra fn. 68.
76Gold 'Marine Pollution Liability After "Exxon Valdez":
The U.S. "All-Or-Nothing" Lottery!' (1991) vo1.22 No.3 Journal
of Maritime Law and Commerce 423 at 436; Wagner 'The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis' (1990) 21 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 569 at 582; James 'Legislative
Reaction to Recent oil Spills' (1990) River and Marine
Industry Seminar. 432; 'Submission Made by the International
Group of P&l Associations regarding Draft Oil Pollution in the
United States' (undated) at 5.
480
contained in the Rules of the Road,77 may well be violated by
conduct that would most likely be characterized as ordinary
negligence. 78
13.6.2.3 Failure or Refusal of the Responsible Party to abide
with § 1004(2) results in the loss of Limitation
The OPA liability limits do not apply if the responsible party
fails or refuses to (a) report the incident as required by law;
(b) cooperate with a responsible official in connection with
removal activities; or (c) comply, without sufficient cause, with
an order issued under § 311(c) or (e) or the Intervention on the
High Seas Act.
Section § 1004(2) is identical to section 1003(c) which
extrapolates the circumstances in which an erring responsible
party may be excluded from the benefit of the complete defences
provided for in section 1003(a) .
13.6.2.4 The Responsible Party must report the Spill
The right to limitation will be lost if the responsible party
fails, or refuses to report the incident, as required by law,
where he knows, or has reason to know, of the incident. 79 A
judge, it is submitted, should consider whether the responsible
party made la voluntary, timely and complete disclosure of the
matter at hand. Consideration should be given to whether the
responsible party came forward promptly on becoming aware of the
incident, and to the quantity and quality of the information
provided. Consideration may be given to whether or not the
disclosure substantially aided the government response, and
whether it occurred before a federal, state or local authority
77Se e 33 CFR ss 81.1 - 82.3. pt. 81, app. A (1990) (The
international navigation rules) .
78Noyes, op ci t, 49.
790PA § 1004 (c) (2) (A), 33 use s 2704 (c) (2) (A) .
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had already obtained knowledge of the incident. It is submitted
that the phrase 'has reason to know', is analogous to 'should
have known'. Clearly, where the facts show that the responsible
party did have the requisite knowledge although there is a denial
of such knowledge the responsible party will be found to have had
'reason to know' .
The responsible party is put in a difficult position because the
OPA amends the FWPCA penalty provisions to enable information,
obtained by way of such notification, to be used against any
owner, operator, or persons in charge of any vessel in any
criminal prosecution which may arise in connection with the
discharge. Bo This is a significant departure from the previous
law pertaining to the use of oil spill reports in criminal
prosecutions.B1 This amendment raises Fifth Amendment concerns
regarding protection of the reporter's constitutional right to
avoid self incrimination. B:I Before the FWPCA was amended by
Title IV of the OPA, however, the United States was able to use
the oil spill report to support the assessment of penalties
against the responsible ·pa r t y because such penalties under the
FWPCA were civil rather than criminal in nature. B3
It may be in the notifying party's best interest to report only
the bare minimum required, in order to avoid inadvertently
including information that might later be used against him in
criminal proceedings. Surely the public interest is better served
by prompt, complete notification of a discharge? The extent to
which this amendment will defeat the public interest will only
BOOPA § 4301 (a) (3), 33 USC § 1321 (b) (5) .
81Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 514.
B:lRuhl & Jewell, op cit, 531.
. B3In United States v, Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), rehg.
den~ed 448 U.S. 916; the court held that as the penalties were
civil, the Fifth Amendment could not be invoked to protect a
violator from having his oil spill report under 33 USC § 1321
(b) (5) used to support an assessment of a penalty under 33 USC
§ 1321 (b) (6) .
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become clear from the operation of this provision in future
maritime accidents involving tank vessels. 8t
Furthermore, an additional disincentive to make detailed
notification is that such information may well be used by
claimants in any litigation for the recovery of removal costs and
damages which may arise after a discharge of oil or the threat
thereof.
13.6.2.5 The Responsible Party must render Reasonable Cooperation
and Assistance
The right to limitation will be lost if the responsible party
fails or refuses to provide reasonable assistance requested of
him by a responsible official in connection with removal
activities. 8s The possible loss of the liability limit for non-
cooperation helps to assure that enforcement of the removal
orders is not jeopardised by the availability of the right to
limit. 8 6 Clearly, where the responsible party expects that he
will be able to limit liability he will be unlikely to jeopardise
this privilege by being uncooperative. By contrast, where the
responsible party expects that he has no expectation of limiting
liability, he may not provide full cooperation with removal
orders because where he is unable to limit, his removal costs are
not credited to a limitation fund. However, by failing to
cooperate the responsible party could be open to heavy civil and
criminal sanctions. Also, where the responsible party neglects
to remove the oil, the cleanup operation will be carried out by
the Federal Government. In the U. S . it is not unusual for
government cleanup operations to be significantly more expensive
84Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 531.
8SOPA § 1004 (c) (2) (B), 33 USC s 2704 (c) (2) (B) .
86Randle, op cit, 10124.
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than those undertaken by the industry. 87
In the final analysis, the level of reasonableness of the
cooperation and a~sistance offered by the responsible party, in
connection with removal activities, can be decided only by a
judge after a lengthy enquiry. A judge may wish to consider the
degree and timeliness of cooperation by the responsible party.
Considerable weight may be given to prompt and willing efforts
to reach environmental compliance and remedial agreements with
federal or state authorities including the United States Coast
Guard. Full compliance with such agreements could be a factor to
be considered in the favour of the responsible party in any
decision to regarding limitation.
In many situations a determination of which party is the
responsible party may be possible only after litigation. Where
a party feels he is not responsible for the incident, but
nevertheless is called upon to cooperate and assist in removal
operations, he is under pressure to oblige for fear of facing the
substantial penalties "a nd increased liability that non-
cooperation may attract. BB
Removal costs incurred by a responsible party, whether assumed
voluntarily, or in compliance with official orders, will be
offset against the limitation fund where the responsible party
has established the right to limit. 89 This rule provides some
relief to shipowners and operators and encourages the initiation
of polluter sponsored clean-up operations. On the other hand,
where a responsible party foresees no possibility of being able
to limit liability, clean-up expenditure may well be perceived
as an additional burden.
87Interviews conducted at the Marine Ecology Committee
Meeting of the American Maritime Law Association in New York
November, 1992.
88A. F. Bessemer Clark at 248.
890PA § 1004 (a), 33 USC § 2704 (a) .
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Prior to the OPA the position was that, in terms of § 1321(i) (1)
of FWPCA, no "credit" was allowed against the discharger's
limited liability fund for clean-up costs undertaken voluntarily
by the discharger. 90
13.6.2.6 The Responsible Party must comply with certain Orders
The right to limitation will be lost if the responsible party,
without sufficient cause, failed or refused to comply with an
administrative or judicial order issued under subsection (c) or
(e) of § 311 of the FWPCA (33 USC 1321), or the Intervention on
the High Seas Act (33 usc 1471 et seq.) .91 possible grounds for
not obeying such order would be where the responsible party was
unable to comply with those orders or where in the circumstances
it was not reasonable to do so i.e. where human life would be
endangered.
13.6.2.6 Conclusion
What will the position be where an agent, employee or a third
party in a contractual relationship with the responsible party
fails or refuses to report the incident, to cooperate or assist
in the clean up as instructed to do; or, without sufficient
cause, does not comply with orders given under FWPCA or the
Intervention on the High Seas Act? Will the responsible party
incur the sanction of losing the option of using the complete
defences and the possibility of limited liability? The wording
90Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing Corporation,
596 F.2d at 619, 1979 AMC at 1201-02, United States v. Dixie
Carriers, 736 F.2d 180, 183-85, 1985 AMC 815, 818-21 (5th
Cir.) In the former decision it is interesting to note the
dissenting judgement of Williams, Ct.J. He concluded at 824-26
(AMC) that the reasoning of the majority was unwise in that,
by almost doubling the discharging party's liability, the
majority decision discouraged vessel owners from cleaning up
oil spills. The dissenting judges reasoning was preferred by
the authors of OPA. See further Tanker Hygrade No.18, Inc. v.
United States, 1976 AMC 840, 526 F.2d 805 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
9l0PA § 1004 (c) (2) (C), 33 usc s 2704 (c) (2) (C) .
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of the Act would suggest not, but this question remains open to
interpretation by the courts.
Where the responsible party, and possibly his agents or employees
and those operating within a contractual relationship with that
party fall foul of the above three requirements, the right to
limitation may be denied. This may be the case even where the
actual spill occurred without the gross negligence or wilful
misconduct of the responsible party or those associated with him.
Therefore, any responsible party who does not comply with these
requirements does so at his peril.
These provisions vividly exemplify the spirit of OPA,
incorporating the threat of unlimited liability as a mechanism
to promote increased responsibility, higher operational
standards, and technological improvements within the tanker
industry. Dischargers are prompted to report the incident
timeously, to undertake reasonable clean-up measures and to
follow orders given by the appropriate authority, or run the risk
of losing access to provisions of the Act which may be invoked
to their benefit.
13.7 The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)
It is important at this point to realize that the OPA, like the
Civil Liability/Fund Convention and TOVALOP/CRISTAL compensation
arrangement, provides for a two-tiered compensation regime. The
OSLTF (the Fund) was established by § 9509 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (USC 9509).92 The size of the Fund as
amended by OPA Title IX is $1 billion. Where the responsible
party is entitled to limit his liability, then the costs and
damages which remain uncompensated can be recovered against the
Fund. The Fund may spend no more than $1 billion on anyone
incident, and no more than a total of $500 million may be spent
on compensating damage to natural resources. The guiding
920PA § 1001(11), 33 USC § 2701(11).
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principle of the OPA is that the responsible party is required
to satisfy all claims for removal costs and damages in the first
instance. Alternatively, the Fund will provide interim
compensation with the right to seek recovery from the responsible
party thereafter.
A comprehensive consideration of the OSLTF is necessary in order
to illustrate the full operation of the compensation regime
created by OPA. Furthermore, by considering the OSLTF the
similarities and differences between the V.S. Federal regime and
those encapsulated by the two-tier international Conventions and
the voluntary compensation agreements become evident. Also, the
OSLTF represents the cargo owners' portion of financial
responsibility for tanker-source oil pollution damage under the
Federal dispensation. As such it is necessary to illustrate how
OPA, through the OSLTF, insulates the actual cargo owner from
personal liability where that cargo owner's oil causes oil
pollution damage.
Because the responsible party bears primary compensation, it is
appropriate to continue the examination of the OPA as it applies
to the responsible party. A more comprehensive examination of the
provisions relating to the Fund is undertaken below.
13.8 Evidence of Financial Responsibility (§ 1016 provisions)
A requirement of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention is that
vessels trading to member states must be in possession of a
certificate of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the
liability limits of that Convention. Also, in terms of TOVALOP,
a tanker owner will be admitted as a member only once he has
satisfied the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation
(ITOPF) that his vessel(s) have sufficient insurance to meet its
potential contractual responsibility under that Agreement. The
OPA has similar requirements, which provide that financial
responsibility to meet claims (that may be imposed under the OPAl
must be maintained.
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Any vessel over 300 gt. using any place subject to ' the
jurisdiction of the United States or any vessel using the waters
of the exclusive economic zone of the U. S. to transship or
lighter oil destined for a place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States shall establish and maintain evidence of
financial responsibility. 93 The degree of financial
responsibility required must be sufficient to meet the maximum
liability limit which can be assessed against the vessel in terms
of the Act, as if the responsible party is entitled to limit his
Ld.abi.Li.ty c "
Section 1016 also provides that where a responsible party owns
or operates more than one vessel, evidence of financial
responsibility need meet the maximum limited liability applicable
only to the vessel having the greatest liability limit (i.e. the
largest vessel in the fleet). The rationale behind this rule is
that it is "unlikely" for two vessels owned or operated by the
same company to be the cause of different oil spills at the same
time. On the other hand, considering the size of certain tanker
fleets, and that certain companies have a preference for
operating at a particular terminal, the possibility of a
collision between two tankers owned by the same company can not
be discounted. 95
13.8.1 Discouraging One-ship Operations under § 1016
930PA § 1016(a), 33 USC § 2716(a), however, a non-self-
propelled vessel, (a dumb barge) that does not carry oil as
cargo or fuel is excluded from this requirement.
94Tank vessel limits are contained in OPA § 1004(a) (1) or
(d), 33 USC § 2704(a) (1) or (d), and limits for other ships in
s 1004 (a) (2) or (d), 33 USC § 2704 (a) (2) or (d).
95The collision of the 292,666 ton ULCC Atlantic Empress
and the 210,000 ton VLCC Aegean Captain resulted in the
spillage of 330,000 tons of oil. This was the largest tanker
source oil spill in history. Both ships were ostensibly owned
by Liberian companies, but the beneficial owners were Greek
interests. Coincidentally, both ships were under charter to
Mobil see Renouf 'Counting the Cost of the Tobago Collision'
Seatrade Magazine October i979 at 47.
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The above rule may also work to discourage the expected
proliferation of so called single-ship companies, in the face of
diminished prospects for limiting liability, and widened heads
of liability facilitated by OPA. 96 One-ship companies are
designed to operate with minimal assets in an attempt to exclude
claims against the larger organization in the event of a maritime
accident. Should the owners of tanker fleets choose to subdivide
fleets into numerous one-ship companies, they would then be
required to provide evidence of financial responsibility with
respect to each and every ship operating in U. S. waters. By
contrast if they operate in the normal way, they will have to
provide evidence of financial responsibility only for an amount
equal to the limitation ceiling assessable against the largest
vessel in that fleet. However, one response to the above
observation is that such operators may decide to operate only one
ship in U.S. waters. This is not, however, a viable long term
proposition for large oil companies or tanker owners.
13.8.2 Acceptable For.ms of Evidence of Financial Responsibility
In terms of the OPA, evidence of financial responsibility may
take the form of an insurance policy, a surety bond, a guarantee,
a letter of credit, qualification as a self insurer, or any other
evidence of financial responsibility. In promulgating
requirements under this section, the Secretary or the President,
may specify policy or other contractual terms, conditions, or
defences which are necessary, or which are unacceptable, in
establishing evidence of financial responsibility to effectuate
the purposes of the Act. 97 OPA provides that interested parties
may contest regulations promulgated under the Act only in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Challenges
960n the possibility of single ship companies developing
in the wake of the OPA see; Gold (1991), op cit, 438-439;
Rodriguez & Jaffe 'The Oil Pollution Act of 1990' (1990) 15
Tulane Maritime L.J. 1 at 25-27; Noyes, op cit, 55; Sullivan
'Oil firms, Shippers Seek to Circumvent Laws Setting No
Liability Limits for Spills' (26 July 1990) Wall St.J. at 1.
970PA § 1016(e), 33 USC § 2716(e).
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must be initiated within 90 days from the date on which ' the
regulations are promulgated. Because regulations promulgated in
terms of the OPA may not be challenged in a civil or criminal
enforcement action, high priority is placed on promptly resolving
such challenges. 98
The proposed rules set forth only four options for providing
evidence of financial responsibility; (a) Insurance (b) Surety
Bond (c) Guaranty99 (d) Self-Insurance. 1oo
13.8.2.1 Qualification as a Self-Insurer
The proposed rules stipulate that in order to qualify as a self-
insurer the responsible party must satisfy the following two
tests.
13.8.2.1.1 The Working Capital Test
The responsible party must be able to prove that his current
assets located in the United States, less all current
liabilities, is equal to or greater than the total applicable
amount of financial responsibility required .101
13.8.2.1.2 The "Net Worth" Test
The responsible party must also be able to prove that the amount
of all assets located in the United States, less all liabilities
980PA § 1017 (a), 33 USC § 2717 (a) .
99In the case of ordinary insurance, surety bond and a
guaranty, the insurer the surety and the guarantor must
consent to be sued directly.
looProposed 33 C. F . R. § 130.8, Federal Register, Vol. 56,
No.187, Thursday, September 26, 1991, 49,006.
101Proposed 33 C. F . R. § 130.8 (3); cited by Alcantana & Cox
'OPA 90 Certificates of Financial Responsibility' (1992)
vol.23 No.3 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 369 at 384
fn.34.
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anywhere in the world, is equal to or greater than the total
applicable amount of financial responsibility required.10:l
Therefore a self-insurer must possess assets in the United States
that may in the event of a costly spill be attached to satisfy
judgment . In addition, the responsible party's assets in the
United States are offset against his liabilities throughout the
world. This is intended to ensure that assets available to U.S.
claimants in the United States are not exhausted in meeting
competing claims established upon foreign liabilities.
The Coast Guard has stated that P&l Club cover, or other
insurance coverage will not be counted as an asset for the
purpose of self-insurance. The reasoning for this decision was
outlined in the Testimony of Rear Admiral Appelbaum, as follows:
'"
'I have recently heard of a proposal to allow the use of
protection and indemnity club membership, P&l Club
membership, or insurance as an asset for self-insurance
purposes. There are several points that I would like to
make concerning this proposal. First, as between the
insured and the insurer, insurance is subject to policy
defenses, some of which may not be explicit in the
insurance contracts Second, typically P&l Club
insurance specifically prohibits attachment or direct
action by claimants . Third, we understand that P&l
insurance normally can be cancelled without the consent of
the shipowner and without the knowledge of the Coast Guard.
Fourth, P&l insurance is typically characterized as
indemnity insurance. That means that if a vessel covered by
a P&l club has an oil spill , the insured must first pay for
the removal costs and damages out of its own pocket. Then
and only then would the shipowner have legal standing to
demand that the P&l Club pay - provided, of course, that
the club did not have the right to assert a policy defense.
l~Proposed 33 C.F.R. § 130.8(3); cited by Alcantana &
Cox, op cit, 384 fn.34.
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If we were to issue regulations permitting an insurance
policy to be counted as an asset, the insurer could avoid
direct action, thereby thwarting the requirements of OPA-
90.
[W]hile there may be some equity or value to the insured by
having the policy, that does not extend to the third party
claimant.
[M]ost of the assets that we consider in terms of
qualification for self-insurance are assets that can be
attached. ,103
Until the Secretary issues actual regulations, the position is
that regulations governing existing Coast Guard Certificates of
financial responsibility will remain in force.1~ Nowhere in the
OPA or elsewhere was any specific closing date imposed by which
these regulations have to be passed.
The P&l Clubs have refused to allow existing cover, which is
limited to US$ 500 million and, in some cases, the option of an
added US$ 200 million on the commercial markets, to serve as
evidence of financial responsibility. It is noteworthy that these
limits set by the P&l Clubs substantially exceed the levels
required by the proposed Coast Guard regulations.
13.8.3 Enforcement of Financial Responsibility
The Act provides for the enforcement of vessel financial
responsibility. In essence, no vessel for which evidence of
financial responsibility is required, will be allowed entry
clearance, or clearance to leave the United States, without
103The Impact on the Country of Proposed Rules for
Evidence of Financial Responsibility Required by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast
Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) at 6-9; cited by
Alcantana & Cox, op cit, 384 fn.35.
1040PA § 1016 (h), 33 USC § 2716 (h) .
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evidence of financial responsibility . While the OPA does ' not
specify where evidence of financial responsibility must be
maintained, it will probably be required to be maintained on
board the vessel. l05
Any vessel, which is required to maintain evidence of financial
responsibility, but fails t o do so, shall be refused
clearance. 106 If the offending vessel has already obtained such
clearance, this shall be revoked . 107 Furthermore, if upon being
requested to produce evidence of financial responsibility a
vessel does not comply with that request, the secret.ary':" may
at his discretion either detain the vessel, 109 or deny entrance
to U.S. navigable waters o r to any place in the United
States. 110 Offending vessels discovered in U.S. navigable waters
shall be seized and forfeited t o the United States. 11l
Civil penalties may also be assessed for failure to comply with
the financial responsibility requirements of § 1016. 112 After
notice and hearing, a noncomplying party may be assessed up to
$25,000 per day in violation . The President is granted the
authority to assess the civil penalty after considering 'the
nature, circumstances, extent , and gravity of the violation, the
105Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 503 fn.204 citing H.R. Rep.
No.242, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. , pt .2, at 69 (1989).
106Clearance for entry into US waters under § 4197 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States may be withheld or
revoked by the Secretary for t h e Treasury .
1070PA § 1016 (b) (1) .
10BFor the purpose of the OPA the Secretary is designated
by § 1001(33), 33 USC § 2701(33) as the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating, this is the
Secretary of the Treasury.
1090PA § 1016 (b) (2) (B), 33 USC § 2716 (b) (2) (B) .
l1°OPA § 1016 (b) (2) (A), 33 USC § 2716 (b) (2) (A) .
ll10PA § 1016 (b) (3), 33 USC § 2716 (b) (3) •
1123 3 USC § 2716.
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degree of culpability, any history of prior violation, abi1ity
to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.' Where
appropriate, the President may exercise his discretion to adjust
or modify the penalty after imposition. Where such civil penalty
has been assessed but has not been paid, the President can refer
the issue to the Attorney General for collection. 113
In addition to, or in lieu of, assessing a penalty, the President
may request the Attorney General to secure such relief as
necessary to compel compliance with § 1016, including a judicial
order terminating operations. 114
The OPA provides that the states are authorized to enforce the
requirements for evidence of financial responsibility under §
1016115 of the OPA on state navigable waters. 116
13.8.4 Claims may be brought directly against the Guarantor
A guarantor is any person, other than the responsible party, who
provides the responsible party with evidence of financial
responsibility. 117 For ocean-going tankers the guarantor is
normally the vessel's P&l Club, which furnishes the United States
Coast Guard with the FWPCA118 or other required Certificate of
Financial Responsibility (COFR).
Claimants who establish removal costs or damages under § 1002119
may assert their claims directly against the guarantor. 120 This
1130PA § 4303 (a), 33 USC s 2716a (a).
1140PA § 4303 (b), 33 USC § 2716a (b) .
11533 USC § 2716.
1160PA § 1019, 33 USC § 2719.
1170PA § 1001 (13), 33 usc § 2701 (13) .
118As laid down by CFR § 130.
11933 USC § 2702.
1200PA § 1016 (f), 33 USC § 2716 (f) .
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rule enhances opportunities for claimants to proceed against a
financially solvent defendant. Direct action against guarantors
has become a controversial issue for the P&l Clubs and marine
underwriters. These interest groups have adopted the position
that they will not provide COFR for limits above those specified
by the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and FWPCA. The P&l Clubs
have also expressed a reluctance to provide certificates of
financial responsibility required in terms of State
legislation. 121 Furthermore, P&l underwriters have expressed the
opinion that direct action against them on the basis of the
financial responsibility certificate may expose their mutual
associations to potentially unlimited liability.u2 This would
seem unfounded, as no guarantor will be held liable for damages
or removal costs exceeding the financial responsibility provided
for the vessel involved. u 3 This fear is largely associated with
COFR for U.S. state legislation . The P&l Clubs' fears are that
the COFR will be construed as being appropriate to pollution
damage caused in one state. Therefore, where pollution damage is
caused in more than one state the fund could be multiplied by the
number of states where damage was sustained. u 4
13.8.4.1 Defences available to the Guarantor
Where direct claims are brought against guarantors they may
invoke the rights and defences which would be available to the
121See, Oil Pollution Legislation in the United States
BIMCO Special Circular, No.9, 15 August 1990. See also, '
Temple, Barker & Sloane Ltd. Initial Industry Reaction to the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 report prepared for the U.S. Coast
Guard, December 5, 1990 (Cited as Temple, Barker & Sloane
Report 11).
122Gold (1991), op ci t, 437.




Guarantors may also invoke any defence contained in regulations
pertaining to the establishment and maintenance of COFR. 126 This
provision refers to the authorization of certain policy terms and
defences which may be allowed in terms of regulations passed
under § 1016 (e) .127 It was envisaged that concessions to
insurers were to be made through this channel so as to promote
the continued existence of a market for providers of financial
responsibility. 128 A notice of proposed rulemaking concerning
regulations that will implement the financial responsibility
requirements was issued by the Coast Guard. U9 Here the Coast
Guard recognized that some vessel owners may encounter difficulty
obtaining these certificates of financial responsibility once the
proposed rules come into effect. u o
The guarantor will be exempt from liability where he proves that
the incident was caused by the wilful misconduct of the
responsible party. The guarantor may not, in that case, invoke
any defense that he would otherwise be entitled to against the
responsible party.U1 These would be the usual range of defences
USOPA § 1016 (f) (I), 33 usc § 2716 (f) (I) - these defences
are dealt with more fully in the text below, the OPA provides
some relief to the responsible party where the incident is
solely caused by an act of God, an act of war or the act or
omission of a third party, on condition that the responsible
party abides with certain requirements.
U60PA § 1016 (f) (2), 33 USC § 2716 (f) (2) .
u733 USC § 2716{e).
U8H.R. Conf. Rep. No.101-653, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at
120 (1990) cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 504 fn.215.
12956 Fed. Reg. 49,006 (1991) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
Pc;rts 130, 131, 132 and 137) (proposed September 26, 1991);
clted by Donaldson 'The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction
and Response' (1993) 3 Villanova Environmental Law Journal 283
at 295 fn.71.
UOIbid. at 49009.
1310PA § 1016 (f), 33 USC § 2716 (f) .
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The
which the guarantor would incorporate in a policy of insurance
or the P&l Club Rules.
The Conference Committee limited the defenses that a guarantor
could assert 'to facilitate the prompt recovery by
claimants' .132
13.8.4.2 Concerns of Guarantors - Submission to U. S. Jurisdiction
A major part of the financial responsibility provisions is the
designation of a guarantor in the United States, subject to the
United States Jurisdiction. Claimants may have grounds for
arguing that upon the wording of § 1016(a) (1) guarantors can be
said to submit to U.S. jurisdiction. D3
13.9 Defenses to Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act
The OPA offers complete defences to liability as well as defences
to claims asserted by particular claimants. These defences to
liability are limited and narrowly construed. The practical
utility of the three complete defences is considerably diminished
because the immunity from liability applies only to the federal
government's damages and cleanup costs. Claims under state oil
pollution statutes are governed by the defenses, if any, provided
by those state laws. D4
13.9.1 Absolute Defences to Liability
A responsible party shall not be liable for removal costs, costs
D2H.R. Conf. Rep. NO.101-653, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at
119 (1990) cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 504 fn.215.
1330PA § 1016 (a) (1), 33 USC § 2716 (a) (1) provides that -
responsible party for -
(1) any vessel over 300 gross tons (except a non-
self-propelled vessel that does not carry oil as
cargo or fuel) using any place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States ...
D40PA § 1018 (c) (1), 33 USC § 2718 (c) (1) .
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incurred during threat removal operations, or damages, where the
responsible party, by a preponderance of the evidence, is able
to establish that the sole cause of the discharge, or substantial
threat thereof, was caused solely by anyone or a cornbi.na.t Lorrr"
of the complete defences available. 136 These are where the
incident leading to the damage was caused solely by (a) an act
of God, (b) an act of war, or (c ) an act or omission of a third
party. 137
13.9.1.1 Act of God
A responsible party shall escape liability under the OPA where
the incident was caused solely by an "Act of God". 138 For the
purpose of the OPA an "Act of God" means an unanticipated grave
natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which
could not have been avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight (emphasis added) . 139 It is to be expected, therefore,
that bad weather, such as seasonal hurricanes, or earthquakes in
1350PA s 1003 (a) (4), 33 USC § 2703 (a) (4) .
1360PA § 1003 (a) 33 USC § 2703 (a) .
137See, Travellers Indemnity Co. v. United States, 230 Ct.
Cl. 867, 867 (1982) (' ... the phrase caused solely by means
that an owner or operator will be excused from liability in
those situations which are completely beyond his control.').
In Travellers Indemnity Co. v. U.S. however, the court
determined that an owner of an onshore facility did not take
all reasonable precautions to prevent an act of vandalism, and
that such act did not constitute an act or omission of a third
party which would absolve the onshore facility owner of
liability. See also, Cities Service Pipe Line Co. v. United
States, 742 F.2d 626 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1380PA § 1003 (a) (1), 33 USC § 2703 (a) (1) .
1390PA § 1001 (1). In contrast under the FWPCA an "Act of
God" was defined as, 'an act occasioned by an unanticipated
grave natural disaster,' - 33 USC § 1321 (a) (12) (1988). Both
an unknown underwater object which was struck by a vessel and
the run off of melted snow were recognized to be acts of God
as de~ined by the FWPCA - Sabine Towing & Transportation Co.
v. Un~ted States, 666 F.2d 561, 564 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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o
areas where earthquakes are common, will not satisfy the act of
God.~o This traditional defence, therefore, is more likely to
favour prospective plaintiffs, and to provide relatively minor
relief to ship owners or operators.
13.9.1.2 Act of War
A responsible party shall escape liability under the OPA where
the incident was caused solely by an act of war. 141 "Act of War"
is not defined in the OPA, the CERCLA, or the FWPCA. Congress
probably envisaged a discharge caused by the destruction or
damaging of a vessel by a hostile foreign power.~;I It is
uncertain whether an act of terrorism would be included in this
defence. It must be borne in mind that this defence will be
successful only where the aggressive action is the sole cause of
the discharge.
13.9.1.3 Sole Cause Third Party Defence
A responsible party shall not be liable under the OPA where the
incident was caused solely through the act or omission of a third
party.~3 The potential application of this defence is narrow.
To be invoked successfully, the third party may not be an
employee or agent of the responsible party, or any person who has
entered into a contractual relationship with the responsible
party.144 For example, a barge owner who contracts with a tug to
14°Randle, op ci t, 10121.
1410PA s 1003 (a) (2), 33 USC s 2703 (a) (2) .
142Randle, op cit, 10121.
1430PA s 1003 (a) (3) 33 usc § 2703 (a) (3) .
144Where, however, the sole contractual arrangement arises
in connection with the transportation of oil by rail, the
contractual relationship will not bar the responsible party
from invoking the third party defence. In Atlantic Coast Line
v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S.186 (1911), the Supreme Court was
asked to determine the constitutionality of the Carmack
Amendment. By this amendment, a railroad receiving goods to be
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provide propulsive power cannot assert the third party defense
where the tug's negligence or even gross negligence was the sole
cause of the discharge. Here claimants would be able to establish
that the owner or operator or demise charterer of the barge had
a contractual relationship with the tug owner.
The utility of this defence is further curtailed in that the
responsible party must prove that he exercised due care with
respect to the oil concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of the oil and in the light of all relevant facts
and circumstances. 145 Furthermore, the responsible party must
prove that he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of the third party and the foreseeable consequences of
those acts or omissions. 146
A very high standard of diligence is demanded of the responsible
party in his dealings with third parties if he is to be able to
escape liability under the sole third party defence.
Nevertheless, although a responsible party may forfeit the "third
party defence" under the circumstances listed above, the
responsible party may still seek indemnity or contribution under
general concepts of maritime law (ie: the maritime law based on
judicial precedent) for the claims paid out under OPA. 147
13.9.1.3.1 Previous construction of the 3rd party defence
shipped over more than one rail line was held liable for
damage to the goods occurring while the goods were in the
hands of the subsequent carrier - Referred to in Portland Pipe
Line Corporation v. Environmental improvement Commission 1341,
1973 A.M.C. 1355.
1450PA § 1003 (a) (3) (A) 33 USC § 2703 (a) (3) (A) .
1460PA § 1003 (a) (3) (B), 33 USC § 2703 (a) (3) (B) .
1470PA § 1015 (a), 33 USC § 2715 (a) provides that: \Any
person, including the Fund, who pays compensation pursuant to
this Act to any claimant for removal costs or damages shall be
subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that
the claimant has under any other law.'
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The courts of the United States have held with respect to ' the
FWPCA that the third party defence is not available if the spill
results from the negligence of a compulsory pilot acting under
the general supervision of the ship's master. 148 Similarly, the
defence is not available to the owner of an oil barge if the crew
of the tug having the barge in tow caused the spill, because a
tug is an independent contractor and not a third party under the
FWPCA1U The third party defence may be available for the acts
of vandals .150
13.9.1.3.2 Third party/Responsible party
As a general rule, the owner or operator of the vessel causing
the incident is the responsible party for the purpose of the
OPA. 151 But where a responsible party is able to prove that a
discharge or the threat thereof was caused solely by the act or
omission of one or more third parties, or by their act or
omission in combination with a cause that amounts to a complete
defence, such as an act of God or an act of war, the third party
will be treated as the responsible party. 152 Under such
circumstances, the third party and not the "owner or operator"
of the tank vessel will become liable for removal costs and
damages under t .he OPA.
13.9.1.3.3 Negligence on the part of the United States excluded
Under § 311 (f) (1) (C) of the FWPCA, 'negligence on the part of the
148Burgess v , M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (1st Cir.
1977) .
149United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d
787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hollywood Marine,
Inc., 625 F.2d 524, 524 (5th Cir. 1980).
150Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 734,
736 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
1510PA § 1002 (a), 33 USC § 2702 (a) .
1520PA § 1002 (d) (1) (A), 33 USC § 2702 (d) (1) (A) .
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United States Government' was
resulted solely from that
eliminates this defence. 154
a complete defence if the discharge
cause. 153 Significantly, the OPA
This defence had considerable
the U.S. Coast Guard was responsible for
to navigation, and where other agencies were
publishing navigational charts, maintaining





13.9.1.3.4 The Responsible Party remains Liable in the First
Instance
The OPA requires a responsible party to pay all cleanup and
damage claims as a condition precedent to seeking redress from
a culpable sole cause third party. Where the responsible party
alleges one or more third party[s] were the sole cause of the
discharge, the responsible party is required to satisfy claims
in the first instance .156 Upon doing so, he may then proceed by
subrogation to recover removal costs or damages from the alleged
third party [s] or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 157 In
certain situations, as where, for example, the third party is
bankrupt, an otherwise blameless "responsible party" will bear
the burden of cleanup costs and damage claims .158 Although this
situation may seem inequitable it does force the owners of
tankers to accept responsibility for the inherently dangerous
153 3 3 USC s 1321 (f) (1) (C) (1988).
1540PA § 2002 (a) effectively eliminates the defense of
negligence on the part of the United States:
'Subsections (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section 311 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 USC 1321) shall
not apply with respect to any incident for which
liability is established under section 1002 of this Act.'
155Randle, op cit, 10122.
1560PA s 1002 (d) (1) (B) (i), 33 USC § 2702 (d) (1) (B) (1) .
1570PA s 1002 (d) (1) (B) (ii), 33 USC § 2702 (d) (1) (B) (ii) .
158Healy, Paulson & Marion 'The United States Oil
Pollution Act' (1990) September/October 27 BIMCO Bulletin 5/90
at 29.
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activity of transporting oil at sea .
13.9.1.3.5 Limitation Limits applicable to Sole Cause Third
Parties
If the sole cause of the inc ident was due to an act or omission
of a third party vessel, such vessel owner or operator is
permitted to limit liability based on the tonnage limits
applicable as if the third party vessel was the discharging
vessel . For example, where a vessel which is not a tank vessel
is the sole cause of a collision with a tank vessel and the owner
of the third party vessel maintains the right to limit, he will
be liable for removal costs and damages under the OPA up to $600
per gt. of his vessel or $500 ,000, whichever is the greater. 159
Where one tank vessel causes a discharge from another, the
applicable limit will be that for the third party tank
vessel. 160 Where the third party is not an owner or operator of
a vessel or a facility, the third party's liability is limited
to the liability limits "t ha t would have applied to the owner or
operator of the vessel or facility from which the discharge
emanated, but for the existence of the third party defense. 161
A possible example would be where an aircraft strikes a tanker
and a discharge of oil results .
13.9.2 Action which excludes all defences
A breach of any of the following three duties by the responsible
party prevents the application of the above defences. A breach
of such requirements will also result in the loss of limitation
for the responsible party, including a sole cause third party.
1590PA § 1002 (d) (2), 33 use § 2702 (d) (2) read in
conjunction with OPA § 1004(a) (2 ) , 33 use § 2704(a) (2).
160See limitation amounts above.
1610PA § 1002 (d) (2) (B), 33 use § 2702 (d) (2) (B) .
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None of these defences may be invoked if the responsible party
fails or refuses (a) to report the incident, as required by law,
where he knows or · has reason to know of the incident; 162 where
he fails or refuses (b) to provide all reasonable cooperation and
assistance requested of him by a responsible official in
connection with removal activities;U3 or the responsible party,
without sufficient cause, failed or refused (c) to comply with
an order issued under subsection (c) or (e) of § 311 of the FWPCA
(33 USC 1321), as amended by the OPA, or the Intervention on the
High Seas Act (33 USC 1471 et seq.).Uf This third element
applies to orders to comply with a National Contingency Plan and
to judicial enforcement of abatement orders designed to force a
private party to commence cleanup activities .165
1620PA s 1003 (c) (1), 33 USC s 2703 (c) (1) .
1630PA s 1003 (c) (2), 33 USC s 2703 (c) (2) .
16fOPA s 1003 (c) (3), 33 USC s 2703 (c) (3) .
1653 3 USC § 1321 (c) (1) (B) provides: \ ... the President
may - (ii) direct or monitor all Federal, State, and
private actions to remove a discharge' [emphasis added] .
Subsection 1321 (c) (2) provides:
(A) If a discharge, or a substantial threat of a
discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance from a vessel,
offshore facility, or onshore facility is of such a size
or character as to be a substantial threat to the public
health or the United States (including but not limited to
fish, shellfish, wildlife, other natural resources, and
the public and private beaches and shorelines of the
United States), the President shall direct all Federal,
State, and private actions to remove the discharge or to
mitigate or prevent the threat of the discharge [emphasis
added] .
Subsection 1321 provides:
(A) Each Federal agency, State, owner or operator, or
other person participating in efforts under this
subsection shall act in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan or as directed by the President.
(B) An owner or operator participating in efforts under
this subsection shall act in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan and the applicable response plan
required under subsection (j) of this section, or as
directed by the President.
504
13.9.3 Defences as to a Particular Claimant
Clearly situations can arise where the claimant has in some way,
by action or omission, contributed to the cause of the incident.
The OPA provides that, where the gross negligence or wilful
misconduct of a claimant has contributed to causing the incident
giving rise to the claim, the amount of liability exacted will
be reduced proportionately. 166 Therefore, if the responsible
party cannot prove that the third party claimant was guilty of
gross negligence or wilful misconduct in causing the discharge,
he is required to pay the whole of that claimant's claim even
where the claimant's ordinary negligence was a cause of the
accident.
It is possible to read ambiguity into the language of the clause
providing for an exemption of responsibility to the claimant 'to
the extent that the incident is caused by gross negligence or
wilful misconduct of the claimant' . 167 This clause is open to
Subsection 1321 (e) (1) provides:
In addition to any action taken by a State or local
government, when the President determines that there may
be an imminent and substantial threat to the public
health or welfare of the United States, including fish,
shellfish, and wildlife, public and private property,
shorelines, beaches, habitat, and other living and
nonliving natural resources .. . because of an actual or
threatened discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from
a vessel or facility in violation of subsection (b) of
this section, the President may -
(A) require the Attorney General to secure any relief
from any person, including the owner or operator of the
vessel or facility, as may be necessary to abate such
endangerment; or
(B) after notice to the affected State, take any other
action under this section, including issuing
administrative orders, that may be necessary to protect
the public health or welfare.
1660PA s 1003 (b), 33 USC § 2703 (b) .
1670PA § 1003 (b), 33 USC s 2703 (b) .
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the interpretation that, as between such claimant and a
responsible party, the apportionment should be on the basis of
pure comparative apportionment of responsibility according to
maritime law . This analysis was adopted in the paragraph
immediately above. Alternatively, the clause may be interpreted
so that the claimant's gross negligence is an absolute defence.
The latter construction, although not in keeping with general
admiralty practice, seems the easier to apply in the limited
number of cases likely to arise. Such a construction would also
operate as a sanction to a party who had contributed in a
significant manner to the cause of the incident. This hypothesis
can be settled only by the courts but it is submitted that the
former interpretation is preferable.
13.10 Damage Recoverable under the Oil Pollution Act
Besides claims for removal costs, there are six heads in terms
of which claims for pollution damagel 68 may be pursued. 169
Generally, claims will be made for removal costs, physical
damage, pure economic loss and natural resource damage. The
extent of potential liability permitted under the Act clearly
t~anscends the established boundaries of maritime tort.
13.10.1 Removal Costs
Removal costs are the costs of removal incurred after a discharge
of oil has occurred, or the costs to prevent, minimise, or
mitigate oil pollution where a substantial threat of an oil spill
had been posed. 170 The responsible party is liablel71 for all
removal costs incurred by the federal government, State
governments, or Indian tribes under subsection (c), (d), (e), or
168The definition of damage expressly includes recovery of
damage assessment costs. OPA § 1001(5), 33 use § 2701(5).
1690PA § 1002 (b) (2) (A-F) , 33 use § 2702(b) (2) (A-F).
I
1700PA § 1001(31), 33 use § 2701 (31) .
1710PA § 1002 (a) , 33 use § 2702 (a) .
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(1) of § 311 of FWPCA,172 as amended by the 1990 Act, 173 under
the Intervention on the High Seas Act, 174 or under state
law. 175 Any removal costs incurred consistent with the National
Contingency Plan are also recoverable. n 6
Is it a precondition for the recovery of removal costs that the
clean up expenses were incurred in operations consistent with the
National Contingency plan. 177
Prior to 1990 the oil industry had accepted the recoverability
of threat removal costs, thereby accepting that claims based on
pure economic loss were justifiable in certain circumstances. The
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 broadens the scope of liability through
an expanded definition of pure economic loss.
13.10.2 Claims for Damage other than by way of Removal Costs
13.10.2.1 Natural Resource Damage Claims
The first head of claim concerns natural resource damage, which
is defined to include; land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water,
ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources
belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or
otherwise controlled by the United States (including the
resources of the exclusive economic zone), any State or local
government or Indian tribe, or any foreign government. 178
1723 3 USC § 1321 (c), (d), (e), (1) (1988).
1730PA § 4201.
1743 3 USC §§ 1471-1487 (1988).
1750PA s 1002 (b) (1) (A), 33 USC § 2702 (b) (1) (A) .
1760PA § 1002 (b) (1) (B), 33 USC § 2702 (b) (1) (B) .
177Edelman, op ci t, 13.
1780PA § 1002 (b) (2) (A), 33 USC s 2702 (b) (2) (A) read with
OPA § 1001(20), 33 USC § 2701(20).
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Th~ right vested in federal and state governments to recbver
expenses incurred in the restoration and replacement of natural
resources has been recognised previously. 179 Some states had
enacted state legislation in terms of which the state was
entitled to sue as a trustee of its citizens .180 Despite the
availability of some precedent, 181 the law pertaining to pure
environmental loss and particularly the development of a precise
legal standard or norm in terms of which the quantum of damages
may be assessed is as yet unsettled.
Clarity is, however, expected to be derived from the promulgation
of regulations for the assessment of natural resource damage
caused by oil pollution. The Act provides that these regulations
will be made by the President, acting through the Under Secretary
of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and in consultation with
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and
Director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
heads of other affected agencies, not later than two years after
the date of OPA's enactment .182
These regulations will confer a significant advantage on Federal,
State and Indian trustees, in that, if a determination of natural
resource damage is made according to the regulations, that
determination will have the force and effect of a rebuttable
presumption in favour of the trustee in any administrative or
179Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA) of 1972,
costs for the replacement or restoration of natural resources
are found in s 311 (f) (4) , (5), 33 USC s 1321 (f) (4) ,(5) (1988 &
Supp. V); CERCLA § 111(i), 42 USC § 9611(i); Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 USC § 1813(b) (3) (1988); Deepwater Port
Act, 33 USC 1517(d) (1988); Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, 43 USC § 1653(a) (1) (1988).
180See Maine v , M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D.C. Me.
1973); In re Steuart Trans., 495 F. Supp. 38 (D.C. Va. 1980);
Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
181See for example Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. The S.S.
Zoe Colocotroni 628 F.Supp. 38 (D.C. Va. 1980).
1820PA § 1006 (e) (1), 33 USC § 2706 (e) (1) .
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judicial proceeding under this Act .183 It is significant that
this presumption does not however apply to a foreign trustee.
The Oil Pollution Act does provide a general indication of how
damage is to be assessed. The measure of damages shall reflect
the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring
the equivalent of, the damaged natural resources .184 It will
include, as well, the diminution in value of those natural
resources pending restoration; 185 plus the reasonable cost of
assessing those damages. 186 The standpoint taken by the authors
of the OPA was that, where possible, the definitions contained
in the Act should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
decision in Ohio v. Dep't of the Interior which permits
subjective evaluations of the intangible worth of natural
resources to be taken into account in damage assessment.1~ The
Federal U. S. Court of Appeal refused to uphold regulations
promulgated by the Department of the Interior which limited the
damage sustained to natural resources to a calculation of the use
or market value of the damaged resource. 188
It seems that potential liability under this head could be
virtually impossible for tanker owners and operators and their
insurers to predict with any accuracy for the purposes of risk
assessment and insurance.
13.10.2.2 Claims for Damage to Real or Personal Property
1830PA § 1006 (e) (2), 33 USC § 2706 (e) (2) .
1840PA § 1006 (d) (1) (A), 33 USC § 2706 (d) (1) (A) .
1850PA § 1006 (d) (1) (B), 33 USC § 2706 (d) (1) (B) .
1860PA § 1006 (d) (1) (C), 33 USC § 2706 (d) (1) (C) .
187Conference Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No.653, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess (1990), reprinted in 1990 USCCAN 779-818.
1880hio v. Dep't of the Interior 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir.
1989) .
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Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from
destruction of, real or personal property, shall be recoverable
by a claimant who owns or leases that property.189
13.10.2.3 Claims for the Loss of Subsistence Use
Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, shall
be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources
which have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to
the ownership or management of the resources. 190
13.10.2.4 Claims for the Loss of Revenue
Damages equal to the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees,
or net profit shares due to the injury, destruction, or loss of
real property, personal property, or natural resources, shall be
recoverable by the Government of the United States, a State, or
a political subdivision thereof. 191
13.10.2.5 Claims for lost Profits and Earning Capacity
Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning
capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real
property, personal property, or natural resources, shall be
recoverable by any claimant sustaining such loss. 19:1 A claimant
for these lost profits and lost earning capacity does not have
to be the owner of the damaged property or resources to recover
the lost profits of income. 193
1890PA § 1002 (b) (2) (B) , 33 USC § 2702 (b) (2) (B) .
19°OPA § 1002 (b) (2) (C) , 33 USC § 2702 (b) (2) (C) .
1910PA § 1002 (b) (2) (D) , 33 USC § 2702 (b) (2) (D) .
19:10PA § 1002 (b) (2) (E) , 33 USC § 2702 (b) (2) (E) .
193H. R. Conf. Rep. No.101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103
(1990) , cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op ci t, 500 fn.181.
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13.10.2.6 Claims for the Cost of Public Services
Damages for costs of providing increased or additional public
services during or after removal activities, including protection
from fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a discharge of
oil, shall be recoverable by a State or a political subdivision
of a State. 194
13.10.2.7 The "physical injury" rule
When interpreting the ambit of the above heads of damage one must
bear in mind that the OPA imposes liability, \notwi thstanding any
other provision or rule of law ' The Conference Committee
reports that it intended to avoid the "Physical Injury" rule
which was formulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Robbins Dry Dock lie Repair Co. v. Flint. 19s Here the defendant
dry dock company negligently damaged a ship's propeller in the
course of repairs. The plaintiff, who had chartered the vessel,
sued for loss of profits suffered because of the vessels extra
delay in the dry dock. 196 The Court held that the defendant had
caused damages only to the persons owning the ship, not to the
charterers. 197 The Court also found that, because the defendant
had no knowledge of the contract between the plaintiff and the
shipowner, the inj ury complained of was not foreseeable. 198
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, explained that the
claims did not originate from any legally protected interest
because the plaintiff charterer had neither a contract with the
defendant dry dock company nor a proprietary interest in the
1940PA § 1002 (b) (2) (F), 33 USC § 2702 (b) (2) (F) .
19s275 U.S. 303 (1927).
196Robbins Dry Dock lie Repair co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303
307 (1927). '
197Id. at 309 .
198Id. at 307-309.
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vessel. 199 Holmes' judgement further determined that the law' did
not extend so far as to impose liability beyond the claim for
property damage (physical injury) that was owed to the
shipowner. 200
In Louisiana ex rel. Guste v , M/V Testbank,201 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the
applicability of the physical injury rule to maritime tort
claims. 202 In that case, the M/V Sea Daniel collided with the
M/V Testbank in the Mississippi River outlet, resulting in a
spill of approximately twelve tons of pentachlorophenol (PCP) in
the Mississippi River and surrounding waterways. 203 The area was
temporarily closed to navigation and fishing. Several businesses
including shipping interests, marinas, boat rentals, restaurants,
tackle shops, fishers, seafood processors, suppliers, and
distributors sued to recover for economic losses that resulted
from this closure. 204 The trial court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment as to all the pure economic loss
claims except those of the commercial fishers. 205
The court of appeals barred the plaintiffs' claim for pure
economic losses in the Testbank appeal. The majority held that
199Id. 307-308.
200Id. at 309
2017 52 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied,




205L . . 1 G b
ou~s~ana ex re. uste v. Test ank, 524 F. Supp. 1170,
1174 (E.D. La. 1981). The district court noted that seamen are
favoured litigants under admiralty law, and that their
economic interests require the greatest legal protection
available. Id. at 1173 (citing Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d
178, 182 (9th Cir. 1953). In keeping with this notion the
courts have protected commercial fishers when there has been a
tortious invasion of their fishing grounds. Id. at 1173.
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the Robbins physical injury rule should extend to all maritime
tort claims because it provided a necessary, identifiable, and
predictable rule for determining a defendant's liability. 206 The
court held that, although the losses and delays from the spill
were foreseeable, the pure economic losses should be barred by
application of the physical injury rule because foreseeability
alone was insufficient to limit a defendant's liability
fairly .207
It remains to be seen whether the intent of Congress to remove
the application of the Robbins Dry Dock principle to claims under
the OPA will prevail. Given the scope of the damages imposed
under the OPA, this issue will no doubt be thoroughly litigated.
13.11 Periods of Limitation for Claims other than Claims against
the Fund
13.11.1 Damage Limitation Periods
Except with regard to matters of contribution and subrogation as
discussed below, an action for damages must be brought within
three years after the date on which the loss and the connection
of the loss with the incident are reasonably discoverable with
the exercise of due care, 208 - in the case of natural resource
damages, three years from the date of completion of the natural
resources damage assessment. 209
10.11.2 Removal Costs Limitation Periods
The action must be commenced within three years after completion
206Id. at 1029.
207Id. at 1026.
2080PA § 1017 (f) (1) (A) , 33 USC § 2717 (f) (1) (A) .
2090PA s 1017 (f) (1) (B) , 33 USC s 2717 (f) (1) (B) .
513
of the removal. 210 This could be a considerable length of time
after the incident.
13.11.3 Contribution for removal costs or damages
An action for contribution must be commenced within three years
after the date of judgment in any action for recovery of costs
or damages, 211 or three years after the date of entry of a
judicially approved settlement with respect to costs or
damages. 212
13.11.4 Subrogation
Action based on rights subrogated under the OPA by reason of
claim paYment must be commenced within three years after the date
of paymerit . 213
13.12 Uses of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
13.12.1 Introduction
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (the Fund) was established by
§ 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 214 The Fund is
generated by a five cents per barrel tax on crude oil received
at United States refineries, and on any petroleum products
entering the United States for consumption or warehousing. 215
21°OPA § 1017(f) (2), 33 USC § 2717 (f) (2) .
2110PA § 1017 (f) (3) (A) , 33 USC § 2717 (f) (3) (A) .
2120PA § 1017 (f) (3) (B) , 33 USC § 2717 (f) (3) (B) .
2130PA § 1017(f)(4), 33 USC § 2717 (f) (4) .
2142 6 USC § 9509 (Supp. 1991) .
2152 6 USCA § 4611 (a) (1) and (2) (West Supp. 1991) as
amended by the OPA, cited by Nash 'The Adequacy of the Oil
Pollution Act's Compensation Scheme in the Case of a
Catastrophic Oil Spill' (Spring 1991) 7 J. Min. L. & Pol'y 105
at 105 fn.4.
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The size of the Fund as amended by the OPA Title 9 is $1
billion. 316 The Fund may spend no more than $1 billion on any
one incident, of which no more than $500 million may be spent on
damages to natural resources.~n This section describes how, and
for what purpose, money in the Fund may be spent.
13.12.2 Purpose of the Fund
h d b d f 1 , t d' § 1012~18 fT e Fun may e use or purposes lS e an 0
OPA. 319 The Fund is available for the payment of removal costs
including the costs of monitoring removal actions determined to
be consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) by Federal
authorities or the designated state official where special
circumstances prevail. ~~o
The Fund is available for the payment of costs incurred by
natural resource trustees~~l in executing functions pursuant to
§ 1006 in connection with natural resource damage assessment and
the development and implementation of natural resource remedial
plans consistent with the NCP. ~22 However, the Fund may be
utilized for remedial natural resource measures undertaken
outside the parameters of a NCP, where the exigencies of the
situation require emergency action: (a) to avoid irreversible
loss of natural resources, or (b) to prevent or reduce any
3160PA § 9001 (c).
3170PA § 9001 (c) (2) .
~1833 USC § 2712.
319Internal Revenue Code of 1986 § 9509 (c) (1) (A) as
amended by OPA § 9001 (b).
~~oOPA § 1012 (a) (1), 33 USC § 2712 (a) (1) for a description
of ~h~se special circumstances see heading below, State
off~c~als' emergency power to obligate the Fund.
~~lSee pg. 508 of this work.
~~~OPA § 1012 (a) (2), 33 USC § 2712 (a) (2) .
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continuing danger to natural resources. 2n
Individuals residing or transacting business in the area affected
by the spill shall be given preference, to the extent possible,
in the expenditure of federal funds for the removal of oil, but
this imposes no limitation on the use of Defense Department
resources in responding to an incident. 224
The Fund may be utilized for the paYment of removal costs and
damages resulting from a discharge or threat of discharge from
a foreign offshore unit. 225 It may also be utilized for the
paYment of uncompensated removal costs (incurred in keeping with
a NCP) and uncompensated damages, where the responsible party
cannot be identified or is unable to pay, or where the liability
limits have been exceeded. 226 It may be used, further, for
paYment of federal administrative, operational, and personnel
costs and expenses reasonably necessary to implement, administer
and enforce the OPA as well as § 311 of FWPCA. 227 Expenses under
this provision, limited in each fiscal year to not more than $25
million, may be allocated to the Coast Guard for operating
expenses. 228
13.12.3 Defences of the Fund against claims
The Fund has a defence to any claim for removal costs or damages
made by a particular claimant, based on the extent that the
incident, costs, or damages were caused by the gross negligence
2230PA § 1012(j), 33 usc § 2712 (j) .
2240PA § 1012(k) , 33 USC § 2712 (k) .
22SOPA § 1012 (a) (3) , 33 USC § 2712 (a) (3) .
2260PA § 1012 (a) (4) , 33 USC § 2712 (a) (4) .
227FWPCA § 311 (b) , (c) , (d) , (j ) and (1).
2280PA § 1012 (a) (5) (A) , 33 USC § 2712 (a) (5) (A) .
516
or wilful misconduct of the claimant. 229 Again, the language is
ambiguous, and it is uncertain whether the defence is absolute
or based on comparative causation. The better interpretation is
that this provision facilitates a pro rata reduction in the
liability of the Fund. 230
13.12.4 State officials' emergency power to obligate the Fund
Use of the OSLTF by state officials will be governed by
regulations which are to be promulgated by the President. 231 The
states will be authorized to obligate the Fund, for emergency
response, in an amount not to exceed $250,000 for removal costs
consistent with the National Contingency Plan. 232 The President
is also empowered to promulgate regulations regarding how the
Fund may be obligated to pay certain costs. 233 The delay in
promulgating these regulations has hindered the Coast Guard's
ability to assess the Fund. 234
13.12.5 Limitation period for claims against the Fund
Claims against the Fund are governed by different limitation
provisions. The limitation period varies, depending on the basis
of the claim. For removal costs no claim may be brought six years
after the date of completion of all removal action. 235 Claims
for all damages, apart from natural resource damage claims, may
2290PA s 1012 (b), 33 USC § 2712 (b) .
230See pg.505 of this work for an analysis of the
application of this defence by the responsible party against
the claimant.
2310PA § 1012 (c), 33 USC § 2712 (c) .
2320PA s 1012 (d) (1), 33 USC s 2712 (d) (1) .
2330PA § 1012 (e), 33 USC § 2712 (e) .
2340utdated Rules, Lack of Authority Limits Coast Guard
Use Of Oil Spill Fund, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1058 1058-59
(1991), cited by Ruhl & Jewell, op cit, 502 fn.191.
2350PA s 1012 (h) (1), 33 USC s 2712 (h) (1) .
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not be brought three years after the date on which the injury,
and its connection with the discharge, was reasonably
discoverable in the exercise of due care. 236 Claims for natural
resource damages may not be brought after the limitation period
applicable to all other damage claims, or three years after the
completion of the natural resource damage assessment, whichever
is later. 237
The limitation provisions also prohibits duplicate paYments out
of the Fund for any removal costs or damages. 238
13.13 Claims Procedure under § 1013 - A Fund of Last Resort
Claims for removal costs o r damages are to be handled as
described in this section. The guiding principle is that the
responsible party should pay. Accordingly, claims are to be
presented first to the responsible party or guarantor of the
source of the discharge as designated under § 1014 (a). 239
Alternatively, the Fund will, at least in the interim, provide
compensation and then attempt to recover from any other
responsible party.
13.13.1 Claims against the Fund
In the following three situations, claims may be presented to the
Fund in the first instance .
Claims may be presented to the Fund in the first instance when
the U.S. President has notified claimants, in accordance with §
1014(c), that claims should be directed to the Fund. 240 This
2360PA § 1012 (h) (2), 33 USC § 2712 (h) (2) .
2380PA § 1012 (i) I 33 USC § 2712 (i) .
2390PA § 1013 (a), 33 USC § 2713 (a) .
2400PA § 1013 (b) (1) (A), 33 USC § 2713 (b) (1) (A) .
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situation will arise where the responsible party and · the
guarantor both deny a designation within five days of receiving
notification as a designated responsible party241 where (a) the
source of the discharge or threat was a public vessel, 242 or (b)
the President is unable to designate the source or sources of the
discharge or threat thereof. H3
The designation of source and advertisement is a procedure
designed to expedite the submission and handling of claims. If
the source of the spill is a vessel or a facility, the Coast
Guard will notify the responsible party and the guarantor
immediately. 244 The allegedly responsible party and his
guarantor must both deny the designation within five days or
begin advertising the designation and the procedures whereby
claims may be presented. If the designated party fails to begin
advertising, the Coast Guard will do so for not less than thirty
days.245
Claims may be presented to the Fund in the first instance when
a responsible party is in a position to assert a claim against
the Fund. 246
When a state is seeking reimbursement for removal costs incurred
by that state,24' an automatic draw is established for requests
from governmental agencies so as to circumvent the possible
2410PA § 1014 (c) (1) , 33 USC § 2714 (c) (1) .
2420PA § 1014 (c) (2) , 33 USC § 2714 (c) (2) .
2430PA s 1014(c) (3), 33 usc § 2714 (c) (3) .
2440PA § 1014 (a) , 33 USC s 2714 (a) .
2450PA § 1014(b) , 33 USC § 2714 (b) .
2460PA s 1013 (b) (1) (A) , 33 USC § 2713 (b) (1) (A) such claim
can be asserted against the Fund under the OPA § 1008, 33 USC
§ 2708.
24'OPA § 1013 (b) (1) (C) , 33 USC § 2713 (b) (1) (C) .
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adversarial claims procedure. :l48
Claims may be presented to the Fund in the first instance when
a United States claimant is pursuing damages caused by a foreign
offshore unit for which the Fund is liable under 1012 (a) (3) .249
13.13.2 Procedure after presentation of claim to Responsible
Party
If a claim is presented to the responsible party or his guarantor
and he denies liability for the claim, or the claim is not
settled within 90 days of presentation or advertisement in terms
of § 1014 (b), whichever is later, the claimant may initiate suit
against the responsible party or his guarantor. Alternatively he
may present the claim to the Fund. 250 Where the claimant
proceeds against the Fund, the Fund may not approve or certify
any claim during the pendency of a lawsuit to recover costs which
are the subj ect of the same claim. 251
If a claim is presented ·t o the responsible party, but full and
adequate compensation is unavailable, a claim for the
uncompensated damage and removal costs may be presented to the
Fund. 252 These provisions illustrate how the Fund is intended to
operate as a secondary source of coverage, should a responsible
party be unable to satisfy claims asserted against it under the
Act.
13.13.3 The Fund has the Right of Recourse Action
248S. Rep. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in
1990 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 722, 731 cited by McKaig,
op cit, 1619 at fn.318.
2490PA § 1013 (b) (1) (D), 33 USC § 2713 (b) (1) (D) .
2500PA § 1013 (c), 33 USC s 2713 (c) .
2510PA § 1013 (b) (2), 3~ USC § 2713 (b) (2) .
2520PA § 1013 (d), 33 USC § 2713 (d) .
520
If the Fund pays the Claim, the Fund is subrogated to t hat;
claim. 353 The Attorney General (the Department of Justice) will
initiate suit on behalf of the Fund to recover compensation it
has paid. In such actions, the Fund may recover its
administrative costs, interest (including prejudgment interest) ,
costs of court and attorney's fees. The suit may be initiated
against any responsible party or guarantor or any other person
who is liable pursuant to any law. 354
13.13.4 Fund Regulations
The President is obliged to promulgate, and he may from time to
time amend, regulations for the presentation, filing, processing,
settlement and adjudication, and settlement of claims under the
OPA against the Fund. 355
13.13.5 No pro rata reduction of claims
Where the Fund has insufficient money to satisfy all valid
claims, the order of filing determines which are to be paid. 356
Accordingly all valid claims are paid in full in the order that
they are filed and there is no pro rata reduction of all valid
claims. This provision makes prompt filing of claims
imperative. 357
13.14 Litigation, Jurisdiction and Venue
Apart from the review of regulations promulgated under the OPA
3530PA s 1015 (a) , 33 USC § 2715 (a) .
3540PA § 1015(b) , 33 USC § 2715 (b) .
3550PA § 1013 (e) , 33 USC § 2713 (e) .
356Internal Revenue Code § 9509 (e) (3) cited by Randle, op
ci t, 10127 fn.65.
357Randle op cit, 10127-10128.,
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and state court jurisdiction, 258 the United States district
courts have original jurisdiction over all controversies arising
under the OPA without regard to citizenship of the parties or the
amount of the controversy. The proper venue in which claims shall
be heard is generally that of the district in which the discharge
or injury or damage occurred or in which the defendant resides,
may be found, or has its principal office, or has appointed an
agent for service of process. For the purposes of venue the Fund
resides in the District of Columbia. 259
13.15 Conclusions
Upon consideration of the OPA liability provisions it becomes
clear that, at least in theory, the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions, even as revised by the 1984 Protocols, could not
have provided the same degree of control or compensation. The
limits of liability in the OPA are greater, there is a broader
range of responsible parties, fewer opportunities for the
responsible party to limit liability and a broader variety of
damage recoverable. Furthermore there is the added protection of
the billion dollar Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and the
existence of State legislation.
In reaction to the above observations it must be said that
certain advantages would have accrued to the international
community and the U. S. had that State ratified the 1984 Protocols
and thereby brought the revised conventions into force. These
advantages were identified by the Director of the IOPC Fund in
1989 in 'A Note Promoting United States' Ratification of the 1984
Protocols', and appear below, as summarized by S.T. Smith:
'First, participation by the United States would ensure
that insurance certificates are internationally recognized.
2580PA § 1017 (c), 33 usc § 2717 (c) State trial courts of
competent jurisdiction over claims for removal costs and/or
damages may consider claims under OPA or state law.
2590PA s 1017 (b), 33 USC s 2717 (b) .
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Second, the financial burden of cleaning up after a major
oil spill would not be met exclusively by the oil companies
and taxpayers of one country, but would be shared among the
oil industry and consumers globally. Third, international
participation in the 1984 Protocols would encourage and
provide a means for protecting the marine environment of
developing countries. Fourth, United States participation
in the 1984 Protocols would enable it to influence the
development of international law by examining compensation
claims under the CLC and the 1984 Fund. Fifth, victims of
oil spill pollution would be ensured compensation for
damages suffered without having to resort to costly and
time consuming litigation.' 260
The advent of OPA and the continued application of U.S. State law
to oil pollution liability is a fait accompli and the result is
in general preferable in spite of the arguments quoted above.
However, one of the main faults of OPA is that it neglected to
expressly include the cargo owner as a responsible party. This
fault has been remedied by certain progressive State legislation.
26°Director of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund, A Note Promoting United States'
Ra~ification of ~he 1984 Pr~tocols 3 (Feb. 22, 1989) cited by
Sm1th 'An Analys1s of the 011 Pollution Act of 1990 and the
1984 Protocols on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage'
(1990) 14 Houston J. Int'l Law 115 at 144-145.
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CHAPTER 14
U.S. State legislation and direct cargo owner
liability for Oil Pollution
14.1 Introduction
The analysis of all applicable U. S. State tanker-source oil
pollution liability legislation is beyond the scope of this work.
It may even be questioned whether to do so would be appropriate
in terms of the largely "international" focus of this study.
Therefore, in this Chapter, an attempt will not be made to
reproduce in respect of applicable U.S. State legislation the
same degree of detailed analysis which has been undertaken within
the context of the international Conventions, the voluntary
agreements and the OPA. Instead, only a succinct description of
important provisions is undertaken. The focus in this analysis
is on the liability provisions of U.S. state legislation where
these provisions depict the emergence of a new policy governing
tanker-source oil pollution liability. Accordingly, the relevant
areas of enqUiry are the provisions of U.S. State legislation
which determine which parties will be exposed to liability, the
scope of damage recoverable and the test upon which such
liability is founded. In this Chapter the evaluative analysis of
the economic consequences of certain state legislation is
emphasised above the exposition of the actual provisions of all
U.S. State liability legislation.
This conceptually important Chapter will be structured in the
following manner. Firstly, the relevant provisions of U.S. State
legislation will be identified . Then an attempt can be made to
explain how the direct cargo-owner liability provisions provided
for in certain U.S. State legislation may exert a significant
remedial influence upon the quality of tankers used to transport
oil at sea. An attempt will also be made to assess whether or not
it is desirable that direct cargo-owner liability provisions be
implemented at the level of U.S. Federal law and in the
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international Conventions.
41.2 Important liability provisions in U.S. State Legislation
Including the Great Lakes there are no fewer than 32 coastal
states, and consequently diverse liability rules apply.
Several states expressly impose liability on cargo owners. The
most notable among them is Cal ifornia. California imposes strict,
unlimited liability upon the owner, operator, lessee or charterer
by demise of any vessel or marine facility or person accepting
responsibility for the vesse l or marine facility; owner or
transporter of discharged oil. 1 Clearly, the owner of the cargo
may become independently liable . Furthermore, the criteria of
admissible damages includes economic loss and injury to natural
r eaoui-cee ."
Subject to certain defences , Oregon imposes strict liability for
clean-up and removal costs and all damages to persons and
property upon 'any person owning or having control over any oil
or hazardous material spilled or released or threatening to spill
or release.' 3
Washington's Water Pollution Control Act4 imposes strict
unlimited liability upon 'any person owning oil or having control
over oil that enters the waters of that state .'s Damages include
injury to natural resources .'
lCal. Gov't Code § 8670 .25
2Cal. Gov't Code § 8670.65 .5; see Thaddeus Miller &
Braunreuther 3 Benedict on Admiralty 7th ed. Chapter 9 'Marine
Oil Pollution' 1992 Revision § 113 at 9-52.
30r . Rev. Stat. § 468.790.
4Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90 .48.037 et seq.
sWash. Rev. Code Ann. § 90 .48.336.
'Thaddeus Miller & Braunreuther, op cit, 9-62.
525
Alaska's oil pollution law' imposes unlimited strict liability
for clean-up and removal expenses, all damages including loss of
income or economic benefit, and natural resource damages upon the
owners and operators of vessels and the owner of the oil cargo
at time of loading, if loading occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state or facility adjacent to the state. 8
The liability provisions of the Hawaiian Environmental Emergency
Response Act9 impose strict unlimited liability upon the owner
of the oil who has arranged for its transportation and upon any
person who has accepted the pol lutant for transport. 10
On the East Atlantic Coast of the United States, Maryland's Water
Pollution Control and Abatement Act imposes unlimited strict
liability upon the vessel owner or operator and owner of the
discharged oil. ll
North Carolina's Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances Control
Act12 provides strict unlimited liability for cargo owners,
operators, demise charterers and lessees of vessels causing oil
po l IutLon.."
In effect the legislators of the above U.S. States have adopted
the approach advanced in this work. Such approach is an
improvement on the provisions of OPA which in the majority of
circumstances allow cargo owners to escape any form of direct
liability. It is submitted that the OPA approach is ineffective
'Alaska Stat. § 46.03.011, et seq.
8Thaddeus Miller & Braunreuther, op cit, 9-50.
9Haw. Rev. Stat. § 128D-6 .
l°Thaddeus Miller & Braunreuther, op cit, 9-54.
llMd. Envt. Code §§ 4-401 , 4-410. cited by Thaddeus Miller
& Braunreuther, op cit, 9 -55.
uN.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-215 .83, 143-215 .94Q.
uThaddeus Miller & Braunreuther, op ci t, 9-58.
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as a tool to force cargo owners to make secure the process
whereby oil is transported by sea.
Furthermore, many states hold 'any person who causes' a spill
liable. For example, the Alabama Water Pollution Control Act14
imposes unlimited liability upon any person who negligently,
directly or indirectly, discharges oil into state waters.
Compensatory damages extend to the replenishment of wildlife. 1s
Civil penalties include punitive damages if pollution results
from wilful/wanton conduct (not merely a negligent act or
omission) .16 These open-ended provisions could make the cargo
owner directly liable.
It may be predicted that there will be a progressive tendency
amongst U. S. state legislators to impose clear, strict and
unlimited liability on the owners of oil cargoes carried by
tankers. This, in keeping with the argument to be proposed in
this Chapter, may serve to improve the quality of the tanker
industry and protect the environment. Such development is also
sound on equitable grounds as it takes the "polluter pays"
principle to its logical conclusion.
14.3 The possible effects of direct cargo-owner liability
14.3.1 Introduction
Now that a legal precedent for direct cargo-owner liability has
been established in certain U.S. State legislation it is now
appropriate to evaluate the possible effect that the existence
of direct liability for cargo-owners may have on the tanker and
oil industry. An attempt will also be made to predict the
14Ala. Code § 22-22-9.
lSThaddeus Miller & Braunreuther, op cit, 9-50.
l60ther states which have similar "any person" provisions
are Connecticut, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, South Carolina and Virginia - see generally Thaddeus
Miller & Braunreuther, op cit, § 113.
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possible impact that the wider acceptance of this policy may have
upon those industries. This analysis will begin by identifying
the underlying cause of tanker-source oil pollution. It is
necessary to do this in order to further the argument which will
unfold in the remainder of this Chapter.
14.3.2 Identifying the problem
Before one attempts to find a solution to any particular problem
it is necessary to identify the cause of the problem to be
solved. What then is the precise cause of tanker-source oil
pollution? The cause is often said to be the poor quality of
tankers and continued operation of such vessels. It is the view
of the present writer that this state of affairs, like the
resulting oil pollution which often ensues, is not the problem
but a symptom of a more fundamental problem - the lack of capital
available to the tanker industry to improve the standards of its
vessels. The most accurate and persuasive explanations of the
problems posed to the tanker industry are to be found in the
statements of commentators within that industry. For this reason
such commentators are quoted at some length where their
observations substantiate the statement of policy advanced in
this Chapter.
At the 1991 International Bar Association Business Law conference
in Hong Kong, Phillippe Bisson, legal advisor to Bureau Veritas
(a leading ship classification society) isolated two factors
which have impacted on the working environment of the maritime
world over the last fifteen years .
\ - The economic crisis in shipping which has intensified
competition among shipowners, forcing them to use older
ships, and cut operating costs to the bone. Any effects on
maintenance and servicing are obviously to the detriment of
safety at sea.
- A greater awareness of marine conservation issues which
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has arisen from a series of major ecological disasters,
such as oil spills. At present, a typical reaction is to
. t ,~seek compensatlon at any cos .
Director of theIt would seem that Tormod Rafgard the Managing
International Association of Independent




'The problem is simply that what has been acceptable in the
past to the public, to the politicians, to the media, is no
longer acceptable. Polluted sea birds seem to attract far
more media attention than incidents where human lives are
at risk or lost. An air crash seems less spectacular than
a polluted beach.
In addition, there has been a tanker market depression for
15 years, in which the cheapest rust bucket has been the
rate setter.'u
In this regard an observation made in 1983 by David Abecassis,
who is widely regarded as the world's foremost commentator on oil
pollution issues, including the question of liability, is
relevant:
'If you want to clean up the seas, it is better to turn
your mind first how to provide the funds which are needed
to maintain and raise standards of ship management, and
second to then enforcing the legislative standards on
prevention already in existence. But how to do that is, of
17Boisson on 'The Liability of Classification Societies in
the Marine Industry Context' in J. Lux (ed) Classification
Societies (Lloyd's of London Press 1993) pp 1-26 at 1.
18Rafgard 'A year in the life of the OPA' in Leading
Developments in Ship Management Lloyd's of London Press Ltd
(1992) pp 17-28 at 20.
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course, another subject. ,19 (emphasis that of the pre'sent;
writer)
Regrettably, after having succinctly identified the problem the
commentator failed to suggest any answers as to how this funding
should achieved or where it would be derived. 20 Further,
although the lack of funding in the tanker industry has been
noted, especially in various industry publications, no
commentator has suggested a clear and unambiguous remedy.
It would seem, however, that at least two commentators within
industry: Roger Vielvoye, the International Editor for Oil & Gas
Journal and Tormod Rafgard, the Managing Director of the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko), have, identified the under-capitalization of the
tanker industry as the root cause of oil pollution; two: also
determined why this under-capitalization occurred and; three:
implicitly, suggest the possibility of placing liability upon the
cargo owner as a means of rectifying the problem of under-
capitalization.
Both these commentators' statements on this issue, although
important, are brief, unspecific, ambiguous, contradictory and
vague. This is perhaps to be expected considering the direct
links that these commentators have to both the tanker and oil
industries and the considerable vested interests which may be
affected in the course of a forthright policy debate.
14.3.3 Origins of the depressed tanker-market
Due to a high demand for oil in the United States, Western Europe
19Abecassis 'IMO and Liability for Oil Pollution from
Ships: A Retrospective' [1983] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial
LQ 45 at 59.
2°In a subsequent work by Abecassis & Jarashow et al Oil
Pollution from Ships: International, United Kingdom and United
States Law and Practice 2nd ed. (1985) no solution to the
under capitalization of the tanker industry is suggested.
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and Japan during the mid-1970's there was an increased demand for
oil tankers. On the assumption that the world's future demand for
oil would further increase, an unprecedented tanker building boom
took place during 1974-1977. However, this investment optimism
proved premature. The increased global demand for oil did not
materialize and as a result of energy conservation policies, and
an increase in the price of oil, the world's demand for oil in
fact declined. There followed a marked slump in both new
construction and retirement of older tankers. Investors have been
reluctant to build new tankers because of unprofitability in the
crude oil tanker market. Consequently, the tankers built during
this building boom are still transporting most of the world's
crude oil.
As an excess capacity of tanker tonnage sought limited cargoes;
profitability in the tanker sector of the shipping market
declined. Recently this phenomenon has become particularly
marked, with low profits, and even losses, in some years,
experienced by tanker owners. In short, the crude oil tanker
market has become increasingly over-traded. Low freight rates and
intense competition have forced tanker owners to reduce
maintenance and switch to low cost crews to remain competitive.
Owners of higher-quality ships have lost the protection of long
term contracts, which were a feature of the tanker market in the
60's and 70's, and are forced to compete with low quality
tonnage.
Not only does the availability of old, low-cost tonnage reduce
tanker freight rates and maintain those rates at a depressed
level, but other tankers have to reduce operation costs to remain
competitive. This creates a vicious, downward spiral of low
quality tonnage. The standards of the lowest quality tonnage must
not be permitted to continue dictating the standard of the entire
tanker industry. The problem, basically, is how to render poor
ships more costly to use than good ships.
It is the view of the present writer that the laws governing the
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liability for tanker-source oil pollution can be harnessed to
rectify these harmful consequences of the economic depression in
the tanker industry.
14.3.4 Dynamics of an undercapitalized tanker-fleet
It is fitting to introduce this inquiry with another statement
made by Rafgard, Managing Director of INTERTANKO:
'The ship chartering market is probably as close as you can
come to a perfectly competitive market, with a worldwide
daily open auction to match and fix ships and cargoes on
various types of charters. The invisible hand of Adam
Smith21 is constantly at work to ensure an effective
utilisation of tankers and the cheapest freight rates under
the law of supply and demand.' 22
Rafgard, further noted that 'there has been a tanker market
depression for 15 years, in which the cheapest rust bucket has
been the rate setter.' 23 .
The late Sir Roderick MacLeod, formerly Chairman of Lloyd's
Register, observed that:
'World shipping is very largely a free market. The more
free the market, the more difficult it is to enforce
standards which to a considerable extent requires
compelling people to do what they don't want to do.'24
21Adam Smith an early, pioneering economist who is widely
recognized as the champion of unbridled capitalism. (footnote
inserted by the present writer)
22Rafgard, op ci t, 20.
23Rafgard, op ci t, 21.
24 'Forward' in J. Lux (ed) Classification Societies
(Lloyd's of London Press 1993) at v.
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In June 1993 Norwegian Minister
Berntsen, articulated the problem
did not propose a solution:
for Environment, Thorbj0rn
in the following manner, but
'Unfortunately, shipowners in some countries do well from
operating old tonnage which has been fully amortised or
bought on the cheap. This advantage must somehow be
eliminated. We can't let these owners decide the level of
shipping safety. ,25 (emphasis that of the present writer)
An article by Derek Bamber echoes the concern of Minister
Berntsen and also elaborates upon the nature of the problem
raised by the Minister. In August 1992, Bamber reported that:
'The prospects for a recovery in rates are receding.
Fearnley's Hammer comments that, at the present time, "the
tanker market is flooded with tonnage of every stripe at
low rates." No relief is in sight, unless the EC26 and
Japan enact legislation making it difficult, or penal ty
expensive, for sub-standard vessels to continue
operating.'27 (emphasis that of the present writer)
The reader may note that Bamber does not specifically state what
he means by 'penalty expensive' nor who should be forced to face
such penalties. It would seem that he is advocating some type of
punitive "command and control" mechanism. However, in the same
article he writes:
'Jarle Hammer director of the Fearn-research division of
Fearnleys,an Oslo-based ship broker and consultancy, says:
"As long as stubborn market optimists, with sweet memories
25Halvorsen & Berge 'Norway Tightens Green Controls' June
(1993) STATOIL 14-15 at 14.
26European Economic Community (footnote inserted by the
present writer) .
27Bamber 'Rust Buckets Must Go ' August 1992 Petroleum
Economist 12-14 at 14.
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of the early 1970's refuse to adapt to reality and dispose
of their rust buckets, the market will not improve. I
believe we can only see a healthy tanker market when more
realistic creditors, quality-concerned cargo owners,
insurers and authorities, together with scrap-hungry
steelmakers in the Far East, succeed in bringing about
scrappings at a much higher level and thus contribute to
the necessary renewal of the tanker fleet.' 28 (emphasis
that of the present writer)
In January 1993, expanding upon the critically important question
of 'quality concerned cargo owners', David Knott reports Andreas
Ugland, Chairman of INTERTANKO, as voicing the following concern:
'He also said charterers should stop hiring substandard
ships and start paying rates that justify the best
maintenance and investment in new ships. "A shipowner is
responsible to maintain and operate his ships at high
standards," said Ugland, "but he must be given the means to
do so."' 29
Prior to the statement above, there is evidence that the oil
industry had, at least in principle, recognized the nature of
this problem and realized the pivotal role that they would have
to assume if a remedy was to be found. In an interview with Ian
A. McGrath, Managing Director of Shell International Marine,
Roger Vielvoye reported in June 1991 that:
McGrath said Shell conceded that in the past freight
rates had been too low to maintain or renew the tanker
fleet and had been driven down by the large surplus of
tonnage throughout most of the 1980's. This situation could
not continue, he said. Higher quali ty vessels demanded
28Bamber (1992), op cit 12.
29Knott 'Sealife safety could hike oil price' Jan. 18,
1993 Oil & Gas Journal 27.
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higher freight rates. 3D Shell companies accepted that this
change must be made and were prepared to pay higher
prices, 31 provided that they did so in a competitive
environment. Shell companies wanted a level playing field
where high standards applied to all.' 32 (emphasis and
footnotes provided by the present writer)
In August 1992, fifteen months after the above statement had been
made, Bamber made the following observation:
'The availability of low-cost tonnage that is aggressively
marketed not only forces down rates, but keeps them down
because of the surplus capacity that the oldest tonnage
represents. The apparent development of a two-tier market
was stopped in its tracks, despite charterers' claims that
they were prepared to pay a premium for quality, modern
vessels. When it came to the crunch, the charterers were as
aggressive as the owners of low-cost vessels in forcing
down prices; none of them wanted to be seen paying more
than their peers · and competi tors for a charter. ,33
(emphasis that of the present writer)
In a similar vein, in two separate public statements, Rafgard
expresses the following harsh but, it is submitted, justifiable
criticisms of the oil industry:
the main problem for quality-tanker owners is that
there is no premium paid in the spot market for quality
tonnage. Major oil companies go public in the media and
3DThis echoes Hammer's concern for 'quality-concerned
cargo owners' see pg.534 of this work.
31In other words, the development of a two tier freight
market with high freight rates for high-quality tonnage and
low freight rates for low-quality tonnage.
32Vielvoye 'World tanker industry maintains momentum from
Persian Gulf War' June 10, 1991 Oil & Gas Journal 12 at 13-14.
33Bamber (1992), op ci t 13.
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claim that they prefer first-class tankers, but this is
really window-dressing when the sad fact remains that in
the spot market it is the cheapest rustbucket which is the
market leader and sets the rate.,34
'The chartering divisions within the oil industry have not
been up to par or in line with the declared policies of the
oil majors to support environmental policies.'35
It is submitted that the international community can not depend
on the oil industry to, in the words of Shell's Managing
Director, Ian A. McGrath, 'level the playing field' .36 It seems
that the "invisible hand of Adam Smith,,37 continues to exert an
overwhelming influence on the oil companies that charter
tankers. 38 The continued presence of sub-standard tankers on the
international tanker market, which prevents a necessary and
desired increase in freight rates (and thereby starves the tanker
industry of new capital) will continue to exist until an
effective way is found to force oil company charterers to look
beyond the short-term dictates of the free market. Oil companies
must be induced to adopt chartering strategies which consider
tanker quality above the short-term "bottom line". The
international community will be required to force this change in
policy upon the oil industry as a whole.
If we consider once again the statement of Minister Berntsen, the
Norwegian Minister of the Environment where he said' [w]e can't
34Rafgard quoted by Bamber 'Never Up For Long' August 1991
Petroleum Economist 15-16 at 16 .
35Rafgard, op ci t, 20.
36See pg.535 of this work.
37See pg. 532 of this work.
38In November 1993 a reliable and well informed London
source within the oil and tanker industry confirmed that a
two-tier freight market had not yet developed. This source
was, however, hopeful that such a market would develop.
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let these [ship] owners decide the level of shipping safety'39 it
would seem that he had misplaced the emphasis. The owners of poor
quality tonnage are permitted to survive on the international
market only because under short-term market forces the oil
companies continue to charter poor quality tankers rather than
higher quality tonnage.
By the same token, where Minister Berntsen suggests trying to
eliminate the advantage conferred upon the owners of sub-standard
tonnage, he once again misses the mark. The real "profiteers" of
low-quality surplus tonnage are the oil company charterers of
low-quality tonnage and, ultimately, the heavy consumers of
petroleum who, so far, have avoided paying the true costs of the
product. The correct inquiry is to ask how the advantage to the
oil companies in using low-quality tonnage can be removed.
14.3.5 Possible remedies for tanker-source oil pollution
Before one can determine which solution is best suited to solve
a given problem one must first consider all the possible remedies
which may be employed. In this context a \solution' can be
defined as a course of action which will correct the
circumstances giving rise to, or exacerbating, the problem. There
are two broad approaches to the prevention of tanker-source oil
pollution.
14.3.5.1 "Command and control"
As the name implies, the "command and control" methodology
involves two inter-connected types of action. "Command" focuses
on direct prevention by setting standards for vessel design,
construction, navigation, crew training and crew certification.
"Control" attempts to implement and enforce those standards
through ship inspections and various penalties. Such penalties
may include fines or the refusal to allow vessels of
39See pg. 533 of this work .
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unsatisfactory standards permission to enter territorial seas,
offshore installations or ports. Over the next three pages this
approach is discussed.
The multi -national oil industry, including the international
tanker fleet, has in comparison to most other commercial
enterprises been allowed a large degree of autonomy from
governmental interference. For instance, the extent of
governmental regulation and control over the aviation industry
is considerably more pervasive than that imposed upon the oil and
tanker industry. It seems that the scale of operations undertaken
by the oil industry and the tanker transportation system makes
it necessary that the industry be permitted a large degree of
self regulation. By way of an isolated illustration, the task of
inspecting an average VLCC for corrosion involves repeatedly
climbing vertical surfaces amounting in total to more than 10,000
metres. To place this task in perspective, this is roughly the
equivalent to climbing Mount Everest. Further, it is not unusual
in the case of an average VLCC for corrosion surveys to entail
the examination of 1,200 kilometres of welding. 40
Notwithstanding the development of innovative technologies to
assist this process, corrosion surveys require considerable
resources. u
A question which is crucial to the resolution of marine oil
pollution is whether or not the oil industry can be trusted to
regulate its tanker operations in a way which protects the
maritime and coastal environment. Considering the continued
incidence of oil pollution from tankers it could be said that,
so far, they have failed to do so effectively. The penalty for
such failure is increased governmental control and by implication
less autonomy and flexibility for the oil industry. The only way
in which the industry can regain this autonomy is by providing
40Cross & Hamer 'How to seal a supertanker' New Scientist
14 March 1992 40 at 43.
4l'The Energy Carr;ers' L1 d' R .~ oy s eg~ster lOOAl April 1986
13 at 14.
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ideal, which, has not been
possible to achieve in the
the practical realities of
fleet and the magnitude and
real proof that they can in fact be entrusted with the
responsibility of protecting the environment. This is the
challenge that is posed to the oil and other industries as the
world enters a period of greater environmental awareness.
Whatever form of governmental control is brought to bear on the
oil industry (to enhance the quality of the tanker transport
system) it should be aimed at preventing oil spills from
occurring. It is inefficient for governments to pursue only
measures which demand expensive and sometimes questionable clean-
up operations, so as to placate public indignation, while
insufficient measures are taken to ensure that oil spills do not
occur in the first place. Measures taken by governments will be
most effective where they provide disincentives to operate in a
particular, risky way. One of the most telling disincentives to
operate or utilize a sub-quality tanker will be if there exists
a potential for prohibitive liability where that tanker causes
oil pollution.
Tanker-source oil pollution is not a new problem and, although
extensive and adequate laws governing the standards of tankers
have been in effect for a considerable period of time, such laws
have not, as yet, been satisfactorily enforced in any State - not
even the United States. It is submitted that the "command and
control" methodology represents an
brought about and probably is not
short, and medium, terms given
policing the international tanker
cost of this task.
The authorities responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of standards often lack the will or resources to
enforce these standards. Commenting on the implementation and
enforcement of tanker safety standards, Suzanne Hawkes and R.
Michael M'Gonigle observe that' ... the level of political will
and commitment of resources to put new laws into practice
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ultimately determines that law's actual effectiveness. ,42 In the
same vein John B. Hutchinson, formerly Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's
Register, voices the following concern:
'It is disturbing to note that, despite the increase in
importance of public and political opinion in the safety
equation, the political will to maintain standards seems,
in world terms, to be getting weaker rather than
stronger. ,43
The "command and control" methodologies have not in fact
succeeded in solving the problem of tanker source oil pollution.
For these reasons it is the view of the present writer that
attempts by governments to "police" the international tanker
fleet will not bring about the desired capitalization of the
tanker fleet. Even if the implementation and enforcement of
tanker standards were possible, one might ask whether it is the
duty of governments to continuously and vigilantly supervise the
details of the transportation of oil at sea. Rather perhaps, it
is the responsibility of the industry which benefits from the
transportation of oil at sea, in a presently inexpensive but
flawed system, to ensure that the standards of tankers are
improved. The oil industry and, in turn, ultimately the consumers
of oil, must bear the expense necessary to bring this improvement
about. It is submitted that the oil companies are not, on their
own, likely to ensure that the necessary changes are brought into
fruition. Therefore, a way must be found whereby that industry
is forced to accept this responsibility. This approach is
discussed next.
428 Hawkes & M'Gonigle 'A black (and rising?) tide:
controlling maritime oil pollution in Canada' vol.30 no.1
(1992) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 165 at 181; for a discussion
of the many difficulties working against the effective
enforcement of "command and control" standards see pp 209-222.
43Hutchison on 'Practical and Political Considerations' in
J. Lux (ed) Classification Societies (Lloyd's of London Press
1993) pp 27-35 at 34.
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14.3.5.2 "Liability-forcing"
The second and separate methodology, which falls within the realm
of private law, focuses on liability and compensation where
tanker-source oil pollution damage occurs . This area is the
particular concern of the present work.
The phrase "liability-forcing" has been explained by Professor
David E. Pierce who defines the concept as follows:
'Liability-forcing refers to regulatory programmes that
require designated "responsible parties" to fix the
environmental problems which they have, in part, created.
Since "fixing" an environmental problem is usually a
difficult and expensive proposition, potential liability as
a "responsible party" should encourage industry to avoid,
eliminate, or minimize such environmental risks. ,44
The important potential role that liability can play in the
control of tanker-source oil pollution is frequently overlooked
and is mostly perceived as a remedy to be utilized in only those
instances where the "command and control" methodologies have
failed.
14.3.6 A new policy approach
Given the risk of damage which can be caused where a cargo of
tanker oil is spilled, it will be argued that insufficient
capital is being invested in the tanker-transport system to
prevent such accidents from happening. Legal mechanisms must
evolve which have the effect of pushing and steering the entire
44Pierce 'The Emerging Role of "Liability-Forcing" in
Environmental Protection' (1991) 30 Washburn Law Journal 381
at 382. Although Professor Pierce discusses the application of
"liability-forcing" within the context of U.S. Federal law
regulating tanker-source oil pollution damage he does not
isolate the cause of such oil pollution. Neither does that
learned commentator propose the adoption of the policy
suggested by the present writer in this work.
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tanker-transportation industry and the users of that industry
(i.e. cargo owners) in directions which safeguard the affected
environment. In other words directions which ensure that greater
capital investment is injected into the industry.
Oil pollution liability can be managed either to preserve the
status quo or as a dynamic mechanism to bring about change. The
present writer suggests that the eradication of low quality
tonnage from the tanker market can be achieved by levelling
unlimited, strict, joint and severable liability for tanker-
source oil pollution damage on the cargo owner as well as the
shipowner. As has been illustrated in the earlier part of this
Chapter this is presently the legal position in the following
U.8. states; Alaska, California, Hawaii, Maryland, North
Carolina, Oregon and Washington. It is submitted that where this
approach is followed, cargo owners will charter only quality
tonnage. This chartering practice will force low quality tankers
out of the tanker-market. As the capacity of available tanker-
tonnage decreases so freight rates will increase. In this way,
capital will be injected into what is at present a dangerously
under-capitalized tanker industry and the quality of tankers and
crews will rapidly improve.
14.3.6.1 Law can promote a desired evolution of the system
When oil pollution accidents occur, costs are often incurred by
third parties in the course of clean-up operations and direct and
consequential damage is caused to people in the vicinity of the
spill. Compensation is, or more accurately, may be, sought from
the parties judged responsible for these losses, and the law
determines who is liable and assesses the scale of compensation
to be exacted.
14.3.6.2 Apportioning liability between tanker and cargo owners
The two main groups involved in the tanker transport system: (a)
the shipowners and (b) the oil-importers, are involved jointly
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in tanker-source oil pollution and disagreement frequently arises
between these two groups as to the manner in which liability for
such damage should be apportioned.
14.3.6.3 How should liability be apportioned?
This is a question of considerable importance because the point
where pressure, in the form of 'prohibitive' liability, is
applied is where the remedial measures ultimately will be
evolved. If pressure is applied to the party less able to
implement improvements, then the measures undertaken to improve
environmental safety of tanker transport will be less effective.
It is submitted that this is currently the status quo in most
legal systems.
It is suggested that the rate of tanker accidents can be reduced
to an acceptable level in accordance with the economic
constraints affecting the two groups involved. The 'conflict'
between shipowners and oil-importers should ideally be
transformed into a more realistic relationship with inevitable
long-term goals taking priority over the consideration of short-
term self-preservation and profit-enhancement.
Oil importers should be induced, through the legal system, to
assume greater responsibility for the quality of the tankers they
charter. Where previously oil companies have often been willing
to charter poor quality tankers at low rates, they would, under
a more mature set of liability laws, be encouraged to pay higher
rates for higher quality tankers. This, in turn, will enable
tanker owners to recover the costs of improving the quality of
their tankers and accelerate the retirement of obsolete tonnage.
There is nothing unjust or unfair in levelling liability for
pollution damage at the cargo owners, who, will pass the cost
onto the consumer. To do so is to carry the now widely accepted
principle of the "polluter pays" to its logical, and correct,
conclusion. Accordingly, at the 1969 Brussels Convention (which
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saw the development of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention}' Mr.
Philip, a Danish representative, made the following observation:
'Maritime transport was not dangerous in itself: it was
only dangerous if the goods carried were dangerous and it
was therefore normal to impose liability on the cargo for
any damage caused to a third party. The industry which made
a profit from that business should also accept the risks
entailed. ,45
Also, such strategy is justifiable from a utilitarian perspective
because the oil importers hold the "purse strings" which are
necessary to finance increased tanker quality.
14.3.6.4 Liability Considerations
Upon a consideration of the Exxon Valdez spill,46 one may
conclude that most oil companies, and certainly all independent
ship-owners, would not be able to continue in operation if
subjected to the clean-up expenses and damage claims that were,
and may yet be exacted, from the Exxon Corporation. This implies
that all organizations directly or indirectly operating tankers
should be very concerned not to be involved in an oil spill,
particularly in the U.S. where claims are uniformly higher than
elsewhere. One would expect tanker owners to be doing their
utmost to ensure that the possibility of a spill occurring from
one of their tankers is made as small as possible. However, at
present they are not able to do so, due to economic constraints.
45quoted by M'Gonigle & Zacher Pollution, Politics, and
International Law: Tankers at Sea (1971) at 172 citing from
Statement by Mr. Philip (Denmark), Committee 11, Official
Records, p. 642 (9 International Legal Material 45) .
46The Exxon Valdez spill was unusual because in that case
the ship and the cargo was owned by an oil company (EXXON) in
most cases oil is transported by oil companies on tankers




The competitive environment of today's depressed tanker market
naturally forces tanker owners to minimize their operational
costs. By keeping costs low, tanker owners are able to offer
charterers more attractive rates and thereby remain competitive.
Unfortunately, the quality of tankers is directly proportional
to the freight rate. If satisfactory standards for tankers are
to be implemented and maintained, it is imperative that the
tanker industry operates at a level of profitability which will
enable tanker owners to run seaworthy tankers. It is, moreover,
certain that such a development could have beneficial
consequences beyond the protection of the ocean and coastal
environments. The tanker industry would become more efficient as
a supplier of energy, the tanker construction industry would be
re-vitalized, costs such as third party insurance would be
reduced and the quality and safety of tanker emploYment would be
improved. Also, coastal States would be able to reduce the amount
of resources committed to "command and control" operations.
In order to illustrate why this suggested change is necessary,
the present position (i.e. the status quo) will be briefly re-
described in order to facilitate an over-arching explanation and
justification of the argument.
14.3.7 Existing liability regulation
The vast majority of legal systems governing the issue of tanker-
source oil pollution liability do not specify any form of
liability from the cargo owner in his personal capacity. In fact
the three dominant legal systems governing tanker- source oil
pollution in the world today, which have already been dealt with
in detail in this work, actually shield and protect oil cargo
interests from personal liability.
14.3.7.1 Internationally applicable liability regimes
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Certain important liability regimes governing tanker-source' oil
pollution apply in the international arena. To recapitulate,
these two regimes are explained below.
14.3.7.1.1 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
The actual owner of the oil aboard a tanker which causes oil
pollution damage is not subject to any form of personal liability
under the two-tier compensation arrangement brought about by the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1969 (the Civil Liability Convention) and the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (the Fund
Convention) and under the provisions of the Protocols to these
conventions of 1984, which have been further incorporated into
the 1992 Protocols.
14.3.7.1.2 TOVALOP and CRISTAL
The cargo-owner is also excluded from liability in his personal
capacity under the two-tier voluntary compensation agreements
brought about by the oil and tanker industries.
14.3.7.1.3 The two tier system
Put simply, under these regimes the owner of the tanker which
causes pollution damage is liable in the first instance under
either the Civil Liability Convention or TOVALOP, in the
circumstances where these instruments apply. The owner of the
tanker is liable in his personal capacity and his liability is
strict although certain limited absolute defences apply. On the
other hand if the owner is not guilty of 'actual fault of
privity' his liability is limited under the Civil Liability
Convention, and is always limited where TOVALOP applies. The
second tier liability regimes; the Fund Convention and CRISTAL,
provide a second source of compensation where that available from
the tanker owner is exhausted. The funds for second tier
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compensation are obtained from a levy charged on quantities of
oil imported either to Fund Convention states or oil carried at
sea and "owned" by CRISTAL members.'" Significantly, the actual
owner of the oil involved in the pollution incident is not
personally liable for damage claims under either the Fund
Convention or CRISTAL. The burden is shared by all companies
carrying oil at sea.
14.3.7.2 The U.S. Federal and State liability regime
Liability for tanker-source oil pollution in the U.S. is
controlled at a federal and state level. U.S. State law is dealt
with in the earlier part of this Chapter, therefore, it is only
necessary to reconsider the U.S. Federal dispensation for the
purpose of this analysis.
14.3.7.2.1 U.S. Federal law
The cargo-owner is also protected from personal liability under
the federal laws governing tanker-source oil pollution in the
United States, as regulated under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of
1990. This Act exposes tanker owners to primary and potentially
unlimited liability for oil pollution damage occurring in the
United States. It has been criticised widely, however, for
letting oil importers escape direct liability. The Act does,
however, propose the establishment of a billion dollar trust fund
(the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund) which is made up from a tax
on all oil imports into the United States by sea. It is important
to note that OPA does not preempt the right of individual U.S.
states to enact liability legislation which is not in conformity
with the federal provisions of OPA. 48 Hence the different, and,
it is submitted, more desirable approach followed by the earlier
mentioned six U.S. states.
4'The CRISTAL definition of ownership is extended beyond
the strict meaning of proprietary ownership.
UOPA § 1018(a) and (b) ; 33 USC § 2718(a) and (b).
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14.3.8 Is cargo-owner liability an acceptable remedy?
Has cargo-owner liability been identified as an acceptable remedy
by commentators in industry? At this juncture in this inquiry the
observations of Vielvoye and Rafgard are once more relevant. In
sum, Vielvoye, evaluates the problem in the following way:
'Tanker owners and cargo owners are moving into an era of
tough regulation by government and changing public
attitudes that will not accept sloppy, low grade ship
operations. Cargo owners in particular will come under
increased pressure to reject substandard vessels for time
and spot charters and pay a premium for crude to be carried
in modern, well maintained , well managed tankers. Changing
regula tions on liabili ty for spills should ensure that
these problems are tackled head-on.' 49 (emphasis that of
the present writer)
The analysis quoted above is apt but finally unsatisfactory, as
Vielvoye does not explain what form of increased pressure will
be applied to the cargo owners, or what changes in the regulation
of liability are expected to evolve. Despite the limitations of
Vielvoye's comments they are important because he sees a link
between pressurizing charterers with liability and selective
chartering practices.
In considering the implications of OPA 90, Rafgard has stated
that:
the US Oil Pollution Act gives no newbuilding
incentive. The implementation of double hulls for existing
tankers is very liberal, and legally the cargo owners have
no financial responsibility if there is pollution damage,
so neither the technical [i.e. double hulls] nor the legal
aspects [i.e. liability regulation] seem to give the
UVielvoye, op ci t, 12.
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incentive to charter modern tankers.'so (emphasis and words
between square brackets inserted by the present writer)
It has been pointed out that the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions and TOVALOP and CRISTAL also have the same weakness
in that the cargo owner escapes direct liability.
In the same article Rafgard again criticises OPA for allowing oil
cargo owners to escape liability. He comments as follows:
'It is bad enough that the cargo owners under federal law
have been made immune from liability. It is even worse that
OPA 90 significantly reduces the incentive for cargo owners
to secure best-quality transportation. Congress's important
efforts to improve marine and the environmental protection
of the United States, is thereby dangerously jeopardised by
a statute that is incompatible with commercial reality, and
which by excluding responsibility for cargo interests at
the same time excludes the vast majority of assets involved
in the transportation transaction. The result of this
anomaly in a statute is to place intolerable financial
pressure on an extremely small sector of the transportation
chain.,sl (emphasis that of the present writer)
By using the term 'modern tankers' it is likely that Ragard means
high quality, well-equipped, expertly-managed and crewed tankers
of recent design and construction. Such tankers may be contrasted
with the aging, cut-rate tankers which are the focus of
increasing criticism. In the view of the present writer, Rafgard
is correct where he points out that if the cargo owner is not
liable he has no incentive to hire high-quality tonnage. Clearly,
Rafgard seems to suggest that cargo owners be forced to accept
a degree of the total liability for oil pollution damage in the
United States. However, he tends to avoid specifying the exact
SORafgard, op ci t, pp 22 -23.
slIbid. at 26.
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form that this liability should assume.
It is significant, and, also contradictory, that he seems to
advance the regime incorporated in the 1984 Protocols to the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions as a model when considering
the liability rules under OPA 90. To this end he states:
'It is both reasonable and logical for tanker owners to
look for co-operation with cargo owners. It is the physical
characteristics of the cargo that cause damage to the
environment. The principle of sharing liability was
reconfirmed by the 1984 IMO Protocols, and is based upon a
proposal, made at that time by the US delegation.,s2
The obvious point is that the 1984 Protocols which have
subsequently been amended and incorporated into the 1992
Protocols do not place liability upon the oil cargo owner in his
personal capacity. The 1992 Protocols are not yet in force but
even if they were in force, or if a oil pollution regime of a
similar nature was incorporated in the U.S. in place of OPA, that
regime would not, it is submitted, provide a cogent or clear
incentive for cargo owners to charter high-quality tonnage. What
is required is a very definite set of liability laws which place
strict and unlimited liability on the cargo owner in conjunction
with the tanker owner. This would very rapidly see the
development of the desired two-tier freight market and hence the
capitalization of a new, more secure tanker fleet.
Despite the inconclusive nature of Rafgard's observations
concerning the liability of cargo-owners he provides a dramatic
statement as to the relative distribution of resources between
oil companies (i.e. cargo-owners) and tanker owners:
'By leaving cargo owners out of the responsible parties
under the Oil Pollution Act, the Congress has afforded
S2Ibid.
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immunity to 96 per cent of those assets that should
logically stand exposed.' 53
One may therefore conclude that by excluding cargo-owners from
liability the U.S. Government has excluded a very large part of
the resources available to upgrade, replace and improve the
tanker transportation process.
Although Rafgard does not say so directly, he seems to encourage
the reader to draw the correct inference that the cargo owners
hold the "purse strings" and if the Government of the U.S. wants
to see the quality of tankers improved then the large required
sum of money has to be obtained from the cargo owners. The reader
is also led to draw the further inference that this objective can
be achieved if the oil companies are given an incentive to
charter ,on l y high-quality tonnage at higher freight rates.
The question of liability for oil pollution damage is a very
sensitive issue for both tanker owners and oil companies.
Certainly, under the U. S. Federal oil pollution dispensation
(OPA) tanker owners are put to a significant disadvantage, while
oil companies have been afforded significant relief under Federal
legislation and likewise under the provisions of most U.S. State
legislation. However, the rationale which Rafgard seems to be
advancing within the context of OPA, must, if taken to its
logical conclusion, be applied also to the system of compensation
under the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions. If this was to
be done the tanker owners would probably lose a significant
advantage in that they would lose a certain protection from
liability (i.e. a strong right to limit liability).
Furthermore, if the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions were to
53Ibid. Rafgard is suggesting that the cargo owners be
included within the scope of the meaning of a 'responsible
party' as defined for the purpose of OPA. If this were done
then very far-reaching consequences would flow. In effect
direct cargo owner liability, as provided for in certain US
State legislation, would result.
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evolve to facilitate strict and unlimited joint liability on the
cargo owner and the tanker owner in their personal capacity the
voluntary compensation regimes of TOVALOP and CRISTAL would also
be "adversely" affected from their point of view. Clearly, these
are consequences which Rafgard, as the Managing Director of the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko), would not presumably welcome and it is no surprise
that he hesitates to come forward with any specific
suggestions. 54
14.3.9 Conclusions on direct cargo-owner liability
Compensation regimes should enable claimants to take direct legal
action for damages against the cargo owner of the oil involved
in a spill. Such right should ideally be incorporated into state
legislation through amendments to the oil spill compensation
conventions developed by IMO.
The cargo owner (i.e. oil shipper) has until recently generally
avoided direct responsibility for damage caused by a spillage of
his oil, and largely continues to do so. But, it can be expected
that, in the foreseeable future, oil-shippers will have to face
direct liability in certain situations. For example, oil shippers
are already directly liable, with the ship-owner, for oil
pollution damage in certain states of the United States.
As oil pollution incidents continue to occur and the amounts of
liability available under the various compensation regimes prove
insufficient to cover an ever-expanding range of claims and
clean-up costs, the question of who should pay for pollution
incidents may be re-examined. The example of certain U.S. state
54In this regard it may be pointed out that the article
which records Rafgard's ideas on OPA was 'Based on selected
papers form the 2nd International Lloyd's Ship Manager Ship
Management Conference 1991'. It is quite conceivable that
because of the "in-house" nature of the conference Rafgard was
a little more forthright than would otherwise have been the
case.
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legislation, together with the t yp e of arguments raised here, may





The most pronounced observation which can be made regarding the
three compensation systems which have been compared and
contrasted in this study are that the systems are so similar in
so many respects. It seems almost as if some natural law of
evolution has been applied and that the various systems are
evolving along a course of natural evolution. However, although
a significant area of commonality may be identified many
differences exist. It is submitted that a definite pattern of
future evolution can be seen emerging out of U.S. State
legislation. It has been seen how certain U.S. States'
Legislation facilitates the direct liability of the cargo owner
as a potentially responsible party for an oil spill.
Although the laws relating to tanker-source oil pollution
liability have evolved some way in a relatively short space of
time they have yet to venture into still unchartered waters.
Areas of future evolution will probably include the increasing
admissibility of pure environmental loss, punitive damages,
direct cargo owner liability and limitless strict and even
absolute liability. It is predicted that although the progression
towards international uniformity in this area of law has been
delayed by regional initiatives, internationalism will eventually
prevail. Obviously, international uniformity in an area of law
which is so economically, politically and environmentally
sensitive is a difficult ideal to achieve and difficulties in
reaching consensus are to be expected.
15.2 Suggested policy changes
One of the prime objectives of this study was to evaluate the
policies expounded by the three liability controlling mechanisms
which have been compared and contrasted in this work. It was
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stated from the outset that the critical analysis of the three
broad legal systems was in order to suggest a new policy where
and if the analysis reveals that a change in policy is necessary.
It is the conclusion of the present writer that a change in
policy is required in the case of the international Conventions,
the voluntary agreements and in the U. S. Federal and certain U. S.
State legislation. It is submitted that all tanker-source
liability regimes which allow the actual cargo owner to escape
liability are ineffective as tools to ensure that the standard
of the world tanker fleet is maintained at an acceptable standard
of quality. Without direct cargo owner liability the cargo owners
have insufficient incentives to pay a premium for high quality
tankers. It has also been argued that where cargo owners have no
incentive to charter high quality tankers in favour of lower
quality less expensive tankers a spiral of low quality tonnage
ensues. The basis upon which this statement is made is explained
in the previous chapter, Chapter Fourteen.
Unfortunately, although the international approach to oil
pollution compensation is an ideal which should to be strived for
the present international approach does not promote the remedial
policy suggested in Chapter Fourteen. Therefore, it is submitted
that it may be necessary that the responsibility of implementing
a liability system such as that implemented in Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon and
Washington, will incrementally be brought about on a regional
basis and not internationally. The future of the voluntary
compensation regimes will depend on the nature of the liability
laws enacted at a regional level or upon the support accorded to
the international Conventions.
It is further submitted that as environmental considerations
become more pronounced increasing pressure will be brought to
bear upon the oil industry to solve the problem of tanker-source
oil pollution. It is rare that anyone cure is found for a
complex problem. The most effective remedies are usually multi-
pronged. At tempts to improve the standards of tanker
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transportation will best include "liability-forcing" in
association with other methods of control. It is, however,
suggested that the oil and tanker industry is best able to bring
about the required changes from within their own ranks.
Nevertheless, the incentives to bring about these changes will
probably have to be applied from without by governments and legal
regulation.
15.3 Oil and the environmental context
The petroleum industry, which in this analysis includes the
tanker industry, is a multi-facetted, influential, flexible and
often secretive body which is accustomed to being confronted
with, and usually overcoming, a wide variety of large, difficult
and costly problems. It is, essentially, an international body.
This sometimes admired, often denigrated, industry has been able
to solve problems of long-distance supply and widespread demand,
manipulate supply and demand, and fix prices. It has been able
to supply democratic forces in time of war and has also supported
abhorrent regimes during war and peace.
Oil companies have weathered tumultuous quarrels with governments
at different times. For example, they have survived and even
thrived after anti-trust regulation and nationalization. Oil
companies have often powerfully influenced U. S. and European
foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.
The achievements of oil companies in technology and engineering
are well known. The extent of pipe-line networks, refineries and
off-shore drilling operations are striking testaments to
ingenuity. Not least, supertankers, the biggest self-propelled
machines ever designed and constructed are impressive
achievements.
However, in the process of supplying the world with energy, the
oil companies have, of course, impacted negatively with other
556
major areas of concern and often attracted a great deal of
adverse publicity and hostility.
15.3.1 The nature of the environmental challenge
It is suggested that the newest challenge facing the petroleum
industry is in meeting escalating environmental demands. The
industry's ability to manage the impact of this threat will be
crucial to the future business success of individual companies,
and the industry as a whole. Those oil companies which are most
effective at understanding, responding to, and pre-empting public
values, beliefs, and opinions on, especially, "environmental" or
"green" issues will survive and prosper. Those who do not will
probably incur severe government interference and may
increasingly lose competitiveness.
It would seem that this point of view is also held by author
Daniel Yergin, who in his Pulitzer-prize winning book, The Prize,
makes the following prediction:
'Perhaps the single greatest challenge facing the entire
petroleum industry is neither in supply or demand, nor in
relations between companies and governments, but in meeting
growing environmental demands while at the same time
continuing to fulfil the traditional job of energy
supplier. And that new reality is throwing the whole
industry on the defensive. ,1
Environmentalists demand the general right to live in a clean
environment and the implementation and maintenance of standards
of behaviour which protect and even extend this right. A
burgeoning environmentalist lobby has a powerful, but sometimes
exaggerated, influence on the way in which the petroleum industry
operates. It is likely that the influence of this pressure group
will continue to increase in the future and the constraints and
1Yergin The Prize (1991) at 776.
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pressures of environmentalism will
influential throughout the broad spectrum
the petroleum industry is engaged.
become increasingly
of activities in which
This work deals with one particular battleground, where the
environmentalist challenge posed to the petroleum industry is at
present most concentrated: tanker-source oil pollution. This
issue has attained high-profile status in the eyes of the public;
understandably so, given the dramatic scale of such environmental
disasters, images of which graphically impact upon the public
psyche through the media, particularly television. There is no
better example of this than the public outcry which followed the
oil spill which occurred when the Exxon Valdez ran aground on
Bligh Reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound on the 24th March,
1989. This catastrophe has precipitated changes in public
attitudes which will impact on the petroleum industry in many
different ways. Historically, the Exxon Valdez spill may even be
equated with the disasters at Hiroshima, Bopal and Chernobyl in
that these events also evoked significant changes in the way in
which the world public viewed certain aspects of technology.
Five years have passed since the watershed Exxon Valdez
experience and significant spills of oil from tankers continue
to take place with disturbing regularity. The social, political,
technological, economic and legal dispensations relating to oil
pollution have evolved considerably since that time. One apparent
trend is an increase in the price exacted from ship-owners and
oil companies in the settlement of oil pollution claims. It is
true to say that such liability is serving, consciously or
unconsciously, as a powerful tool to increase effective
'environmental responsibility' amongst shipowners and shippers
of oil.
15.3.2 Environmentalism and increased liability
In this work an attempt has been made to assess the effect that
increased liability for tanker-source oil pollution has had, and
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may yet have, on the shipping and petroleum industries, and to
explain how these industries have responded, and may yet be
expected to respond to this development.
An understanding of such developments, specific to tanker-source
pollution, may serve as an important guide for industry in
general, and especially for the petroleum industry, because it
may serve as an indicator of the shape of future accommodations
which may have to be made to demands from the environmentalist
lobby. One may reasonably expect that similar patterns of
increasing environmentalist pressure, and accompanying changes
brought about within the context of tanker-source pollution, will
be, and are already being replicated in other fields of industry
and other facets of petroleum production. Some examples of areas
where this is true for the petroleum industry are: emission
standards for oil refineries and automobile exhausts; more
efficient automobile fuel -burning standards; stringent
requirements for oil storage facilities; co"mprehensive plant
decommissioning or abandonment procedures, and restrictions on
oil exploration in areas which are considered environmentally
sensitive.
Supply is the central component of an
corporation's activities and the vitality, and




significantly by fluctuations in supply. For these reasons,
developments which may hinder the smooth and cost effective flow
of oil from the regions where it is extracted to those where it
is used must receive very careful consideration.
Henri Smets suggests makes the following important observation:
'The issue of whether ceilings (shipowners' liability or
compensation by oil importing States) should be raised
therefore boils down especially to a question of political
expediency, having regard to the various interest involved ,
559
and in particular the interests of oil spill victims. i 2
Environmental issues have become important and this importance
will increase but supply priorities will continue to be a
persuasive factor. The evolution of liability laws governing
tanker source oil pollution exhibit a constant tension between
these two forces. In the final analysis it must be asked whether
States are prepared to expose their oil companies to direct and
possibly limitless liability. It may also be expected that supply
considerations will become increasingly important. In a paper
presented to the World Energy Council's Regional Forum, Keith
Welham of the French International Energy Agency reported that
world demand for oil, was expected to rise to a possible high of
102,7 million barrels a day or a low of 85,9 million barrels by
2010 from 66,9 million barrels in 1991. 3 It is reasonable to
assume that a significant proportion of that oil will be
transported at sea in tankers. Consequently, a pressing need
exists to improve the quality of the international tanker fleet
in order to accommodate the additional demands which will be
brought to bare on the tanker industry in the near future.
Clearly, the oil industry has the financial capability and a
moral responsibility to meet this challenge.
2Smets 'The Oil Spill Risk: Economic Assessment and
Compensation Limit' vol.14, No.1 (1983) Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce 23 at 34.
3Bussiness Day, Monday, October 17, 1994 at 5.
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ANNEXURE ONE
Genesis of the supertanker
Oil tankers are the largest self-propelled machines that mankind
has ever constructed. The rapid growth in size of these vessels
has been remarkable. During the 1930s the average size of an oil
tanker was under 12,000 deadweight tonnes (dwt) and at the end
of the second world war few tankers had a deadweight of more than
16,500 tonnes. Deadweight tonnage in the case of a tanker
essentially reflects the quantity of oil that can safely be
transported by that tanker. The measurement refers to weight (in
long tons of 2,240 lbs, or 1.016 metric tons) of water displaced
by an empty tanker when the tanker is loaded with fuel and cargo
so that she settles in water up to her highest permissible
10adline. 1
As the economic advantages of operating larger tankers became
apparent, supertankers of 60,000 dwt began to be developed. With
the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, tankers were forced to
undertake a more lengthy voyage from the Middle East to Europe
around the Cape of Good Hope. Economics of scale became more
important and larger tankers were constructed on an escalating
scale, no longer constrained by size limits formerly imposed on
vessels having to navigate the Suez Canal. Consequently very
large crude carriers (VLCC) of up to 250,000 dwt were developed
and by the 1970s ultra large crude carriers (ULCC) of over
300,000 dwt were constructed. 2 This process of expansion
culminated in the construction of the Seawise Giant, fabricated
in 1980 by adding a new centre section to an existing VLCC to
create a vessel of 565,000 dwt. Although the engineers at the
Japanese company NKK which built the Seawise Giant stated that
lMeese 'When Jurisdictional Interests Collide' (1982) 12
Journal of Marine Affairs 71 at 81 and M'Gonigle & Zacher
Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea
(1979) at 153.
2\The Energy Carriers' Lloyd's Register lOOAl April 1986
13 pp 13-14.
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it was not impossible to build even larger tankers, it is ' not
expected that such tankers wi ll be made. 3 The Seawise Giant
will, therefore, probably remain the largest ship ever built.
Today most VLCC are between 250 ,000 and 280,000 dwt.
3Cross & Hamer 'How to se 1 k
14 a a supertan er' New ScientistMarch 1992 40 at 40. '
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ANNEXURE TWO
Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement
Offshore drilling rigs and other such operations clearly will not
fall under the provisions of the Civil Liability and Fund
Conventions or TOVALOP, TOVALOP Supplement and CRISTAL for they
do not carry oil in bulk as normal cargo.
The liability for oil pollution from offshore operations will
usually be claimed under the provisions of the Offshore Pollution
Liability Agreement (OPOL). 1 This is a voluntary agreement,
dated 4th September, 1974, between oil companies that operate or
intend to operate offshore installations and pipelines. The
Agreement applies within the jurisdiction of the European
Economic Community (EEC) and Norway. 2 Under this agreement,
operating companies agree to accept strict liability for
pollution damage and the costs of remedial measures, with only
certain exceptions, 3 up to a maximum of US$100 million per
incident. 4 From this amount, US$50 million is designated for
reimbursement of remedial measuress and US$50 million for the
compensation of pollution damage.' Claims are met by the
operating companies themselves and the parties undertake to
establish and maintain evidence of financial capability to meet
1The Agreement (as at January, 1992) is reproduced in
Bates & Benson Marine Environmental Law (1993) at 7.504; see
generally, Summerskill Oil Rigs: Law and Insurance (1979).
20POL, Clause I.3.
3The exceptions are contained in OPOL, Clause IV.B and are






possible claims under the agreement.' In the event of a dispute,
provision is made for International Chamber of Commerce
arbitration in London. s
The Agreement is administered by a private limited liability
company called the Offshore Pollution Liability Association
Limited. 9 This company does not pay any claims nor receive
contributions for the payment of claims from its members.
Therefore it is of a wholly different character from Cristal
Limited which was formed to pay actual claims under the CRISTAL
Contract.
It may be concluded that where pollution damage from storage
tankers at offshore installations is outside the scope of the
Civil Liability and Fund Conventions or TOVALOP, TOVALOP







The tacit amendment procedure is a more speedy, convenient and
less expensive method of amending International Conventions. See,
for example the tacit amendment procedure as specified in Article
16 of the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the protocol of 1978
relating thereto. 1 Under this procedure, an amendment adopted by
the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is communicated by the
Secretary-General to the Parties to the Convention. The amendment
is deemed to have been accepted unless more than one third of the
Parties, or Parties representing not less than one half of the
worlds tanker-tonnage, have notified the Secretary-General of
their objection to the amendment . An amendment that is deemed to
have been accepted will, in practice, enter into force in respect
of all parties except those having filed objections. The
alternative to the tacit amendment procedure is to convene a
diplomatic conference; obviously an expensive and time-consuming
procedure.
The range of instruments included in Article 5.3 (a) has been
expanded since the Fund Convention was drafted. This is
illustrated below.
'5.3 The Fund may be exonerated wholly or partially from
its obligations under paragraph 1 towards the owner and his
guarantor if the Fund proves that as a result of the actual
fault or privity of the owner:
(a) the ship from which the oil causing the pollution





(i) the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil, 1954 , as
amended in 1962; or
(ii) the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea ,
1960; or
Text as at 1 October 199'2.
the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, as modified by the
Protocol of 1978 relating
thereto, and as amended by
Resolution MEPC.14 (20) adopted by
the Marine Environment Protection
Committee of the International
Maritime Organization on 7
September 1984; or
(i i ) the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974, as modified by the Protocol
of 1978 relating thereto, and as
amended by resolutions MSC.
(XLV), MSC.6(48) and MSC.13(57)
adopted by the Maritime Safety
Committee of the International
Maritime Organization on 20
November 1981, 17 June 1983 and
11 April 1989, respectively, and
as amended by Resolution 1
adopted on 9 November 1988 by the
Conference of Contracting
Governments to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, 1974 on the Global
Maritime Distress and Safety
System; or



















(v) any amendments to the above -
mentioned conventions which have
been determined as being of an
important nature in accordance
with Article XVI (5) of the
Convention mentioned under (i),
Article IX (e) of the Convention
mentioned under (ii) or Article
29 (3) (d) or (4) (d) of the
Conv7ntion mentioned under (iii),provlded, however, that such
amendments had been in force for
at least twelve months at the




(b) the incident or damage was caused wholly or partially by such
non-compliance.
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply irrespective
of whether the Contracting State in which the ship was
registered or whose flag the ship is flying is a party to
the relevant instrument.,2
2IOPC Fund Statistics 1 October 1992 at 11.
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ANNEXURE FOUR
lope Fund Regulations 7.1 and 7.2.
The Internal Regulations of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund, Regulation 7 .1 and 7.2.
7.1 Where the Director considers that the Fund may be
liable to meet any claims arising out of a particular
incident, he shall arrange to have the Fund intervene as a
party in any legal proceedings against the owner or his
guarantor or, to the extent permitted under the applicable
national law, in any arbitration concerning any claim
arising out of the incident, if the Director considers that
such intervention is required to safeguard the interests of
the Fund. In case he is satisfied that the interests of the
Fund and those of the owner and/or his guarantor are not in
conflict, he may arrange for the Fund to join the owner
and/or his guarantor in any legal proceedings or
arbitration.
7.2 Where the Fund has joined the owner and/or his
guarantor, the Fund may share the costs incurred in such
proceedings or procedures on a basis agreed between the
Director and the owner and/or his guarantor, unless a court
or arbitration tribunal decides otherwise. In case of
dispute the Director may agree with the other parties
concerned to submit to arbitration the question of how
costs should be shared.
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ANNEXURE FIVE
lope Fund Regulations 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8.
The Internal Regulations of the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund, Regulation 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8.
8.6 Where the Director is satisfied in respect of an
incident that the owner is entitled to limit his liability
under the Civil Liability Convention or has no liability
under the said Convention and that the Fund will be liable
under the Fund Convent ion to pay compensation to the
victims of pollution damage arising from the incident, the
Director shall make provisional payment to such victims if
in his view this is necessary in order to mitigate undue
financial hardship to them. These payments shall be at the
discretion of the Director, who shall endeavour to ensure
that no person receiving such payment receives more that
60% of the amount which he is likely to receive from the
Fund in the event of the claims being abated pro rata.
Total payments under this paragraph shall not exceed 90
million francs in respect of anyone incident. The relevant
date for such conversion shall be the date of the incident
in question. Such provisional payments may be made before
the shipowner has established the limitation fund in
accordance with Article V.3 of the Liability Convention.
8.7 Where, in respect of a particular incident, the
Director considers the level of provisional payments
permitted under Regulation 8.6 is insufficient to mitigate
undue financial hardships to victims, he may bring the
matter to the attention of the Assembly. The Assembly may
decide, in respect of such incident, that provisional
payments may be made beyond the limit of 90 million francs
as laid down in Regulation 8.6.
8.8 As a condition of making a provisional payment in
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respect of a claim, the Director shall obtain from " the
claimant concerned a transfer to the Fund of any right that
such a claimant may enjoy under the Liability Convention
against the owner or his guarantor, up to the amount of the
provisional paYment to be made by the Fund to the claimant.
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ANNEXURE SIX
Article 8 and related provisions
Article 8 of the Fund Convention provides:
'Subject to any decision concerning the distribution
referred to in Article 4, paragraph 5, [pro rata
distribution] any judgement given against the Fund by a
court having jurisdiction in accordance with Article 7,
paragraphs 1 and 3, shall, when it has become enforceable
in the State of origin and is in that State no longer
subj ect to ordinary forms of review, be recognized and
enforceable in each Contracting State on the same
conditions as are prescribed in Article X of the Liability
Convention. '
Article X of the Civil Liability Convention provides:
'I. Any judgement given by a Court with jurisdiction in
accordance with Article IX which is enforceable in the
State of origin where it is no longer subject to ordinary
forms of review, shall be recognized in any Contracting
State, except:
(a) where the judgement was obtained by fraud; or
(b) where the defendant was not given reasonable notice and
a fair opportunity to present his case.,l
lArticle 7.5 of the Fund Convention states:
'Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 6, the Fund shall
not be bound by any judgement or decision in proceedings to
which it has not been a party or by any settlement to which it
is not a party.'
Article 7.6 provides that:
, ... where an action under the [Civil] Liability Convention
for compensation for pollution damage has been brought against
an owner or his guarantor before a competent court in a
Contracting State, each party to the proceedings shall be
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\ 2. A judgement recognized under paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be enforceable in each contracting State as
soon as the formalities required in that State have been
complied with. The formalities shall not permit the merits
of the case to be re-opened.'
entitled under the national law of that State to notify the
Fund of the proceedings. Where such notification has been made
in accordance with the formalities required by the law of the
court seized and in such time and in such manner that the Fund
has in fact been in a position effectively to intervene as a
party to the proceedings, any judgment rendered by the court
in such proceedings shall, after it has become final and
enforceable in the State where the judgement was given, become
binding upon the Fund in the sense that the facts and findings
in that judgement may not be disputed by the Fund even if the
Fund has not actually intervened in the proceedings.'
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ANNEXURE SEVEN
The 1989 Salvage Convention
6.1 The 1989 International Convention on Salvage
It will be recalled that the Court in the Patmos case stated
that, only to the extent that salvage operations were considered
as "preventive measures", could costs and losses be compensated
under the Civil Liability Convention. Accordingly the actual
salvage reward over and above the salvors expenses would not be
recoverable under the Civil Liability or Fund Conventions.
6.1.1 Traditional principles of salvage
Under traditional principles of maritime salvage law the salvor
would only receive the paYment of the salvage award where he had
successfully saved the ship or cargo . l This principle was and
still is referred to the principle of "no cure-no pay". Problems
created by the adherence to this time honoured principle became
manifest during the late 1970's when a number of oil pollution
incidents occurred in which salvage operations prevented serious
pollution damage but nevertheless received no salvage reward
because such operations failed to salve property. The attempts
to salvage the Amoco Cadiz during March, 1978 showed the inequity
of the "no cure-no pay" principle.
The inequity of the "no cure-no pay" principle is even more aptly
illustrated by the misfortunes of two salvage companies which
responded to the largest ship-source oil spill in history. In
July, 1979, the Atlantic Empress a 292,666 dwt. ULCC and the
Aegean Captain a 210,000 dwt. VLCC collided near the island of
Tobago in the West Indies. In total, an estimated 330,000 tonnes
of oil escaped as a result but, largely due to the efforts of the
salvors, very little oil pollut ion damage was sustained in any
lFor a recent discussion of the Law of Sal Gvage, see; .
Brice The maritime law of salvage (1993).
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of the nearby islands. The salvors responsible for saving the
Aegean Captain received no direct monetary reward from the owners
or insurers of the vessel because the vessel was declared a
Constructive Total Loss. The salvor was forced to recoup his
expenses out of the scrap value of the vessel and any cargo
remaining therein. The misfortunes which beset the salvor
responsible for the Atlantic Empress were even greater. No
coastal state would allow the burning tanker into sheltered water
where emergency repairs might be carried out. In the end, after
two weeks of costly salvage operations during which two salvors
lost their lives, the salvors received no reward as the Atlantic
Empress aank .? Therefore the prerequisite for salvage, that
property actually be salved, was not met. How long, it was asked,
would salvors continue to respond to ships in distress which
posed pollution risks but were in such a critical condition that
the prospects of successfully salving the ship or cargo and
thereby recovering a salvage award were not very great?
6.1.2 Lloyd's Open For.m 1980
The first attempt to rectify this problem was the development in
1980 by the marine insurance industry of an amended version of
the Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage Agreement. This agreement
became known as the Lloyd's Open Form 1980 (LOF 1980) and was the
standard instrument used by salvage companies from 1980 to 1990
when agreeing with shipowners and ships' masters to undertake the
salvage of vessels in distress. Clause l(a) of LOF 1980 provided
that, where salvage services were rendered to ships laden or
partly laden with cargoes of oil, salvors could in certain
circumstances recover an "enhanced award" by virtue of a scheme
which became known as the "safety net". This system applied in
circumstances where, without the negligence of the salvor, the
salvage operations failed to save property, or were only partly
successful in doing so, or where a salvor was prevented from
:lW~ite-Harvey \B~ack Tide at the Convergence of Admiralty
and Envlronmental Law (1991) 1 Journal of Environmental Law
and Practice 259 at 264.
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completing the services. In any of these circumstances 'the
salvor shall nevertheless be awarded ... his reasonably incurred
expenses and an increment not exceeding 15 % of such expense' ,
but only if and to the extent that the total of such expenses and
the appropriate increment was greater than any amount which would
otherwise have been recoverable. 3
The P&l Clubs undertook to pay these awards.· Towards the end of
the 1980's, however, experience had shown that the "safety net"
and "enhanced award" provisions were not entirely successful in
that they applied only to laden oil tankers and the rewards were
not commensurate with the high risks involved in such operations.
6.1.3 The Salvage Convention
In an attempt to formulate a system of uniform international
rules relating to salvage operations and to provide additional
incentives to encourage salvors to take measures to prevent or
minimize pollution damage, the International Maritime
Organization facilitated the development of the International
Salvage Convention in 1989. This Convention is not yet in force
but upon entering into force will apply whenever judicial or
arbitral proceedings relating to salvage are brought within a
country which has become party to the Convention. 5
The first point to note is that in terms of Article 12 of the
1989 Salvage Convention, the salvor need not actually save
property in order to receive a salvage reward as long as such
3M. Kerr 'The International Convention on Salvage 1989 _





·Jacobsson & Trotz 'The Definition of Pollution Damage in
1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and
1971 Fund Convention' (1986) 17 Journal of Maritime Law
Commerce 467 at 475.
51989 International Salvage Convention, Article 2.
575
operations have had a useful result. 6 In terms of Article ' 13,
where the salvor's efforts have had a useful result, the salvage
reward will be fixed with a view to encouraging salvage
operations, taking into account certain criteria which include;
the salved value of the vessel and other property,' the skill
and efforts of the salvors in preventing or minimizing damage to
the environment,8 the measure of success obtained by the
aaLvor ," the nature and degree of the danger ,10 the skill and
efforts of the salvors in salving the vessel, other property and
life,ll the time used and expenses and losses incurred by the
aaLvor-s i P the risk of liability and other risks run by the
salvors or their equipment, 13 the promptness of the services
rendered,14 the availability and use of vessels or other
equipment intended for salvage oper-at i ons" and the state of
readiness and efficiency of the salvor's equipment and the value
thereof .16
The central tenet of the 1989 Salvage Convention is Article 14,
which allows the salvor to claim "special compensation" in
certain circumstances. Special Compensation in essence reflects
the "safety net" and "enhanced award" provisions of the LOP 1980.
An important distinction is that the "safety net" and "enhanced
61989 International Salvage Convention, Article 12 (1) .
'1989 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (a) .
81989 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (b) .
'1989 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (c) .
101 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (d) .
111989 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (e) .
121 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (f) .
131 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (g) .
141 9 89 International Salvage Convention, Article 13(1)(h).
151 989 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (i) .
161 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article 13 (1) (j) .
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award" provisions of the 1989 Convention are not restricted to
salvage operations undertaken in respect of laden oil tankers.
For the purpose of the 1989 Salvage Convention a '"vessel" means
any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation,17 and
'"damage to the environment" means substantial physical damage
to human health or to marine life or resources in coastal or
inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution,
contamination, fire, explosion or similar major Lnc i.dent s t i "
Potentially the 1989 Salvage Convention also permits the recovery
of higher enhanced awards. Furthermore, where the LOF 1980
operated by force of contractual agreement, the provisions of the
1989 Salvage Convention will apply automatically through force
of law.
Special compensation under Article 14 (1) means that, where a
salvor carries out salvage operations in respect of a vessel
which by itself or its cargo threatens damage to the environment
but fails to earn a reward under Article 13 which covers his
expenses, he will nevertheless be entitled to recover his
expenses from the owner of the vessel in question.
In contrast to the position as it stands in relation to oil
pollution under the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund
Convention, the salvor is entitled under the 1989 Salvage
Convention to recover all his expenses incurred in the operation,
no r only those expenses which have the primary purpose of
preventing or minimizing pollution damage. Significantly, the
1989 Salvage Convention also permits the recovery of expenses in
so-called pure threat situations which are not admissible under
the Civil Liability or Fund Conventions.
Under Article 14 (2) where a salvor carries out salvage operations
in respect of a vessel which by itself or its cargo threatens
damage to the environment and the salvor by his salvage
17
1 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article l(b).
18
1 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article l(d).
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operations has actually succeeded in preventing or minimizing
damage to the environment, the special compensation payable by
the owner to the salvor under Article 14(1) may be increased up
to a maximum of thirty per cent of the expenses incurred by the
salvor. In appropriate circumstances where it is considered fair
and just to do so such salvor may be rewarded with additional
special compensation which shall not however be assessed at more
than one hundred per cent over and above the actual expenses
incurred by the salvor.
Salvor's expense for the purpose of Article 14(1) and (2) is
fixed as out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor
in the salvage operation and a fair rate for equipment and
personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage operation,
taking into consideration the promptness of the services
rendered, the availability and use of vessels or other equipment
intended for salvage operations and the state of readiness and
efficiency of the salvor's equipment and the value thereof. 1 9
The Convention expressly obliges salvors to exercise due care to
prevent or minimise damage to the environment. 2o If the salvor
has been negligent and has thereby failed to prevent or minimize
damage to the environment, he may be wholly or partially deprived
of special compensations. 21 The master or the owner of the
salved property is similarly called upon to exercise due care to
pr ' ent or minimise damage to the environment,22 as well as to
cooperate fully in the salvage operation23 and when the vessel
or property has been brought to a place of safety to accept re-
delivery of the vessel or property when reasonably requested to
191989 International Salvage Convention, Article 14 (3) .
201989 International Salvage Convention, Article s m rsi .
211989 International Salvage Convention, Article 14 (5) .
221989 International Salvage Convention, Article 8(2)(b).
231989 International Salvage Convention, Article 8(2)(a).
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do so. 24 The issue of redelivery has posed salvors several
problems in the past as seen in the case of the Aegean Captain.
When, for example a ship has been made safe and taken to a safe
haven, owners often refuse to accept the ship. This can involve
a salvor in heavy expenses as tugs, personnel and equipment are
tied up. It is not unheard of for shipowners to delay the salvors
in this way while negotiating with the underwriters to declare
the ship a Constructive Total Loss.
The 1989 Salvage Convention will not enter into force until one
year after the date on which fifteen States have agreed to be
bound by it. 25 This could well mean that the Convention will not
come into force for some years to come. This delay is highly
unfortunate because, as has previously been noted, efficient and
timely salvage operations can clearly make a major contribution
to the safety of vessels and other property in danger and to the
protection of the environment. Hence, it is imperative that
adequate incentives are available to persons who undertake
salvage operations in such cases. 26 The 1989 Salvage Convention
has been widely acknowledged as having a significant role to play
in the protection of the marine environment and the continued
viability of an efficient salvage industry. 27 Coastal States
241 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article 8(2) (c).
251 98 9 International Salvage Convention, Article 29(1).
26See the preamble to the 1989 International Salvage
Convention.
27See for example, Staniland 'Should the 1989
International Convention on Salvage be enacted in South
Africa?' [1993] 110 SALJ 292; Neilson 'The 1989 International
Convention on Salvage' Summer (1992) vol.24 Connecticut Law
Review 1203; White-Harvey 'Black Tide at the Convergence of
Admiralty and Environmental Law' (1991) 1 Journal of
Environmental Law and Practice 259; Gaskell 'The 1989 Salvage
Convention and the Lloyd's Open Form (LOF) Salvage Agreement
1990' (1991) 16 Tulane Maritime LJ 1; AlIen 'The International
Convention on Salvage and LOF 1990' (1991) 22 Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 119; Binney 'Protecting the
Environment with Salvage Law: Risk, Rewards, and the 1989
Salvage Convention' [1990] 65 Washington Law Review 639;
Wooder 'The New Salvage Convention: A Shipowner's Perspective'
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would therefore be well advised to ratify the Convention or to
pre-empt its coming into force by incorporating it into domestic
legislation.
6.1.4 Lloyd's Open For.m 1990
An important positive development is that Lloyds have forestalled
any lead time delay by introducing an amended Lloyd's Open Form
of Salvage Agreement (LOF 1990) which incorporates the essential
terms of the 1989 Salvage Convention as if it was already in
force. 28 Because Article 14 of the 1989 Salvage Convention is
expressly included in LOF 1990 and since a large proportion of
salvage agreements are concluded on the basis ' of LOF it can
reasonably be expected that the new approach adopted by LOF 1990
will overcome the shortcomings of LOF 1980 and will play a
significant role in preventing or minimizing pollution of the sea
by oil and other noxious and hazardous substances.
6.1.5 The Kirki - A case in point
In 1991, the Kirki, a Greek tanker of about 82,660 tonnes built
(1990) 21 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 81; Brice QC
'The new Salvage Convention: green seas and grey areas' [1990]
Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ 32; M. Kerr 'The
International Convention on Salvage 1989 - How it came to be'
(1990) 39 International and Comparative LQ 530; D.A. Kerr 'The
1989 Salvage Convention: Expediency or Equity' [1989] 20
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 505; Gaskell 'The
International Convention on Salvage 1989' [1989] International
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 268; Gold 'Marine
Salvage: Towards a New Regime' (1989) 20 Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce 487; Brice QC 'Salvage and enhanced awards'
[1985] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ 33; Brice QC
'Salvage: Present and future' [1984] Lloyd's Maritime and
Commercial LQ 394; Coulthard 'A New Cure for Salvors? - A
Comparative Analysis of the LOF 1980 and the CMI Draft Salvage
Convention' (1983) 14 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 45.
28Clause 2. of LOF 1990 incorporates Articles 1 (a) to
(e), 8, 13.1, 13.2 first sentence, 13.3 and 14 of the
International Convention on Salvage 1989 (lithe -Convention
Articles") .
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in 1969, was chartered by BP Shipping as agent for BP Australia
to carry crude oil from Jebel Dhana to Kwinana . Due to a state
of advanced corrosion, the bow section of the Kirki became
detached from the rest of the vessel when she encounted bad
weather off the coast of Western Australia. The Australian
Department of Transport and Communications departmental
investigation found that the vessel was very poorly maintained,
heavily rusted and there had been a ' ... deliberate attempt to
mislead the marine surveyors by patching the deck with
canvass disguised with paint. 29 As a result of the serious
structural failure about 15,000 tonnes of oil escaped into the
sea on 21st July, 1991.
Fortunately, prevailing weather conditions drove the oil away
from the coast. The Master of the Kirki signed LOF 1990 with an
Australian salvage company, United Salvage Limited, which towed
the stricken vessel amidst difficult conditions to a place of
refuge where the remaining cargo was transhipped to another
tanker and finally delivered to Kwinana. 3o
In this case the "special compensation" provisions of LOF 1990
will not be tested as the tanker and its cargo was successfully
salvaged. However, if the case went to arbitration it is
conceivable that the ultimate salvage award could be enhanced by
the salvors' successful endeavours to minimise damage to the
environment.
29Report No.33 at 86 cited by M. White 'Oil Pollution in
the Australian and New Zealand Region' (1993) vol.67 no.3 The
Australian Law Journal 191 at 195.
30M. White 'The Kirki Oil Spill: Pollution in Western




IMO Assembly Resolution A.500
(November, 1981)
Which required:
'That the Council and the committee entertain proposals for
new conventions or amendments to existing conventions only
on the basis of clear and well-documented demonstration of
compelling need, taking into account the undesirability of
modifying conventions not yet in force or of amending
existing conventions unless such latter instruments have
been in force for a reasonable period of time, and
experience has been gained of their operation, and having
regard to the costs of the maritime industry and the burden
of the legislative and administrative resources or members
states. '
Quoted from the Official Records, vol.2 at 77.
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ANNEXURE NINE
Texts of Conventions and Agreements
Texts of the 1971 Fund Convention, 1969 Civil Liability
Convention, 1976 Protocols o f the Fund and Civil Liability
Conventions.
Texts of TOVALOP and CRISTAL dated 20th February, 1994.
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IN I I:nNA I I UI'IAL \"VI'I V t:1 'I I IV'"
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUND
FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
(Supplementary to the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969)
The States Parties to the present Convention ,
BEING PARTIES to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, adopted at Brussels on 29 November 1969,
CONSCIOUS of the dangers of pollution posed by the world-wide maritime
carriage of oil in bulk,
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available to
persons who suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape or discharge
of oil from ships,
CONSIDERING that the International Convention of 29 November 1969, on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, by providing a regime for compensation for
pollution damage in Contracting States and for the costs of measures, wherever taken,
to prevent or minimize such damage, represents a considerable progress towards the
achievement of this aim,
CONSIDERING HOWEVER that this regime does not afford full compensation for
victims of oil pollution damage in all cases while it imposes an additional financial
burden on shipowners,
CONSIDERING FURTHER that the economic consequences of oil pollution
damage resulting from the escape or discharge of oil carried in bulk at sea by ships
should not exclusively be borne by the shipping industry but should in part be borne
.by the oil cargo interests,
CONVINCED of the need to elaborate a compensation and indemnification system
supplementary to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage with a view to ensuring that full compensation will be available to victims
of oil pollution incidents and that the shipowners are at the same time given relief in
respect of the additional fmancial burdens imposed on them by the said Convention,
TAKING NOTE of the Resolution on the Establishment of an International
Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution Damage which was adopted on 29 November
1969 by the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollu tion Damage,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
General Provisions
Article 1
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Liability Convention" means the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted at Brussels on 29 November 1969.
L. "~nlp", "person", "Owner", "Oil", "Pollution Damage", "Preventive Measures",
"Incident" and "Organization", have the same meaning as in Article I of the
Liability Convention, provided however that, for the purposes of these terms, "oil"
shall be confined to persistent hydrocarbon mineral oils.
3. "Contributing Oil" means crude oil and fuel oil as defined in sub-paragraphs (a)
and (b) below:
(a) "Crude Oil" means any liquid hydrocarbon mixture occurring naturally in
the earth whether or not treated to render it suitable for transportation. It
also includes crude oils from which certain distillate fractions have been
removed (sometimes referred to as "topped crudes") or to which certain
distillate fractions have been added (sometimes referred to as "spiked" or
"reconstituted" crudes).
(b) "Fuel Oil" means heavy distillates or residues from crude oil or blends of
such materials intended for use as a fuel for the production of heat or
power of a quality equivalent to the "American Society for Testing and
Materials' Specification for Number Four Fuel Oil (Designation D 396-69)",
or heavier.
4. "Franc" means the unit referred to in Article V, paragraph 9 of the Liability
Convention.
5. "Ship's tonnage" has the same meaning as in Article V, paragraph 10, of the
Liability Convention.
6. "Ton", in relation to oil, means a metric ton.
7. "Guarantor" means any person provitling insurance or other financial security
to cover an owner's liability in pursuance of Article VII, paragraph 1, of the
Liability Convention.
8. "Terminal Installation" means any site for the storage of oil in bulk which is
capable of receiving oil from waterborne transportation, including any facility
situated off-shore and linked to such site.
9. Where an inciden t consists of a series of occurrences, it shall be treated as having
occurred on the date of the first such occurrence.
Article 2
1. An International Fund for compensation for pollution damage, to be named
"The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund" and hereinafter referred to as
"The Fund", is hereby established with the following aims:
(a) to provide compensation for pollution damage to the extent that the
protection afforded by the Liability Convention is inadequate;
(b) to give relief to shipowners in respect of the additional financial burden
imposed on them by the Liability Convention, such relief being subject to
conditions designed to ensure compliance with safety at sea and other
conventions;
(c) to give effect to the related purposes set out in this Convention.
2. The Fund shall in each Contracting State be recognized as a legal person
capable under the laws of that State of assuming rights and obligations and of being
a party in legal proceedings before the courts of that State. Each Contracting State
shall recognize the Director of the Fund (hereinafter referred to as "The Director")
as the legal representative of the Fund.
Article 3
This Convention shall apply:
1. With regard to compensation according to Article 4, exclusively to pollution
damage caused on the territory including the ter!i~or~al sea of a Contracting State,
and to preventive measures taken to prevent or rrururmze such damage;
2. With regard to indemnification of shipowners and their guarantors according to
Article 5, exclusively in respect of pollution damage caused on the territory, includ-
ing the territorial sea, of a State Party to the Liability Convention by a ship registered
in or flying the flag of a Contracting State and in respect of preventive measures
taken to prevent or minimize such damage.
Compensation and indemnification
Article 4
1. For the purpose of fulfilling its function under Article 2, paragraph lea), the
Fund shall pay compensation to any person suffering pollution damage if such person
has been unable to obtain full and adequate compensation for the damage under the
terms of the Liability Convention,
(a) because no liability for the damage arises under the Liability Convention;
(b) because the owner liable for the damage under the Liability Convention is
financially incapable of meeting his obligations in full and any financial
security that may be provided under Article VII of that Convention does
not cover or is insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation for the
damage; an owner being treated as financially incapable of meeting his
obligations and a financial security being treated as insufficient if the
person suffering the damage has been unable to obtain full satisfaction of
the amount of compensation due under the Liability Convention after
having taken all reasonable steps to pursue the legal remedies available to
him',
(c) because the damage exceeds the owner's liability under the Liability
Convention as limited pursuant to Article V, paragraph 1, of that Conven-
tion or under the terms of any other international Convention in force or
open for signature, ratification or accession at the date of this Convention.
Expenses reasonably incurred or sacrifices reasonably made by the owner voluntarily
to prevent or minimize pollution damage shall be treated as pollution damage for the
purposes of this Article.
2. The Fund shall incur no obligation under the preceding paragraph if:
(a) it proves that the pollution damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities,
civil war or insurrection or was caused by oil which has escaped or been
discharged from a warship or other ship owned or operated by a State and
used, at the time of the incident, only on Government non-commercial
service; or
(b) the claimant cannot prove that the damage resulted from an incident involv-
ing one or more ships.
3. If the Fund proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially either
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who suffered
the damage or from the negligence of that person, the Fund may be exonerated
wholly or partially from its obligation to pay compensation to such person provided,
however, that there shall be no such exoneration with regard to such preventive
measures which are compensated under paragraph 1. The Fund shall in any event be
exonerated to the extent that the shipowner may have been exonerated under
Article Ill, paragraph 3, of the Liability Convention.
4. (a) Except as otherwise provided in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph, the
aggregate amount of compensation payable by the Fund under this Article
shall in respect of anyone incident be limited, so that the total sum of that
amount and the amount of compensation actually paid under the Liability
Convention for pollution damage caused in the territory of the Contracting
States, including any sums in respect of which the Fund is under an obliga-
tion to indemnify the owner pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1, of this
Convention, shall not exceed 450 million francs.
(b) The aggregate amount of compensation payable by the Fund under this
Article for pollution damage resulting from a natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character shall not exceed 450 million
francs.
5. Where the amount of established claims against the Fund exceeds the aggregate
amount of compensation payable under paragraph 4, the amount available shall be
distributed in such a manner that the proportion between any established claim and
the amount of compensation actually recovered by the claimant under the Liability
Convention and this Convention shall be the same for all claimants.
6. The Assembly of the Fund (hereinafter referred to as "the Assembly") may,
having regard to the experience of incidents which have occurred and in particular
the amount of damage resulting therefrom and to changes in the monetary values,
decide that the amount of 450 million francs referred to in paragraph 4, sub-para-
graphs (a) and (b), shall be changed; provided, however, that this amount shall in no
case exceed 900 million francs or be lower than 450 million francs. The changed
amount shall apply to incidents which occur after the date of the decision effecting
the change. (See Decisions set out on page 48)
7. The Fund' shall, at the request of a Contracting State, use its good offices as
necessary to assist that State to secure promptly such personnel, material and
services as are necessary to enable the State to take measures to prevent or mitigate
pollution damage arising from an incident in respect of which the Fund may be called
upon to pay compensation under this Convention.
8. The Fund may on conditions to be laid down in the Internal Regulations
provide credit facilities with a view to the taking of preventive measures against
pollution damage arising from a particular incident in respect of which the Fund
may be called upon to pay compensation under this Convention.
Article 5
1. For the purpose of fulfilling its function under Article 2, paragraph l(b), the
Fund shall indemnify the owner and his guarantor for that portion of the aggregate
amount of liability under the Liability Convention which:
(a) is in excess of an amount equivalent to 1,500 francs for each ton of the
ship's tonnage or of an amount of 125 million francs, whichever is the less,
and
1")
(b) isnot in excess of an amount equivalent to 2,000 francs for each ton of the
said tonnage or an amount of 210 million francs, whichever is the less,
provided, however, that the Fund shall incur no ~bligati?n under this paragraph
where the pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct of the owner
himself.
2. The Assembly may decide that the Fund shall, on conditions to be laid down in
the Internal Regulations, assume the obligations of a guarantor in respect of ships
referred to in Article 3, paragraph 2, with regard to the portion of laibility referred
to in paragraph 1 of this Article. However, the Fund shall assume such obligations
only if the owner so requests and if he maintains adequate insurance or other
financial security covering the owner's liability under the Liability Convention up to
an amount equivalent to 1,500 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage or an
amount of 125 million francs, whichever is the less. If the Fund assumes such obliga-
tions, the owner shall in each Contracting State be considered to have complied with
Article VII of the Liability Convention in respect of the portion of his liability
mentioned above.
3. The Fund may be exonerated wholly or partially from its obligations under
paragraph I towards the owner and his guarantor if the Fund proves that as a result
of the actual fault or privity of the owner :
(a) the ship from which the oil causing the pollution damage escaped did not
comply with the requirements laid down in:
(i) the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended in 1962; or
(ii) the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960; or
(iii) the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966; or
(iv) the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960; or
(v) any amendments to the above-mentioned Conventions which have
been determined as being of an important nature in accordance with
Article XVI(5) of the Convention mentioned under (i), Article IX(e)
of the Convention mentioned under (ii) or Article 29(3)(d) or (4)(d)
of the Convention mentioned under (iii), provided, however, that
such amendments had been in force for at least twelve months at the
time of the inciden t;
and
(b) the incident or damage was caused wholly or partially by such non-com-
pliance.
The p~ovisi~ns of thi~ paragrapl~ shall apply irrespective of whether the Contracting
State In which the ship was registered or whose flag it was flying is a Party to the
relevant Instrumen1.
~. Upon the entry into force of a new Convention designed to replace, in whole or
In part., any of the. Instruments specified in paragraph 3, the Assembly may decide at
least SIX months In advance a date on which the new Convention will replace such
Instr~ment or pa.rt thereof for the purpose of paragraph 3. However, any State Party
to this Convention may declare to the Director before that date that it does not
accept. such replaceme~t; in .which ~ase the .decision of the Assembly shall have no
effe~t I.n respect of a ship registered In, or flying the flag of, that State at the time of
the incident. Such a declaration may be withdrawn at any later date and shall in any
event ce~se to have effect when the State in question becomes a Party to such new
Convention. (See Decisions set out on page 48)
.J. L""'- ;).lUp \".VlIlP1'y J.JJ5 VY1Lll Lilt; 1.t;y'Ullt;11It;lIl~ HI all amenument IO an Instrument
specified in paragraph 3 or with requirements in a new Convention, where the
amendment or Convention is designed to replace in whole or in part such Instrument,
shall be considered as complying with the requirements in the said Instrument for
the purposes of paragraph 3.
6. Where the Fund, acting as a guarantor by virtue of paragraph 2, has paid
compensation for pollution damage in accordance with the Liability Convention, it
shall have a right of recovery from the owner if and to the extent that the Fund
would have been exonerated pursuant to paragraph 3 from its obligations under
paragraph 1 to indemnify the owner.
7. Expenses reasonably incurred and sacrifices reasonably made by the owner
voluntarily to prevent or minimize polution damage shall be treated as included in
the owner's liability for the purposes of this Article.
Article 6
I . Rights to compensation under Article 4 or indemnification under Article 5
shall be extinguished unless an action is brought thereunder or a notification has
been made pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 6, within three years from the date
when the damage occurred. However, in no case shall an action be brought after six
years from the date of the incident which caused the damage.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph I, the right of the owner or his guarantor to seek
indemnification from the Fund pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1, shall in no case
be extinguished before the expiry of a period of six months as from the date on
which the owner or his guarantor acquired knowledge of the bringing of an action
against him under the Liability Convention.
Article 7
I . Subject to the subsequent provisions of this Article , any action against the Fund
for compensation under Article 4 or indemnification under Article 5 of this Conven-
tion shall be brought only before a court competent under Article IX of the Liability
Convention in respect of actions against the owner who is or who would, but for
the provisions of Article Ill, paragraph 2, of that Convention, have been liable for
pollution damage caused by the relevan t incident.
2. Each Contracting State shall ensure that its courts possess the necessary juris-
diction to entertain such actions against the Fund as are referred to in paragraph I.
3. Where an action for compensation for pollution damage has been brought
before a court competent under Article IX of the Liability Convention against the
owner of a ship or his guarantor, such court shall have exclusive jurisdictional
competence over any action against the Fund for compensation or indemnification
under the provisions of Article 4 or 5 of this Convention in respect of the same
damage . However, where an action for compensation for pollution damage under the
Liability Convention has been brought before a court in a State Party to the Liability
Convention but not to this Convention , any action against the Fund under Article 4
or under Article 5, paragraph I, of this Convention shall at the option of the claimant
be brought either before a court of the Sta te where the Fund has its headquarters or
before any court of a State Party to this Convention competent under Article IX of
the Liability Convention.
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4. Each Contracting-State shall ensure that the Fundshall have fheright to intervene
as a party to any legal proceedings instituted in accordance wi~. Article IX of the
Liability Convention before a competent court of that State against the owner of a
ship or his guarantor.
5. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 6, the Fund shall not be bound by
any judgment or decision in proceedings to which it has not been a party or by any
settlement to which it is not a party.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 4, where an action under the
Liability Convention for compensation for pollution damage has been brought
against an owner or his guarantor before a competent court in a Contracting State,
each party to the proceedings shall be entitled under the national law of that State
to notify the Fund of the proceedings. Where such notification has been made in
accordance with the formalities required by the law of the court seized and in such
time and in such a manner that the Fund has in fact been in a position effectively to
intervene as a party to the proceedings, any judgment rendered by the court in such
proceedings shall, after it has become fmal and enforceable in the State where the
judgment was given, become binding upon the Fund in the sense that the facts and
fmdings in that judgment may not be disputed by the Fund even if the Fund has not
actually intervened in the proceedings.
Article 8
Subject to any decision concerning the distribution referred to in Article 4,
paragraph 5, any judgment given 'against the Fund by a court having jurisdiction in
accordance with Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 3, shall, when it has become enforceable
in the State of origin and is in that State no longer subject to ordinary forms of
review, be recognized and enforceable in each Contracting State on the same condi-
tions as are prescribed in Article X of the Liability Convention.
Article 9
1. Subject to the provisions of Article 5, the Fund shall, in respect of any amount
of compensation for pollution damage paid by the Fund in accordance with Article
4, paragraph 1, of this Convention, acquire by subrogation the rights that the person
so compensated may enjoy under the Liability Convention against the owner or his
guarantor.
2. Nothing in .this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse or subrogation
of the Fund against persons other than those referred to in the preceding paragraph.
In any event the right of the ~und to subrogation against such person shall not be less
favourable than that of an insurer of the person to whom compensation or indem-
nification has been paid.
3. Without prejudice to any other rights of subrogation or recourse against the
Fund whi~h may exist,. a Contract~ng State or agency thereof which has paid
compensa.tlon for POllU!IOn da~age m accordance with provisions of national law
shall acquireby subrogation the nghts which the person so compensated would have
enjoyed under this Convention.
Contributions
Article 10
1. Contributions to the Fund shall be made in respect of each Contracting State
by any person who, in the calendar year referred to in Article 11, paragraph 1, as
regards initial contributions and in Article 12, paragraphs 2 (a) or (b), as regards
annual contributions, has received in total quantities exceeding 150,000 tons:
(a) in the ports or terminal installations in the territory of that State contribu-
ting oil carried by sea to such ports or terminal installations; and
(b) in any installations situated in the territory of that Contracting State
contributing oil which has been carried by sea and discharged in a port or
terminal installation of a non-Contracting State, provided that contributing
oil shall only be taken into account by virtue of this sub-paragraph on first
receipt in a Contracting State after its discharge in that non-Contracting
State.
2. (a) For the purposes of paragraph 1, where the quantity of contributing oil
received in the territory of a Contracting State by any person in a calendar
year when aggregated with the quantity of contributing oil received in the
same Contracting State in that year by any associated person or persons
exceeds 150,000 tons, such person shall pay contributions in respect of the
actual quantity received by him notwithstanding that that quantity did not
exceed 150,000 tons.
(b) "Associated person" means any subsidiary or commonly controlled entity.
The question whether a person comes within this definition shall be deter-
mined by the national law of the State concerned.
Article 11
I. In respect of each Contracting State initial contributions shall be made of an
amount which shall for each person referred to in Article lObe calculated on the
basis of a fixed sum for each ton of contributing oil received by him during the
calendar year preceding that in which this Convention entered into force for that
State.
2. The sum referred to in paragraph I shall be determined by the Assembly within
two months after the entry into force of this Convention. In performing this function
the Assembly shall, to the ex tent possible, fix the sum in such a way that the total
amount of initial contributions would, if contributions were to be made in respect
of 90 per cent of the quantities of contributing oil carried by sea in the world, equal
75 million francs.
3. The initial contributions shall in respect of each Contracting State be paid within
three months following the date at which the Convention entered into force for that
State.
Article 12
1. With a view to assessing for each person referred to in Article 10 the amount of
annua.1 con.tri~utions due, if any, and taking account of the necessity to maintain
sufficient liquid funds, the Assembly shall for each calendar year make an estimate
in the form of a budget of:
(c)
(i) Expenditure
(a) costs and expenses of the administration of the Fund in the relevantyear
and any deficit from operations in preceding years;
(b) payments to be made by the Fund in t~e relevant rear f~r the satisfaction
of claims against the Fund due under Article 4 or:5, m~ludmg repay~ent on
loans previously taken by the Fund for the satisfaction of such claims, to
the extent that the aggregate amount of such claims in respect of anyone
incident does not exceed 15 million francs;
payments to be made by the Fund in the relevant year for the satisfaction
of claims against the Fund due under Article 4 or 5, including repayments
on loans previously taken by the Fund for the satisfaction of such claims,
to the extent that the aggregate amount of such claims in respect of anyone
incident is in excess of 15 million francs ;
(ii) Income
(a) surplus funds from operations in preceding years, including any interest;
(b) initial contributions to be paid in the course of the year;
(c) annual contributions, if required to balance the budget ;
(d) any other income.
2. For each person referred to in Article 10 the amount of his annual contribution
shall be determined by the Assembly and shall be calculated in respect of each
Contracting State: .
(a) in so far as the contribution is for the satisfaction of payments referred to
in paragraph 1(i)(a) and (b) on the basis of a fixed sum for each ton of
contributing oil received in the relevant State by such persons during the
preceding calandar year; and
(b) in so far as the contribution is for the satisfaction of payments referred to
in paragraph 1(i) (c) of this Article on the basis of a fixed sum for each ton
ofcontributing oil received by such person during the calendar year preced-
ing that in which the incident in question occurred, provided that State was
a Party to this Convention at the date of the incident.
3. The sums referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be arrived at by dividing the
relevant total amount of contributions required by the total amount of contributing
oil received in all Contracting States in the relevant year.
4. The Assembly shall decide the portion of the annual contribution which shall
be immediately paid in cash and decide on the date of payment. The remaining part
of each annual contribution shall be paid upon notification by the Director.
5. The Director may, in cases and in accordance with conditions to be laid down
in the Internal Regulations of the Fund, require a contributor to provide financial
security for the sums due from him.
6. Any demand for payments made under paragraph 4 shall be called rateably from
~1I inrli".r1 ....1 ,........ t.a...• ~ __
Article 13
1. The amount of any contribution due under Article 12 and which is in arrear shall
bear interest at a rate which shall be determined by the Assembly for each calendar
year provided that different rates may be fixed for different circumstances.
2. Each Contracting State shall ensure that any obligation to contribute to the
Fund arising under this Convention in respect of oil received within the territory of
that State is fulfilled and shall take any appropriate measures under its law, including
the imposing of such sanctions as it may deem necessary, with a view to the effective
execution of any such obligation; provided, however, that such measures shall only
be directed against those persons who are under an obligation to contribute to the
Fund.
3. Where a person who is liable in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10
and 11 to make contributions to the Fund does not fulfil his obligations in respect
of any such contribution or any part thereof and is in arrear for a period exceeding
three months, the Director shall take all appropriate action against such person on
behalf of the Fund with a view to the recovery of the amount due. However, where
the defaulting contributor is manifestly insolvent or the circumstances otherwise
so warrant, the Assembly may, upon recommendation of the Director, decide that
no action shall be taken or continued against the contributor.
Article 14
1. Each Contracting State may at the time when it deposits its instrument of
ratification or accession or at any time thereafter declare that it assumes itself
obligations that are incumbent under this Convention on any person who is liable to
contribute to the Fund in accordance with Article 10, paragraph I, in respect of oil
received within the territory of that State . Such declaration shall be made in writing
and shall specify which obligations are assumed.
2. Where a declaration under paragraph 1 is made prior to the entry into force of
this Convention in accordance with Article 40, it shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the Organization who shall after the entry into force of the
Convention communicate the declaration to the Director.
3. A declaration under paragraph 1 which is made after the entry into force of this
Convention shall be deposited with the Director.
4. A declaration made in accordance with this Article may be withdrawn by the
relevant State giving notice thereof in writing to the Director. Such notification shall
take effect three months after the Director's receipt thereof.
5. An~ State which is ?ou~d by a declaration made under this Article shall, in any
proc~edm.gs brought aga.mst It ~efore a competent court in respect of any obligation
specified m the declaration, waive any immunity that it would otherwise be entitled
to invoke.
Article 15
1: ~ac~ ~ontrac.ting ~tate shall ensure that any person who receives contributing
oil within Its territory m such quantities that he is liable to contribute to the Fund
a~pearson a list to be established and kept up to date by the Director in accordance
With thp ~lIhc;:>r1t... n+ ~.~•• :_: -- - - r ••. • . '
2. For the purposes set out in paragraph 1, .each.Contracting State shal! communi- .
cate at a time and in the manner to be prescnbed In the Internal Regulations, to the
Director the name and address of any person who in respect of that State is liable to
contribute to the Fund pursuant to Article 10, as well as data on the relevant quanti-
ties of contributing oil received by any such person during the preceding cale!1dar
year.
3. For the purposes of ascertaining who are, at any given time, the persons liable
to contribute to the Fund in accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1, and of establish-
ing, where applicable, the quantities of oil to be taken into account for any such
person when determining the amount of his contribution, the list shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
Organization and Administration
Article 16
The Fund shall have an Assembly, a Secretariat headed by a Director and , in
accordance with the provisions of Article 21 , an Executive Committee.
Assembly
Article 17
The Assembly shall consist of all Contracting States to this Convention.
Article 18
The functions of the Assembly shall , subject to the provisions of Article 26, be:
I. to elect at each regular session its Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen who shall
hold office until the next regular session ;
2. to determine its own rules of procedure, subject to the provisions of this
Convention;
3. to adopt Internal Regulations necessary for the proper functioning of the Fund;
4. to appoint the Director and make provisions for the appointment of such other
personnel as may be necessary and determine the terms and conditions of service of
the Director and other personnel;
5. to adopt the annual budget and fix the annual contributions;
6. to appoint auditors and approve the accounts of the Fund;
7. to a~pr?ve ~ettlements of .claims against the Fund, to take decisions in respect
of the dlstnb.utlOn ~mong claimants of the available amount of compensation in
accordance with Article 4, paragraph 5, .and to determine the terms and conditions
a~cording to which provisional payments in respect of claims shall be made with a
vIew. to ensuring that victims of pollution damage are compensated as promptly as
possible;
8. to elect the members of the Assembly to be represented on the Executive
Committee, as provided in Articles 2 I, 22 and 23;
9. to establish any temnorarv or np.rm~npnt e.- .. h ..;,l; ...... , "'~,.I .. :.. _
10. to determine which non-Contracting States and which inter-governmental and
international non-governmental organizations shall be admitted to take part, without
voting rights, in meetings of the Assembly, the Executive Committee, and subsidiary
bodies;
11. to give instructions concerning the administration of the Fund to the Director,
the Executive Committee and subsidiary bodies;
12. to review and approve the reports and activities of the executive Committee;
13. to supervise the proper. execution of the Convention and of its own decisions;
14. . to perform such other functions as are allocated to it under the Convention or
are otherwise necessary for the proper operation of the Fund.
Article 19
1. Regular sessions of the Assembly shall take place once every calendar year upon
convocation by the Director; provided , however, that if the Assembly allocates to
the Executive Committee the functions specified in Article 18, paragraph 5, regular
sessions of the Assembly shall be held once every two years.
2. Extraordinary sessions of the Assembly shall be convened by the Director at the
request of the Executive Committee or of at least one-third of the members of the
Assembly and may be convened on the Director's .own initiative after consultation
with the Chairman of the Assembly . The Director shall give members at least thirty
days' notice of such sessions.
Article 20




The Executive Committee shall be established at the first regular session of the
Assembly after the date on which the number of Contracting States reaches fifteen.
Article 22
1. The Executive Committee shall consist of one-third of the members of the
Assembly but of not less than seven or more than fifteen members. Where the number
of members of the Assembly is not divisible by three, the one-third referred to shall
be calculated on the next higher number which is divisible by three.
2. When electing the members of the Executive Committee the Assembly shall:
(a) secure an equitable geographical distribution of the seats on the Committee
on the basis of an ~dequat~ represe~tation of Contracting States particularly
exposed to the nsks of 011 pollution and of Contracting States having large
tanker flppfl:· ~nrl
(b) elect one half of the members of the Committee, or in case the total number
of members to be elected is uneven, such number of the members as is
equivalent to one half of the tot~l number less one, ~ong th?se Contract-
ing States in the territory of which the l~rgest q~anhhes of od. to be taken
into account under Article 10 were received durmg the preceding calendar
year, provided that the number of States eligible under this sub-paragraph
shall be limited as shown in the table below:
Total number Number of States Number of States
of Members on eligible under to be elected under










3. A member of the Assembly which was eligible but was not elected under sub-
paragraph (b) shall not be eligible to be elected for any remaining seat on the
Executive Committee.
Article 23
1. Members of the Executive Committee shall hold office until the end of the next
regular session of the Assembly.
2. Except to the extent that may be necessary for complying with the requirements
of Article 22, no State Member of the Assembly may serve on the Executive Com-
mittee for more than two consecutive terms.
Article 24
The Executive Committee shall meet at least once every calendar year at thirty
days' notice upon convocation by the Director, either on his own initiative or at the
request of its Chairman or of at least one -third of its members. It shall meet at such
places as may be convenien1.
Article 25
At least two-thirds of the members of the Executive Committee shall constitute
a quorum for its meetings.
Article 26
1. The functions of the Executive Committee shall be :
(a) to elect its Chairman and adopt its own rules of procedure, except as other-
wise provided in this Convention ;
(b) to assume and exercise in place of the Assembly the following functions :
(i) makin~ provision for the appointment of such personnel, other than
the I?I!ector, as I?ay be necessary and determining the terms and
t"nnrllltll"....".. "t"n ~.. r 1 ..
(ii) approving settlements of claims against the Fund and taking all other
steps envisaged in relation to such claims in Article 18, paragraph? ;
(iii) giving instructions to the Director concerning the administration of
the Fund and supervising the proper execution by him of the Conven-
tion, of the decisions of the Assembly and of the Committee's own
decisions; and
(c) to perform such other functions as are allocated to it by the Assembly.
2. The Executive Committee shall each year prepare and publish a report of the
activities of the Fund during the previous calendar year.
Article 27
Members of the Assembly who are not members of the Executive Committee
shall have the right to attend its meetings as observers.
Secretariat
Article 28
1. The Secretariat shall comprise the Director and such staff as the administration
of the Fund may require.
2. The Director shall be the legal representative of the Fund.
Article 29
1. The Director shall be the chief administrative officer of the Fund and shall,
subject to the instructions given to him by the Assembly and by the Executive Com-
mittee, perform those functions which are assigned to him by this Convention, the
Internal Regulations, the Assembly and the Executive Committee.
2. The Director shall in particular :
(a) appoint the personnel required for the administration of the Fund;
(b) take all appropriate measures with a view to the proper administration of
the Fund's assets;
(c) collect the contributions due under this Convention while observing in
particular the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 3;
(d) to the extent necessary to deal with claims against the Fund and carry out
the other functions of the Fund , employ the services of legal, financial and
other experts;
(e) take all appropriate measures for dealing with claims against the Fund within
the limits and on conditions to be laid down in the Internal Regulations,
including the final settlement of claims without the prior approval of the
Assembly or the Executive Committee where these Regulations so provide;
(f) Prepare and submit to the Assembly or to the Executive Committee. as the
case may be, the financial statements and budget estimates for each calendar
year;
(g) assist the Executive Committee in the preparation of the report referred to
in Article 26, paragraph 2;
(h) prepare, collect and circulate the papers, documents, agenda, minutes and
information that may be required for the work of the Assembly, the Execu-
tive Committee and subsidiary bodies.
Article 30
In the performance of their duties the Director and the staff and experts appoint-
ed by him shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any
authority external to the Fund. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect
on their position as international officials. Each Contracting State on its part under-
takes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the
Director and the staff and experts appointed by him, and not to seek to influence
them in the discharge of their duties.
Finances
Article 31
I . Each Contracting State shall bear the salary, travel and other expenses of its own
delegation to the Assembly and of its representatives on the Executive Committee
and on subsidiary bodies.




The following provisions shall apply to voting in the Assembly and the Executive
Committee:
(a) each member shall have one vote;
(b) except as otherwise provided in Article 33, decisions of the Assembly and
the Executive Committee shall be by a majority vote of the members present
and voting;
(c) decisions where a three-fourths or a two-thirds majority is required shall be
by a three-fourths or two-thirds majority vote, as the case may be, of those
present;
(d) for the purpose of this Article the phrase "members present" means
"members present at the meeting at the time of the vote", and the phrase
"members present and voting" means "members present and casting an
affirmative or negative vote" . Members who abstain from voting shall be
considered as not voting.
Article 33
I. The following decisions of the Assembly shall require a three-fourths majority:
(a) an increase in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6, in the maximum
amount of compensation payable by the Fund;
(b) a determination, under Article 5 , paragraph 4, relating to the replacement
of the Instruments referred to in that paragraph;
(c) the allocation to thp J:'VPt·llt;uo r- ., __ :,, __ r .•
1.. The following decisions of the Assembly shall require a two-thirds majority:
(a) a decision under Article 13, paragraph 3, not to take or continue action
against a contributor;
(b) the appointment of the Director under Article 18, paragraph 4;
(c) the establishment of subsidiary bodies, under Article 18, paragraph 9.
Article 34
1. The Fund, its assets, income, including contributions, and other property shall
enjoy in all Contracting States exemption from all direct taxation.
2. When the Fund makes substantial purchases of movable or immovable property,
or has important work carried out which is necessary for the exercise of its official
activities and the cost of which includes indirect taxes or sales taxes, the Govern-
ments of Member States shall take, whenever possible, appropriate measures for the
remission or refund of the amount of such duties and taxes.
3. No exemption shall be accorded in the case of duties, taxes or dues which merely
constitute payment for public utility services.
4. The Fund shall enjoy exemption from all customs duties, taxes and other related
taxes on articles imported or exported by it or on its behalf for its official use. Articles
thus imported shall not be transferred either for consideration or gratis on the
territory of the country into which they have been imported except on conditions
agreed by the Government of that country .
5. Persons contributing to the Fund and victims and owners of ships receiving
compensation from the Fund shall be subject to the fiscal legislation of the State
where they are taxable, no special exemption or other benefit being conferred on
them in this respect.
6. Information relating to individual contributors supplied for the purpose of this
Convention shall not be divulged outside the Fund except in so far as it may be
strictly necessary to enable the Fund to carry out its functions including the bring-
ing and defending of legal proceedings.
7. Independently of existing or future regulations concerning currency or transfers,
Contracting States shall authorize the transfer and payment of any contribution to
the Fund and of any compensation paid by the Fund without any restriction.
Transitional Provisions
Article 35
1. The Fund shall incur no obligation whatsoever under Article 4 or 5 in respect of
incidents occurring within a period of one hundred and twenty days after the entry
into force of this Convention.
2. Claims for compensation under Article 4 and claims for indemnification under
Article 5, arising from incidents occurring later than one hundred and twenty days
but not later than two hundred and forty days after the entry into force of this
Convention may not be brought against the Fund prior to the elapse of the two
hundred and fortieth day after the entry into force of this Convention.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the Organization shall convene the first session of the
Assembly. This session shall take place as soon as possible after entry into force of




I. This Convention shall be open for signature by the States which have signed or
which accede to the Liability Convention, and by any State represented at the
Conference on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1971. The Convention shall remain open for signature until
31 December 1972.
2. Subject to paragraph 4, this Convention shall be ratified, accepted or approved
by the States which have signed it.
3. Subject to paragraph 4, this Convention is open for accession by States which
did not sign it.
4. This Convention may be ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to, only by
States which have ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to the Liability Convention.
Article 38
I. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit
of a formal instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General of the Organization.
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after
the entry into force of an amendment to this Convention with respect to all existing
Contracting States or after the completion of all measures required for the entry
into force of the amendment with respect to those Parties shall be deemed to apply
to the Convention as modified by the amendment.
Article 39
Before this Convention comes into force a State shall, when depositing an
instrument referred to in Article 38, paragraph I, and annually thereafter at a date
to be determined by the Secretary-General of the Organization, communicate to him
the name and address of any person who in respect of that State would be liable to
contribute to the Fund pursuant to Article 10 as well as data on the relevant
quantities of contributing oil received by any such person in the territory of that
State during the preceding calendar year. .
Article 40
I. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date
on which the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) at least eiaht States have dp.nm:it~rI ;n .. tr.. " _ _ r .. • or-
(b) the Secretary-General of the Organization has received information in
accordance with Article 39 that those persons in such States who would be
liable to contribute pursuant to Article 10 have received during the preceding
calendar year a total quantity of at least 750 million tons of contributing
oil.
2. However, this Convention shall not enter into force before the Liability Conven-
tion has entered into force.
3. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it,
this Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State
of the appropriate instrument.
Article 41
1. This Convention may be denounced by any Contracting State at any time after
the date on which the Convention comes into force for that State.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument with the
Secretary-General of the Organization.
3. A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be
specified in the instrument .of denunciation, after its deposit with the Secretary-
General of the Organization.
4. Denunciation of the Liability Convention shall be deemed to be a denunciation
of this Convention. Such denunciation shall take effect on the same date as the
denunciation of the Liability Convention takes effect according to paragraph 3 of
Article XVI of that Convention.
5. Notwithstanding a denunciation by a Contracting State pursuant to this Article,
any provisions of this Convention relating to the obligations to make contributions
under Article 10 with respect to an incident referred to in Article 12, paragraph 2(b),
and occurring before the denunciation takes effect shall continue to apply.
Article 42
1. Any Contracting State may, within ninety days after the deposit of an instru-
ment of denunciation the result of which it considers will significantly increase the
level of contributions for remaining Contracting States, request the Director to
convene an extraordinary session of the Assembly. The Director shall convene the
Assembly to meet not later than sixty days .after receipt of the request.
2. The Director may convene, on his own initiative, an extraordinary session of the
Assembly to meet within sixty days after the deposit of any instrument of denuncia-
tion, if he considers that such denunciation will result in a significant increase in the
level of contributions for the remaining Contracting States.
3. If the Assembly at an extraordinary session convened in accordance with para-
graph 1 or 2 decides that the denunciation will result in a significant increase in the
level of contributions for the remamlngContracnng States, any such State may, not
later than one hundred and twenty days before the date on which that denunciation
takes effect, denounce this Convention with effect from the same date.
Article 43
1. This Convention shall cease to be in force on the date when the number of
Contracting States falls below three.
2. Contracting States which are bound by this Convention on the date before the
day it ceases to be in force shall enable the Fund to exercise its functions as described
under Article 44 and shall, for that purpose only, remain bound by this Convention.
Article 44
I. If this Convention ceases to be in force , the Fund shall nevertheless
(a) meet its obligations in respect of any incident occurring before the Conven-
tion ceased to be in force;
(b) be entitled to exercise its rights to contributions to the extent that these
contributions are necessary to meet the obligations under sub-paragraph (a),
including expenses for the administration of the Fund necessary for this
purpose.
2. The Assembly shall take all appropriate measures to complete the winding up of
the Fund, including the distribution in an equitable manner of any remaining assets
among those persons who have contributed to the Fund.
3. For the purposes of this Article the Fund shall remain a legal person.
Article 45
I. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending this Convention may be
convened by the Organization. .
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of the Contracting States for the
purpose of revising or amending this Convention at the request of not less than one-
third of all Contracting States.
Article 46
I. This Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organiza--
tion.
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization shall:
(a) inform all States which have signed or acceded to this Convention of:
(i) each new signature or deposit of instrument and the date thereof;
(ii) the date of entry into force of the Convention;
(iii) any denunciation of the Convention and the date on which it takes
effect;
(b) transmit certifie.d true copies of this Convention to all Signatory States and
to all States which accede to the Convention.
Article 47
As so~n as this Convention enters into force, a certified true copy thereof shall
be tran.smltted .by the Secretary-General of the Organization to the Secretariat of
the I Inltprf N·~to",..... f"....~~._.-._. , . • • . . .
Article 48
This Convention is established in a single original in the English and French
languages,both texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the Russian and
Spanish languages shall be prepared by the Secretariat of the Organization and
deposited with the signed original.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries" being duly authorized
for that purpose have signed the present Convention.
DONE at Brussels this eighteenth day of December one thousand nine hundred
and seventy-one.
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR
COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1971
THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT PROTOCOL,
HAVING CONSIDERED the International Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done at
Brussels on 18 December 1971;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article I
For the purpose of the present Protocol :
1. "Convention" means the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971.
2. "Liability Convention" has the same meaning as in the Convention.
3. ''Organization'' has the same meaning as in the Convention.
4. "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the Organization.
Article II
Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Convention is replaced by the following text:
"Unit of Account" or "Monetary Unit" means the unit of account or monetary
unit as the case may be, referred to in Article V of the Liability Convention, as
amended by the Protocol thereto adopted on 19 November 1976.
Article III
The amounts referred to in the Convention shall wherever they appear be
amended as follows:
(a) Article 4:
(i) "450 million francs" is replaced by "30 million units of account or
450 million monetary units";
[ii) "900 million francs" is replaced by "60 million units of account or
900 million monetary units".
(b) In Article 5:
(i) "1,500 francs" is replaced by "100 units of account or 1,500
monetary units";
(ii) "125 million francs" is replaced by "8,333 000 units of account or
125 million monetary units"; ,
(ill) ''2,000 francs" is replaced by "133 units of account or 2000 mone-
tary units"; ,
(iv) ''210.million francs" is replaced by "14 million units of account nr
.., 1n _:11:~_ -~ - .. . . • . •.
(c) In Article 11, "75 million francs" is replaced by "5 million units of account
or 75 million monetary units".
(d) In Article 12, "15 million francs" is replaced by "I million units 'of account
or 15 million monetary units".
Article IV
1. The present Protocol shall be open for signature by .an~ State which has signed
the Convention or acceded thereto and by any State invited to attend the Con-
ference to Revise the Unit of Account Provisions in the International Convention
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1971, held in London from 17 to 19 November 1976. The Protocol shall
be open for signature from 1 February 1977 to 31 December 1977 at the Head-
quarters of the Organization.
2. Subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, the present Protocol shall be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the States which have signed it.
3. Subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, this Protocol shall be open for accession
by States which did not sign it.
4. The present Protocol may be ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by
States Parties to the Convention.
Article V
1. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit
of a formal instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General.
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited
after the entry into force of an amendment to the present Protocol with respect to
all existing Parties or after the completion of all measures required for the entry
into force of the amendment with respect to all existing Parties shall be deemed to
apply to the Protocol as modified by the amendment.
Article VI
1. The present Protocol shall enter into force for the States which have ratified,
accepted, approved or acceded to it on the ninetieth day following the date on
which the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) at least eight States have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession with the Secretary-General, and
(b) the Secretary-General has received information in accordance with Article
39 of the Convention that those persons in such States who would be
liable to contribute pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention have received
during the preceding calendar year a total quantity of at least 750 million
tons of contributing oil.
2. However, the present Protocol shall not enter into force before the Convention
has entered into force.
3. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it,
the present Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by
such State of the appropriate instrument.
Article VII
1. The present Protocol may be denounced by any Party at any time after the
date on which the Protocol enters into force for that Party.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument with the
Secretary-General.
3. Denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be speci-
fied in the instrument of denunciation, after its deposit with the Secretary-General.
Article VIII
1. A conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Protocol may
be convened by the Organization.
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of Parties to the present Protocol
for the purpose of revising or amending it at the request of not less than one-third
of the Parties.
Article IX
1. The present Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.
2. The Secretary-General shall:
(a) inform all States which have signed the present Protocol or acceded there-
to of:
(i) each new signature or deposit of an instrument together with the
date thereof;
(ii) the date of entry into force of the present Protocol;
(ill) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of the present Proto-
.col together with the date on which the denunciation takes effect;
(iv) any amendments to the present Protocol;
(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Protocol to all States which
have signed the present Protocol or acceded thereto.
Article X
As soon as this Protocol enters into force, a certified true copy thereof shall
be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Secretariat of the United Nations
for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations.
Article XI
The present Protocol is established in a single original in the English and
French languages, both texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the
~ussian and Spanish languages shall be prepared by the Secretariat of the On7~n17~-+.01""\. ..... __ ..J ...:1 .... _ -, ....... • - -
DONE AT WNDON this nineteenth day of November one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-six.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned* being duly authorized for that
purpose have signed the present Protocol.
"Signatures omitted.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
The States Parties to the present Convention,
CONSCIOUS of the dangers of pollution posed by the worldwide maritime
carriage of oil in bulk,
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available
to persons who suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape or
discharge of oil from ships,
DESIRING to adopt uniform international rules and procedures for deter-
mining questions of liability and providing adequate compensation in such
cases,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
Article I
For the purposes of this Convention :
I. "Ship" means any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type
whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo.
2. "Person" means any individual or partnership or any public or private
body, whether corporate or not, including a State or any of its constituent
subdivisions.
3. "Owner" means the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or,
in the absence of registration, the person or persons owning the ship. How-
ever in the case of a ship owned by a State and operated by a company which
in that State is registered as the ship's operator, "owner" shall mean such
company.
4. "State of the ship's registry" means in relation to registered ships the State
of registration of the ship, and in relation to unregistered ships the State whose
flag the ship is flying.
5. "Oil" means any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil,
lubricating oil and whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the
bunkers of such a ship.
6. "Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying
oil by contamination resul~ing from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship,
~herever such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preven-
tive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.
7. "Preventive. ~easures" means any reasonable. ~easures taken by any
person after an incident has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage.
8. "Incident" means any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same
origin, which causes pollution damage.
9. "Organization" means the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization.
Article 11
This Convention shall apply exclusively to pollution damage caused on the
territory including the territorial sea of a Contracting State and to preventive
measures taken to prevent or 'minimize such damage.
Article III
1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a
ship at the time of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series of
occurrences at the time of the first such occurrence, shall be liable for any
pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the
ship as a result of the incident.
2. No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that
the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a
natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible
character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage by a third party, or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of
lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of that function.
3. If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially
either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person
who suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person, the owner may
be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to such person.
4. No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be made against the
owner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention. No claim for
pollution damage under this Convention or otherwise may be made against the
servants or agents of the owner.
5. Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the
owner against third parties.
Article IV
~hen oil has escaped or has been discharged from two or more ships, and
pollution damage results therefrom, the owners of all the ships concerned,
unless exonerated under Article Ill, shall be jointly and severally liable for all
such damage which is not reasonably separable.
Article V
1. The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Con-
vention in respect of anyone incident to an aggr~gate amount of 2,000 francs
for each ton of the ship's tonnage. However, this aggregate amount shall not
in any event exceed 210 million francs.
2. If the incident occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner,
he shall not be entitled to avail himself of the limitation provided in paragraph
1 of this Article.
3. For the purpose of availing himself of the ben~fit of limitation provided for
in paragraph I of this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum
representing the limit of his liability with ~he ~ourt ?r ~ther competent
authority of anyone of the Contracting States In which action IS brought under
Article IX. The fund can be constituted either by depositing the sum or by
producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation
of the Contracting State where the fund is constituted, and considered to be
adequate by the Court or another competent authority.
4. The fund shall be distributed among the claimants in proportion to the
amounts of their established claims,
5. If before the fund is distributed the owner or any of his servants or agents
or any person providing him insurance or other financial security has as a result
of the incident in question, paid compensation for pollution damage, such
person shall, up to the amount he has paid, acquire by subrogation the rights
which the person so compensated would have enjoyed under this Convention.
6. The right of subrogation provided for in paragraph 5 of this Article may
also be exercised by a person other than those mentioned therein in respect of
any amount of compensation for pollution damage which he may have paid but
only to the extent that such subrogation is permitted under the applicable
national law.
7. Where the owner or any other person establishes that he may be compelled
to pay at a later date in whole or in part any such amount of compensation, with
regard to which such person would have enjoyed a right of subrogation under
paragraphs 5 or 6 of this Article, had the compensation been paid before the
fund was distributed, the Court or other competent authority of the State where
the fund ~as been constituted may order that a sufficient sum shall be provision-
ally set aside to enable such person at such later date to enforce his claim against
the fund.
8. Claims in respect of expenses reasonably incurred or sacrifices reasonably
made by the o~ner volunt/~rily to prevent or minimize pollution damage shall
rank equally with other claims against the fund.
9. The fra~c .mentioned in this ~rti~le shall be a unit consisting of sixty-five
and a half milligrams of gold of millesirnal fineness nine hundred. The amount
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be converted into the national
curr~ncy of the State in which the fund is being constituted on the basis of the
official value of that currency by reference to the unit defined above on the date
of the constitution of the fund.
10. For the purpose of this Article the ship's tonnage shall be the net tonnage
of the ship with the addition of the amount deducted fr,?~ the gross tonnage
on account of engine room space for the purpose of ascertammg the net tonnage.
In the case of a ship which cannot be measured in accordance with the normal
rules of tonnage measurement, the ship's tonnage shall be deemed to be 40 per
cent of the weight in tons (of 2240 lbs) of oil which the ship is capable of carrying.
11. The insurer or other person providing financial security shall be entitled to
constitute a fund in accordance with this Article on the same conditions and
having the same effe~t as if it were constituted by the ow~e~. Such a fund may
be constituted even In the event of the actual fault or privity of the owner but
its constitution shall in that case not prejudice the rights of any claimant
against the owner.
Article VI
1. Where the owner, after an incident, has constituted a fund in accordance
with Article V, and is entitled to limit his liability;
(a) no person having a claim for pollution damage arising out of that
incident shall be entitled to exercise any right against any other assets
of the owner in respect of such claim;
(b) the Court or other competent authority of any Contracting State shall
order the release of any ship or other property belonging to the owner
which has been arrested in respect of a claim for pollution damage
arising out of that incident, and shall similarly release any bailor other
security furnished to avoid such arrest.
2. The foregoing shall, however, only apply if the claimant has access to the
Court administering the fund and the fund is actually available in respect or
his claim.
Article VII
1. The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying more than
2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo shall be required to maintain insurance or other
financial security, such as the guarantee of a bank or a certificate delivered by an
i~te~~ational ~omp~nsati,?n fund, in the sums fixed by applying the limits of
liability prescnbed In Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability for pollution
damage under this Convention.
2. A certificate attesting that insurance or other financial security is in force in
accordance .with the provisions of this Convention shall be issued to each ship.
It .s~all b~ Issued or certifi~d.by the appropriate authority of the State of the
ShII? s registry after d~te~mInI:~lg that t.he requirements of paragraph I of this
Article have been complied WIth. ThIS certIficate shall be in the form of the
annexed model and shall contain the following particulars:
(a) name of ship ~nd port of registration;
(b) name and principal place of business of owner;
(c) type of security;
(d) name and principal place of. business of insur~r or other pers?n giving
security and, where appropriate, place of business where the insurance
or security is established;
(e) period of validity of certificate which shall no~ be longer than the
period of validity of the insurance or other security,
3. The certificate shall be in the official language or languages of the .issuing
State. If the language used is neither English nor French, the text shall include
a translation into one of these languages.
4. The certificate shall be carried on board the ship and a copy shall be
deposited with the authorities who keep the record of the ship's registry.
5. An insurance or other financial security shall not satisfy the requirements of
this Article if it can cease, for reasons other than the expiry of the period of
validity of the insurance or security specified in the certificate under paragraph
2 of this Article, before three months have elapsed from the date on which
notice of its termination is given to the authorities referred to in paragraph 4 of
this Article, unless the certificate has been surrendered to these authorities or a
new certificate has been issued within the said period. The foregoing provisions
shall similarly apply to any modification which results in the insurance or
security no longer satisfying the requirements of this Article.
6. The State of registry shall, subject to the provisions of this Article, determine
the conditions of issue and validity of the certificate.
7. Certificates issued or certified under the authority of a Contracting State
shall be accepted by other Contracting States for the purposes of this Convention
and shall be regarded by other Contracting States as having the same force as
certificates issued or certified by them. A Contracting State may at any time
request consultation with the State of a ship's registry should it believe that the
insurer or guarantor named in the certificate is not financially capable of meeting
the obligations imposed by this Convention .
8. Any claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly
against the insurer or other person providing financial security for the owner's
liability for pollution damage. In such case the defendant may, irrespective of
the actual fault or privity of the owner, avail himself of the limits of liability
prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1. He may further avail himself of the
defences (other than the bankruptcy or winding up of the owner) which the
owner himself would have been entitled to invoke. Furthermore, the defendant
may avail himself of the defence that the pollution damage resulted from the
wilful misconduct of the owner himself, but the defendant shall not avail himself
of any other defence which he might have been entitled to invoke in proceedings
brought by the owner against him. The defendant shall in any event have the
right to require the owner to be joined in the proceedings.
? Any sums p~ovided by insurance.or by other financial security maintained
m accordance WIth paragraph I of this Article shall be available exclusively for
the satisfaction of claims under this Convention.
10.. A Con~racting State shall not permit a ship under its flag to which this
Article applies to trade unless a certificate has been issued under paragraph 2
or 12 of this Article.
11. Subject to the provisions of this Article, each Contracting S.tate shall
ensure under its national legislation, that insurance or other secunty to t.he
extent'specified in paragraph I of thi.s Article i~ i~ force ~n respect ' o~ ~ny ship,
wherever registered, entering or leaving a port In Its terntory, or arnvmg at or
leaving an off-shore terminal in its territorial sea, if the ship actually carnes more
than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo.
12. If insurance or other financial security is not maintained in respect of a ship
owned by a Contracting State, the provisions. of this Article rel~ting t~ereto
shall not be applicable to such ship, but the ship shall carry a certificate Issued
by the appropriate authorities of the State o~ t~e ~hip'~ re~istry stating. th.at the
ship is owned by that State and that the ship s liability ~s covered within the
limits prescribed by Article V, paragr3:ph I. Such a certificate .shall ~ollow as
closely as practicable the model prescnbed by paragraph 2 of this Article.
Article VUI
Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished unless an
action is brought thereunder within three years from the date when the damage
occurred. However, in no case shall an action be brought after six years from
the date of the incident which caused the damage. Where this incident consists
of a series of occurrences, the six years' period shall run from the date of the
first such occurrence.
Article IX
1. Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the territory including
the territorial sea of one or more Contracting States, or preventive measures
have been taken to prevent or minimize pollution damage in such territory
including the territorial sea, actions for compensation may only be brought in
the Courts of any such Contracting State or States. Reasonable notice of any
such action shall be given to the defendant.
2. Each Contracting State shall ensure that its Courts possess the necessary
jurisdiction to entertain such actions for compensation.
3. After the fund has been constituted in accordance with Article V the Courts
of the ?tate in which the fund is constituted shall be exclusively competent to
determine all matters relating to the apportionment and distribution of the fund.
Article X
1. Any judgment given by a Court with jurisdiction in accordance with Article
IX which is enforcea~le in the State of ~rigi~ where it is no longer subject to
ordinary forms of review, shall be recogmzed In any Contracting State, except:
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
(b) wh~re the defenda~t was not given reasonable notice and a fair oppor-
tumty to present hIS case.
2. A judgment recognized under paragraph 1 of th~s.Article .shal~ be enforce-
able in each Contracting State as soon as the formalities required In that State
have been complied with. The formalities shall not permit the merits of the
case to be re-opened.
Article XI
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to warships or other ships
owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government
non-commercial service.
2. With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for commercial
purposes, each State shall be subject to suit in the jurisdictions set forth in
Article IX and shall waive all defences based on its status as a sovereign State.
Article XII
This Convention shall supersede any International Conventions in force or
open for signature, ratification or accession at the date on which the Convention
is opened for signature, but only to the extent that such Conventions would be
in conflict with it; however, nothing in this Article shall affect the obligations of
Contracting States to non-Contracting States arising under such International
Conventions.
Article XIII
1. The present Convention shall remain open for signature until 31 December
1970 and shall thereafter remain open for accession.
2. States Members of the United Nations or any of the Specialized Agencies or
of the International Atomic Energy Agency or Parties to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice may become Parties to this Convention by:
(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval;
(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval followed by
ratification, acceptance or approval; or
(c) accession.
Article XIV
1. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the
deposit of a formal instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General of the
Organization.
2. Any instru~ent of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited
,!fter the entry mto force of an amendment to the present Convention with
resp~ct to all existing C.ontracting States, or after the completion of all measures
requ~red for the entry into force of the amendment with respect to those Con-
tractmg States shall be deemed to apply to the Convention as modified by the
amendment.
Article XV
1. The present Convention shall ent~r into forc~ on th~ ninetieth day following
the date on which Governments of eight States including five States each with
not less than 1,000,000 gross tons of tanker tonnage have either signe~ it
without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval or have deposited
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-
General of the Organization.
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it
the present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day after deposit
by such State of the appropriate instrument.
Article XVI
1. The present Convention may be denounced by any Contracting State at any
time after the date on which the Convention comes into force for that State.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument with the
Secretary-General of the Organization.
3. A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be
specified in the instrument of denunciation, after its deposit with the Secretary-
General of the Organization.
Article XVII
I. The United Nations, where it is the administering authority for a territory,
or any Contracting State responsible for the international relations of a territory,
shall as soon as possible consult with the appropriate authorities of such
territory or take such other measures as may be appropriate, in order to extend
the present Convention to that territory and may at any time by notification in
writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization declare that the present
Convention shall extend to such territory.
2. The present Convention shall, from the date of receipt of the notification or
from such other date as may be specified in the notification, extend to the
territory named therein.
3. The United Nations, or any Contracting State which has made a declaration
under paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time after the date on which the
Convention has been so extended to any territory declare by notification in
writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization that the present Convention
shall cease to extend to any such territory named in the notification.
4. The present Convention shall cease to extend to any territory mentioned in
such notification one year, or such longer period as may be specified therein
after t.he ~ate of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General of th~
Organization,
Article XVIII
1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Conven-
tion may be convened by the Organization.
2. The Organization shall convene a Co~ference of the Contracting States for
revising or amending the present Convention at the request of not less than one-
third of the Contracting States.
Article XIX
1. The present Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the Organization.
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization shall:
(a) inform all States which have signed or" acceded to the Convention of:
(i) each new signature or deposit of instrument together with the date
thereof;
(ii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Convention
together with the date of the deposit;
(iii) the extension of the present Convention to any territory under
paragraph 1 of Article XVII and of the termination of any such
extension under the provisions of paragraph 4 of that Article
stating in each case the date on which the present Convention has
been or will cease to be so extended;
(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Convention to all Signatory
States and to all States which accede to the present Convention.
Article XX
As soon as the present Convention comes into force, the text shall be
transmitted by the Secretary-General of the Organization to the Secretariat of
the United Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XXI
The present Convention is established in a single copy in the English and
French languages, both texts being equally authentic. Official translations in
the Russian and Spanish languages shall be prepared and deposited with the
signed original.
IN. WITNESS WHEREOF the .undersigned* being duly authorized by their
respective Governments for that purpose have signed the present Convention.
DONE at Brussels this twenty-ninth day of November 1969.
PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON
CIVI L LIABI LITV FOR 01L POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1969
THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT PROTOCOL,
BEING PARTIES to the International Convention on Civil liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, done at Brussels on 29 November 1969;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE I
For the purpose of the present Protocol:
1. "Convention" means the International Convention on Civil liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 1969.
2. "Organization" has the same meaning as in the Convention.
3. "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the Organization.
ARTICLE 11
Article V of the Convention is amended as follows:
(1) Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following text:
"The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Conven-
tion in respect of anyone incident to an aggregate amount of 133 units of account
for each ton of the ship's tonnage. However , this aggregate amount shall not in any
event exceed 14 million units of account."
(2) Paragraph 9 is replaced by the following text:
9(a) The "unit of account" referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is the Special
Drawing Right as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The amounts
mentioned in paragraph 1 shall be converted into the national currency of the State
in which the fund is being constituted on the basis of the value of that currency by
reference to the Special Drawing Right on the date of the constitution of the fund.
The value of the national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a
Contracting State which is a member of the International Monetary Fund, shall be
calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied by the International
Monetary Fund in effect at the date in question for its operations and transactions.
The value of the national currency, in terms of the Special Drawing Right, of a
Contracting State which is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, shall
be calculated in a manner determined by that State.
9(b) Nevertheless, a Contracting State which is not a member of the International
Monetary Fund and whose law does not permit the application of the provisions of
paragraph 9(a) of this Article may, at the time of ratification, acceptance, approval
of or accession to the present Convention, or at any time thereafter, declare that the
limits of liability provided for in paragraph 1 to be applied in its territory shall, in
respect of anyone incident, be an aggregate of 2,000 monetary units for each ton
of the ship's tonnage provided that this aggregate amount shall not in any event
exceed 210 million monetary units . The monetary unit referred to in this para-
graph corresponds to sixty-five and a half milligrammes of gold of mil1esimal
fineness nine hundred. The conversion of these amounts into the national currency
shall be made according to the law of the State concerned.
9(c) The calculation mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 9(a) and the
conversion mentioned in paragraph 9(b) shall be made in such a manner as to
express in the national currency of the Contracting State as far as possible the same
real value for the amounts in paragraph 1 as is expressed there in units of account.
Contracting States shall communicate to the depositary the manner of calculation
pursuant to paragraph 9(a), or the result of the conversion in paragraph 9(b) as the
case may be, when depositing an instrument referred to in Article IV and whenever
there is a change in either.
ARTICLE III
1. The present Protocol shall be open for signature by any State which has
signed the Convention or acceded thereto and by any State invited to attend the
Conference to Revise the Unit of Account Provisions of the Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 , held in London from 17 to 19 November
1976. The Protocol shall be open for signature from 1 February 1977 to
31 December 1977 at the Headquarters of the Organization.
2. .S.ubj ~ct to paragraph 4 of this Article, the present Protocol shall be subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval by the States which have signed it.
3. Subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, this Protocol shall be open for
accession by States which did not sign it .
4. The present Protocol may be ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by
States Parties to the Convention.
ARTICLE IV
1. .Ratification, .acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the
deposit of a formal Instrument to that effect with the Secretary-Ceneral.
2. Any instr~ment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited
after ~h~ entry ~to force of an amendm~nt to the present Protocol with respect to
~l existing Parties or after the. completion of all measures required for the entry
mto force of the amendment WIth respect to all existing Parties shall be deemed to
apply to the Protocol as modified by the amendment. '
ARTICLE V
1. The present Protocol shall enter into force for the States which have ratified,
accepted, approved or acceded to it on the ninetieth day followingthe date on
which eight States including five States each with not less than 1,000,000 gross tons
of tanker tonnage have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession with the Secretary-General.
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it,
the present Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit by
such State of the appropriate instrument.
ARTICLE VI
1. The present Protocol may be denounced by any Party at any time after the
date on which the Protocol enters into force for that Party.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument to that effect
with the Secretary-General.
3. Denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be
specified in the instrument of denunciation, after its deposit with the Secretary-
General.
ARTICLE VII
1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Protocol
may be convened by the Organization.
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of Parties to the present
Protocol for the purpose of revising or amending it at the request of not less than
one-third of the Parties.
ARTICLE VIII
1. The present Protocol shall be deposited with the Secretary-General.
2. The Secretary-General shall:
(a) inform all States which have signed the present Protocol or acceded
thereto of:
(i) each new signature or deposit of an instrument together with the
date thereof;
(ii) the date of entry into force of the present Protocol;
(iii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of the present
Protocol together with the date on which the denunciation takes
effect;
(iv) any amendments to the present Protocol;
(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Protocol to all States which
have signed the present Protocol or acceded thereto.
ARTICLE IX
As soon as the present Protocol enters into force, a certified true copy
thereof shall be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Secretariat of the
United Nations for registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
The present Protocol is established in a single original in the English and
French languages, both texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the
Russian and Spanish languages shall be prepared and deposited with the signed
original.
DONE AT LONDON this nineteenth day of November one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-six.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned" being duly authorized for that
purpose have signed the present Protocol.
* Sienatures omitted.
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THE TANKER OWNERS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT
CONCERNING LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION ("TOVALOP")
STANDING AGREEMENT
Introduction
The Parties to this Agreement are Tanker Owners and Bareboat Charterers.
By means of the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil
Pollution dated January 7th, 1969, as amended, (hereinafter called " TOVALOP" )
the Parties took constructive measures to mitigate and provide compensation for
damage by oil pollution from Tankers .
Pending the widespread application of the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 and the Protocols thereto, the Parties have from time
to time amended TOVALOP to enhance the benefits and protection available to
persons sustaining Pollution Damage.
Accordingly, the Parties, and such other Tanker Owners and Bareboat Charterers
as may hereafter become Parties, in consideration of their mutual promises, have
agreed with one another and do hereby agree as follows:
I. Definitions
Whenever the following words .and phrases appear in the Introduction and other
Clauses hereof, they shall have the meaning indicated below:
(a) "Bareboat Charterer" means the Person(s) who has chartered a Tanker
upon terms which provide, among other things, that the Charterer shall have
exclusive possession and control of the Tanker during the life of the charter.
(b) "Cost" or "Costs" means reasonable cost or costs, respectively.
(c) The "Federation" means The International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation Limited, a Company limited by guarantee and formed pursuant
to the laws of England for the purpose of administering this Agreement.
(d) "Incident" means any occurrence , or series of occurrences having the same
origin, which causes Pollution Damage, or which creates the Threat of an
escape or discharge of Oil.
(e) "Liability Convention" means the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, including the 1976 Protocol thereto and
legislation and regulations implementing the provisions thereof which are
enacted from time to time by any Contracting State thereunder.
(f) "Oil" means any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, fuel
oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil whether or not carried as cargo.
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(g) "Owner" means the Person or Persons registered as the owner of the
Tanker or, in the absence of registration, the Person or Persons owning the
Tanker. However, in the case of a Tanker owned by a State and operated
by a company which in that State is registered as the Tanker's operator,
"Owner" shall mean such company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the
case of a Tanker under bareboat charter, "Owner" means the Bareboat
Charterer.
(h) "Participating Owner" means the Owner of a Tanker who is a Party.
(i) "Party" means a Party to this Agreement.
U) "Person" means any individual or partnership or any public or private body,
whether corporate or not, including a State or any of its constituent sub-
divisions.
(k) "Pollution Damage" means loss or damage caused outside the Tanker by
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of Oil from the Tanker,
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that the loss or
damage is caused on the territory , including the territorial sea, of any State
and includes the costs of Preventive Measures, wherever taken, and further
loss or damage caused by Preventive Measures but excludes any loss or
damage which is remote or speculative, or which does not result directly
from such escape or discharge.
(I) "Preventive Measures" means any reasonable measures taken by any
Person after an Incident has occurred to prevent or minimise Pollution
Damage.
(m) "Protocol" means the 1992 Protocol to the Liability Convention.
(n) "Tanker" means any sea-going vessel and any sea-borne craft of any type
whatsoever, designed and constructed for carrying Oil in bulk as cargo,
whether or not it is actually so carrying Oil.
(0) "Threat of an escape or discharge of Oil" means a grave and imminent
danger of the escape or discharge of Oil from a Tanker which, if it occurred,
would create a serious danger of Pollution Damage, whether or not an
escape or discharge in fact subsequently occurs.
(p) "Threat Removal Measures" means reasonable measures taken by any
Person after an Incident has occurred for the purposes of removing the
Threat of an escape or discharge of Oil.
(q) A Tanker's "Tonnage" shall be the net tonnage of the Tanker with the
addition of the amount deducted from the gross tonnage on account of
engine room space for the purpose of ascertaining the net tonnage. In the
case of a Tanker for which this Tonnage cannot be ascertained, the Tanker's
Tonnage shall be deemed to be 40 per cent. of the weight in tons of
2,240Ibs. of Oil which the Tanker is capable of carrying.
(r) "Ton" means a ton of a Tanker's Tonnage.
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11. General Conditions
(A) Upon acceptance by the Federation of an application by an Owner in the .form
annexed hereto as Exhibit "A", that Owner shall become a Party and a member of
the Federation.
(8) Each Party shall:
(1) make the terms of this Agreement applicable to all Tankers of which he is
or becomes Owner;
(2) at all times be the Owner of a Tanker to which the terms of this Agreement
are applied;
(3) establish and maintain his financial capability to fulfil his obligations under
this Agreement to the satisfaction of the Federation;
(4) dispose of all valid claims against him arising under this Agreement as
promptly as is practicable;
(5) become a member of the Federation and, subject to the Articles of
Association of the Federation , remain a member thereof so long as he
continues to be a Party hereto ;
(6) abide by the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Federation and
all rules and directives of the Federation ; and
(7) fulfil all his other obligations under this Agreement.
(C) A Party shall forthwith notify the Federation if he shall fail to perform or observe
any of the conditions specified in Clause 11(8).
(0) A Party shall forthwith cease to be a Party if he shall fail to perform or observe
any of the conditions specified in Clause 11(8), but without, however, affecting his
rights and obligations accrued at the time of such cessation (including his obligation
under Clause II(C)) and without limitation to his right at any time thereafter to
become a Party.
(E) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Clause or to the generality
of Clause IX the Federation may at any time by notice in writing require a Party to
inform it whether or not that Party has failed to perform or observe any of the
conditions specified in Clause 11(8) and if that Party shall fail to respond to such
request within 28 days after the date of that notice, then that Party shall thereupon
forthwith cease to be a Party.
Ill. Duration
(A) This Agreement may be terminated by Special Resolution adopted at a General
Meeting of the members of the Federation convened and conducted in accordance
with the Articles of Association of the Federation upon a poll vote in which at least
75 per cent. of the votes cast are in favour of the said Resolution.
(8) A Party may withdraw from this Agreement on any date by giving at least six
months prior written notice of withdrawal to the Federation, or in accordance with
Clause X.
(C) The withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement under Clause Ill, or under Clause
X, or termination of this Agreement by the Parties shall not affect any rights and
obligations of any Party then accrued under this Agreement.
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(D) Upon termination of this Agreement the Fed~ration ~hall c~ntinue in existence
for such reasonable period as is necessary to wmd up Its affairs.
IV. Responsibility
(A) Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the ~a.~icipating Own~r
of a Tanker involved in an Incident agrees to assume responsibility hereunder m
respect of Pollution Damage caused by Oil which has escaped or which has been
discharged from the Tanker, and the Cost of Threat Removal Measures taken as a
result of the Incident.
(B) No responsibility for Pollution Damage or for the Cost of Threat Removal
Measures shall be assumed if the Incident:
(a) caused Pollution Damage anywhere in the world for any part of which liability
is imposed under the terms of the Liability Convention or the Protocol, or
(b) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural
phenomenon of an exceptional , inevitable and irresistible character, or
(c) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage
by a third party, or
(d) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or
other navigational aids in the exercise of that function.
(C) If Pollution Damage or the circumstances which gave rise to Threat Removal
Measures resulted wholly or partially from the negligence of the Person who
sustained the Pollution Damage or who took the Threat Removal Measures, the
Participating Owner shall be exonerated wholly or partially from any responsibility
he would otherwise have to such Person under this Agreement.
V. Responsibility for Pollution Damage Where Two or More Tankers are
Involved
When Oil has escaped or been discharged from two or more Tankers of Participating
Owners and causes Pollution Damage, the Participating Owners concerned, except
as exonerated by reason of Clause IV, shall be jointly and severally responsible
hereunder in respect of all such Pollution Damage which is not reasonably
separable.
VI. Preventive Measures and Threat Removal Measures by the Participating
Owner
A Participating Owner of a Tanker involved in an Incident shall exercise his best
efforts to take such Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures as are
practicable and appropriate under the circumstances. The taking of such Measures
shall not constitute an admission of liability or of responsibility under this
Agreement.
Each Participating Owner shall in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of financial capability referred to in Clause II(B)(3) make appropriate
provision for the reimbursement of the Cost of such Measures.
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VII. Limits of Financial Responsibility
(A) The maximum financial responsibility under this Agreement o! a Participating
Owner in respect of anyone Incident shall be One Hundred and Sixty U.S. Dollars
(US$160.00) per Ton of each of his Tankers involved in the Incident, or Sixteen
Million Eight Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$16,800,OOO.OO), whichever is
less.
(8) When the aggregate of the established claims hereunder exceeds the maximum
financial responsibility specified in Clause VII(A), the Participating Owner(s) shall
pay that proportion of each of those established claims as the said maximum
financial responsibility bears to the total amount of those established claims.
(C) If, before the Participating Owner has satisfied in full his financial responsibility
under this Agreement, he or any Person falling within the definition of Owner
hereunder or any Person providing the Participating Owner or such Person
insurance or other financial security has, as a result of the Incident in question, paid
compensation for Pollution Damage and/or for the Costs of Threat Removal
Measures, then
(a) the amount of that payment shall be taken into account in assessing the
aggregate of established claims under this Agreement in respect of that
Incident; and
(b) the Participating Owner or other such Person making such payment shall,
to the extent of that payment, be in the same position as the Person to whom
that sum was paid would have been.
(D) Costs incurred in taking Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures
by the Participating Owner or any Person falling within the definition of Owner
hereunder or any Person providing the Participating Owner or such Person
insurance or other financial security shall be treated as if they were claims by
Persons other than the Participating Owner and
(a) the amount of those Costs shall be taken into account in assessing the
aggregate of established claims under this Agreement in respect of that
Incident; and
(b) the Participating Owner or other such Person incurring such Costs shall, to
the extent of those Costs, be in the same position as if he were any other
Person with a claim under this Agreement.
(E) When a Participating Owner establishes that the aggregate of claims in respect
of an Incident may exceed his maximum financial responsibility hereunder, he or any
Person providing him insurance or other financial security may in his sole discretion
make partial payment to claimants until the full extent of all claims is determined.
VIII. Procedure and Miscellaneous
(A) The Parties hereto authorise the Federation to provide Persons concerned with
the esca~e or.discharge of Oil or the Threat thereof with a copy of this Agreement
and confirmation that the Owner was, at the time of such escape or discharge or
Threat, a Participating Owner.
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(B) A Participating Owner may require that any payment hereunder to a Person by
him, or on his behalf by anyone providing him insurance or other financial security,
shall be conditional upon either that Person assigning to that Participating Owner
his right of action, or authorising him to proceed in the name of that Person, in each
case up to the amounts paid or to be paid to that Person in relation to the Incident
in question.
(C) No responsibility shall arise under this Agreement unless written notice of claim
is received by the Participating Owner within two years of the date of the Incident.
(D) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, any payment to a Person by or on behalf of
a Participating Owner shall be in full settlement of all said Person's claims against
the Participating Owner, the Tanker involved, its master, officers and crew, its
charterer(s), manager or operator and their respective officers, agents, employees
and affiliates and underwriters, which arise out of the Incident.
(E) Persons making claims hereunder may, in the event of a dispute with a
Participating Owner concerning same, commence arbitration proceedings, in
accordance with Clause VIII(F) hereof, within three years of the date of the Incident,
and these proceedings shall be the exclusive means for enforcing a Participating
Owner's responsibility hereunder. Each Participating Owner by becoming a Party to
this Agreement, and so long as he remains bound hereby, shall be deemed
irrevocably to have offered to any such Person to submit all such disputes to
arbitration as provided in said Clause VIII(F).
(F) All claims by any Person or Persons under this Agreement shall, if not otherwise
disposed of, be finally settled under the rules of conciliation and arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in
accordance with said rules. In any such proceeding the Person allegedly having the
claim shall have the burden of proving that Oil discharged from the Tanker caused
him Pollution Damage or that the Threat thereof necessitated his taking Threat
Removal Measures.
(G) Except as provided by Clause V, no Participating Owner shall be responsible
under this Agreement in respect of an escape or discharge of Oil or the Threat
thereof from the Tanker of another Participating Owner.
(H) This Agreement does not create any rights against the Federation and the
Federation shall have no liability hereunder or otherwise to any Person.
(I) No rights or obligations created hereunder or connected herewith may be
assigned or transferred except as provided in Clause VIII(B).
(J) No payment made hereunder shall be deemed (i) an admission of, or evidence
of liability on the part of the Participating Owner in any proceeding or to any Person,
or (ii) submission to any jurisdiction on the part of the Participating Owner for any
purpose whatsoever.
(K) Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of recourse of a Participating
Owner against third parties or vessels.
IX. Interpretation
The Federation shall have the right to make rules and directives from time to time
with respect to the interpretation and administration of this Agreement.
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X. Amendments
This Agreement may be amended by Special Resolution adopted at a General
Meeting of the members of the Federation convened and conducted in accordance
with the Articles of Association of the Federation upon a poll vote in which at least
75 per cent. of the votes cast are in favour of said Resolution. A Party who votes
against such Resolution shall thereupon have the option, to be exercised by written
notice served upon the Federation within sixty days of the date of said Special
Resolution, to withdraw from this Agreement, without, however, affecting his rights
and obligations accrued at the time of his withdrawal.
XI. Law Governing
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of England. However, anything herein
to the contrary notwithstanding, a Participating Owner shall not be required:
(a) to Incur any obligation or take any action, with respect to any Incident in
which his Tanker is involved, which would violate the laws or government
regulations of the flag State of the Tanker; or
(b) to incur any obligation or take any action which would, if a majority of the
stock of the Participating Owner is owned, directly or indirectly by another
corporation, partnership or individual, violate any laws or government





The Parties recognise that (i) while the Standing Agreement (as hereinafter defined)
has provided constructive measures to mitigate and provide compensation for
Pollution Damage, it does not now provide, in all respects, adequate compensation
for all legitimate claims for Pollution Damage, (ii) while the Liability Convention has
established, in many jurisdictions, a legal system providing for the compensation of
persons who sustain Pollution Damage, it does not provide for compensation of
Costs incurred to remove a Threat of an escape or discharge of Oil from a Tanker
where no pollution occurs, nor does it provide, in all respects, adequate
compensation for all legitimate claims for Pollution Damage and (iii) it will require
some time before the Protocol to the Liability Convention will come into force in a
substantial number of jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the Parties decided to amend TOVALOP pursuant to Clause X thereof
effective from February 20th, 1987 by the adoption of this Supplement (as
subsequently amended) so as to provide in respect of an Applicable Incident (as
hereinafter defined) enhanced compensation for Pollution Damage and Costs
incurred to remove a Threat of an escape or discharge of Oil, but without affecting
the provisions of the Standing Agreement which alone shall continue to apply to any
Incident which is not an Applicable Incident.
1. Definitions and Interpretation
(1) Whenever the following words and phrases appear in the Introduction to and
other Paragraphs of this Supplement, they shall have the meaning set forth below:
(A) "Applicable Incident" means any occurrence or series of occurrences,
having the same origin, which causes Pollution Damage by, or which
creates the Threat of an escape or discharge of, Oil when the cargo in the
Tanker is "owned", as defined in CRISTAL, by an Oil Company Party to
CRISTAL.
(B) "CRISTAL" means the Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution dated January 14th, 1971, as the same has been and may
from time to time be amended.
(C) "Cristal Limited" means Cristal Limited, a company organised and existing
under the Laws of Bermuda.
(D) "Fund" means the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
established under the Fund Convention.
(E) "Fund Convention" means the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1971, as amended from time to time, including the 1976 and 1992
Protocols thereto.
(F) "Pollution Damage" means (i) physical loss or damage caused outside the
Tanker by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of Oil from
the Tanker, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, including such
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loss or damage caused by Preventive Measures, and/or (ii) proven economic
loss actually sustained, irrespective as to accompanying physical damage,
as a direct result of contamination as set out in (i) above, including the Costs
of Preventive Measures, and/or (iii) Costs actually incurred in taking
reasonable and necessary measures to restore or replace natural resources
damaged as a direct result of an Applicable lncident, but excluding any other
damage to the environment.
(G) "Preventive Measures" means any reasonable measures taken by any
Person after an Applicable Incident has occurred to prevent or minimise
Pollution Damage.
(H) "Special Drawing Right" or "SDR" means a Special Drawing Right as
defined by the International Monetary Fund.
(I) "Standing Agreement" means the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement
concerning Liability for Oil Pollution dated January 7th, 1969, as the same
has been and may from time to time be amended, but excluding the
provisions of this Supplement thereto.
(J) "Tanker" means any sea-going vessel and any sea-borne craft of any type
whatsoever, designed and constructed for carrying Oil in bulk as cargo, and
actually so carrying Oil.
(K) "Threat Removal Measures" means reasonable measures taken by any
Person after an Applicable Incident has occurred for the purposes of
removing a Threat of an escape or discharge of Oil.
(L) "Ton" means a ton of a Tanker's gross tonnage calculated in accordance
with the tonnage measurement regulations contained in Annex I of the
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 whether
or not that Convention is in force and applicable to the Tanker in question.
(2) (A) Insofar as they are not varied by this Paragraph 1, words and phrases shall
have the same meanings as defined in Clause I of the Standing Agreement
whenever they appear in this Supplement.
(B) References in this Supplement to Clauses I to XI are references to those
Clauses in the Standing Agreement, and references to Paragraphs 1 to 5 are
references to those Paragraphs in this Supplement.
(C) References in the Standing Agreement to "this Agreement" shall, where the
context permits, apply also to the provisions of this Supplement.
(D) The Standing Agreement alone shall apply to an Incident (as defined in
Clause I(d) thereof) which is not an Applicable Incident and shall remain in
full force and effect in respect of each such Incident. This Supplement shall
not apply to any Incident which is not an Applicable Incident.
(E) The provisions of this Supplement shall apply to an Applicable Incident in
substitution for and to the exclusion of Clauses IV, V and VII of the Standing
Agreement. The provisions of all other Clauses of the Standing Agreement
shall apply to an Applicable Incident except where those provisions are




(A) This Supplement shall apply to Applicable Incidents occurring at or after
12.00 hours G.M.T. on February 20th, 1994 and shall cease to apply to Applicable
Incidents occurring after 12.00 hours G.M.T. on February 20th, 1997, it being
understood that nothing set forth herein shall affect the obligations of a Participating
Owner with respect 'to an Applicable Incident which shall have occurred prior to
12.00 hours G.M.T. on February 20th, 1994.
(8) Upon termination of this Supplement the existence of the Federation shall not
be affected, its continued existence being governed by the terms of the Standing
Agreement.
3. Financial Responsibility for an Applicable Incident
(A) If an Applicable Incident occurs which does not cause Pollution Damage in a
jurisdiction where the provisions of the Fund Convention are in force (but
irrespective as to whether or not the provisions of the Liability Convention or any
other applicable domestic laws are in force) the Participating Owner of a Tanker
involved in that Applicable Incident shall, subject to the provisions of Paragraph 3(C),
take such Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures as are practical
and appropriate under the circumstances and, subject as aforesaid and in the
following order of priority -
(1) pay such amount(s) to such Person(s) as may be necessary to fulfil his
obligations under the Liability Convention, the Protocol and domestic
legislation giving effect thereto or any other applicable domestic law
together with any Costs incurred by the Participating Owner in taking
Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures; and
(2) compensate any Person who would otherwise remain uncompensated and
who (i) sustains Pollution Damage and/or (ii) incurs Costs in taking
Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures.
(8) If an Applicable Incident occurs which causes Pollution Damage in a jurisdiction
where the provisions of both the Liability Convention and Fund Convention are in
force, the Participating Owner of a Tanker involved in that Applicable Incident shall,
SUbject to the provisions of Paragraph 3(C), take such Preventive Measures and/or
Threat Removal Measures as are practical and appropriate under the circumstances
and, subject as aforesaid and in the following order of priority -
(1) pay such amount(s) to such Person(s) as may be necessary to fulfil his
obligations under the Liability Convention, the Protocol and domestic
legislation giving effect thereto or any other applicable domestic law
together with any Costs incurred by the Participating Owner in taking
Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures;
(2) compensate Cristal Limited in an amount equal to the amount that the Fund
has assessed against Oil Company Parties to CRISTAL as a result of the
Applicable Incident; and
(3) compensate any Person who would otherwise remain uncompensated and
who (i) sustains Pollution Damage and/or (ii) incurs Costs in taking
Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures.
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(C) The responsibilities which a Participating Owner has assumed, pursuant to
Paragraphs 3(A) and (8), shall be subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1) A Participating Owner shall not be obligated to take Preventive Measures or
Threat Removal Measures or pay Costs or make any compensation to a
Person if the Applicable Incident (i) resulted from an act of war, hostilities,
civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable
and irresistible character, or (ii) was wholly caused by an act or omission
done with intent to cause damage by a third party or (iii) was wholly caused
by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority
responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the
exercise of that function. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this
sub-paragraph (1), a Participating Owner shall (irrespective as to whether he
bears or would bear any liability under the Liability Convention with respect
to the Applicable Incident) compensate Cristal Limited pursuant to
Paragraph 3(8)(2) except when the Applicable Incident (i) resulted from an
act of war, hostilities, civil war or insurrection or (ii) was wholly caused by
an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party.
(2) If Pollution Damage or the circumstances which gave rise to Preventive
Measures or Threat Removal Measures resulted wholly or partially either
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by, or from the
negligence of, the Person who sustained the Pollution Damage and/or who
took the Preventive Measures and/or Threat Removal Measures, the
Participating Owner shall be proportionately exonerated from any
responsibility he would otherwise have to such Person.
(3) The maximum amount of Costs to be incurred in respect of Preventive
Measures and Threat Removal Measures and compensation to be paid by
a Participating Owner under Paragraph 3(A) or (8) in respect of each of his
Tankers involved in anyone Applicable Incident, shall not exceed an amount
equal, in the case of a Tanker of Five Thousand (5,000) Tons or less, Three
Million SDRs (SDR 3,000,000) and for a Tanker in excess of Five Thousand
(5,000) Tons, Three Million SDRs (SDR 3,000,000) plus an additional Four
Hundred and Twenty SDRs (SDR 420) for each Ton in excess of said Five
Thousand Tons, subject to a maximum of Fifty-Nine Million Seven Hundred
Thousand SDRs (SDR 59,700,000).
(4) When Oil has escaped or been discharged from two or more Tankers of
Participating Owners and/or there is a Threat of an escape or discharge of
Oil from two or more Tankers of Participating Owners, the Particpating
Owners concerned, subject to the other provisions of Paragraph 3(C), shall
be jointly and severally responsible for all said Costs and compensation
under Paragraphs 3(A) and (8) which are not reasonably separable.
(5) If the maximum sum that can be paid by a Participating Owner within the
provisions of Paragraph 3(C)(3), after deducting all payments made or to be
made together with all Costs incurred under Paragraph 3(A)(1) or, as the
case may be, 3(8)(1) and (2), is insufficient to meet all established claims in
respect ~f ,an ~pplicable Incident under Paragraphs ~(A)(2) or (8)(3), then
the Participating Owner shall pay that proportion of each of those
established claims as the available balance of that maximum sum bears to
the total amount of those established claims.
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4. Special Provisions
(A) If, before the Participating Owner has satisfied in full his financial responsibility
under this Supplement, he or any Person falling within the definition of Owner
hereunder or any Person providing the Participating Owner or such Person
insurance or other financial security has, as a result of the Applicable Incident in
question, made payment pursuant to Paragraphs 3(A) or (B), then
(1) the amount of that payment shall be taken into account in assessing the
aggregate of established claims under this Supplement in respect of that
Applicable Incident; and
(2) the Participating Owner or other such Person making such payment shall,
to the extent of that payment, be in the same position as the Person to whom
that sum was paid would have been.
(B) When a Participating Owner establishes that the aggregate of claims in respect
of an Applicable Incident may exceed the available balance of his maximum
financial responsibility hereunder, he or any Person providing him insurance or
other financial security may in his sole discretion make partial payment to claimants
until the full extent of all claims is determined.
(C) For the purpose of determining the extent to which a Participating Owner has
discharged his financial responsibility the amount of any payment made by a
Participating Owner under this Supplement in a national currency shall be converted
into Special Drawing Rights on the basis of the value of a Special Drawing Right by
reference to that national currency on the date of such payment, except when a
limitation fund is established under the provisions of the Liability Convention or the
Protocol when the conversion shall be on the basis of the value of a Special Drawing
Right to that national currency on the date that the limitation fund is established. The
value shall be calculated in accordance with the method of valuation applied by the
International Monetary Fund in effect on the date in question for its operations and
transactions. In the case of a currency for which no such valuation exists, the
amount of any payment in said currency shall be converted to United States Dollars
at the buy rate of exchange for said currency to United States Dollars as quoted by
the National Westminster Bank Plc on the date in question and the resulting United
States Dollar amount shall be converted into Special Drawing Rights on the basis
and in accordance with the method of valuation aforesaid.
5. Procedure and Miscellaneous
(A) The provisions of Clauses VIII(B), (D) and (E) of the Standing Agreement shall
apply to this Supplement as if references in those Clauses to the Incident were to
the Applicable Incident.
(B) No financial responsibility shall arise under Paragraph 3(A) or (B) unless written
notice of claim is received by the Participating Owner within two years of the date
of the Applicable Incident giving rise thereto, it being understood that this provision
shall not apply to the Participating Owner's obligation to compensate Cristal Limited
under Paragraph 3(B)(2) which obligation shall not arise unless written notice of
claim is received by Cristal Limited from an Oil Company Party and notified in writing
to the Participating Owner within one year after the date that payment of the
contribution under Article 10 of the Fund Convention is to be made.
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(C) In the event that during the period of this Supplement there shall be any change
to any oil pollution compensation regime, including CRISTAL, which, in the opinion
of the Board of Directors of the Federation, is or may be material to the Parties'
obligations hereunder, then the said Board shall further consider the same with a
view to making such recommendation to Parties in that regard as it thinks fit.
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CONTRACT REGARDING A SUPPLEMENT
TO TANKER LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION
PREAMBLE
The Parties to this Contract are various Oil Companies and Cristal Limited
(hereinafter referred to as "CRISTAL" ), a Company organised and existing under
the laws of Bermuda.
The Parties recognize that (i) Tankers carrying bulk Oil cargoes may cause
substantial Pollution Damage as a result of the escape or discharge of Oil into the
sea, and (ii) Persons who have sustained Pollution Damage are sometimes unable
to recover adequate compensation .
Therefore, the Parties have decided by means of this Contract to (i) provide
supplemental compensation to such Persons and (ii) reimburse Oil Company
Parties their contributions to the Fund, when cargoes are "owned" by Oil Company
Parties, all in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein.
Clause I.
Definitions
For the purpose of this Contract (including the Preamble):
(A) "Bareboat Charterer" means the Person (or Persons) who has
chartered a Tanker upon terms which provide, among other things, that the
charterer shall have exclusive possession and control of the Tanker during the
life of the charter.
(B) "Cost" or "Costs" means reasonable cost or costs, respectively.
(C) "Fund" means the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
established under the Fund Convention.
(D) "Fund Convention" means the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, 1971, including any amendments thereto in force from time to time.
(E) "Incident" means any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the
same origin, which causes Pollution Damage, or which creates the Threat of
an escape or discharge of Oil.
(F) "Liability Convention" means the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, including any amendments thereto in
force from time to time.
(G) "Oil" means any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil including, but
not limited to, crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil whether
carried on board a Tanker as cargo or in the bunkersof such a Tanker.
(H) "Oil Company" means any Person (i) engaged in the production,
refining, marketing, storing, trading or terminaling of Oil, or anyone or more
of whose affiliates are so engaged or (ii) that receives Oil in bulk for its own
consumption or use.
(I) "Oil Company Party" means an Oil Company which is a Party to this
Contract.
(J) "Owner" means the Person or Persons registered as the owner of the Tanker
or, in the absence of registration, the Person or Persons owning the Tanker.
However, in the case of a Tanker owned by a State and operated by a company
which in that State is registered as the Tanker's operator, "Owner" shall mean such
company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the case of a Tanker under bareboat
charter, "Owner" means the Bareboat Charterer or any other Person deemed to be
an owner under the laws applicable to the Incident.
(K) "Person" means (i) an Owner and (ii) any individual or partnership or any
public or private body, whether corporate or not, including a State or any of its
constituent subdivisions.
(L) "Preventive Measures" means any reasonable measures taken by any
Person after an Incident has occurred to prevent or minimise Pollution Damage.
(M) "Pollution Damage" means (i) physical loss or damage caused outside the
Tanker by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of Oil from the
Tanker, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, including such loss or
damage caused by Preventive Measures, and/or (ii) proven economic loss actually
sustained, irrespective as to accompanying physical damage, as a direct result of
contamination as set out in (i) above, including the Costs of Preventive Measures,
and/or (iii) Costs actually incurred in taking reasonable and necessary measures to
restore or replace natural resources damaged as a direct result of an Incident, but
excluding any other damage to the environment.
(N) "Tanker" means any seagoing vessel and any seaborne craft of any type
whatsoever, designed and constructed for carrying Oil in bulk as cargo, and actually
so carrying Oil.
(0) "Threat of an escape or discharge of Oil" means a grave and imminent
danger of the escape or discharge of Oil from a Tanker, which, if it occurred, would
create a serious danger of Pollution Damage, whether or not an escape or discharge
in fact subsequently occurs.
(P) "Threat Removal Measures" means reasonable measures taken by any
Person after an Incident has occurred for the purposes of removing the Threat of an
escape or discharge of Oil.
(Q) "Ton" means a ton of a Tanker's gross tonnage calculated in accordance
with the tonnage measurement regulations contained in Annex I of the International
Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 whether or not that
Convention is in force and applicable to the Tanker in question.
(R) "Special Drawing Right" or "SDR" means a Special Drawing Right as
defined by the International Monetary Fund."
Clause 11.
General Conditions
(A) Any Oil Company may become an Oil Company Party to this Contract and a
Member of CRISTAL upon acceptance by CRISTAL of an application in the form
attached hereto as "Exhibit At.
(B) The obligations of an Oil Company Party under this Contract shall extend
solely to CRISTAL and to the other Oil Company Parties hereto. The obligations of
CRISTAL under this Contract shall extend solely to the Oil Company Parties hereto.
Clause Ill.
Effective Date
(A) This Contract shall be applicable to Incidents which shall have occurred at
or after 12.00 hours G.M.T. on February 20, 1994, (the "Effective Date"), and shall no
longer be applicable to Incidents occurring after 12.00 hours G.M.T. on February 20,
1997; it being understood that nothing set forth herein shall affect the obligations of
CRISTAL with respect to an Incident which occurred prior to the Effective Date.
(8) An Oil Company Party may withdraw from this Contract at any time
following the Effective Date, provided that it gives at least six (6) months prior
written notice of withdrawal to CRISTAL and such withdrawing Oil Company Party
shall have no rights hereunder as of the date of withdrawal; however any such
withdrawal shall not affect the obligations of the withdrawing Oil Company Party
with respect to Incidents which occurred prior to the said date of withdrawal, which
obligations shall be satisfied as set forth in Paragraph (C) of this Clause Ill.
(C) An Oil Company Party shall satisfy its obligations under Paragraph (8) of
this Clause III by either (i) paying a release assessment calculated by CRISTAL in a
manner set forth in the Rules to this Contract or (ii) at CRISTAL's option, contributing
to Periodic Calls made after the aforesaid date of withdrawal in accordance with
terms and conditions set forth in the Rules to this Contract.
Clause IV.
Compensation and Payments
(A) If an Incident does not cause Pollution Damage in a jurisdiction where the
provisions of the Fund Convention are in force, but irrespective as to whether the
provisions of the Liability Convention or any applicable domestic law are in force,
CRISTAL shall, subject to the conditions and in the amounts set forth in Paragraphs
(D) and (E) of this Clause IV, compensate any Person who (i) sustains Pollution
Damage or (ii) incurs Costs in taking Threat Removal Measures.
(8) If an Incident causes Pollution Damage in a jurisdiction where the provisions
of both the Liability Convention and the Fund Convention are in force CRISTAL
shall, subject to the conditions and in the amounts set forth in Paragraphs (D) and
(E) of this Clause IV:
(1) pay an Oil Company Party an amount equal to the contribution assessed by
the Fund or made to the Fund by such Oil Company Party under Article 10
of the Fund Convention, with respect to the amount that the Fund intends
to payor did pay as compensation as a result of an Incident; and
(2) compensate any Person who (i) sustains Pollution Damage or (ii) incurs
Costs in taking Threat Removal Measures and who would otherwise remain
uncompensated.
(C) For the purpose of Paragraphs (A) and (B) of this Clause IV, Pollution
Damage and Costs of Threat Removal Measures shall include amounts paid by a
Person to compensate another Person for Pollution Damage or Costs of Threat
Removal Measures, but shall exclude amounts paid by a fund established and/or
maintained by means of assessments against Oil Companies to compensate
another Person for Pollution Damage or Costs of Threat Removal Measures.
(D) No payment or compensation shall be made under either Paragraphs (A) or
(8) of this Clause IV except subject to and in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth herein.
(1) It shall be a condition precedent to CRISTAL's obligation to make any
payment whatsoever that, at the time of the Incident, the Oil involved in
the Incident be "owned" by an Oil Company Party, as provided in Clause V.
(2) No compensation shall be paid to a Person, under either Paragraph (A) or
(8) (2) of this Clause IV, if the Incident (i) resulted from an act of war,
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or (ii) was wholly caused
by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party, or
(iii) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or
other navigational aids in the exercise of that function.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Subparagraph (2)
CRISTAL shall compensate Oil Company Parties under Paragraph (8) (1) of
this Clause IV except when the Incident resulted from an act of war,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection, or was wholly caused by an act or
omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party.
(3) If Pollution Damage or the taking of Threat Removal Measures resulted
wholly or partially either from an act or omission done with intent to cause
damage by, or from the negligence of the Person who sustained the
Pollution Damage or who took the Threat Removal Measures, any payment
or compensation that would otherwise be payable by CRISTAL to that
Person, under either Paragraphs (A) or (8) (2) of this Clause IV, shall be
denied or reduced proportionately to the extent of that Person's
negligence; however, nothing set forth in this Subparagraph shall affect
CRISTAL's obligations under Paragraph (8) (1) of this Clause IV, or to the
Owner in respect of an Incident which does not result from the wilful
misconduct of the Owner or from the unseaworthiness of the Tanker where
this occurs with the privity of the Owner.
(4) No payment or compensation shall be made or paid under Paragraphs (A)
and (8), of this Clause IV, until evidence, satisfactory to CRISTAL, has been
presented demonstrating that claims for Pollution Damage or Costs of
Preventive Measures or Threat Removal Measures (including payments
made by the Owner to CRISTAL, as agent for Oil Company Party(ies)), and
payments or costs incurred by the Owner as a result of the application of
the Liability Convention, applicable domestic laws or otherwise have been
paid by, or on behalf of, the Owner equal, in the case of a Tanker of Five
Thousand (5,000) Tons or less to Three Million SDR (3,000,000 SDR) and
for a Tanker in excess of Five Thousand (5,000) Tons Three Million SDR
(3,000,000 SDR) plus Four Hundred and Twenty SDR (420 SDR) for each
Ton in excess of said Five Thousand (5,000) Tons, subject to a maximum of
Fifty-Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand SDR (59,700,000 SDR).
(5) (a)The aggregate amount to be paid by CRISTAL, under Paragraph (A), (8)
and (0)(8) of this Clause IV, in respect of anyone incident, shall not
exceed, after taking into account payments made under Subparagraph (4)
of this Clause IV(D) an amount equal to Thirty Two Million SDR
(32,000,000 SDR) for a Tanker of Five Thousand (5,000) Tons or less and for
a Tanker in excess of Five Thousand (5,000) Tons Thirty Two Million SDR
(32,000,000 SDR) plus Six Hundred and Fifty Two SDR (652 SDR) for each
Ton in excess of said Five Thousand (5,000) Tons, subject to a maximum of
One Hundred and Twenty Million SDR (120,000,000 SDR).
(b) In the event more than one Tanker discharges Oil or poses a Threat of an
escape or discharge of Oil in respect of anyone Incident, the. aggregate
amount to be paid by CRISTAL under Subparagraph (5) (a) of this Clause IV
(D) shall be established by reference to the tonnage of the largest of said
Tankers. For the purpose of establishing under Subparagraph (4) of this
Clause IV (D) whether payment or compensation shall be made or paid,
payments or Costs incurred by or on behalf of the Owners of all the said
Tankers shall be taken into account.
(6) If the maximum amount that can be paid by CRISTAL, pursuant to
Paragraph (D) (5) of this Clause IV, is insufficient to reimburse an Oil
Company Party(ies), pursuant to Paragraph (8) (1) of this Clause IV, and
meet in full all other claims, approved under Paragraphs (A) and (8) (2) of
this Clause IV, then CRISTAL shall prorate the amount available among all
claims.
(7) No payment or compensation shall be made or paid to a Person entitled,
under Paragraphs (A) and (8)(2) of this Clause IV, to make a claim with
respect to an Incident, if that Person prosecutes a claim for Pollution
Damage or the Cost of Preventive Measures or Threat Removal Measures
against any fund established and/or maintained by means of assessments
against Oil Companies, irrespective as to whether any said Person is
entitled to either indemnification or compensation under the terms of any
such fund; provided that nothing set forth herein shall prevent such a
Person from asserting and settling a claim against any said fund for those
amounts not satisfied pursuant to this Contract or under either (i) the
Liability Convention or (ii) against the Fund under the Fund Convention, or
both, if, or to the extent, they are applicable. For the purposes of this
Subparagraph (7) "prosecutes a claim" shall not mean taking steps, under
the law or regulations applicable to said fund, designed to preserve said
Person's rights against said fund, but shall mean receiving any payment
from such a fund for Pollution Damage or the Cost of Preventive Measures
or Threat Removal Measures prior to receiving any payment from CRISTAL.
(8) No compensation (except any payment to be made pursuant to Paragraph
(8) (1) of this Clause IV) shall be made or paid to a Person until such Person
has taken all reasonable steps to obtain full compensation for Pollution
Damage or for the Cost of Preventive Measures or Threat Removal
Measures or any element thereof from any Person, but not including the
Owner unless the Pollution Damage or Costs resulted from the wilful
misconduct of the Owner or from the unseaworthiness of the Tanker where
this occurs with the privity of the Owner, or ship (which shall include but
not be limited to a Tanker or any other vessel or ship) liable therefor, and
from any other source of compensation available under convention, law or
regulation (except for funds established and maintained by means of
assessments against Oil Companies as referred to in Subparagraph (7) of
this Clause IV (D)); provided, however, that CRISTAL may, in its sole
discretion and to the extent permitted under applicable law, advance
monies to said Person to partially or fully compensate for the Costs said
Person might incur in taking reasonable steps to -obtain full compensation
as set forth in this Subparagraph (8).
(9) (a) In the event that CRISTAL should determine that it is unreasonable for a
Person to take steps or further steps, pursuant to Subparagraph (8) of this
Clause IV (D), CRISTAL may require, prior to compensating said Person
under Paragraphs (A) or (8) (2) of this Clause IV, that it receive, in a form
acceptable to it, documentation or other instrument(s) executed by said
Person (but without prejudice to the rights of the Fund under the Fund
Convention if it has made a payment to said Person under the Fund
Convention (i) transferring, or assigning, to CRISTAL any and all rights of
any nature or kind said Person has, or might have, to seek compensation
from any third party (including a government or governmental agency, but
excluding the Fund) for the compensation to be paid by CRISTAL to said
Person for either Pollution Damage and Costs of Preventive Measures or
Threat Removal Measures; (ii) granting irrevocable authority to CRISTAL to
institute, in the name of any said Person, legal, equitable or administrative
proceedings in any jurisdiction whatsoever to perfect and exercise the
aforesaid rights, and if any judgment, award, decision or decree is secured
to collect the same, in the name of any said Person, and when collected to
endorse and negotiate any cheque, money order, bill of exchange,
promissory note, transfer or similar instrument so that the proceeds of such
judgment, award, decision or decree shall be the sole property of CRISTAL;
and/or (iii) establishing any other condition which, in the sole discretion of
CRISTAL, is designed to preserve CRISTAL's ability to seek compensation
from such a third party and to preserve any evidence or secure the
cooperation of any person necessary to seek such compensation; and (b)
no payment shall be made under Paragraph (B) (1) of this Clause IV until
CRISTAL has received, in a form acceptable to it, a document or other
instrument evidencing settlement in part or in full, as the case may be, the
obligations of CRISTAL pursuant to Paragraph (B) (1) of this Clause IV.
(10)For the purposes of Paragraph (D) (3) and (8) of this Clause IV the terms
"wilful misconduct", "privity" and "unseaworthiness" shall have the same
meaning as they have under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 as interpreted
by the English Courts under English Law.
(E) For the purposes of determining the amount of any payments or
compensation to be paid by CRISTAL hereunder, CRISTALshall:
(1) Convert any losses or Costs constituting Pollution Damage, Preventive
Measures or Threat Removal Measures either incurred or suffered by a
Person or any payment made by or on behalf of an Owner, for the purposes
of Paragraph (0)(4) and (5) of this Clause IV, from the currency or
currencies in which they were incurred or paid into Special Drawing Rights
on the basis of the value of a Special Drawing Right by reference to that
currency or those currencies on the dates of payment by or on behalf of an
Owner or by CRISTAL, as the case may be, calculated in accordance with
the method of valuation applied by the International Monetary Fund in
effect for its operations and transactions on the date or dates in question;
except where a limitation fund is established under the provisions of the
Liability Convention when the conversion as aforesaid for payment(s)
made by or on behalf of an Owner from a currency or currencies in which
they were incurred or paid into Special Drawing Rights shall be on the basis
of the value of a Special Drawing Right on the date that the limitation fund
is established.
In the case of a currency or currencies for which no such valuation exists,
the amount of any payment in said currency or currencies shall be
converted to United States Dollars at the buy rate of exchange for said
currency or currencies as quoted by the National Westminster Bank Plc on
the applicable dates as aforesaid and the resulting United States Dollar
amount shall be converted into Special Drawing Rights on the basis and in
accordance with the applicable method of valuation as aforesaid.
(2) Convert any payments to be made to an Oil Company Party, pursuant to
Paragraph (B) (1) of this Clause IV, if incurred in a currency(ies) other than
United States Dollars, to United States Dollars at the buy rate of exch~nge
for said currency(ies) to United States Dollars as quoted by the National
Westminster Bank Plc in London on the date that the Fund shall have
demanded payment by the Oil Company Party.
(3) The amount of all losses or Costs constituting Pollution Damage,
Preventitve Measures or Threat Removal Measures shall be determined by
CRISTAL in the currency of the jurisdiction where the incident has occured
or the Costs were incurred by a Person. All payments in compensation
therefore made pursuant to Paragraphs (A) or (B) (2) of this Clause IV shall
be made by CRISTAL in such currency(ies). If on the date payment of said
e1aim(s) is (are) to be made, an expenditure (after considering all payments
to be made under Paragraph (B)( 1) of this Clause IV) is required by
CRISTAL in excess of the provisions of Paragraph (D)(5) of this Clause IV,
the provisions of Paragraph (D)(6) of this Clause IV shall be applicable.
Clause V.
Ownership of Shipments
(A) A particular shipment of Oil shall be considered "owned" by an Oil
Company Party for the purpose of Clause IV (D) (1) and Clause VII if at the time of
the Incident title to the shipment is in either:
(1) said Oil Company Party, or
(2) a Person not an Oil Company Party to whom said Oil Company Party has
transferred the shipment, or
(3) a Person not an Oil Company Party but the shipment is being carried by a
Tanker owned by or under charter to an Oil Company Party or one of its
affiliates, or
(4) a Person not an Oil Company Party who, prior to any Incident involving said
shipment, contracted to transfer said shipment to an Oil Company Party, or
(5) a Person not an Oil Company Party who, prior to any Incident involving said
shipment, contracted for delivery to, storage, processing or transshipment
at or shipment from a terminal or other facility owned, operated, managed,
leased, hired or otherwise controlled by an Oil Company Party or in which
an Oil Company Party has an interest and an Incident occurs or Pollution
Damage is caused in a geographic area within 250 nautical miles in any
direction from a point at the geographic centre of said terminal or other
facility.
(B) For the purposes of Clause V(A)(2) and (3) such Oil shall be deemed to be
so "owned" by an Oil Company Party provided that prior to any Incident involving
said shipment of Oil, and in accordance with the Rules of CRISTAL, said Oil
Company Party has advised CRISTAL in writing that it elects to be considered the
"owner" thereof.
(C) For the purposes of Clause V(A)(5) terminal or other facility shall mean any
property, fixed or floating, from which Oil can be unloaded from or discharged into
a ~anker in.e1uding, ~ut not limited to, oil terminals, tank farms, refineries, single
POint moorings, floating storage or offshore discharging or loading vessels.
(~) For the purpose of Clause IV (A) and (B) only, segregated slops of a Tanker
carrying any shipment so owned, and bunker oil and lubricating oil intended for
use in said Tanker's operation shall be deemed ineluded in such shipment.
Clause VI.
Subrogation
(A) CRISTAL shall, in respect of any amount of compensation paid in
accordance with Clause IV (A) and (8) (2), acquire by subrogation the rights that the
Person so compensated may enjoy under applicable legislation, law, convention or
otherwise against the Owner or its insurers.
(8) Nothing herein shall prejudice any right of recourse or subrogation of
CRISTAL against Persons other than those referred to in the preceding Paragraph.
In any event, the right of CRISTAL to subrogation against such Person shall not be




(A) (1) CRISTAL, in order to assure its financial capability to
(i) make payments in accordance with Clause IV;
(ii) meet its administrative expenses; and
(iii) meet any other expenses which CRISTAL shall incur by
contract, or otherwise,
shall maintain and administer an account to be known as the "CRISTAL
Fund," contributions to which shall be made by each Oil Company
Party.
(2) Contributions to the CRISTAL Fund shall be calculated on the basis of
the Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts of the Oil Company Parties. For the purpose
of this Clause VII, Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts means
(i) crude oil and fuel oil received at an installation or terminal by an
Oil Company Party which has been transported all or part of the
way to such installation or terminal by Tanker (excluding any crude
oil which is received solely for transshipment for onward
transportation by Tanker to an installation or terminal for receipt
by an Oil Company Party) and which at the time of receipt is
"owned" by an Oil Company Party,
(ii) crude oil and fuel oil not so received but with respect to which an
Oil Company Party has elected, pursuant to Clause V, to be
considered the"owner",
(Iii) crude oil and fuel oil owned by an Oil Company Party but with
respect to which title was transferred at destination to a Person not
an Oil Company Party,
(iv) crude oil and fuel oil at the time when it has been retained on
board a Tanker for a period of six (6) months and which at that
time is owned by an Oil Company Party, together with any such
crude oil and fuel oil retained on board such Tanker on the last day
of each ensuing calendar year thereafter which, at that time, is
owned by an Oil Company Party,
(v) that portion of all crude oil and fuel oil received at a terminal or
other facility, defined in Clause V(A) (5) and (C), in which an Oil
Company Party has an equity interest, equal to that Oil Company
Party's proportional equity interest in said terminal or other facility,
as compared to the equity interest(s) of all Oil Company Parties in
that terminal or other facility and which is not otherwise either
reported or to be reported in the Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts of the Oil
Company Party or any other related or affiliated Oil Company Party,
and
(vi) crude oil and fuel o il, transported by Tanker, in which an Oil
Company Party had t itle at some point after loading and prior to
discharge from the Tanker and which (i) is not included in the
Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts of that Oil Company Party or any other
related or affiliated Oil Company Party by reason of any other
provision of this Paragraph, and/or (ii) had not been sold to another
Oil Company Party.
(B) (1) CRISTAL shall from time to time estimate amounts (hereinafter referred
to as a "Periodic Call") required to assure the capability of the CRISTAL Fund to
make payments in accordance with Clause IV and to meet expenses as described in
Paragraph (A)(I) of this Clause VII.
(2) Contributions to a Periodic Call shall be calculated by dividing the
amount of the Call by the total of the Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts of all the Oil
Company Parties as at the date of the Periodic Call during the calendar year
preceding the year in which the Period ic Call is made, and multiplying the figure so
calculated by the Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts of each Oil Company Party for such
preceding year. For the purpose of these calculations the Crude/Fuel Oil Receipts
shall be the total of the crude oil and fue l oil as defined in Paragraphs (A)(2)(i), (li),
(iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of this Clause VII. .
(3) However, notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Paragraph
(B)(1) and (2) of this Clause VII:
(i) each such Oil Company Party (whether or not it had any
Crude/FuelOil Receipts during such preceding calendar year) shall
pay no less than a minimum Charge determined by CRISTAL
to be reasonable under the circumstances, and
(ii) no Oil Company Party shall be liable to contribute to any payment
of compensation by CRISTAL in respect to any Incident which
occurred before it became a Party to this Contract, and
(Hi) any Oil Company Party which becomes a Party hereto shall pay a
contribution to any Periodic Call made in the calendar year of
joining, subject to the provision of Paragraph (B)(3)(ii) of this
Clause VII, and in no event less than the minimum sum referred to
in Paragraph (B)(3)(i) of this Clause VII.
(C) Upon the Oil Company Parties deciding on a date beyond which claims will
not be accepted under this Contract, any amounts remaining in the CRISTAL Fund,
after t.he settlement ~r other disposition of all claims arising from Incidents
occurrrng. be!ore the said date and the settlement of all costs and expenses relating
to the ~lndlng up of ~RISTAL, shall be equitably distributed among the Oil
Companies that are Parties at the date when CRISTAL is finally dissolved.
Clause VIII.
Notice of Claim
No liability shall arise under Clause IV (A) or (8) (2) unless written notice of
claim is received by CRISTAL within two (2) years of the date of the Incident
giving rise thereto. In the case of a payment to be made under Clause IV (8) (1)
no liability shall arise unless written notice of claim is received by CRISTAL
from an Oil Company Party within one year of the date that payment of the
contribution under Article 10 of the Fund Convention is to be made.
Clause IX.
Rules and Directives
In fulfilling its obligations, in accordance with the terms of this Contract,
RISTAL shall beth~in accordance with these terms of the validity
df any claim made hereunder, except that CRISTAL, for the purposes of Clause
~
(8) (1), will accept the validity of any request for a contribution made by the
undo CRISTAL shall also have the right to make rules and directives from time




This Contract may be amended by resolution adopted at any Regular or
Special Meeting of the Members of CRISTAL upon a vote in which at least
seventy five percent (75%) of the votes cast are in favour of said resolution.
Amendments to this Contract shall apply only in respect of Incidents which
occur after 12.00 hours G.M.T. on the date on which said amendment is




(A) This Contract shall be construed and shall take effect in accordance 1t
with the Laws of England; the Courts of England shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over any matter arising therefrom.
(8) This Contract shall not be construed as creating a trust.
(C) A Party hereto shall not be required to incur any obligation or take any
action which would violate any laws or government regulations which apply to
it or, in the event its stock or shares are owned by another Person, which would
violate any laws or government regulations which apply to said Person.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have entered into this Contract upon
January 14, 1971, or upon such later date as their applications to become
Parties are accepted by CRISTAL.
